P. v. Farmer CA2/8 filed 8/20/26

Filed 8/20/26 P. v. Farmer CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DENNIS FARMER,

Defendant and Appellant.

B337979

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA487955-01)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
Teresa Biagini, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blake Armstrong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Dennis Farmerargues his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at his attempted murder trial. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After Farmer repeatedly shot Emilio Mayes, his fellow resident in a transitional housing building,he was charged with willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code,§§664/187, subd. (a)).It was alleged that in the commission of the offense, Farmer used a handgun within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through(d) and inflicted great bodily injury on Mayes (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
Farmer’s first trial ended with a hung jury and mistrial.On retrial, the jury convicted Farmer as charged and found the special allegations true.Farmer’s total sentence was 14 years to life in state prison.Farmer appeals.
DISCUSSION
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Farmer“ ‘must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’ [Citation.] On direct appeal, a finding of deficient performance is warranted where ‘(1)the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]here counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.’ ” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165 (Johnsen).)
Farmer claims his trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms because counsel failed to cross-examine Mayes “about his drug and alcohol use on the day of the incident and to offer medical testimony on how that affected his ability to perceive and recall.”He contends there could be no satisfactory explanation for failing to cross-examine Mayes on this topic or for failing to present testimony from the trauma surgeon or an expert witness on drug and alcohol use.Farmer argues that because the entire case rested on Mayes’s testimony, the “need to attack [Mayes’s] credibility by exploiting his drug and alcohol use outweighed any possible tactical reason defense counsel could have had for failing to do so.”Therefore, he argues, counsel’s alleged omissions “cannot be explained away as tactical decisions because they were unreasonable.”
The scope of cross-examination and the decision of what witnesses to call are classic examples of tactical decisions given great deference by reviewing courts. “Once an attorney is appointed to represent a client, [they] assume[] the authority and duty to control the proceedings. The scope of this authority extends to matters such as deciding what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or reject, what motions to make, and most other strategic and tactical determinations.” (People v. McKenzie (1983) 34Cal.3d 616, 631, limitedon another ground inPeople v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364–365; see People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 746 [“normally the decision to what extent and how to cross-examine witnesses comes within the wide range of tactical decisions competent counsel must make”]; People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 989 [“The decision whether to call certain witnesses is a ‘matter[ ] of trial tactics and strategy which a reviewing court generally may not second-guess’”].)
We cannot say there could be no satisfactory explanation for failing to cross-examine Mayes about his drug and alcohol use, or for failing to call the trauma surgeon or a defense expert on alcohol and drugs. The basis for this possible line of questioning is the presence of four statements in Mayes’s hospital records, which were marked for identification at Farmer’s first trial but not introduced into evidence at either trial.Two notes indicate Mayes had reported drug and alcohol use on the day of the incident.The notes from the orthopedic consultation performed in the early hours of June 3, 2020, include the statement, “Per patient report in the [emergency department], he had used meth and etoh [alcohol] earlier in the day.”The surgical report for the June 3, 2020 surgery states Mayes “had previously used meth and was drinking alcohol during the day.”The other two statements relate to a June 15, 2020 psychosocial assessment in preparation for Mayes’s discharge.The social worker’s notes from that assessment include an entry that reads, “Patient denies Substance Abuse history,”and a statement that Mayes was assessed for substance use and denied using drugs.
The two statements about Mayes’s drug and alcohol use on the day of the incident in the medical records were vague as to time—“earlier in the day” and “during the day.”Given that the 911 call was placed at 11:14 p.m.,“earlier in the day” could encompass up to 23 hours. The statements also included no information about the quantity of either alcohol or methamphetamine used by Mayes. Without evidence of how much of these substances Mayes used and when he took them, counsel could easily have concluded this evidence was insufficient to lead to meaningful medical expert testimonyabout possible impairment of Mayes’s abilities to perceive and recall. Testimony from the trauma surgeon, moreover, would have run the risk of strengthening the prosecution’s case for the sentencing enhancements alleging great bodily injury, and counsel may have concluded that the value likely to be yielded by inquiring into the very limited evidence of drug and alcohol use was not worth the risk of the other damaging evidence this witness could provide.
Similarly, trial counsel could reasonably have concluded that cross-examining Mayes on the brief references in the medical records to drug and alcohol use in some unidentified amount and at an unspecified time during the daywas unlikely to significantly undermine Mayes’s credibility and risked alienating the jury, particularly given that Mayes and Farmer knew each other—they lived in the same transitional housing residence and got along well—and Mayes consistently and emphatically identified Farmer as the person who had shot him.
Moreover, defense counsel already had a wealth of material for cross-examination and a theory that made Mayes’s perception and recall abilities irrelevant. Mayes presented himself as a respectful, religious man who was focused on helping others, looked after his neighbors, spent his free time cleaning up the streets in his community, fed the homeless, and bore no ill will or animosity toward Farmer for shooting him.Defense counsel cross-examined Mayes thoroughly about hisrecent prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, eliciting Mayes’s admissions thatthis conviction arose from an incident in which he jumped into a woman’s car, drove away at a high rate of speed while she was hanging out the car window, used a metal pipe and a belt to fight a bystander who attempted to intervene, locked himself inside a nearby business, and then fled, breaking a glass door in the process.Indeed, in closing argument, defense counsel caricatured Mayes as a self-proclaimed saint, argued extensively that he could not be trusted, exhorted the jury not to believe Mayes’s testimony, and accused Mayes of “lying about the whole thing.”Whether Mayes’s perception or memory could have been impacted by the substances he used at an unknown time of day in an unknown quantity was beside the point when the defense theory was that Mayes deliberately fabricated the entire account.
As a general rule, ineffective assistanceof counsel claims are more suited to petitions for habeas corpus than direct appeals. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–267 [a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to “ ‘ “why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged” ’ . . . is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding”].) This case is no exception. Because the record does not affirmatively disclose counsel had no rational tactical purpose for these choices, and we cannot say there could be no satisfactory reason for failing to cross-examine Mayes,call the trauma surgeon as a witness, or present a medical expert’s testimony on drug and alcohol use, Farmer’s claim must be denied on direct appeal. (See Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p.1165.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

VIRAMONTES, J.SCHERB, J.