P. v. King CA2/3 filed 8/11/26

Filed 8/11/26 P. v. King CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AUNDRA LIONELL KING,

Defendant and Appellant.

B339341

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CMCF00116)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Sean Coen, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Michael Reed for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Appellant Aundra Lionell King appeals his conviction forgrand theft.King challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the grand theft conviction, the admissibility of witness testimony regarding the value of the stolen items, and the failure to instruct on the value of the stolen items. He also claims cumulative error.We reject King’s claims and affirm the judgment but order the clerk of the superior court to correct the abstract of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.Facts
A.September 24, 2023 incident
On September 24, 2023, King jumped the backyard fence ofthe home of Phyllis and Mallory Funches in Gardena, California,and broke into their backyard storage shed.Kingbroke the lock, pried open the door, and removed several items including a toolbox containing various tools and a powerweedwhacker. The incident was caught on a surveillance video taken by a neighboring electrical company. Mallory Funches was givena still shot from the surveillance video, and recognized King from having seen him around the neighborhood. Mallory Funches approached King with the photo. King admitted he was the person in the photo and told MalloryFunches that he no longer had possession of the stolen items but would attempt to “make things right.” King did not return the items.
B. December 25, 2023 incident
On the evening of December 25, 2023, King broke into the warehouse of Pro Design Group, a plastic manufacturing facility in Gardena, California. Over a period of eight hours, King stole approximately 12 to16 wheels from the warehouse.King also damaged the business’ front gate, which cost a “couple hundred dollars” to repair. The incident was captured by Pro Design Group’s motion activated cameras.
Margarita Garcia Orozco, an office manager at Pro Design Group, testifiedabout the stolen wheels. Orozco testified that approximately 12 wheels were stolen from the warehouse. From the surveillance footage, Orozco identified King as the individual who took the wheels.
Orozco testified that she had worked at Pro Design Group for four years, and her job responsibilities included accounting, accounts payable, accounts receivable, and payroll. She stated that related to her job duties she was familiar with the warehouse inventory and with the production of plastic products for wheels.
According to Orozco, each wheel was worth “around $200.”Pro Design Group used the wheels for testing purposes but did not manufacture or sell wheels.On cross-examination, Orozcoexplained that the wheels were factory seconds provided by a customer. The wheels were used to determine the correct dimensions of the plastic productsthat Pro Design Group produced.She confirmed that factory seconds usually had some sort of manufacturing defect, which would typically affect the value of the wheel. However, she did not change her estimation of the value of the wheels.
Darrin Olsen, the Chief Operating Officer and a partial owner of Pro Design Group,also testified regarding the value of the stolen wheels.Olsen testified that he was familiar with the warehouse inventory and approximately 16 wheels were stolen from the warehouse. He explained that thewheels were used for quality checking the wheel dunnage the company manufactured for a wheel company. When asked the value of each wheel he replied, “estimated $200, $400 each. Maybe I – honestly I couldn’t tell you exactly.”
II. Procedure
On April 17, 2024, a jury convicted King of one count of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 2),one count of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a); count 3), and one count of vandalism under $400 (§ 594, subd. (a); count 4). The court declared a mistrial as to the additional count of second degree burglary (§459; count 1) related to the September 24, 2023 incident. King pleaded no contest to this charge.
OnMay 15, 2024, the trial court imposed three years on count 2 and a consecutive one year on count 4. The court imposed a concurrent term of two years on count 1. The court imposed and stayed two years on count 3 under section 654.
The court found King in violation of his probation for cases TA157309, TA157608, and TA158129, based on the convictions in the underlying case.The court imposed consecutive terms of eight months on each probation case.For all four cases, the aggregate term was six years.
DISCUSSION
I.Sufficiency of the evidence
King challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the grand theft conviction. Specifically, he asserts that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding that the value of the stolen items exceeded $950. We disagree.
Standard of review
In determining a sufficiencyof the evidence challenge, we “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment . . . to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26Cal.3d557, 578.) “The focus of the substantial evidence test is on the whole record of evidence presented to the trier of fact, rather than on ‘ “isolated bits of evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261, italics omitted.) “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) In other words, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055, italics omitted.)
Analysis
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s grand theft conviction. Two witnesses testified that the value of the stolen wheels exceeded $950, the minimum amount required for grand theft. Olsen, a partial owner of Pro Design Group and its Chief Operating Officer, testified that King stole approximately 16 wheels, which he estimated were valued at $200 to $400 each. Based on Olsen’s lower estimation, the value of the stolen items totaled $3,200, which far exceeded the required minimum.
Even though Olsen admitted that he did not know the exact value of the stolen wheels, he was materially consistent with Orozco. With four years of experience as an office manager at Pro Design Group, Orozco was familiar with the contents of the warehouse, and was responsible for accounting, accounts payable, and accounts receivable. According to Orozco, King took approximately 12 wheels from the warehouse. She estimated that each wheel was worth around $200. Based on her estimation, the value of the stolen property totaled $2,400, which also exceeded the required minimum. “The testimony of just one witness is enough to sustain a conviction, so long as that testimony is not inherently incredible. [Citation.]” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.) Here, neither witness’ testimony regarding the value of the wheels was “ ‘so inherentlyincredible, so contrary to the teachings of basic human experience, so completely at odds with ordinary common sense, that no reasonable person would believe it beyond a reasonable doubt.’[Citation.]” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 996.) Based on the testimony of Olsen and Orozco and the lack of any conflicting evidence, a rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the stolen wheels were worth more than $950.
Personal knowledge of witnesses
King argues that the courtshould have excluded Olsen’s and Orozco’stestimony as unreliable because neitherhad sufficient personal knowledge of the value of the wheels, as required under Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a). We disagree.
Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a) states that “the testimony of a witness [at trial] concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless [the witness] has personalknowledge of the matter.” Personalknowledgemeans a present recollection of an impression derived from the exercise of thewitness’sown senses. (People v. St. Andrew(1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 450, 458.)When a witness’spersonalknowledge is in question, the trial court must make a preliminary determination of whether “there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding” that the witness has the requisite knowledge. (Evid.Code, § 403, subd. (a)(2).) The trial court may exclude testimony for lack of personalknowledge “ ‘only if no jury could reasonably find that [the witness] has such knowledge.’ ” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 573.) Thus, “[a] witness challenged for lack of personalknowledgemust . . . be allowed to testify if there is evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that the witness accurately perceived and recollected the testimonial events. Once that threshold is passed, it is for the jury to decide whether the witness’s perceptions and recollections are credible. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 574.)
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s determination of this issue for abuse of discretion.(People v. Tatum (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 288, 298.)
King argues Orozco did not have personal knowledge of the value of the wheels because Pro Design Group did not buy or sell them.We reject King’s argument that personal knowledge of the value of the wheels required involvement in buying or selling them or ownership of them. The evidence does not show a lack of the requisite knowledge.As stated earlier, Orozco testified that her job responsibilities included accounting, accounts payable, and accounts receivable. She was familiar with the inventory of the warehouse and with Pro Design Group’s process of producing plastic productsfor awheel company. Orozco acknowledged that the value of the wheels could be affected by being factory seconds, but she did not change her original estimation.This record established that Orozco had personal knowledge of the value of the wheels that were in the company’s possession and were used in itsmanufacturing process. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Orozco’s testimony.
We also reject King’s claim that Olsen’s testimony was “speculative and irrelevant because it was not based on his personal knowledge.”As stated earlier, Olsen was a partial owner and Chief Operating Officer of Pro Design Group. He was familiar with the day-to-day operations, manufacturing process, and inventory of the company. Again, we recognize that Olsen admitted he did not know the exact value of each wheel. But he provided an approximate value which corresponded to the value Orozco provided. Considering the scope and responsibilities of Olsen’s position, the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Olsen to testify. Any doubts about Olsen’s knowledge were appropriately left for the jury to decide. (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 735) [“Generally, ‘doubts about the credibility of [an] in-court witness should be left for the jury’s resolution.’”]
2. CALJIC No. 14.26
King argues that the trial court erred by declining to instruct with CALJIC No. 14.26, which informs the jury that thevalue of stolen property is based on its fair market value. The Attorney General concedes. We need not decide whether the trial’s refusal to instruct was error. Even assuming it was error, it was harmless under eitherPeople v.Watson(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 or Chapmanv. California(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).
CALJIC No. 14.26is based on section 484, subdivision (a). CALJIC No. 14.26 states, “When the value of property alleged to have been taken by theft must be determined, the reasonable and fair market value at the time and in the locality of the theft shall be the test.”CALJIC No. 14.26 appears to set the fair market value of property as the defaultwhen its valuation has not otherwise been specified by statute. (See e.g., §491 [companion animals];§ 492 [written instruments]; § 493 [passage tickets].)
As stated,Olsen and Orozco both testified that the value of each stolen wheelwas at least $200. The testimonies of Orozco and Olsen were the only evidence in the record relating to the value of the wheels. CALJIC No. 14.26 would have only directed the jury to consider their testimony as the fair market value of the wheels. (See People v. Tijerina (1969) 1 Cal.3d 41, 45 [“[i]n the absence of proof . . . that the price charged by a retail store from which merchandise is stolen does not accurately reflect the value of the merchandise in the retail market, that price is sufficient to establish the value of the merchandise . . . .”].) It would not have directed the jury to reduce the value provided by Olsen and Orozco, absent evidence to support such a reduction. “‘[F]air market value’ means the highest price obtainable in the market rather than the lowest price or the average price.” (People v. Pena (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 100, 104.)
King argues that by failing to instruct with CALJIC No. 14.26, the trial court deprived the jury of the criteria they should have used to analyze the fair market value of the stolen items.But King misreads CALJIC No. 14.26. CALJIC No. 14.26 defines fair market value as “the highest price, in cash, for which the property would have sold in the open market at that time and in that locality, (1) if the owner was desirous of selling, but under no urgent necessity to do so; (2) if the buyer was desirous of buying but under no urgent necessity to do so; (3) if the seller had a reasonable time within which to find a purchaser; and (4) if the buyer had knowledge of the character of the property and of the uses to which it might be put.”Thefour conditionslisted in CALJIC No. 14.26do not comprise criteria to assess or challenge evidence about the stolen property’s value. They are theconditions that would provide the “highest price . . . for which the property would have been sold in the open market” at the time.(Ibid.) The conditions eliminate variables which might reduce the value of the property, such as urgency, desperation, or coercionto buy or sell, or lack of knowledge about the property which might dupe a potential buyer into paying a higher price.
The questions King now poses—how did Olsen and Orozco know what an owner would receive if he sold the wheels or what a buyer would pay if he was desirous of buying them—are not questions that would arise from reading CALJIC No. 14.26. Rather, they are questions contemplated by CALJIC No. 14.27, which the trial court read to the jury.CALJIC No. 14.27 guides jurors to evaluate the opinion of an owner who testifies to the value of the property, including an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the reasons on which it is based. King had the opportunity to challenge the bases of Orozco’s and Olsen’s opinions. For example, King asked Orozco about whether the condition of the wheels as factory seconds could affect their value. She acknowledged it could, but she did not change her valuation that each was worth $200. Olsen candidly admitted that he could not be more precise than the estimated range of $200 to $400 for each wheel.CALJIC No. 14.27 instructed the jury to consider these facts, along with Orozco’s and Olsen’s qualificationsand other testimony, to accept or disregard their opinions.
We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s denial of King’s request to instruct with CALJIC No. 14.26 did not contribute to the guilty verdict because the only evidence in the record about the stolen property’s value supported that it exceeded $950 and CALJIC No. 14.26 would have merely directed the jury tovalue the stolen property atits fair market valueat the time of the theft, rather than evaluate or challengethe evidence related to the property’s value asinstructed in CALJIC No. 14.27.(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)
3. Cumulative prejudice
King contends that the cumulative prejudice from the multiple errors requires reversal.But King cannot demonstrate that the cumulative effect of any alleged error resulted in prejudice. We havedetermined that no errors were made by the trial court. Because the one error we assumed for the sake of argument was harmless,we conclude reversal is not required. (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 348.)
4. Abstract of judgment
Both parties agree that the abstract of judgment erroneously states that King’s convictions forcounts 2 and 3 were the result of guilty pleas.We order the clerk of the superior court to amendItem No. 1 on theabstract of judgment toreflect thatfor counts 2 and 3, King was convicted by jury.
DISPOSITION
We order the clerk of the superior court to amend theabstract of judgment to reflect in Item No. 1 that forcounts 2and3, King was convicted by jury.
In all other aspects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

OCHOA, J.*