P. v. Stafford

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Filed 12/5/06 P. v. Stafford CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Glenn)
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THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHARLES ANTHONY STAFFORD,
Defendant and Appellant.
C051859
(Super. Ct. No.
05SCR02288)
Defendant Charles Anthony Stafford was employed as a handyman
at a residence. While the occupants were absent, defendant went
into the residence and stole seven valuable handguns. He was
charged with first degree burglary and seven counts of grand theft
of a firearm. It was further alleged that he had a prior serious
felony conviction within the meaning of the “three strikes law.”
Defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to grand theft
of a firearm, admitted having a prior serious felony conviction,
entered a Harvey waiver allowing the court to consider, for purposes

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of sentencing, the facts of the other charges (People v. Harvey
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 754), and acknowledged that his plea and admission
exposed him to a maximum prison term of six years.
In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced
to a state prison term of six years (the upper term of three years
doubled pursuant to the three strikes law).
On appeal, defendant claims that imposition of the upper term
violated his constitutional rights to a jury trial and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)
530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435] (hereafter Apprendi) and Blakely v.
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403] (hereafter Blakely).
In Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at page 490 [147 L.Ed.2d at p. 455], the
United States Supreme Court held that a defendant in a criminal case
is entitled to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt with
respect to any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum. In Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 303-305 [159 L.Ed.2d
at pp. 413-414], the court held that for this purpose the “statutory
maximum” is the maximum sentence that may be imposed solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict or admitted by
the defendant.
The People assert, among other things, that defendant forfeited
his claim of error when he entered his plea with the agreement that
it exposed him to the upper term, doubled by the three strikes law.
We need not address the forfeiture argument because defendant’s
claim of error fails for two separate reasons.

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In People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238, the California
Supreme Court held that the upper term in our state’s determinate
sentencing scheme is the “statutory maximum” for purposes of the
rule of Apprendi and Blakely. Unless the United States Supreme
Court decides otherwise, we are bound by the decision in People v.
Black, supra. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
In any event, the United States Supreme Court has expressly
excluded from the application of the rule of Apprendi and Blakely
the consideration of a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing.
(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490 [147 L.Ed.2d at p. 455]; see
also United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, 230-231 [160
L.Ed.2d 621, 641-642].)
Here, in selecting the upper term, the trial court cited
defendant’s criminal history as one of the aggravating factors
supporting that term. Indeed, defendant’s criminal history is
dismal. The probation report identifies a plethora of prior
misdemeanor convictions and a substantial number of prior felony
convictions. The convictions were based on conduct at different
times and places. They reflect a virtually continuous refusal
to abide by the law.
Since defendant’s prior convictions were not subject to the
rule of Apprendi and Blakely and were sufficient to expose him
to the upper term, the court’s consideration of other factors as
well does not require reversal of the judgment. A single factor
in aggravation is sufficient to support the imposition of the
upper term. (People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 433.)

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Accordingly, one properly determined factor in aggravation is
legally sufficient to expose the defendant to imposition of the
upper term. This is sufficient to satisfy the rule of Apprendi
and Blakely.
The judgment is affirmed.
SCOTLAND , P.J.
We concur:
BLEASE , J.
MORRISON , J.

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