P. v. Super. Ct. (Sparks)

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Filed 6/6/08 P. v. Super. Ct. (Sparks) CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
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THE PEOPLE,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF YUBA COUNTY,
Respondent;
DUSTIN WILLIAM SPARKS,
Real Party in Interest.
C057766
(Super. Ct. No. CFR0600126)
In this writ proceeding, we resolve whether respondent (the
superior court) properly ruled that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel precluded petitioner (the People) from trying real
party in interest (Dustin William Sparks) for felony murder
based on a plan to steal marijuana plants that resulted in the
killing of two people. The superior court’s ruling was based on
the fact that separate juries in separate trials found that two
others who also were involved in the plan to steal marijuana
(Michael Huggins and Matthew Griffin) were either not guilty of

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any crimes, including felony murder, or guilty only of the
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
We hold that the superior court erred in its ruling. As we
will explain, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply
here where Sparks’s alleged guilt is not premised solely on
vicarious liability and the evidence to be introduced at his
trial is different than the evidence in the other two trials.
We therefore grant the People’s petition for a writ of mandate
to compel the superior court to vacate its order barring the
People from trying Sparks for crimes greater than voluntary
manslaughter.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In separate pleadings, the People charged Huggins, Griffin,
and Sparks each with two counts of felony murder. Griffin was
acquitted and Huggins was found guilty of two counts of
voluntary manslaughter with attached enhancements for personal
use of a firearm. Sparks has yet to go to trial.
The evidence at Huggins’s trial, of which we have taken
judicial notice, showed the following:
In September 2005, Huggins lived in a house in Antelope
with his girlfriend, Angelic Rampone, Matthew Griffin, and
Griffin’s girlfriend, Amy Butler. Levill Hill would sometimes
spend the night at the house.
In the house one day there was a discussion in which Butler
told Griffin, Huggins, Rampone, and Hill that she knew of a
house in Olivehurst where they could steal marijuana plants.
The Olivehurst house belonged to Michael Hance. In back of the

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Olivehurst house was a trailer occupied by two men who had gone
to school with Butler -- Scott Davis and Michael Hance’s son,
Christopher Hance. Davis lived rent free in the trailer in
exchange for guarding marijuana plants that were on the
property.
One evening in the beginning of September 2005, Butler,
Griffin, Huggins, Rampone, and Hill drove to the Olivehurst
house but decided not to steal the marijuana plants at that
time. Later, Huggins, Griffin, and Butler talked about
returning to the Olivehurst house, tying “the boys up,” and
trying to steal the marijuana plants. Butler said she wanted
nothing more to do with the plan.
In the early morning of September 27, Huggins, Rampone,
Hill, and Griffin drove back to the Olivehurst house. En route,
they picked up Huggins’s cousin, Sparks. When they got to the
Olivehurst house, they parked the car, and Huggins, Sparks,
Griffin, and Hill got out. Huggins had a .45-caliber pistol and
Sparks had a toy gun that looked real. Hill was handed duct
tape and Griffin rope “just in case” they needed to tie anybody
up. Hill threw the duct tape back inside the car. They all
then walked past the house and decided that none of them were
going to go ahead with the plan to steal marijuana. They then
split up in two groups -- Huggins and Sparks ahead and Hill and
Griffin behind -- and all headed back toward the Olivehurst
house.

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When they got to the house, however, Huggins kneeled down
between the south and north gate to the house. Sparks stood
right by Huggins. Hill and Griffin walked by them, and Hill
asked what they were doing. Huggins replied, “‘We’re going to
do it.’” Hill responded, “‘No, you’re not.’” Hill and Griffin
then walked away. In Hill’s view, he and Griffin abandoned the
plan, but Huggins and Sparks did not.
Huggins walked through the gate to the side of the house.
Sparks stayed at the gate. While Sparks was at the gate,
someone hit him.
After Sparks was hit, Hill heard a gunshot. Hill and
Griffin ran back to the car. Sparks and Huggins followed. They
drove back to the Antelope house.
Michael Hance was home at the time of the shooting and
described what he heard and saw. He was in the house talking
with his son while Davis was sleeping in the trailer. Michael
and Christopher Hance heard one of the gates open, so
Christopher went out to investigate. Michael Hance then heard
“scuffling” “between the two gates” and heard a shot.
Michael Hance ran outside and saw Huggins go into the
trailer, heard “some yelling,” and then “a shot or two” inside
the trailer. As Michael Hance started going toward the trailer,
Christopher Hance, Huggins, and Davis “poured out” of the
trailer. Davis, who was holding his neck, fell to the ground.
Michael Hance called 911. When police arrived, they found
Davis dead. Christopher Hance was bleeding profusely from his
lower abdomen and right leg and died from blood loss.

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Based on this and other evidence introduced at trial, the
jury in Huggins’s case was instructed on felony murder with the
underlying felony being robbery or burglary or attempted robbery
or burglary and on voluntary manslaughter based on intent to
kill or conscious disregard for life. The jury found Huggins
guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter while personally
using a firearm.
As a result of this verdict and a not guilty verdict in
Griffin’s case, Sparks filed a motion to preclude the People
from trying him for any crimes greater than voluntary
manslaughter, arguing that collateral estoppel prevented them
from relitigating issues previously decided in Huggins’s and
Griffin’s trials.
The People opposed the motion, arguing there was evidence
excluded from both of those trials that could come in during
Sparks’s trial. This evidence included statements made by
Sparks during a police interview. In that interview, Sparks
initially explained that he, Huggins, Griffin, and Hill all
planned to participate in stealing the marijuana with his role
being to “grab the plants.” When they got to the street,
Griffin got scared, “punk[ed] out,” and went back to the car.1
Sparks and Huggins stood by the gate. Huggins went onto the
property. As Sparks was standing outside the gate, he was
confronted by someone wanting to know who he was, leading to a
1 Sparks also “didn’t want to do it,” but apparently never
communicated that to Huggins or anybody else.

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short physical altercation. Sparks then heard gunshots and ran
back to the car. When Huggins returned to the car, he said to
Sparks, “[W]here the Fuck were you a[t] Dustin?” Not wanting
Huggins to think he “just punked out,” Sparks said that he got
into a fight.
Despite this other evidence, the superior court granted
Sparks’s motion, ruling that “the People are collaterally
estopped from pursuing a conviction for homicide [against
Sparks] . . . on the basis [that] the homicides allegedly
occurred during the commission of a robbery, burglary, or an
attempt of either crime.”
The People filed a petition for a writ of mandate and an
application for a stay of Sparks’s trial, seeking to compel the
superior court to vacate its order barring them from trying
Sparks for felony murder. We issued an alternative writ and
stayed Sparks’s trial.
DISCUSSION
In a well written petition, the People contend that the
superior court erred in precluding them from trying Sparks for
felony murder based on collateral estoppel. We agree.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from
relitigating matters litigated and decided in a prior
proceeding. (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 477.) The
doctrine can apply if: (1) the issue is identical to the one
which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the prior proceedings
resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in

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privity with a party at the previous proceedings. (People v.
Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 691.) The issue of whether
collateral estoppel applies is a question of law that we review
de novo. (Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
593, 618.)
Relying on Taylor, the superior court found that collateral
estoppel applied here because it would preclude a “third trial
on these same facts” and would prevent inconsistent judgments,
“eliminat[ing] the risk of undermining the integrity of the
justice system.”
Contrary to the superior court’s reasoning, Taylor does not
apply. “Taylor expressly limited the application of the
doctrine to ‘the particular circumstances of the instant case
where an accused’s guilt must be predicated on his vicarious
liability for the acts of a previously acquit[t]ed
confederate.’” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 163,
quoting People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 698.) Taylor
also impliedly limited application of the doctrine to situations
in which there were no “differences in evidence” at the trials.2
(Taylor, at p. 698.)
2 The Taylor court stated: “It is unlikely that the
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the case
at bar will result in spreading the effects of a possibly
erroneous acquittal, the third of the reasons urged for not
relaxing the identity-of-parties requirement. Contrary to the
contention of the People the inconsistency in the results of
[another defendant’s] trial and defendant’s trial cannot be
explained by differences in evidence or jury instructions.”
(People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 698, fns. omitted.)

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Here, Sparks’s culpability was neither based solely on
vicarious liability nor limited to the evidence at Huggins’s or
Griffin’s trials. As to Sparks’s own involvement in the crimes,
there was evidence that he decided to go ahead with the plan to
steal marijuana and he was involved in an attempted burglary or
robbery. After Griffin and Hill ran back to the car, Sparks
remained by the gate and got into a scuffle with another person,
likely Christopher Hance. Sparks’s statements made during a
police interview, evidence that was not introduced at Huggins’s
or Griffin’s trials, further explained Sparks’s involvement.
Sparks told police that when he was standing outside the gate he
was confronted by someone wanting to know who he was, and there
was a short physical altercation before the gun was fired. His
statements also indicate he never communicated to Huggins that
he did not want to go through with the plan, which was apparent
on Huggins’s return to the car when he asked Sparks, “[W]here
the Fuck were you a[t] Dustin?”3 Based on the foregoing evidence
3 Sparks contends that his statements made to police officers
were inadmissible because the corpus delicti rule is not
satisfied here. He is wrong.
The corpus delicti rule requires proof by independent
evidence of “the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the
existence of a criminal agency as its cause.” (People v.
Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168.) “The independent proof
may be circumstantial and need not be beyond a reasonable doubt,
but is sufficient if it permits an inference of criminal
conduct.” (Id. at p. 1171.) “There is no requirement of
independent evidence ‘of every physical act constituting an
element of an offense,’ so long as there is some slight or prima

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of Sparks’s involvement, this is not a case like Taylor “where
an accused’s guilt [is] predicated on his vicarious liability
for the acts of a previously acquit[t]ed confederate” (People v.
Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 698) or a case in which the
evidence presented at the other trials is identical to the
evidence that implicates the defendant remaining to be tried.
Collateral estoppel therefore does not limit the People from
trying Sparks for crimes greater than those for which Huggins
was convicted or for crimes of which Griffin was acquitted.
DISPOSITION
The petition is granted. Let a peremptory writ issue
directing the superior court to: (1) vacate its order
precluding the People from trying defendant Sparks for felony
facie showing of injury, loss, or harm by a criminal agency.”
(Ibid.)
Here, leaving aside Sparks’s statements to police officers
about his involvement in the crimes, the evidence tended to show
the following: Sparks and others planned to steal marijuana at
the Olivehurst property. On arrival, Sparks stayed by the gate
and was hit by someone during a scuffle. Huggins meanwhile went
into the trailer where Scott Davis was residing, and when they
emerged, Christopher Hance and Davis were mortally wounded.
These facts satisfied the People’s burden to make “some slight
or prima facie” showing of “injury, loss, or harm by a criminal
agency.” (People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)

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murder; and (2) enter a new order denying Sparks’s motion to
preclude the People from trying him for any crime greater than
voluntary manslaughter. Upon finality of this opinion, the stay
previously issued is vacated.
ROBIE , J.
We concur:
RAYE , Acting P.J.
MORRISON , J.

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