P. v. Mendez

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Filed 2/28/07 P. v. Mendez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LETICIA MARIE MENDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
E040413
(Super.Ct.No. FSB054013)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. W. Robert Fawke,
Judge. Affirmed.
Anna M. Jauregui, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Scott C. Taylor, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of child
endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)).1 In return, the remaining two counts of
child endangerment were dismissed, and defendant was placed on probation on various
terms and conditions. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the probation condition
requiring her to keep the probation officer informed of whether she owns any pets is
invalid; and (2) the probation condition requiring her to submit to and cooperate in field
interrogations is overly broad and infringes upon her constitutional rights. We reject
these contentions and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
On January 18, 2006, San Bernardino County Sheriff’s deputies executed a search
warrant at defendant’s residence. Inside the home, deputies found marijuana,
methamphetamine, and a smoking pipe within access and reach of defendant’s three
young children. Deputies also found a homemade water “bong” next to a bench marked
“timeout” inside the garage.
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
2 The factual background is taken from the probation report.

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II
DISCUSSION
A. Pet Condition
At sentencing, defense counsel asked that the trial court strike the word “pets”
from probation condition No. 7 on the grounds that it was unconstitutional and
overbroad. The court denied that request.
Condition No. 7 specifically provides that defendant “[k]eep the probation officer
informed of place of residence, cohabitants and pets, and give written notice to the
probation officer twenty-four (24) hours prior to any changes. Prior to any move provide
written authorization to the Post Office to forward mail to the new address.” (Italics
added.)
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to
strike the pet condition because the condition is not reasonably related to her crime or
future criminality, and it is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. We disagree.
“‘The primary goal of probation is to ensure ‘[t]he safety of the public . . . through
the enforcement of court-ordered conditions of probation.’ [Citation.] [C]onditions of
probation ‘are routinely imposed when the sentencing court determines, in an exercise of
its discretion, that a defendant who is statutorily eligible for probation is also suitable to
receive it.’ [Citation.] In the granting of probation, the Legislature has declared the
primary considerations to be: ‘the nature of the offense; the interests of justice, including
punishment, reintegration of the offender into the community, and enforcement of
conditions of probation; the loss to the victim; and the needs of the defendant.’

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[Citation.] [¶] In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions
to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.
[Citations.] ‘The court may impose and require . . . [such] reasonable conditions[] as it
may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends
may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person
resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and
rehabilitation of the probationer.’ [Citation.] The trial court’s discretion, although broad,
nevertheless is not without limits: a condition of probation must serve a purpose specified
in the statute. In addition, . . . Penal Code section 1203.1 . . . require[s] that probation
conditions which regulate conduct ‘not itself criminal’ be ‘reasonably related to the crime
of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120-1121; see also § 1203.1; People v. Welch (1993)
5 Cal.4th 228, 233; People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678, 682-683.)
While pet ownership is not in itself criminal, it is reasonably related to the
supervision of a probationer and in some respect to child endangerment, and hence to
defendant’s future criminality.
“‘[C]onditions of probation that impinge on constitutional rights must be tailored
carefully and “reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and
rehabilitation . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Byron B. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th
1013, 1016 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two], quoting People v. Delvalle (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th
869, 879, quoting People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759, 768 (dis. opn. of Peters, J.).)
However, there is no constitutional right to keep a pet. (See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside

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Village Condominium Assn. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 361, 388.) A fortiori, there is no
constitutional right to keep a pet without telling your probation officer.3
Absent any such constitutional concerns, “[a]n adult probation condition is
unreasonable if ‘it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was
convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids
conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (In re Byron B., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016, quoting People v. Lent
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted, quoting People v. Dominguez (1967) 256
Cal.App.2d 623, 627.) “As with any exercise of discretion, the sentencing court violates
this standard when its determination is arbitrary or capricious or ‘“‘exceeds the bounds of
reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.)
“[Probation conditions] are meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of
genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at
large. [Citation.] These same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to
assure that the restrictions are in fact observed. Recent research suggests that more
intensive supervision can reduce recidivism, [citation], and the importance of supervision
has grown as probation has become an increasingly common sentence for those convicted
of serious crimes, [citation].” (Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 875 [97
3 Arguably, if keeping the pet was, in itself, a crime, such a requirement
might violate the right against self-incrimination. This, however, is not the thrust of
defendant’s argument.

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L.Ed.2d 709, 107 S.Ct. 3164].) A probation condition therefore may be deemed
reasonable if it “enable[s] the [probation] department to supervise compliance with the
specific conditions of probation.” (People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238,
1240.)
A probation officer may need to visit a probationer’s home unannounced. Here,
for example, defendant’s probation conditions required her to “[s]ubmit to a search . . . of
your . . . residence . . . at any time of the day or night . . . .” Knowing, in advance, what
animals are in the probationer’s home is reasonably related to the safety of the probation
officer.
While some pets are so innocuous that they could not possibly interfere with a
probation officer’s performance of his or her duties (see, e.g.,
<http://www.cuteoverload.com>, as of Feb. 7, 2007), it is perfectly reasonable for the
trial court not to be more specific as to species, breed, or temperament. Animals can be
unpredictable, particularly when confronted by a stranger in what they consider to be
their own territory. Ask any letter carrier. Or ask any professional animal trainer -- they
have a saying: “[A]nything with a mouth bites.” (Sutherland, Kicked, Bitten and
Scratched (2006) p. 63.)
Moreover, a probation officer is entitled to some protection against undue surprise.
A trial court drafting probation conditions in the abstract might not think to include a
parrot among the pets that must be disclosed; presumably, however, a probation officer
would appreciate being warned that that voice in another room may just be a bird.
Likewise, any probation officer who has to open a closet or reach under a bed during a

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search would no doubt like to know ahead of time whether the probationer keeps
snakes -- regardless of whether the snakes are venomous.
Even assuming the challenged condition could have been more narrowly tailored,
that does not render it invalid; rather, it simply must not exceed the bounds of reason. It
not unreasonable to put the burden on the probationer to tell the probation officer what
animals may be present. The probation officer can then decide what precautions to take.
The challenged condition does not prevent the probationer from owning a pet of any
kind. It does not even require approval of the pet. It simply requires notice to the
probation officer. This is amply within the bounds of reason.
Significantly, defendant does not challenge the probation condition that required
her to keep the probation officer informed of her cohabitants. This condition serves the
salutary, rehabilitative purpose of preventing defendant from associating with those who
might lead her into criminal behavior. Defendant does not seem to think this condition
had to be more narrowly drawn so as to require defendant to report only cohabitants who
are gang members, drug users, or known felons. It is just as reasonable to require
defendant to report all of her pets as it is to require her to report all of her cohabitants.
“[A] probation condition also may be challenged as excessively vague.” (In re
Byron B., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.) Any ambiguity in a probation condition
can be dispelled when, at the time probation is granted, the defendant is advised of the
condition. (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 610, fn. 7.) “Oral advice at the time
of sentencing . . . afford[s] defendants the opportunity to clarify any conditions they may
not understand and intelligently to exercise the right to reject probation granted on

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conditions deemed too onerous.” (Ibid.) Here, at sentencing, defense counsel objected
that the challenged condition was “unconstitutional” and “overbroad.” He did not object
that it was vague; he did not request any clarification. Thus, defendant waived any
objection that it was vague or ambiguous. In any event, defense counsel clarified for the
court that he had gone over all of the terms and conditions of probation with defendant
and that defendant had indicated to counsel that she understood them and was willing to
accept them. In addition, the term is not sufficiently vague to require that it be stricken.
All that is necessary is that the condition be reasonable under all the circumstances. This
condition here meets this requirement.
B. Field Interrogation Condition
At sentencing, defense counsel also objected to probation condition No. 19, which
requires defendant to “[s]ubmit to and cooperate in a field interrogation by any peace
officer at any time of the day or night,” as “unconstitutional[,] overbroad and
overburdensome.” The court denied the request to strike this condition as well.
Defendant contends this probation is unreasonable, is overbroad, and violates her
constitutional rights against self-incrimination, personal privacy, and liberty.4 We
disagree.
As described above, trial courts have broad discretion in determining what
conditions of probation will aid the reformation and rehabilitation of the defendant.
4 We reject the People’s contention that defendant waived this issue on
appeal for failing to specifically object on the grounds that it was unreasonable and in
[footnote continued on next page]

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(§ 1203.1; People v. Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1120-1121.) Again, a condition
will not be held invalid unless it has no relationship to the crime of which the defendant
is convicted, relates to conduct which is not itself criminal, and requires or forbids
conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. (People v. Lent, supra, 15
Cal.3d at p. 486.) All three factors must be present for a condition of probation to be
invalid. (People v. Wardlow (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 360, 366.)
Defendant’s concern that the field interrogation condition is overly broad and
serves no legitimate purpose is not well founded. Like the standard probation search
condition, a field interrogation probation condition is a correctional tool that can be used
to determine whether the defendant is complying with the terms of his or her probation or
disobeying the law. (See People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 752 [purpose of an
unexpected search is to determine not only whether parolee disobeys the law, a basic
condition of parole, but also whether he or she obeys the law; the condition helps
measure the effectiveness of parole supervision]; In re Anthony S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th
1000, 1006 [probation is an alternative form of punishment, carrying with it certain
burdens, such as a search term, which can be used as a correctional tool].)
This court observed in People v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 705 that “a
warrantless search condition is intended and does enable a probation officer ‘“to ascertain
whether [the defendant] is complying with the terms of probation; to determine not only
[footnote continued from previous page]
violation of her Fifth Amendment constitutional right against self-incrimination and
rights to privacy, security, and liberty.

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whether [the defendant] disobeys the law, but also whether he [or she] obeys the law.
Information obtained . . . would afford a valuable measure of the effectiveness of the
supervision given the defendant and his [or her] amenability to rehabilitation.”’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 712.) In addition, as our Supreme Court observed, “[w]hen
[warrantless search and seizure] conditions are imposed upon a probationer . . . , it is
established that the individual ‘consents to the waiver of his [or her] Fourth Amendment
rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term. Probation is
not a right, but a privilege.’ [Citation.]” (In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1150,
quoting People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 608.)
Likewise, here, the field interrogation probation condition will provide practical,
on-the-street supervision to defendant. Field interrogations will be used to monitor
defendant’s compliance with conditions of her probation. Also, information obtained
from field interrogations will provide a valuable measure of her amenability to
rehabilitation, which is related to her future criminality. A condition allowing field
interrogations may further dual purposes of deterring future offenses by the probationer
and ascertaining whether she is complying with the terms of her probation. The purpose
of an unexpected, unprovoked field interrogation of defendant is to ascertain whether
defendant is complying with the terms of probation -- to determine not only whether she
disobeys the law, but also whether she obeys the law. Information obtained under such
circumstances would afford a valuable measure of the effectiveness of the supervision
given defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 752.)

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Although the field interrogation probation condition forbids defendant from doing
something that is not in itself criminal, that is, “‘ignore [her] interrogator and walk
away’” (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 553 [100 S.Ct. 1870, 64
L.Ed.2d 497]), it is related to the purposes of probation as described in People v. Lent,
supra, 15 Cal.3d 481. It provides officers with a means of assessing defendant’s progress
toward rehabilitation, it assists them in enforcing other terms of her probation, and it
deters further criminal activity. Thus, the field interrogation condition serves the
purposes of probation and is valid under the Lent criteria. (Id. at p. 486.) In addition,
implicit in almost every probation condition, including the field interrogation condition,
is reasonableness.
Here, defendant committed three counts of child endangerment when officers
found drugs and drug paraphernalia within access and reach of her three young children.
Inside the garage, the officers also found a homemade water “bong” next to a bench
marked “timeout.” We believe the field interrogation condition is necessary to help
reform defendant by discouraging her from concealing future criminality and to ensure
that defendant remains in compliance with probation (as well as her court-ordered
reunification plan as set forth by the San Bernardino County Department of Children’s
Services). The field interrogation term is reasonably related to defendant’s future
criminality. This term also serves a rehabilitative purpose in deterring defendant’s drug
use and ensuring that her children are safe and protected.
Additionally, “interrogation” inherently means questions related to “seek solution
of a crime.” (See Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 818, col. 2.) Thus the inherent

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meaning of the term limits the questions that could be asked of a probationer in a field
interrogation to those designed to monitor the probationer’s compliance with the other
terms of his or her probation as well as future criminality. We do not find that the failure
to make this limitation explicit provides any justification for striking the condition. It
may be that this limitation is implicit in the language that the court adopted and could be
permitted to stand without modifying the language of the condition. Moreover, as
discussed in detail, post, it is unlikely that a probationer would likely be found to have
violated the field interrogation term in a probation revocation hearing for merely refusing
to answer questions unrelated to the conduct of the probationer. This condition would
assist defendant in maintaining compliance with the law and the terms of her probation.
Again, even assuming the challenged condition could have been more narrowly
tailored, that does not render it invalid; rather, it simply must not exceed the bounds of
reason. The challenged condition will provide a means to monitor defendant’s progress
toward rehabilitation, and deter future criminality. This is amply within the bounds of
reason.
Defendant claims the field interrogation condition implicates her Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of self-incrimination, personal liberty, and security. We
find no constitutional violation.
Defendant is not an ordinary citizen. She is a convicted felon who has been
granted the privilege of probation. It has long been settled that certain constitutional
rights can be limited where appropriate in the probation process. (See People v.
Arvanites (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1052, 1063 [prohibition against planning and engaging

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in demonstrations was valid where the defendant falsely imprisoned a man during a
protest rally]; In re Mannino (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 953, 968-969, overruled on other
grounds in People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 237 [probation condition prohibiting
the defendant from active participation in demonstrations following his conviction of
assault at a college demonstration was reasonable]; People v. King (1968) 267
Cal.App.2d 814, 822-823 [condition of probation proscribing participation in
demonstrations valid where the defendant battered police officers at an antiwar
demonstration].) Because of her status as a felon, defendant may be detained and
questioned by a peace officer without the requirement that the officer have at least a
reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that defendant is engaged in criminal
activity. (See Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889].)
Although an ordinary citizen “may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable,
objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen [to a peace officer] or answer
[any question put to him] does not, without more, furnish those grounds[,]” we repeat that
defendant is not an ordinary citizen. (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 498 [103
S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229].) The impingement on her constitutional right to remain
silent is warranted due to her status as a felon. The condition is sufficiently narrow to
serve the interests of the state and her reform and rehabilitation while merely requiring
her to submit to and cooperate in a field interrogation. Defendant still retains her Fifth
Amendment rights, as discussed below. Furthermore, any custodial interrogation that
might follow a field interrogation would be subject to the requirements of Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 478-479 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694].

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While probationers have long been required to “cooperate” with their probation
officers, a probationer is not foreclosed from asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege,
and it would not be inherently uncooperative for her to assert that privilege. (See United
States v. Davis (1st Cir. 2001) 242 F.3d 49, 52 [finding no realistic threat in a
requirement to “cooperate” with the probation officer].) Therefore, although defendant
must cooperate with the police, she retains the right to assert the Fifth Amendment, and
her probation cannot be revoked based on a valid exercise of that right. (Minnesota v.
Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420, 427, 434 [104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409].) In Murphy,
the Supreme Court explained that if a state attaches “[t]he threat of punishment for
reliance on the privilege” against self-incrimination by asserting either “expressly or by
implication . . . that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation . . .
the probationer’s answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal
prosecution.” (Id. at p. 435.) However, defendant’s probation condition contains no such
threat. It would not be inherently uncooperative for defendant to assert the Fifth
Amendment; defendant could still follow instructions and answer nonincriminating
questions. (See Davis, at p. 52.)
Furthermore, if the officer inquires into improper matters or otherwise acts
improperly, defendant may present evidence at the probation violation hearing to show
that the interrogation or conduct was arbitrary, capricious, harassing, or otherwise not
reasonably related to the purposes for which she is on probation. (See In re Tyrell J.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 87, fn. 5.) Similarly, the field interrogation condition does not allow
law enforcement officials to awaken defendant “at any time or place.” Rather, the

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challenged condition requires defendant to submit to and cooperate in a field
interrogation -- the condition does not allow officers to barge into defendant’s home and
question her unnecessarily. Also, defendant may, when questioned, give a truthful
answer, and her answer may be used at trial without offending the Fifth Amendment.
Her obligation to answer questions truthfully is the same obligation borne by any witness
at a trial or before a grand jury. (Minnesota v. Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 427.) It is
not too onerous to require her, for purposes of rehabilitation and reform, to speak
truthfully to an officer. Because she has a duty to answer an officer’s questions
truthfully, unless she asserts the privilege, it does not violate her right not to incriminate
herself. The purpose of probation is, of course, defendant’s reformation and
rehabilitation, and speaking truthfully to a peace officer is arguably an implied condition
of probation. (See People v. Cortez (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 839, 844.) Nevertheless,
defendant is not required to give up her freedom to decline to answer particular questions.
(Murphy, at p. 429.) The Constitution does not forbid the asking of incriminating
questions (id. at p. 428), and the state in this case has neither expressly nor by implication
threatened that invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege would lead to revocation of
probation.
The defendant in People v. Miller (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1311, 1315, who was
required to submit to polygraph testing at the direction of his probation officer as a
condition of probation, also argued that the condition violated his privilege against self-
incrimination. The Miller court stated: “Defendant misconstrues the nature of the
privilege. The privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing; it must be

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claimed. [Citation.] Although defendant has a duty to answer the polygraph examiner’s
questions truthfully, unless he invokes the privilege, shows a realistic threat of self-
incrimination and nevertheless is required to answer, no violation of his right against self-
incrimination is suffered. [Citation.] The mere requirement of taking the test in itself is
insufficient to constitute an infringement of the privilege.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, the field interrogation condition is less intrusive than some of the other
conditions of defendant’s probation that defendant does not challenge. For example,
condition No. 10 requires defendant to “[s]ubmit to a search and seizure of [her] person,
residence and/or property under [her] control at any time of the day or night by any law
enforcement officer, with or without a search warrant, and with or without cause.”
(Italics added.) Additionally, condition No. 22 requires defendant to “[c]arry a copy of
[her] terms and conditions of probation on [her] person at all times, and offer them to any
peace officer upon contact.” Condition No. 18 obliges defendant to “[s]ubmit a record of
income and expenditure to the probation officer quarterly.” Condition No. 16 forbids
defendant from associating “with known convicted felons or anyone actively engaged in
criminal activity.” Likewise, condition No. 17 prohibits defendant from associating
“with known illegal users or sellers of controlled substances.”
In summary, we note that the limitation on defendant’s liberty is warranted due to
her status as a felon. The condition is sufficiently narrow to serve the interests of the
state -- her reform and rehabilitation -- while requiring her merely to submit to and
cooperate in a field interrogation. And any custodial interrogation that might follow a
field interrogation would be subject to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, supra,

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384 U.S. 436. In these circumstances, we conclude that the condition is reasonable and
constitutional.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI
J.
I concur:
HOLLENHORST
Acting P.J.

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MILLER, J.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the court did not abuse
its discretion in denying defendant’s request to strike the word “pets” from probation
condition No. 7.
“A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship
to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in
itself criminal, and (3) requires . . . conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted.)
Probation condition No. 7 states that defendant must keep her probation officer
informed of ownership of pets. This probation condition violates all three criteria set
forth in Lent. The defendant’s ownership of a pet has nothing to do with the crime of
which she was convicted. Having a pet is not in itself criminal. Pet ownership is not
indicative of or related to future criminality.
I clearly understand the majority’s concern about the safety of probation officers.
However, the probation condition in its current language is both unreasonable and
overbroad. Does the pet condition encompass all pets or only certain pets that may pose
a danger to a visiting probation officer? Could a defendant’s probation be violated by
failing to notify his or her probation officer of a new goldfish or hamster? Clearly, it
would not, and if that is true, then, why not define the exact terms and limitations that are
“really” being imposed by the probation condition. When violation of a probation term
can lead to incarceration in state prison the defendant needs to be provided with proper
notice of what conduct would constitute a violation.

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Therefore, the trial court should have been ordered to modify probation condition
No. 7 to include language that addresses concerns related to ownership of dangerous
animals.
/s/ MILLER
J.

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