In re Rene O.

Filed 9/03/02 In re Rene O. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re RENE O., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
H023439
(Monterey County
Super.Ct.No. J35596)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RENE O.,
Defendant and Appellant.
I. Statement of the Case
On May 23, 2001, the Monterey County District Attorney filed a petition for
juvenile wardship under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that Rene
O., (hereafter the minor), aged 14, committed a battery punishable as a felony for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 242; 186.22, subd. (d)),1
and a
misdemeanor battery, resisted arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), and violated a school
suspension order (§ 626.2). Under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 726 and 777,
the petition further alleged that a previous juvenile court disposition had not been
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

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effective in rehabilitating the minor.2
After overruling the minor’s demurrer to the gang
allegation, the juvenile court sustained the petition as to only the battery counts and the
gang allegation. At the dispositional hearing, the court continued the minor as a ward of
the court for two years and placed him on probation in the custody of his parents with the
condition that he comply with the gang-registration requirement in section 186.30 et seq.
The minor appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders. He broadly
challenges the gang-registration requirement imposed under sections 186.22, subdivision
(d) (hereafter section 186.22(d)) and 186.30, which were enacted as part of Proposition
21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998 “the Act” (approved
by the voters Mar. 7, 2000, Primary Election).3
He claims Proposition 21 violated the
single-subject rule for initiative measures and, if not, that section 186.22(d) is
inapplicable to juvenile proceedings. Next, he claims that the court should have
sustained his demurrer to the gang allegation, there is insufficient evidence to support the
gang finding, and defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise a
hearsay objection to testimony offered to prove the gang allegation. Last, he claims that
sections 186.22(d) and 186.30 are unconstitutionally ambiguous, vague, and overbroad
and that the registration requirement violates his state constitutional right of privacy, the
federal constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and his
state and federal constitutional rights to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.
He further claims that imposition of the registration requirement violates the
constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.
2
The previous disposition related to a petition filed on July 6, 2000, for felony
burglary and misdemeanor larceny and a second petition filed on July 21, 2000, for
misdemeanor battery.
3
We have taken judicial notice of the text of Proposition 21 and the summary and
arguments concerning it in the ballot pamphlet. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c); 459;
People v. Hazelton (1996) 14 Cal.4th 101, 107, fn. 2.)

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We affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
The minor has also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which this court
ordered considered with the appeal. In it he reiterates his claim of ineffective assistance
based on counsel’s failure to raise hearsay objection to gang evidence.
In a separate order filed this day, we issue an order to show cause returnable in the
Monterey County Superior Court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 24(a).)
II. Facts
A. The Minor’s Conduct
On the morning of May 22, 2001, Jorge M. and his friend Mark were standing in
front of Washington Middle School The minor and David I. were across the street. Jorge
saw the minor “throwing 14,” which is a hand gesture used by members of a Norteño
gang to identify themselves. The minor and David and Jorge and Mark approached each
other. The minor said something like “fucking ever do that to me” and “14 Boronda,”
which refers to a clique of the Norteños in Monterey County. The minor then punched
Jorge in the head, and when Jorge backed up, the minor continued his attack.
Aurelio Gonzales, assistant principal at Washington Middle School, testified on
the morning of May 22, he saw the minor and David charge across the street ready to
attack. The minor was throwing gang signs. Gonzales rushed out, and as he tried to pull
the minor away, they both fell down. The minor got up and came after Gonzales, ready
to hit him. Gonzales fended him off, and the minor fled. He was later apprehended and
arrested.
B. Gang Evidence
Officer Mark Lazzarini of the Salinas Police Department testified concerning
criminal street gangs. He explained that there is a rivalry between Norteño and Sureño
gang members. He opined that the Norteño gang is a criminal street gang as defined by
statute, that is, an ongoing organization of more than three people that uses a variety of
identifying symbols, signs, and tattoos, including “norte, norteno, X four, one four, the

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number 14, dots on tattoos one and four, dots, [and] four dots by themselves.” He
explained that the primary activities of the gang includes the commission of homicide,
robberies, rapes, drug possessions, carjackings, car theft, and witness intimidation and
threats. Based on his review of police department reports of incidents that resulted in
criminal prosecutions, he opined that the Norteño gang engages in a pattern of criminal
activity.
In particular, he related two gang-related offenses. The first, which he referred to
as “report number 00090361,” occurred on September 5, 2000, in North Salinas. Three
Norteño gang members, followed a motorist to an apartment complex. They were armed
and accosted the motorist, yelling things like “ ‘where are you from’ ” and “ ‘norte.’ ”
Police were summoned and the gang members were arrested for assault with a deadly
weapon. Records from the subsequent prosecution, Monterey County case number
1002081, revealed that two of the perpetrators were convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon with a gang enhancement, and the third was convicted of gang-related activity.
The second incident, “case number SS 001972 B,” occurred on August 20, 2000,
and involved two “Kilbreth criminal street gang members.” Armed with handguns, the
two robbed two pedestrians on North Main Street in Salinas. The victims notified police,
and the suspects were arrested. Lazzarini said that he participated in the arrest and found
the two in possession of firearms. They were ultimately convicted of armed robbery with
gang enhancements.
Lazzarini reviewed documentary evidence from the police department concerning
the minor and his association with gangs. He noted that the report concerning the
incident at Washington Middle School related the minor’s statements to Jorge and
revealed that the minor was wearing red clothing. Lazzarini opined that when gang
members throw gang signs and yell slogans, they are announcing who they are and
making a challenge. Such conduct enhances the reputation of the gang, helps it gain
notoriety for having the ability and fearlessness to commit crimes, and attracts new

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members. He explained, “If one member is just claiming to be a norteno and they want
to hook up with another norteno alliance that may be bigger or better than their specific
clique, then by going out and committing crimes on [sic] the benefit of norteno, that’s
going to be a good recruiting tool for that gang [sic] members.” Lazzarini also noted that
such conduct also enhances the individual gang member’s reputation and “shows that the
person isn’t afraid to commit crimes on [sic] the benefit of a gang name and they are
willing to go out and put in work.” He also explained that the more work a gang member
puts in, the more recognition, popularity, and stature he or she receives from other gang
members.
Given all of the relevant information, Lazzarini opined that the Washington
Middle School incident was committed for the benefit of the Norteño criminal street gang
because it would enhance the reputations of the minor and the Norteño gang. Lazzarini
noted the minor’s red clothing and the nature of the attack. He explained that the minor’s
reference to “14” and “Boronda” revealed his connection to north side Boronda, which is
a Norteño group in the county. In this regard, he testified that the overall structure of the
Norteño gang is formal at the prison level but on the streets is more informal. He
explained that “the primarily [sic] norteno gang is the Nuestra Familia. The Nuestra
Familia has set bylaws which are followed by the northern structure, a sister gang in the
prison system and directed as basically rules for nortenos to follow and abide by while
they are out acting as nortenos on the street. [¶] There are different cliques of nortenos
gangs, one of them being Boronda. Other people just claim to be Norteños, that they
believe in the Norteño philosophy. And those crimes that are committed by those gang
members ultimately benefit everyone of the norteno gangs.” Lazzarini noted a recent
effort among individual Norteños to get away from claiming particular street gangs and
just claim Norteño. He pointed out that in 1998, police officers obtained a note written
by a Nuestra Familia member in prison that appeared to amend the groups “constitution.”
As related by Lazzarini, the note indicated that “if you believed in a philosophy that the

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Nuestra Familia had, you would refer to yourself as a norteno and if you wanted to
participate as a norteno gang member but didn’t want to dedicate as much of your life to
it then you would refer to yourself as a northerner. Both of them are levels of
participation within the norteno gang.”
III. Validity and Applicability of the Act
The minor contends that the Act may not be applied because Proposition 21
violated the single-subject rule concerning ballot initiatives. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8,
subd. (d).) 4
In Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 573-582, the California
Supreme Court addressed and rejected this contention.
The minor further contends that the Act does not apply to juvenile adjudications.
He asserts that the drafters clearly understood that different terminology is used in
juvenile and adult cases. Thus, the drafters used both the term conviction and the phrase
petition sustained in a juvenile court. (E.g., §§ 186.22, subd. (i); 186.30, subd. (b);
186.31; 186.33, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) He notes that the drafters also knew how to use
generic language—e.g., any person who commits a particular act—when a particular
provision applied to both juvenile and adult cases. (E.g., §§ 182.5; 186.26, subd. (a);
186.30, subds. (a) & (b).) On the other hand, the drafters made certain provisions
applicable only to juveniles. (E.g., § 186.32, subd. (a)(1)(B); Welf. & Inst. Code,
§§ 602.5; 790.) Moreover, he points out that Welfare and Institutions Code section 203
provides, “An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be
deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile
court be deemed a criminal proceeding.”
4
This provision provides, “An initiative measure embracing more than one subject
may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd.,
(d).)

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With this background in mind, the minor notes that section 186.22(d), which was
applied here, provides, in pertinent part, “Any person who is convicted of a public
offense punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor, which is committed for the benefit of,
at the direction of or in association with, any criminal street gang with the specific intent
to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, shall be punished
by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the
state prison for one, two, or three years, provided that any person sentenced to
imprisonment in the county jail shall be imprisoned for a period not to exceed one year,
but not less than 180 days, and shall not be eligible for release upon completion of
sentence, parole, or any other basis, until he or she has served 180 days. If the court
grants probation or suspends the execution of sentence imposed upon the defendant, it
shall require as a condition thereof that the defendant serve 180 days in a county jail.”
(Italics added.) The minor argues that the drafter’s use of the legal terms of art
conviction and defendant reflects an intent to exclude juvenile adjudications from the
ambit of section 186.22(d). We disagree.
In construing statutes, our fundamental goal is to “ascertain the intent of the
Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” (People v. Jenkins (1995) 10
Cal.4th 234, 246.) To find intent, we first turn to the words of the statute. Viewing them
in context and in light of the nature and obvious purpose of the statute, we give the words
their plain, everyday, commonsense meaning. If we find no ambiguity or uncertainty, we
simply presume the Legislature meant what it said, which makes further inquiry into
legislative intent unnecessary. However, if we find the statutory language susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation, we may then turn to extrinsic indicia of intent,
such as legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is
a part. And where the language of a penal statute is susceptible to alternative reasonable
interpretations, we give the defendant the benefit of a doubt and interpret it as favorably
to him or her as is reasonably possible, being careful, however, to avoid interpretations

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that would frustrate the purpose of a statute, render it nugatory, or lead to an absurd
result. (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142; People v. Superior Court
(Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 192; People v. Alvarado (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 178,
185-186; People v. Rackley (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1659, 1665-1666.)
The same rules apply in interpreting a voter initiative (People v. Rizo (2000) 22
Cal.4th 681, 685), with the focus of our inquiry being “the electorate's purpose, as
indicated in the ballot arguments and elsewhere.” (Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21
Cal.4th 109, 114.)
In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, the California Supreme Court addressed the
same argument raised here vis-à-vis the application of section 12022.1 in a juvenile
proceeding. Because that statute uses terminology that refers exclusively to adult
criminal proceedings—e.g., information, indictment, complaint, preliminary hearing,
sentencing, conviction, bail—the minor claimed it did not apply to juveniles. However,
the court explained, “The approach taken by the minor . . . overlooks the plain language
of another statute, Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, which provides that a
juvenile ward’s maximum confinement or commitment shall be a time equal to ‘the
maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the
[same] offense or offenses . . . .’ (Italics added.) Hence, for this limited juvenile
purpose, the minor’s current and prior juvenile records are to be treated as if they were
compiled in an adult context. [¶] The [Determinate Sentencing Act (DSA)] provides in
detail for the enhancement of adult sentences when specified circumstances of an offense,
or of the offender’s record, suggest that a longer period of confinement is warranted.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 expressly adopts this system of enhancements
for purposes of computing a juvenile ward’s maximum confinement or commitment. [¶]
Thus, paragraph three of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 defines a ward’s
maximum confinement or commitment on a single count as the upper DSA term for the
offense as set forth in . . . section 1170, subdivision (a)(2), ‘plus enhancements which

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must be proven if pled.’ The inference is that any enhancement which would apply to an
adult conviction may likewise be applied, if pled and proven, in the juvenile setting.” (In
re Jovan B., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 811-812, original italics.)
The court further explained, “Of course, juvenile proceedings do not literally
result in ‘convictions’ and juvenile confinements are not ‘sentences,’ but that cannot be
dispositive of the question whether the bail/O.R. [own recognizance] enhancement
applies to juvenile wards. Because they were enacted in an adult context, all felony
sentence enhancements set forth in the DSA are defined in terms of ‘conviction’ and
‘sentence’ or ‘punishment’ for an underlying offense. If use of this adult terminology
were enough to prevent these enhancements from applying to juvenile wardship matters,
paragraphs three and four of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 would be
meaningless.” (In re Jovan B., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 812, original italics.)
As Jovan makes clear, the juvenile law, via Welfare and Institutions Code section
726, recognizes the applicability of penal statutes and enhancements that are phrased
exclusively in the language of adult criminal proceedings. Indeed, the minor concedes
that “Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 explicitly authorizes the application of
the Determinate Sentencing Act to calculate a minor’s maximum exposure to
confinement.” Thus, the use of adult criminal terminology in section 186.22(d) does not,
in our view, make it an exception.
The purpose of Proposition 21 supports our view. The initiative “made numerous
changes to the Penal Code and Welfare and Institutions Code relating to the adult and
juvenile justice systems, including the treatment of juvenile offenders, the confidentiality
protections afforded to juvenile proceedings, the type of juvenile offenders that can be
tried in adult court, and the punishment for gang-related offenses and offenders.” (In re
Melvin J. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 742, 744.) The main purpose of the Act was to combat
violent crime committed by juveniles and gang members. (Prop. 21, § 2.) As explained
in the “FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS” section of Proposition 21, “Criminal street

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gangs and gang-related violence pose a significant threat to public safety and the health
of many of our communities. Criminal street gangs have become more violent, bolder,
and better organized in recent years.” (Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (b).) Despite “a substantial
and consistent four year decline in overall crime . . . [v]iolent juvenile crime has proven
most resistant to this positive trend.” (Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (c).)
In response to this problem, Proposition 21 establishes severe penalties for gang-
related felonies. (Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (h).) Indeed, in the argument in favor of
Proposition 21, its backers stated that it “ends the ‘slap on the wrist’ of current law by
imposing real consequences for GANG MEMBERS, RAPISTS, AND MURDERERS
who cannot be reached through prevention or education. [¶] Californians must send a
clear message that violent juvenile criminals will be held accountable for their actions
and that the punishment will fit the crime. YOUTH SHOULD NOT BE AN EXCUSE
FOR MURDER, RAPE OR ANY VIOLENT ACT—BUT IT IS UNDER
CALIFORNIA’S DANGEROUSLY LENIENT EXISTING LAW.” (Ballot Pamp.,
Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) argument in favor of Prop. 21, p. 48.)
Given the purpose and focus of Proposition 21 and the reasoning in Jovan, we
conclude that section 186.22(d) must be construed to apply to both adults and juveniles.
Indeed, the minor’s view that it was intended to punish only adults, and not juveniles,
who commit gang related offenses is patently inconsistent the statements in the ballot
pamphlet and would defeat the fundamental purpose of Proposition 21, which, as noted,
is to combat juvenile and gang-related violence and crime. For this reason, we consider
the minor’s interpretation is unreasonable. Thus, we further reject his claim that the
statute is at least ambiguous concerning whether it applies to juvenile proceedings and
must, therefore, be construed in his favor. (See People v. Franklin (1999) 20 Cal.4th
249, 253 [where reasonably possible, ambiguous statutes construed in favor of
defendant]; People v. Alvarado, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 186 [interpretation that
frustrates purpose of statute must be avoided].)

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IV. Denial of Demurrer
The minor contends that the court erred in denying his demurrer to the gang
allegation. First, he claims that section 186.22(d) is not a substantive offense—i.e., the
statute does not define a separate crime. Thus, the allegation that he violated it was
subject to demurrer because the alleged facts did not constitute a public offense. (§ 1004,
subd. 4.5
) This claim is meritless.
The People concede that section 186.22(d) does not define a crime. Rather, it is a
penalty provision. More importantly, the People correctly note that, contrary to the
minor’s claim, the petition did not allege that he violated section 186.22(d). It alleged
that he committed a battery “punishable as a FELONY pursuant to” section 186.22(d)
and that he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
Alternatively, the minor claims that the phrase “ ‘[a]ny person who is convicted of
a public offense, punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor . . .’ ” in section 186.22(d)
means that the statute applies only when the underlying public “offense” is a wobbler.6
(Original italics.) Again we disagree.
According to the minor, if one commits either a misdemeanor battery or a
felony—e.g., murder—for the benefit of a street gang, then section 186.22(d) is
inapplicable. Rather, he argues that the statute is directed at only the limited class of
perpetrators who commit wobblers. However, Proposition 21, as noted, was intended to
5
Section 1004 provides, in pertinent part, “The defendant may demur to the
accusatory pleading at any time prior to the entry of a plea, when it appears upon the face
thereof either: [¶] . . . [¶] 4. That the facts stated do not constitute a public offense.”
6
“[A] wobbler is a special class of crime which could be classified and punished
as a felony or misdemeanor depending upon the severity of the facts surrounding its
commission.” (People v. Superior Court (Perez) (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 347, 360, fn.
17.)
The “wobbler” issue is currently before the California Supreme Court. (See
Robert L. v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1414, review granted Oct. 24, 2001,
(S100359).)

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the increase the punishment for gang-related offenses and change current system of
leniency with which juveniles who commit such offenses are often treated. Clearly, to
achieve this purpose, the Act must apply to all gang-related crimes, whether
misdemeanors, wobblers, or felonies. Thus, when viewed in light of the purpose of the
Act, the minor’s position is unreasonable. For this reason we reject it and the minor’s
alternative claim that the statute is ambiguous. Rather, we understand section 186.22(d)
to apply to any person who is convicted of a any public offense that is punishable as a
felony or that is punishable as a misdemeanor.
The minor argues that such an interpretation will lead to harsh penalties for
misdemeanor offenses. While this may be so, it does not negate applicability of the
statute to all degrees of criminal offenses or establish that harsher penalties for gang-
related misdemeanors is unreasonable.
In sum, we conclude that the court properly ruled on the minor’s demurrer.
V. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The minor contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding that he committed felony battery for the benefit of a criminal street gang as
defined by statute. He notes that to prove a criminal street gang, the prosecution had to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor acted for the benefit of an
organization of three or more people, having as one of its primary activities the
commission of specified felonies, including assault with a firearm and robbery, and
having a common name or common identifying symbol, whose members individually or
collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, which
means the commission of at least two of the specified offenses. (§ 186.22, subd. (f).)
The minor argues that there is insufficient evidence he belonged to an organization and, if
he did, that its primary activity is the commission of specified offenses or that it engaged
in a pattern of criminal gang activity. We disagree.

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When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
jurisdictional finding, our task is to determine whether there is substantial evidence—
evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that the court could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor committed the alleged conduct. In making this
determination, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment,
we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence that support it, and we presume the
existence of every fact the court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Conversely,
we do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the
credibility of witnesses. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371-1372; see
Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319-320; People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th
434, 460; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314; People v. Johnson (1980) 26
Cal.3d 557, 578.)
As noted, Officer Lazzarini understood the statutory definition of criminal street
gang. He opined that the Norteño gang is an ongoing organization of more than three
people that uses various identifying symbols, signs, and tattoos, including “norte,
norteno, X four, one four, the number 14, dots on tattoos one and four, dots, [and] four
dots by themselves.” He explained that the prison group known as the Nuestra Familia is
the primary organ of the Norteño gang and that outside prison the structure is less formal,
with different Norteño cliques, including the Boronda group. Based on the evidence
obtained from a Norteño prisoner, Lazzarini further explained that Norteños have been
moving away from the fragmented structure of numerous separate cliques and to a more
unified structure under a single Norteño umbrella organization. This testimony is
sufficient to support a finding that the minor belonged the Boronda clique of the Norteño
organization, which qualifies as a criminal street gang.
The minor cites this court’s opinion in People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th
494 for the proposition that Norteño is a general term and not the name of a gang.

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Rather, Norteños belong to separate and discrete gangs that may or may not qualify as
criminal street gangs.
In Valdez, one issue before us was whether the court erred in permitting expert
testimony concerning whether the alleged conduct was committed for the benefit of a
criminal street gang. In that case, a group comprising individuals from a number of
different Norteño cliques or gangs in San Jose came together one day and formed a
caravan to attack Sureños. Given the expert testimony, we stated, “At the time it
assembled, the caravan was not a ‘criminal street gang’ within the meaning of the [gang]
enhancement allegation. Moreover, their common identification as Norteños did not
establish them as a street gang, for, as [the expert] testified, Norteño and Sureño are not
the names of gangs.” (People v. Valdez, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 508.) We concluded
that the expert testimony was admissible because it could help the jury understand that
joint conduct by such a diverse group could benefit each of the gangs. (Id. at pp. 508-
509.)
Valdez does not hold that there is no criminal street gang called the Norteño gang.
Nor does it preclude reliance on Lazzarini’s testimony. Moreover, the expert testimony
in Valdez is irrelevant here in determining whether there is substantial evidence to
support the gang finding.
The minor next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding
that the Norteño gang has as its primary activity the commission of specified offenses.
We disagree.
Lazzarini received formal training concerning gangs. He has personally
investigated over one hundred gang crimes, arrested over one hundred gang members,
and interviewed them concerning, among other things, the types of crimes they commit.
Based on his experience and review of the documentary evidence, he opined that the
primary activities of the Norteño gang include homicide, robberies, rapes, drug
possessions, carjackings, car theft, and witness intimidation and threats, all of which are

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specified offenses. (See § 186.22, subd. (e).) He presented two examples of such crimes
by Norteños: an assault with a deadly weapon and an armed robbery. This testimony
plus the evidence of the current conduct was sufficient to establish the “primary activity”
element. (Compare People v. Galvan (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1135 [sufficient evidence]
with In re Elodio O. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1175 [insufficient evidence], disapproved in
People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 323.) Indeed, in People v.
Sengpadychith, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 324, the California Supreme Court opined that
testimony based on an experts long experience with gangs, personal investigation of
hundreds of gang members and crimes committed by them, along with documentary
evidence from the police department and opinion testimony that the primary activity of a
gang is the commission of specified offenses would be sufficient to support a finding.
Lazzarini’s testimony fits this description.
Last, the minor claims there is no evidence concerning the primary activities of his
gang—the Boranda gang—or that it engages in a pattern of criminal gang activity. This
claim fails because it is based on a faulty premise that the Boranda group is a separate,
distinct, independent criminal street gang. However, as Lazzarini’s testified, the Boranda
gang is merely a subgroup or clique within the Norteño gang, making the greater Norteño
gang the relevant group for purposes of proving the gang allegation.
VI. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The minor contends that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance because
she failed to raise a hearsay objection to Lazzarini’s testimony concerning the other
crimes, which was introduced to establish the “pattern” element of a criminal street gang.
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
show counsel’s performance fell below a standard of reasonable competence, and that
prejudice resulted. [Citations.] When a claim of ineffective assistance is made on direct
appeal, and the record does not show the reason for counsel’s challenged actions or
omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no satisfactory

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explanation. [Citation.] Even where deficient performance appears, the conviction must
be upheld unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice, i.e., that, ‘ “ ‘but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569; see
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688; People v. Pope (1979) 23
Cal.3d 412, 426; In re Elizabeth G. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 496, 502-503.)
Since the record on appeal does not reveal why defense counsel failed to raise the
hearsay objection and since the claim is also raised in the minor’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, which includes material not part of the record on appeal, we reject the
appellate claim and deal with the issue in the context of his writ petition.
VII. Validity of the Registration Requirement
As noted, defendant challenges the registration requirement in section 186.30.
This section provides, “(a) Any person described in subdivision (b) shall register with the
chief of police of the city in which he or she resides, or the sheriff of the county if he or
she resides in an unincorporated area, within 10 days of release from custody or within
10 days of his or her arrival in any city, county, or city and county to reside there,
whichever occurs first. [¶] (b) Subdivision (a) shall apply to any person convicted in a
criminal court or who has had a petition sustained in a juvenile court in this state for any
of the following offenses: [¶] (1) Subdivision (a) of Section 186.22. [¶] (2) Any crime
where the enhancement specified in subdivision (b) of Section 186.22 is found to be true.
[¶] (3) Any crime that the court finds is gang related at the time of sentencing or
disposition.” (Italics added.)
The minor argues that the phrase “gang related” in section 186.30 fails to provide
adequate notice concerning what the statute requires and fosters arbitrary law
enforcement. Consequently, he claims the statute is unconstitutionally vague.

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The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient precision that “ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357; People v. Castenada
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751.) “The constitutional interest implicated in questions of
statutory vagueness is that no person be deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property without due
process of law,’ as assured by both the federal Constitution (U.S. Const., Amends. V,
XIV) and the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7).” (Williams v. Garcetti
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567.)
“To satisfy the constitutional command, a statute must meet two basic
requirements: (1) The statute must be sufficiently definite to provide adequate notice of
the conduct proscribed; and (2) the statute must provide sufficiently definite guidelines
for the police in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citations.]”
(Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1106-1107.) However, reasonable
certainty is all that is necessary. (Ibid.) “[A]ll that is required is that the language
‘conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices . . . .’ Citation.]” (Roth v. United States (1957) 354
U.S. 476, 491.)
To resolve a vagueness claim, we consider the challenged statutory terms in the
context of the statute’s purpose. (Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984)
468 U.S. 288, 290-291; Communications Assn. v. Douds (1950) 339 U.S. 382, 412.)
Even imprecise language will not automatically render a statute void if it reasonably can
be construed to provide constitutionally sufficient clarity. To this end, we look to see
whether the language may be given a reasonable and practical construction or its terms
made reasonably certain by reference to secondary sources such as long established or
commonly accepted usage, usage at common law, judicial interpretations of statutory
language or of similar language, and legislative history and purpose. (People v. Tran

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(1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 253, 259-260; City of Los Altos v. Barnes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th
1193, 1202; People v. Nguyen (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 687, 692.)
In reviewing the minor’s challenge to the statutory phrase “gang related,” we find
guidance in People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605 and People v. Lopez (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 615.
In Gardeley, the court concluded that proving the “pattern” element of a gang
enhancement required evidence that specified offenses were committed but not that those
predicate offenses were “gang related.” (People v. Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 620-
622.) In reaching this conclusion, the court construed the nonstatutory phrase “gang
related” to mean “ ‘for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with’ ” a
criminal street gang. (Id. at p. 619.)
In Lopez, the defendant claimed that the word “gang” in a probation condition
prohibiting various “gang” related activity was vague.7
(People v. Lopez, supra, 66
Cal.App.4th at pp. 622, 629.) The court agreed that the word was uncertain in the
abstract. (Id. at p. 631.) However, given its context and the purpose of the probation
condition, the court found that gang could only mean groups or associations whose
purpose is to commit crimes. (Id. at pp. 630-632.) “The contextual construction of the
word ‘gang’ to mean a group primarily engaged in the pursuit of criminal activities tends
to give it a ‘constitutionally sufficient concreteness.’ [Citation.] Activities of an
association which deprive third parties of their lawful rights fall outside the constitutional
pale. [Citation.] The commission of crimes is the most apparent manifestation of such
7
“ ‘The defendant is not to be involved in any gang activities or associate with
any gang members, nor wear or possess, any item of identified gang clothing, including:
any item of clothing with gang insignia, moniker, color pattern, bandanas, jewelry with
any gang significance, nor shall the defendant display any gang insignia, moniker, or
other markings of gang significance on his/her person or property as may be identified by
Law Enforcement or the Probation Officer.’ ” (People v. Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at
p. 622.)

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unprotected conduct. The performance of acts that constitute a civil nuisance is another.
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 632.)
The court further noted that California’s gang statutes proscribe active
participation crimes by a “criminal street gang” and specifically define such a gang.
Because those statutes have been upheld against a variety of constitutional challenges,
including claims based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court
found that the terms of the statute “ensure that mere membership in a criminal street gang
will not be punished and that groups or associations whose primary purpose is not the
commission of crime will be excluded from coverage.” (People v. Lopez, supra, 66
Cal.App.4th at p. 633.) For this reason, the court modified the challenged probation
condition to incorporate the statutory definition of a “criminal street gang.” (Id. at
p. 634.)
As in Gardeley, we believe that “gang related” can have a clear meaning, and we
adopt the reasoning in Lopez to give it constitutionally sufficient clarity. Although
section 186.30, subdivision (b)(3) does not employ the phrase “criminal street gang,” we
consider it apparent from its context and the purpose of the registration requirement that
the term gang in the phrase refers to a criminal street gang as defined in section 186.22,
subdivision (f). So construed, section 186.30, subdivision (b)(3) gains reasonable
certainty and is not unconstitutionally vague.
The minor challenges the requirement in 186.32, subd. (a)(1)(C) (hereafter section
186.32(a)(1)(C)), that he provide “any information that may be required by the law
enforcement agency.”8
He claims that this provision is unconstitutionally vague and
8
Section 186.32 provides, in relevant part, “(a) The registration required by
Section 186.30 shall consist of the following: [¶] (1) Juvenile registration shall include
the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (C) A written statement signed by the juvenile, giving any
information that may be required by the law enforcement agency, shall be submitted to
the law enforcement agency.”

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overbroad. He argues, “An ordinary citizen cannot tell from the words used in the statute
which information shall be required.” (Original italics.) Moreover, the statute “does not
provide the law enforcement agency guidance regarding what may be asked. The agency
is allowed to ask any question it chooses. There are absolutely no defining boundaries to
the types of questions to which a registrant may be subjected. Each law enforcement
agency has been given sweeping authority to set its own standards and defining
perimeters, without regard to constitutional restrictions.” We are not persuaded.
Under the statute, registration entails an appearance at the police or sheriff’s
department, a written statement containing information required by the law enforcement
agency, and submission of fingerprints and a photograph. In addition, any change in
residence address must be reported within 10 days to the appropriate agency. (§ 186.32.)
We note that “ ‘[r]egistration requirements generally are based on the assumption that
persons convicted of certain offenses are more likely to repeat the crimes and that law
enforcement’s ability to prevent certain crimes and its ability to apprehend certain types
of criminals will be improved if these repeat offenders' whereabouts are known.
[Citation.] Accordingly, the Legislature has determined that sex offenders (. . . § 290),
narcotics offenders (Health & Saf. Code, § 11590) and arsonists (. . . § 457.1) are likely
to repeat their offenses and therefore are subject to registration requirements.’
[Citation.]” (In re Luisa Z. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 978, 982, quoting People v. Adams
(1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 705, 710.) We further note that the registration requirement in
section 186.32(a)(1)(C) is couched in language similar to registration provisions for sex
offenders, narcotics offenders, and arsonists.9
9
Registration by sex offenders entails “[a] statement in writing signed by the
person giving information as shall be required by the Department of Justice and giving
the name and address of the person’s employer, and the address of the person’s place of
employment if that is different from the employer’s main address.” (§ 290, subd.
(e)(2)(A).) Narcotics offenders must register by providing “a statement in writing signed
by such person, giving such information as may be required by the Department of

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Given our construction of “gang related,” we believe that section 186.32(a)(1)(C)
may reasonably be construed to require only information concerning criminal street
gangs that is reasonably related to the purpose of the Act and its goal of protecting the
public form gang-related violent crime. (See Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27
Cal.4th at pp. 573-576; Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (b).) When limited to this focused purpose,
the phrase giving any information that may be required by the law enforcement agency
reasonably means that the registrant must provide information necessary for the law
enforcement agency to locate the offender, such as the person’s full name, any aliases,
the person’s date of birth, the person’s residence, the description and license plate
number of any vehicle the person owns or drives, and information regarding any
employment the person has. It also means descriptive or identifying information
concerning the membership and whereabouts of criminal street gangs that is reasonably
designed to aid agencies in preventing gang-related violence and crime. So construed,
section 186.32 provides constitutionally sufficient notice to a registrant and reasonable
guidance to law enforcement agencies and thus adequate protection against arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.
Given our construction of section 186.32(a)(1)(C), we also concluded that it is not
impermissibly overbroad and does not abridge the First Amendment right of association.
Simply put, it does not give law enforcement agencies carte blanche authority to ask
unlimited questions about anything. Rather, the statute authorizes agencies to ask, and
requires the registrant to provide, only that information reasonably necessary to carry out
the legitimate purposes of the Act. (See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th
1090, 1112.) For the same reason, we reject the minor’s claim that the statute violates his
Justice” as well as fingerprints and a photograph. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11594.)
Arsonists similarly are required to provide “a statement in writing signed by the person,
giving information as may be required by the Department of Justice” along with
fingerprints and a photograph.” (§ 457.1, subd. (f).)

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California constitutional right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; see People v. Hove
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1005-1007.)
Next, we find no merit to the minor’s claim that the registration requirement
violates the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and his right to counsel. (U.S. Const., 4th, 5th, & 6th
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 15 & 24.)
The minor cites no authority for the proposition that a registration requirement
imposed after a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication violates, or even implicates,
the offender’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. Understandably so. In People v.
McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, the defendant was convicted of certain sex offenses and,
under section 1202.1 was required to submit to blood testing for AIDS. The court
concluded that like DNA analysis of blood samples, deportation, hospitalization of the
potentially insane, and registration as a sex offender, AIDS testing served a legitimate
nonpunitive governmental purpose. The court rejected the claim that the test did not so
implicate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights as to constitute additional
punishment. (People v. McVickers, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 87-89.)
As our discussion reveals, the registration requirement is a consequence of the
minor’s continued wardship and release on probation and serves a legitimate, nonpunitive
and compelling governmental purpose: prevention of recidivism and gang violence and
crime. (See People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 872-873.) We note that as a
condition of probation, courts may require that minors be subject to search or seizure
without grounds for suspicion as long as such conduct is not arbitrary or capricious or
undertaken solely for purposes of harassment. (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 83,
86, 87, fn. 5.) The registration requirement is akin to a probation condition, and to the
degree that it may be considered a search or seizure, it does not impermissibly infringe on
the minor’s Fourth Amendment rights.

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Inasmuch as we have determined that the permissible scope of the inquiry by
authorities under the registration requirement is limited to descriptive information about
the registrant and criminal street gangs, we further conclude that it does not implicate the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. The minor is not subject to
custodial interrogation or prosecution in violation of his right to remain silent or his right
to counsel, nor can the challenged procedure be regarded as comparable to a
preindictment investigation of a crime suspect or the initiation of an adversarial criminal
proceeding where his fundamental rights may be affected. (See Marchetti v. United
States (1968) 390 U.S. 39, 53 [self-incrimination]; Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 128,
134 [right to counsel].)
Last, we reject the minor’s claim that the registration requirement violates the
constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const., 8th
Amend; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) Assuming that the requirement constitutes punishment
(see In re Reed (1983) 33 Cal.3d 914 [sex offender registration requirement is
punishment], disapproved in People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785 insofar as Reed
suggests that registration is punishment for purposes of ex post facto analysis]), we do
not find that the minor has satisfied his heavy burden to establish that the registration is
cruel and unusual punishment. (See People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174.)
In In re Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914, the court concluded that the lifetime
registration requirement for sex offenders, and the stigma attached to such registration,
was unconstitutional punishment for a misdemeanor involving a relatively minor,
nonviolent, sexual indiscretion. (Id. at p. 926.)
Here, the minor committed a gang-related violent and unprovoked attack, and, as a
result he is subject to a five-year registration requirement. We have considered this
requirement in light of the criteria relevant in determining his constitutional challenge.
(See Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, 290-291; In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425-
427.) We do not find that the registration requirement as construed is “so

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disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and
offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424,
fn. omitted; see People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 477-478; Gregg v. Georgia
(1976) 428 U.S. 153, 173.)

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VIII. Disposition
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
Wunderlich, J.
WE CONCUR:
Premo, Acting P.J.
Elia, J.

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