Mendoza v. City of Duarte 12/30/24 L.A./AD

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Filed 12/30/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
ARMANDO MENDOZA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CITY OF DUARTE,
Defendant and Appellant.
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No. 24APLC00050
Spring Street Trial Court
No. 23STLC02807
OPINION
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Latrice A.G.
Byrdsong, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Valerie D. Escalante Troesh and Matthew G. Trujillo, Civica Law Group, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Julie N. Nong for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *

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Armando Mendoza was cited by the City of Duarte (the City) based on municipal code
violations for keeping noisy animals and exceeding the permissible number of animals which
could be kept on his property. After the citation was upheld in an administrative hearing,
Mendoza sought de novo review in the superior court (Gov. Code, § 53069.4, subd. (b)) and
following the court upholding the citations in a “Notice of Decision” mailed to the parties, the
City filed a motion for an award of attorney fees and costs. The court denied the motion on the
basis it was not timely filed, and the City appeals the order.
As discussed below, we affirm. Because the decision of the court upholding the citation
constituted a judgment in a limited civil jurisdiction matter which finally disposed of
Mendoza’s appeal of the citation, with no further order or judicial directive forthcoming, the
City was required to file its motion within 30 days from when the clerk served the parties with
the decision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1702(b)(1) & 8.822(a)(1)(A).) Since the motion was
filed 66 days after the decision was served, the court correctly denied it as untimely.
BACKGROUND
On October 13, 2023,1 the court conducted its de novo review concerning a February 22
administrative citation. Following the hearing, the court affirmed the citation the same date.
Using a Los Angeles County Superior Court form order titled, “Notice of Decision –
Administrative Appeal” (some capitalization omitted), the court issued its decision on October
13. Mendoza was listed as the “contestant” and the City as the “Processing Agency,” and a box
was checked indicating “Appeal of Processing Agency’s Final Decision (Gov. Code, §
53069.4)” as to the “Type of Appeal” involved. The form stated, “The above-entitled matter
having been heard de novo, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the Court
that the final administrative decision in the case, rendered on 10/13/2023 is”—and a box was
checked next to—“AFFIRMED, contestant to recover nothing.” The seal of the court was
affixed beside the signature of the presiding bench officer, and a “10/13/2023” file stamp was
added at the top of the document. A certificate of service executed by the clerk stated, at the
1All undesignated date references are to the year 2023.

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bottom of the form, that on October 13, the clerk “served the Notice of Decision –
Administrative Appeal upon each party or counsel named below,” with Mendoza and the City,
as well as their addresses, listed.
The City filed its motion for an award of attorney fees and costs on December 18,
requesting $45,078.93 pursuant to Duarte Municipal Code sections 1.08.130(a) and 1.08.140.
Prior to the January 16, 2024 hearing on the motion, the court provided the parties with a
tentative ruling denying the motion as untimely, indicating California Rules of Court, rule
3.1702(b)(1), required a motion for attorney fees to be filed within the time period for filing a
notice of appeal in a limited civil case, and under California Rules of Court, rule
8.822(a)(1)(A), the time to file an appeal was 30 days from when the clerk served the parties
with its notice of decision.
At the hearing, counsel for the City argued the motion was timely, because the 30-day
limit in California Rules of Court, rule 8.822(a)(1)(A), applies when a party is served with a
judgment, and only a notice of decision was served. Counsel maintained the October 13
decision did not constitute a judgment, and following the decision having been filed, the City
was expecting a judgment to be issued. Counsel claimed a 90-day limit applied (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.822(a)(1)(C)), and thus the motion was timely filed. Additionally, counsel asked
the court to provide it with “leniency” exercising its “equitable powers,” and consider the
motion on its merits.
The court explained, “there is no judgment in administrative appeals, there is a
decision[,]” and noted, “There’s no subsequent judgment that comes.” The court stated, “Is
your position that there would be no decision or judgment by the court that’s enforceable until
what? The court needs to issue something else that says judgment? Because that’s not
supported.”
In a January 23, 2024, minute order, the court concluded the motion for attorney fees
and costs was untimely filed. The court determined, “For administrative appeals, the operative
event is the court’s issuance of the Notice of Decision. As such, the City’s argument at the
hearing that the 90-day period under CRC rule 8.822(a)(1)(C) should apply because the Court

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issued a Notice of Decision rather than a ‘‘“Notice of Entry” of judgment’ is misplaced.” In
denying the motion, the court stated, “[N]otice of the Court’s decision was given on October
13, . . . which decision was a final decision on the matter. The City did not file its motion for
attorney’s fees until December 18, . . . well over the 30-day deadline to file such motion. . . .
[A] motion for attorney’s fees must be filed within 30-days from the date notice of the court’s
decision was given.”2
DISCUSSION
Appealability and Standard of Review
A trial court’s decision in a de novo hearing reviewing an administrative fine is an
appealable judgment or order under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.2, subdivision (a).
(See Dedication & Everlasting Love to Animals, Inc. v. City of El Monte (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
113, 119-122 (Dedication) [decision in a de novo hearing reviewing an administrative fine in a
limited civil jurisdiction case is appealable to the appellate division of the superior court]; see
also County of Humboldt v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 298,
303-304 (Humboldt) [“a final judgment or order from a de novo appeal to the superior court
under [Government Code] section 53069.4 is itself reviewable on appeal to an intermediate
appellate court”].) It follows that an order on a post-decision attorney’s fees motion is also
appealable, as an order made after an appealable judgment or order under Code of Civil
Procedure section 904.2, subdivision (b).
The issues involved in the appeal are ones of law regarding interpretation of the
applicable statutes and the California Rules of Court, with no facts in dispute. We therefore
exercise de novo review. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800; York Healthcare &
Wellness Centre LP v. State Dept. of Public Health (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th Supp. 20, 26.)
2The court found the City’s request for costs other than attorney fees to be untimely under
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1), a rule that states a party’s costs memorandum must be
served within 15 days after the earliest of service of notice of entry of judgment or 180 days after entry
of judgment. Because the parties on appeal do not address California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1),
and focus on the timeliness of the attorney fees portion of the motion under California Rules of Court,
rule 3.1702(b)(1), we only discuss the timeliness of the attorney fees request in our opinion.

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An interpretation of statutes and court rules both begin with an examination of the plain
language used. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871 [“In construing a statute, a court’s
objective is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. . . . To determine legislative intent, a
court begins with the words of the statute, because they generally provide the most reliable
indicator of legislative intent”]; Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th
894, 902 [“The ordinary principles of statutory construction govern our interpretation of the
California Rules of Court”].) We proceed to apply the unambiguous terms in the statutes and
rules in resolving the appeal. (Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 521, 534
[“‘“The plain meaning [of a statute] controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory
language”’”].)
Statutes and California Rules of Court
Government Code section 53069.4 authorizes local governments to enact an
administrative process to enforce violations of ordinances through the imposition and collection
of administrative fines or penalties; Government Code section 53069.4, subdivision (b)(1),
provides a party dissatisfied with an administrative order or decision of a local agency may file
an appeal wherein the superior court shall conduct a de novo hearing; and this provision
specifies, “[a] proceeding under this subdivision is a limited civil case.” (Accord, Dedication,
supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 118-121; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 85, subd. (c)(14) [an action
under Government Code section 53069.4 constitutes a limited jurisdiction civil case].)
Once a court issues a decision following its de novo review in a limited civil appeal (in a
case where, as here, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 86, subdivision (a)(1), the
amount provided in the citation is $35,000 or under), a party may file an appeal with the
appellate division of the superior court. (Dedication, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 121-122.)
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1), indicates that, to determine the deadline for the
filing of a post-decision motion for attorney’ fees, a court must look to the time limit for filing
an appeal from a decision following de novo review. The rule provides, in relevant part, “A
notice of motion to claim attorney’s fees for services up to and including the rendition of

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judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of
appeal under . . . rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.”
California Rules of Court, rule 8.822(a)(1), states as follows:
“Unless a statute or rule 8.823 provides otherwise, a notice of appeal must be filed on or
before the earliest of:
“(A) 30 days after the trial court clerk serves the party filing the notice of appeal a
document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the
judgment, showing the date it was served;
“(B) 30 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a
party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed
copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or
“(C) 90 days after the entry of judgment.”3
Application to Present Appeal
The dispositive issue before us is whether the October 13 decision, issued following the
de novo review by the court, amounted to a “filed-endorsed copy of the judgment” under
California Rules of Court, rule 8.822(a)(1)(A). We conclude it did.4
As noted above, Humboldt, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 303-304, held a decision by a
trial court following de novo review of an administrative citation constitutes an appealable
judgment. In the case, the amount of the administrative fine exceeded the cap for limited civil
actions. (Id. at p. 312.) Thus, the question for the appellate court was whether an appeal was
allowed to the Court of Appeal under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1),
3California Rules of Court, rule 8.823, can extend the time to file a notice of appeal under
circumstances inapplicable here, which include the filing of motions for a new trial and to vacate a
judgment. For purposes of the rules in limited civil appeals, California Rules of Court, rule 8.803(22),
provides, “‘Judgment’ includes a judgment or order that may be appealed.”
4The trial court appeared to have concluded the attorney fees motion to be untimely based on
the parties having been served with a “notice of the court’s decision” on October 13 under California
Rules of Court, rule 8.822(a)(1), as opposed to the parties having been served with a copy of the
judgment under the rule. But, we review the court’s dismissal order, not its rationale (see Cahill v. San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956), and because we determine the October 13
decision constituted a judgment and the parties were served with a copy of the judgment, we do not
analyze whether the parties were served with a document titled “Notice of Entry” of judgment (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.822(a)(1)(A)).

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which provides, with some exceptions, an appeal may be taken, “[f]rom a judgment, . . .” (Id.
at p. 310.) Humboldt explained, “‘“A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the
parties in an action or proceeding . . .” [citation] . . . [and] “is final ‘when it terminates the
litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined.’”’ [Citation] ‘“‘It is not the form of the
decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative. As a general
test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, it may be
said that where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or
noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further
in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the
rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.’”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
The Court of Appeal stated, “With these principles in mind, we conclude that a superior
court order that conclusively resolves the merits of a de novo appeal under [Government Code]
section 53069.4 in an unlimited civil matter is a final judgment, appealable to an intermediate
appellate court under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1).” (Humboldt,
supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 311.) The Court of Appeal noted the trial court’s decision in its
case “‘determined all of the parties’ rights and liabilities at issue in the proceedings’” (quoting
City of Santa Cruz v. Patel (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 234, 243), and left “nothing to the party
against whom judgment is rendered except to comply” (quoting Dana Point Safe Harbor
Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 11). (Humboldt, supra, at p. 311.) The
appellate court thus concluded, “the superior court order below was an appealable final
judgment.” (Ibid.)
The appeal here involves a limited civil matter. But, the statute providing for an appeal
from the trial court’s decision is substantially the same as the one at issue in Humboldt,
providing in a limited civil case, an appeal may be taken, with exceptions inapplicable here,
“[f]rom a judgment, . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.2, subd. (a)(1).)
Akin to the decision in an unlimited civil matter in Humboldt, the “Notice of Decision”
served on the parties on October 13, even though it was not labeled “judgment,” was the final

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determination of the rights and liabilities of Mendoza and the City following the de novo
hearing, and there was nothing following the decision for Mendoza to do but to comply with
the citation. The decision was signed by the court and file-stamped with the date it was
entered, and thus constituted “a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date it was
served[,]” within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 8.822(a)(1)(A).
California Supreme Court Opinion on Appeals in Administrative Mandate Writs
The City on appeal relies on Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024) 16 Cal.5th 643
(Meinhardt). Although the opinion was issued after the trial court rendered its ruling, because
we review the issue of the timeliness of the City’s motion de novo, we consider the opinion.
We conclude Meinhardt is distinguishable and not controlling in the context before us. (See
Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019, 1029 [an opinion is not
authority for matters unaddressed therein].)
In Meinhardt, the California Supreme Court held that, for purposes of the time limit to
appeal to the Court of Appeal a trial court’s ruling in a writ of administrative mandate (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1094.5), the triggering event is the court’s filing of a judgment, as opposed to the
filing of a previously issued order granting or denying the writ. (Meinhardt, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at p. 650.) In the case, the City of Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety suspended one of its
police officers, the suspension was upheld by the personnel board, and the officer challenged
the suspension by filing a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the superior court.
(Ibid.) Following a hearing, the court clerk served the parties with a “‘Notice of Entry of
Judgment or Order,’” along with a file-stamped copy of a document titled “‘ORDER,’” which
contained the court’s factual findings and legal rulings and concluded, “‘the Petition for Writ of
Administrative Mandamus is DENIED.’” (Ibid.) Two and a half weeks later, the court issued a
document titled “‘JUDGMENT’” that stated the court had previously issued an order denying
the officer’s petition, and “‘For the reasons set forth in the Order, the Court hereby enters
Judgment for Respondents City of Sunnyvale, et al., and against [the officer], who shall take
nothing by this action. [¶] IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.’” (Ibid.)

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The California Supreme Court noted that, in resolving an administrative mandate writ,
entry of a “judgment,” not simply entry of an “order” is required by the applicable statutes.
(Meinhardt, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 650-653 [observing Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5, subdivision (f), states the “‘court shall enter judgment’” and Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.5, subdivision (h)(1), setting forth rules on stays, contemplates the notice of
appeal will be “‘from the judgment’”].) The Supreme Court indicated, consistent with the
statutory scheme, “courts have contemplated that there will be entry of a formal judgment
following an order granting or denying a petition for writ of administrative mandate.”
(Meinhardt, supra, at p. 654 [citing Supreme Court and Court of Appeal opinions as
examples].) Meinhardt found it is the service of notice of entry of judgment or service of a
copy of the judgment in an administrative mandate proceeding that is the triggering event for
the time limit to file a notice of appeal, not notice of entry of the order granting or denying the
writ or the service of a copy of the order. (Meinhardt, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 650, 657-658,
662.)
The statutory scheme at issue in Meinhardt is different from the one in the case sub
judice, in that, the issuance of no judgment or order is contemplated after a court in a de novo
review of an administrative hearing provides its final decision in the matter. Unlike with
administrative mandate writs, where a court will enter an order denying or granting a writ and
subsequently enter formal judgment on the order, the court’s decision following de novo review
fully resolves the matter. Government Code section 53069.4 does not state, as with the statutes
at issue in Meinhardt, the “court shall enter judgment” in order to end the matter. The only
reference to “judgment” in the statute pertains to when a party requesting de novo review
prevails, and “[a]ny deposit of the fine or penalty shall be refunded by the local agency in
accordance with the judgment of the court.” (Gov. Code, § 53069.4, subd. (b)(2).) Given the
finality of the decision resolving the issue when a decision is rendered, the lone use of the word
“judgment,” when characterizing the court’s determination for purposes of disposition of a
deposit, could not have been intended as requiring the issuance of a second document following
the court’s written decision. (See Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of

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Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245 [“The literal language of enactments may be
disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the apparent intent of the framers”].)
In addition, Meinhardt noted appellate opinions “contemplated that there will be entry of
a formal judgment following an order granting or denying a petition for writ of administrative
mandate.” (Meinhardt, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 654.) Unlike in Meinhardt, no published
appellate opinion has held a document titled “judgment” must follow a court’s decision, and as
discussed above, it has been held the decision of a court following a de novo review of an
administrative citation under Government Code section 53069.4 “is a final judgment.”
(Humboldt, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 311.)5
Similar to the judgment which Meinhardt held was the trigger for starting the period for
filing a notice of appeal, the trial court’s October 13 decision stated, “IT IS ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED” a determination had been made. The decision plainly stated
the court issued a “final administrative decision in the case,” and its decision was hence as final
a judgment as the one Meinhardt noted started the clock for purposes of filing a notice of
appeal.
Remaining Arguments
Pointing to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(d), the City argues this court should,
“extend the [City’s] deadline to file its [f]ee [m]otion such that the December filing is deemed
timely . . . .” We reject the argument.
The rule provides, “For good cause, the trial judge may extend the time for filing a
motion for attorney’s fees in the absence of a stipulation or for a longer period than allowed by
stipulation.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(d).) The rule, by its own terms, does not apply
to an appellate court, and the City does not appear to argue the trial court should have relied on
5We also note that, consistent with our determination, the Court of Appeal in Dedication,
without analyzing the issue, appeared to recognize service of a court’s decision following a de novo
hearing triggers the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal in California Rules of Court, rule
8.822(a)(1), indicating, “The superior court’s notice of decision was issued on September 24, 2021, and
served the same day[,]” and “DELTA attempted to file a notice of appeal to the appellate division of the
superior court on October 22, 2021, before the 30-day deadline.” (Dedication, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at
p. 121.)

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the rule and granted an extension when the City, at the hearing on its motion, asked the court to
demonstrate “leniency” and exercise its “equitable powers” in considering the attorney fees
motion on its merits.
The City also argues this court “should use its discretion and authority under equity to
allow [the City’s] [f]ee [m]otion to move forward on the merits given the clear law above and
public policy behind the recovery laws in the first place.” Given the argument is undeveloped
and is made without citation to relevant authority, we do not further address it. (See Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.883(a)(1)(A); Atchley v. City of Fresno (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 635, 647 [when
a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, “it is deemed to be
without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court”].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the City’s attorney fees motion is affirmed. Mendoza, as
the respondent, is to recover costs on appeal.
_________________________
Ricciardulli, J.
We concur:
_______________________ _________________________
Kumar, Acting P. J. Guillemet, J.