24-1821 United States of America v. SUNNA SEPETU and NAFIS QUAYE

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 24-1650, 24-1821
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
SUNNA SEPETU and NAFIS QUAYE,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Samantha D. Elliot, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Thompson, and Dunlap,
Circuit Judges.
Emma Quinn-Judge, with whom Zalkind Duncan & Bernstein LLP,
was on brief, for Appellant Sunna Sepetu.
Zainabu Rumala, with whom Federal Public Defender Office, was
on brief, for Appellant Nafis Quaye.
Anna Z. Krasinski, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Erin Creegan, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
Appellee.
May 15, 2026

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DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Nafis Quaye
and Defendant-Appellant Sunna Sepetu (collectively "Defendants")
appeal from the district court's final judgment entering guilty
verdicts against them for money laundering conspiracy. The
evidence adduced at trial showed that Quaye engaged in a years-long
pattern of using his friends and family to register businesses and
create bank accounts on his behalf, including an account operated
by Sepetu. Quaye and Sepetu facilitated the transfer of illegally
obtained funds in and out of these accounts under the guise of a
business that purportedly bought goods domestically and shipped
them to customers overseas. Both Defendants challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions, as well
as the jury instructions issued by the district court on the issues
of willful blindness and good faith. Sepetu separately challenges
the propriety of the government's collective references to
Defendants in its opening and closing arguments and the district
court's calculation of her sentencing guidelines. We reject
Defendants' arguments and affirm both their convictions and
Sepetu's sentence.
I.
Over a six-year period, Quaye directed his friends and
family to register four business entities -- Easy Soft, Ken and K,

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Micro Syncnetic, and Logitech1 -- and open various bank accounts
for the businesses on his behalf. Quaye regularly facilitated
large wire transfers in and out of those accounts, purportedly as
part of a business operation in which he bought cars, computers,
and other goods in the United States and shipped them to customers
overseas.
Quaye represented that he entered this line of business
after a trusted Ghanaian community member introduced him to a man
named Samuel Ansah, whom Quaye believed to be a buyer in Ghana and
owner of La Vita Ghana and SpeedPrints Ghana. Quaye, however,
never received payment directly from Ansah.
Quaye's operation followed a distinct pattern: He would
direct friends or family members to hold themselves out as owners
of a business entity, and would then direct them to sign blank
checks and make cash withdrawals on his behalf from the business
bank accounts. When a bank would close an account or when he
would otherwise choose to close an account, Quaye would rely on
his friends and family to open more new accounts on his behalf so
that he could continue his operation.
As part of this operation and at Quaye's request,
Sepetu -- who was romantically involved with Quaye -- registered
1 Initially, Logitech was also named Easy Soft, but was later
renamed Logitech. For ease and avoidance of confusion, we refer
to this business as Logitech.

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a business called Logitech (initially registered as Easy Soft).
She also opened three bank accounts for the business entity. After
law enforcement learned of and began investigating this scheme,
Sepetu told officers that Logitech was a business that she owned
and ran out of her home, and variously stated that the business
shipped computers and printers to customers overseas and that the
business would buy anything -- including crushers2 -- for anyone.3
Within days of receiving funds in the Logitech account, Sepetu,
under Quaye's direction, would wire funds to various entities and
send Quaye screenshots confirming the transactions. When
questioned by law enforcement, Sepetu could not answer basic
questions about Logitech's operations, including its sales,
volumes, and profits. She nonetheless claimed that she believed
Logitech was a legitimate business and that she never "became
suspicious about" the source of its funds.
While Quaye and Sepetu operated these business entities,
Maryann Schirmer, the victim in this case, began communicating
with a man purportedly named Shawn Walker on a dating website and
developed what she thought was a romantic relationship with him.
"Walker" asked Schirmer for money, under the guise of needing
2 A law enforcement agent described a crusher as "a large
construction machinery that rips up stone and turns it into
aggregate."
3 When questioned at trial, however, Sepetu said Quaye did
not share with her what items Logitech would buy and sell.

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assistance with a variety of expenses, and directed her to wire it
to the Easy Soft, Ken and K, Micro Syncnetic, and Logitech
accounts. From 2014 to 2019, Schirmer wired more than three
million dollars to those accounts, including $827,000 into the
Logitech account controlled by Sepetu. Unbeknownst to Schirmer,
Ansah -- whom she did not know -- had been posing as Walker.
Neither Quaye nor Sepetu knew Schirmer. And while Quaye knew
Ansah's wife, Sepetu did not know Ansah. Further, except for a
2015 email from the "Shawn Walker" email account to an Easy Soft
account confirming a wire transfer, no direct evidence connected
Quaye or Sepetu to Ansah's romance scam.
Each of Schirmer's wire transfers showed that the funds
originated from a U.S.-based account under her name: "Maryann K
Schirmer." Most of the funds were earmarked for "investment," and
some were earmarked for "services." These transfers constituted
most of the incoming funds in Quaye and Sepetu's accounts,
including, for example, 88% of funds sent to an Easy Soft account
at Santander Bank, 68% of funds sent to a Ken & K account at Bank
of America, 93% of funds sent to a Micro Syncnetic account at Bank
of America, and 83% of funds sent to a Logitech account at Bank of
America. Quaye variously claimed that Schirmer was an owner or
CEO of a car dealership, and that Quaye purchased computer products
for Schirmer.

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Quaye and Sepetu withdrew significant amounts of cash
from the accounts, at times up to and exceeding hundreds of
thousands of dollars. For example, Quaye withdrew over $246,000
from one Easy Soft account, reflecting more than 50% of the money
wired by Schirmer to that account, and over $249,000 from a second
Easy Soft account, reflecting more than 87% of the money wired by
Schirmer to that account. Sepetu withdrew over $62,000 from the
Logitech account, and she sent over $36,000 from the account to
Quaye. Quaye and Sepetu used funds from the accounts for personal
expenses, such as retail and luxury purchases, club expenditures,
and travel expenses unrelated to their purported business. With
respect to the Logitech account, with Quaye's permission, Sepetu
used funds for gas, food, spa and salon expenses, and retail
purchases. Personal expenses paid from the Logitech account
totaled nearly $32,000.
After opening one of the Easy Soft accounts in July 2014
and facilitating numerous wire transfers and cash withdrawals,
Quaye was contacted by the compliance division at Santander Bank
and questioned regarding "[t]he origin of" those transfers and
"the use for th[e] funds." Quaye characterized the funds as
"business transactions" meant for him to "buy printing machines
and cars that he needed to send to another country." Santander
closed that account in September 2015 after it was overdrawn.
Similarly, in February 2019, law enforcement questioned Sepetu

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about the source of the wire transfers into the Logitech account.
They specifically inquired whether "anything illegal was going on
at Logitech," which Sepetu denied. Even after these inquiries,
Quaye and Sepetu continued to accept funds from
Schirmer -- including five wires to the Logitech account totaling
over $190,000 -- and similarly continued to withdraw and spend
cash.
Although the type of business operation that Quaye and
Sepetu were allegedly part of would involve paperwork such as
titles, bills of lading, and bills of sale, Quaye did not have
records of such business transactions. Sepetu likewise did not
maintain such records and told agents that she "would have to talk
to her friend" to get invoices that Logitech paid related to the
transactions. She ultimately produced three invoices, none of
which referenced Logitech or Quaye's other business entities.
Sepetu conceded that "she wasn't sure th[ey] were the invoices
that relate[d] to the wires" and that she "didn't have any further
documentation" of Logitech's transactions. Except for one text
message to Quaye generally inquiring about "fil[]ing taxes," and
another requesting Logitech's "estimated gross income a year,"
Sepetu did not seek information about the business, including the
source of its funds.
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Quaye and
Sepetu with conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of

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18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). They were
tried jointly. At trial, both Quaye and Sepetu testified that
they lacked knowledge of the illegal source of the funds.
Nonetheless, the jury found Quaye and Sepetu guilty. This appeal
followed.
II.
Defendants raise several challenges to the trial
proceedings. They each argue that the evidence was not sufficient
to support the jury's verdict, and that the district court erred
by both providing a willful blindness instruction and declining to
provide Defendants' proposed good faith instruction. Sepetu
separately contends that the government improperly argued for
Sepetu's guilt by association to Quaye during opening and closing
arguments and challenges the district court's calculation of her
guideline range. We address each argument in turn.
A. Trial Challenges
1. Sufficiency of Evidence
Defendants assert that the evidence adduced at trial
failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that they knowingly
agreed to launder fraud proceeds. They highlight the lack of
direct evidence showing their involvement in the romance scam
perpetrated against Schirmer. We disagree because the
circumstantial evidence sufficed to support a jury verdict that

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Defendants had actual knowledge of, or were at least willfully
blind to, the unlawful origins of the proceeds.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 "provides that a
court may acquit a defendant if the evidence is insufficient to
establish factual guilt." United States v. Pérez-Greaux, 83 F.4th
1, 23 (1st Cir. 2023); Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(2). We "review a
district court's determination on a Rule 29 motion for acquittal
de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government." Id. That means we "must credit the government's
witnesses, draw all reasonable inferences in its favor, and uphold
the verdict if it is 'supported by a plausible rendition of the
record'" without "re-weigh[ing] the evidence or second-guess[ing]
the jury's credibility determinations." Id. (quoting United
States v. Bobadilla-Pagán, 747 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2014)). "If
the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict
gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of
guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, the court
must reverse the conviction." United States v. Coleman, 149 F.4th
1, 42 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation modified) (quoting United States
v. Morillo, 158 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1998)). "A verdict
satisfying this standard may be supported by circumstantial
evidence alone"; however, we will neither "give credence to
evidentiary interpretations and illations that are unreasonable,
insupportable, or overly speculative," nor "stack inference upon

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inference in order to uphold the jury's verdict." United States
v. Burgos, 703 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012) (citation modified)
(first quoting Morgan v. Dickhaut, 677 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2012);
and then quoting Leftwich v. Maloney, 532 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir.
2008)).
To sustain Defendants' convictions, the evidence must be
sufficient to show that (1) "a conspiracy existed," (2) they "had
knowledge of the conspiracy," and (3) they "knowingly and
voluntarily participated in the conspiracy." Burgos, 703 F.3d at
10 (quoting United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 116 (1st
Cir. 2011)). "Knowledge" of a conspiracy can be established
either "with evidence of actual knowledge or with evidence of
willful blindness," id. at 11, the latter meaning that Defendants
were aware of a high probability of conspiracy but "consciously
and deliberately avoided learning of [it]," id. at 11 (quoting
United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 85 n.7 (1st Cir. 2006));
see United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d, 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2009).
As for the requirement that Defendants "knowingly and voluntarily
participated in the conspiracy," "the evidence must establish that
they both intended to join the conspiracy and intended to
effectuate the objects of the conspiracy." Id. at 11 (citation
modified). The underlying money-laundering offense further
requires a showing that Defendants knew that (1) "the funds
involved in the financial transaction were the proceeds of some

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unlawful activity," and (2) "the transaction itself was 'designed
in whole or in part to conceal the nature, location, source,
ownership, or control of the proceeds of such unlawful activity.'"
United States v. Frigerio-Migiano, 254 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)).
There can be no conspiracy to commit money laundering
where a defendant lacks knowledge of -- and did not deliberately
avoid knowledge of -- the illegal source of funds. Id. A
defendant need not, however, "know the precise origin" of the
funds, but "only that [they] came 'from some form, though not
necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under
State, Federal, or foreign law.'" United States v. Cedeno-Perez,
579 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1)).
Here, despite the lack of direct evidence showing that Defendants
knew about the romance scam, circumstantial evidence supported the
jury's finding that Defendants had actual knowledge, or at least
remained willfully blind to, the illegality of the transferred
funds.
As a general matter, Defendants engaged in an unusual
pattern of (1) establishing numerous business accounts under the
names of Quaye's family and friends, including Sepetu,
(2) receiving large transfers of funds to those accounts, and
(3) swiftly wiring funds out of the accounts to other entities.
Given the absence of business records providing a legitimate

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explanation for this pattern, a jury could reasonably construe it
as an effort by Defendants to conceal the source of the funds,
suggesting that they either knew or remained willfully blind to
the funds' illegal inception. See United States v. Adorno-Molina,
774 F.3d 116, 125 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that "use of straw
owners to purchase vehicles" and "frequent cash transfers between"
conspirators contributed to circumstantial evidence sufficient to
find that the defendant knew funds were laundered or ignored
"warning signs" of money laundering conspiracy); United States v.
Rivera-Rodriguez, 318 F.3d 268, 272 (1st Cir. 2003) (concluding
that "more than one [] venture" involving "very large cash
transactions" with "concealment" and "false ownership"
demonstrated a "pattern" that a jury could reasonably construe as
"an effort to launder illegally obtained proceeds").
Moreover, despite Defendants' purported business of
buying goods domestically to export to buyers in Ghana, bank
records confirm that the transfers to their business accounts all
originated from a U.S.-based account owned by Schirmer, most of
which were earmarked for "investment." The Logitech account
specifically received at least sixteen such transfers over just
nine months, accounting for $827,000 total and eighty-three
percent of its received funds. Viewed in the light most favorable
to the government, these repeated, large transfers within a short
period -- all originating from Schirmer's U.S.-based account -- to

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Quaye's and Sepetu's accounts could lead a jury to conclude that,
at the very least, Quaye and Sepetu ignored a red flag indicating
that the funds were not coming from a legitimate Ghanaian business.
The absence of legitimate business records, specifically
any "invoices documenting the source of the[ir] [received] funds,"
further supports our conclusion that the defendants knew or were
willfully blind to the illicit source of funds. United States v.
Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 2006). In total, Defendants
provided just three invoices. Two were from La Vita to Shop Car
Parts Ghana Ltd., and one was from Sigma to First Core Quarry
Limited. None referenced Defendants' business entities. Quaye
identified one text message where he asked Sepetu to transfer funds
to Sigma, along with a bank record confirming that transfer, as
evidence that he "operated an exporting business" and "transferred
money for . . . commercial activities." But as the law
enforcement agent who examined Quaye's phone testified, Quaye
overall had "very little communication[] regarding the type of
business activity" that he "purported to be involved in." A jury
could reasonably rely on this lack of documentation as additional
support for the conclusion that Quaye's and Sepetu's businesses
were illegitimate.
As to Sepetu specifically, although she sent Quaye
screenshots of his requested wire transfers to various entities,
she admitted that she "didn't have any further documentation" of

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Logitech's transactions, such as invoices documenting purchases by
its purported customers. Although Sepetu suggests that she
maintained appropriate records "with respect to her own role" at
Logitech, in which she "did not claim to . . . set[] up
transactions to export computers," this suggestions stands in
significant tension with the story Sepetu told law enforcement:
that "Logitech Group was her business," that she "works out of her
house," and that her business involved "the purchase of computers
and printers and computer parts for customers in Africa." A jury
could reasonably construe these statements as showing that Sepetu
played an active role in Logitech's export operations and thus
would have had reason and opportunity to document those
transactions if they actually occurred. The jury could similarly
conclude that her failure to do so suggests that she knew the
business was a sham.
Sepetu argues that the evidence simply "demonstrate[s]
her lack of knowledge" about Logitech's operations and that she
"trusted her long-term partner and assisted him by operating a
business account." Again, her statements to law enforcement
suggest otherwise. But even accepting this premise, given the
lack of records and large amounts of money flowing in and out of
Logitech's account, "warning signs existed" that were "sufficient
to put" Sepetu "on inquiry notice" regarding the legitimacy of the
purported business operations. See United States v. Singh, 222

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F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). Sepetu insists that she tried to
learn about the business when she "asked Quaye about [its] profits
and tax obligations," but she cites just two general text messages,
neither of which inquired about the source of the funds. Her
choice not to question Logitech's business activity more
extensively indicates that she remained intentionally ignorant of
warning signs. See Singh, 222 F.3d at 11 (explaining that willful
blindness may exist where "the defendant claims to lack guilty
knowledge, yet the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to
the government, suffices to support an inference that he
deliberately shut his eyes to the true facts").
Further, despite representing that their business did
not generate large profits, Defendants made significant personal
expenditures from the funds in their accounts. They took tens of
thousands of dollars in cash withdrawals and direct transfers from
the Logitech account alone, and they spent money at, for example,
retail and luxury stores, and clubs. Sepetu contends that she
received permission from Quaye for personal expenditures from the
Logitech account and that Quaye made such expenditures on her
behalf, but that does not change the fact that she either made
those expenditures or knew about them. Defendants' pattern of
gratuitous spending against a backdrop of purportedly thin profits
supports a finding that there was no legitimate business and that
they knew the funds did not come from a legitimate source. See

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United States v. Corchado-Peralta, 318 F.3d 255, 258 (1st Cir.
2003) (holding that there was sufficient evidence of knowledge
that funds were illegal where "expenditures were huge, [] reported
income was a fraction of what was being spent[,] and [] legitimate
sources were not so obvious as to banish all thoughts of possible
illegal origin").
Defendants additionally gave conflicting accounts of
their business throughout the investigation. For example, "[a]t
first [Quaye] described [Ansah] to be the one in charge of
Logitech" but then changed his story to say that Ansah "was the
one in charge of La Vita in Ghana." Sepetu likewise wavered in
her accounts by first representing to law enforcement that
"Logitech Group was her business" and that she "work[ed] out of
her house," but later claiming that she did not know basic
information like "how much profit [Logitech] made or sales" and
that she would have to "talk to her friend" to obtain business
records. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a
jury could reasonably construe Quaye's and Sepetu's varying
stories as evidence that they knew that they were participating in
a money laundering scheme.
Finally, Quaye and Sepetu were alerted to, but ignored,
concerns about the irregular activity in their accounts. Indeed,
Quaye enlisted family and friends to open other businesses and
bank accounts to receive Schirmer's funds even after the compliance

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division at Santander Bank raised questions as to "[t]he origin of
where the money" for the wire transfers "was coming from" and "the
use for those funds." Similarly, despite receiving inquiries from
law enforcement as to whether "anything illegal was going on at
Logitech," Sepetu continued to accept and forward wire transfers
and withdraw and spend cash from the Logitech account.
Defendants' disregard of these inquiries and failure to probe the
areas of concern raised by both Santander and law enforcement
suggest that they knew of or deliberately ignored the illegitimacy
of the contested funds. See United States v. Abbas, 100 F.4th
267, 289 (1st Cir. 2024) (concluding that a "jury could infer that
[the defendant] 'had general knowledge' of the money's 'criminal
nature'" where "a bank investigator informed [the defendant] about
the suspicious nature of [a] wire" but the defendant continued to
"receive[] fraudulent funds through identical circumstances"
(quoting United States v. Rivera-Izquierdo, 850 F.3d 38, 49 (1st
Cir. 2017))).
Viewing this evidence as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the government, we conclude that it was sufficient to
support that Defendants knew -- or at least remained willfully
blind to -- the illegal source of the transfers to their accounts,
which, in turn, supports the jury's guilty verdicts on money
laundering conspiracy.

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2. Jury Instructions
Defendants also raised two arguments regarding the
adequacy of the district court's jury instructions. Neither
argument persuades us.4
a. Willful Blindness
Defendants first argue that the district court erred by
giving a willful blindness instruction because there is no evidence
that they "engaged in a conscious course of deliberate ignorance."
Although "[t]his court has been inconsistent as to the standard of
review that applies when reviewing a preserved challenge to a
willful blindness instruction, at times reviewing such challenges
de novo, and at others for abuse of discretion," United States v.
Evans, 143 F.4th 1, 9 n. 2 (1st Cir. 2025), Defendants' argument
fails under either standard.
Over defense counsel's objection, the district court
provided the following willful blindness instruction with respect
to the money-laundering component of the charge:
In deciding whether a defendant acted
knowingly, you may infer that the defendant
had knowledge of a fact if you find that he or
she deliberately closed his or her eyes to a
fact that otherwise would have been obvious to
4 Sepetu separately argues that "[e]ven if no single error
independently requires reversal, the combined effect of the
district court's instructional rulings and the prosecutor's
closing argument denied Sepetu a fair trial" and thus warrants a
new trial. Because we hold that no error occurred, there was
no prejudice to Sepetu and any argument of cumulative error
necessarily fails.

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him or her. In order to infer such knowledge,
you must find that two things have been
established. First, that the defendant was
aware of a high probability of the fact in
question. Second, that the defendant
consciously and deliberately avoided learning
of the fact. That is to say, the defendant
willfully made himself or herself blind to the
fact. It is entirely up to you to determine
whether he or she deliberately closed his or
her eyes to the fact, and if so, what
inference, if any, should be drawn. However,
it is important to bear in mind that mere
negligence or mistake in failing to learn the
fact or legal requirement is not sufficient.
There must be deliberate effort to remain
ignorant of the fact.
With respect to the conspiracy component of the charge,
the district court further instructed the jury as follows:
As I described with regard to money
laundering, you may, but you are not required
to, infer actual knowledge based on evidence
of willful blindness, that is, awareness of a
high probability of the fact in question and
conscious and deliberate avoidance of learning
the fact in question. You can refer to the
instructions for money laundering for a fuller
description of knowledge and willful
blindness.
"A willful blindness instruction is appropriate if (1) a
defendant claims a lack of knowledge, (2) the facts suggest a
conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and (3) the instruction,
taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood as mandating an inference
of knowledge." Azubike, 564 F.3d at 66. "Direct evidence of
willful blindness is not required; what is needed are sufficient
warning signs that call out for investigation or evidence of

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deliberate avoidance of knowledge." Id. "The evidence is
reviewed in the light most favorable to the government." Id.
Defendants do not dispute the first and third elements.
As for the second element, Defendants argue that the district
court's instructions improperly permitted a conviction based on a
finding that they merely "should have known" of the illegal source
of the transferred funds. To the contrary, the instructions
demanded that any conviction rest on a finding that Defendants had
the requisite mental state -- namely, that they "deliberately
closed [their] eyes," "consciously and deliberately avoided
learning of," and "willfully made [themselves] blind to" the funds'
illegality. Nowhere did the instructions suggest that negligence
was enough.
Moreover, as recounted above, the evidence is sufficient
to support that Defendants engaged in a conscious course of
deliberate ignorance. Defendants challenge the government's
reliance on the same evidence that it used to argue actual
knowledge, but this court has never indicated that "the set of
evidence supporting an inference of willful blindness cannot be
contained within a larger set of evidence that, in the alternative,
could support a finding of actual knowledge, or even that the two
sets cannot completely overlap." Id. at 68. Here, the evidence
at least shows "warning signs" indicating fraudulent activity
that, when coupled with Defendants' failure to inquire about or

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document the source of the funds, supports a finding that they
deliberately avoided such knowledge (if they did not have actual
knowledge). Id. at 66. The government was not required to show
that Defendants actively shut down conversations or expressly
refused information; their refusal to investigate red flags
sufficed to establish willful blindness. See Adorno-Molina, 774
F.3d at 125 (upholding willful blindness instruction where "the
record evidence reveal[ed] 'flags' of suspicion that,
uninvestigated, suggest[ed] willful blindness" (quoting Azubike,
564 F.3d at 66)). Based on this evidence, the district court
properly provided a willful blindness instruction.
b. Good Faith
Defendants next argue that the district court erred by
declining to issue a good faith instruction with their proposed
language, including that good faith "is a complete defense to the
charge." We review de novo a district court's refusal to give a
requested jury instruction. United States v. Figueroa-Lugo, 793
F.3d 179, 191 (1st Cir. 2015). We find no error here.
Defendants requested the following jury instruction on
good faith:
The "good faith" of a Defendant is a complete
defense to the charge in the indictment
because good faith on the part of the
Defendant is, simply, inconsistent with both
knowingly and willfully agreeing to be a
member of the alleged conspiracy and
specifically intending that a member of the

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alleged conspiracy would commit criminal
conduct . . . . An honest mistake in judgment
does not rise to the level of criminal conduct
. . . . Therefore, if the evidence in this
case leaves you with reasonable doubt as to
whether Ms. Sepetu acted with criminal intent
or in good faith, you should find her not
guilty.
Declining to adopt Defendants' proposed instruction, the
district court instead instructed the jury that "the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly,
willfully, and intentionally joined in the conspiracy," including
that the defendant had "knowledge of the conspiracy and its
purpose, an intent to agree to the conspiracy, and an intent to
achieve the conspiracy's unlawful objectives." The district court
further instructed that:
A defendant does not act knowingly, willfully,
or intentionally if his or her conduct is
involuntary or if it is the result of an
accident, mistake, or a misunderstanding that
prevents the defendant from acting with the
required intent. If the evidence leaves a
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant
acted with criminal intent as opposed to
acting in good faith, you should find the
defendant not guilty.
The district court finally instructed that "[a] person who has no
knowledge of the conspiracy but simply happens to act in a way
that furthers some object or purpose of the conspiracy is not a
conspirator."
"Jury instructions are to be evaluated in the context of
the charge as a whole, and a defendant has no absolute right to

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the use of particular language." United States v. Dockray, 943
F.2d 152, 154 (1st Cir. 1991). "The refusal to give a requested
instruction constitutes a reversible error 'only if the
instruction (1) is substantively correct; (2) was not
substantially covered in the charge actually delivered to the jury;
and (3) concerns an important point in the trial so that the
failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant's ability to
effectively present a given defense.'" United States v.
González-Pérez, 778 F.3d 3, 15 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United
States v. González-Soberal, 109 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 1997)).
"Under the third requirement, 'reversal is not required unless a
defendant suffers substantial prejudice.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 139 (1st Cir. 2008)).
The district court provided proper instructions here.
"Although good faith is an absolute defense" to money laundering
conspiracy, a court "need only convey the substance of the theory
to the jury." Dockray, 943 F.2d at 155. "[W]here the court
properly instructs the jury on the element of
intent . . . -- essentially the opposite of good faith -- a
separate instruction on good faith is not required." Id.; see
United States v. Goodspeed, 977 F.2d 566, *2 (1st Cir. 1992) ("We
have already explicitly declined to follow the rulings . . . which
require a separate good faith instruction despite a clear and
accurate instruction on the necessity of finding specific criminal

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intent."). Here, not only did the court's charge "explicitly
mention[] . . . good faith" -- albeit not in the precise fashion
that Defendants proposed -- but it also "unambiguously put the
jury on notice that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt" specific intent. United States v. Arcadipane, 41 F.3d 1,
8 (1st Cir. 1994). Nothing more was required.
3. Opening and Closing Argument
Sepetu argues that the government's references to "the
defendants" collectively during its opening and closing arguments
"misstated the evidence" and "invited guilt by association." We
review unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct in opening
and closing argument, as here, for plain error only. United States
v. Wilkerson, 411 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005). That "requires
determining whether an error occurred which was clear or obvious
and which not only affected the defendant's substantial rights but
also seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. We find no such error.
Sepetu specifically contends that "the trial record
revealed a stark disparity" between herself and Quaye because only
Quaye "was linked to Easy Soft, Ken and K, and Micro Syncnetic,"
while she "was tied only to the . . . Logitech account." According
to Sepetu, the government improperly grouped her with Quaye when
she "was connected to" only "a fraction of the[] transactions."
It is true that the government may not argue for the conviction of

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one defendant merely based on association with another defendant.
See United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 1988).
And "[t]he threat of guilt by association is perhaps greatest where
the defendant has done little but is closely associated with others
already known to have been convicted or, more often, who are
co-defendants or alleged co-conspirators whose patent wrongdoing
is brought out in detail in the trial." United States v. Allen,
670 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2012). But here, although Quaye
facilitated more transfers to more accounts than Sepetu did,
evidence of Sepetu's own conduct -- including her receipt of more
than $800,000 from Schirmer into the Logitech account, which she
opened and managed -- supplied the basis for her conviction. The
government's references to "the defendants'" conduct -- including
the accounts associated with both Defendants, the flow of funds in
and out of those accounts, Defendants' knowledge of Schirmer's
name on the wire transfers, and Defendants' personal spending from
the accounts -- appropriately encompassed Sepetu's own conduct.
Similarly, both Defendants proffered an innocent-business defense,
wherein Sepetu specifically claimed that she worked in the export
business and relied on Quaye for record-keeping; therefore, the
government appropriately referenced Defendants collectively when
refuting this defense at closing.
In any event, "[f]ears of a jury's finding of guilt based
on association are generally . . . countered by cautionary

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instructions." United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823,
831 (1st Cir. 1987); see Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95
(1954). Here, the district court stressed that "[t]here are two
defendants on trial" and that the jury "must as a matter of law
consider each defendant's guilt separately." It instructed the
jury to "bear in mind that guilt is personal and individual,"
meaning that their "verdict of guilty or not guilty must be based
solely upon the evidence about each defendant." It further
instructed that "[t]he case against each defendant stands or fails
upon the proof or lack of proof against that defendant alone, and
your verdict as to one defendant should not control your decision
as to the other defendant." Even had the government committed any
error in its closing argument, these instructions would have cured
it.5
5 Sepetu cites cases where "improper remarks" in the
government's argument "[we]re particularly severe or pervasive"
such that "general instructions may not be sufficient to neutralize
them." The collective references to the "Defendants" here fall
far from the same level of severity or pervasiveness. See United
States v. Canty, 37 F.4th 775, 788 (1st Cir. 2022) (government
argued that (1) "it was the defendants' 'turn' to go to jail
because other coconspirators . . . had gone to jail"; (2) "the[]
other coconspirators who had gone to jail were" more culpable than
defendants; and (3) another person "was sitting in jail for [the
defendant's] crime"); United States v. Ayala-Garcia, 574 F.3d 5,
19 (1st Cir. 2009) (government suggested that "the defendants were
potential killers who would have murdered thirty-one individuals
if they had not been arrested").

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B. Sentencing
Sepetu separately challenges the procedural
reasonableness of her sentence, arguing that the district court
improperly relied on a finding that she "personally caused
substantial financial hardship" in calculating her guidelines
range. We review preserved sentencing challenges for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Delgado, 106 F.4th 185, 191 (1st
Cir. 2024). "A district court commits a procedural error by,
among other things, 'selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts.'" Id. (quoting United States v.
Contreras-Delgado, 913 F.3d 232, 238 (1st Cir. 2019)); see Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Importantly, however, even
if a procedural error occurred, it does not mandate reversal and
"will be found harmless if 'it is highly probable that the
challenged action did not affect the judgment.'" United States
v. Romero-Carrion, 54 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 36 (1st Cir. 1990)). We need not
determine whether any procedural error occurred here because, even
if it did, it was harmless.
The district court applied a two-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) based on a finding that the offense
conduct resulted in "substantial financial hardship" to Schirmer.
The district court credited Schirmer's sworn declaration that she
suffered a ten-million-dollar tax penalty because of the offense

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conduct. It stressed, however, that "none of [its] rulings on
the[] sentencing calculations [we]re going to affect that actual
sentence that [it] impose[d] in the case" because it was "prepared
to grant a substantial variance." Sepetu's counsel nonetheless
objected to the enhancement, arguing that Schirmer's declaration
was unreliable, and the court overruled that objection.
Similarly, the district court declined to apply a two-level
reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a) based on a finding that Sepetu
"personally cause[d] substantial financial hardship." But the
district court reiterated that it "[could not]
stress . . . enough" that while it sought the correct guidelines
range, "everyone, including the government, [wa]s asking for a
downward variance," and so the resulting guidelines range would
not inform any "objective sentence." The district court
ultimately calculated a guidelines range of sixty-three to
seventy-eight months, but it varied downward and imposed a sentence
of just twelve months and one day.
Sepetu argues that the district court's reliance on
Schirmer's sworn declaration "conflicted with the government's
pre-trial disclosure that Schirmer told prosecutors 'she has been
involved in a dispute with the IRS over the last several years
arising out of her accountant's failure to file her taxes while he
was suffering from dementia.'" Regardless of whether the district
court abused its discretion, however, any error was harmless

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because it did not affect Sepetu's sentence. "[W]e have
consistently held that when a sentencing court makes clear that it
would have entered the same sentence regardless of the Guidelines,
any error in the court's Guidelines calculation is harmless."
United States v. Rivera, 51 F.4th 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting
United States v. Ouellette, 985 F.3d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 2021)).
Here, the district court "explicitly stated that it would impose
an identical sentence without regard to the sentencing
guidelines," including any determination as to the cause of
Schirmer's financial hardship. Id. Therefore, "any error in the
guideline calculations -- even if one occurred -- [was] harmless."
Id.
III.
For the above reasons, we affirm both Defendants'
convictions and Sepetu's sentence.

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