Washington v. Polis, et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
BRIAN WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JARED POLIS; JENA GRISWOLD;
and DAVE YOUNG,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 19-1468
(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00989-LTB-GPG)
(D. Colo.)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
*

_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________

This appeal follows the dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to
comply with federal pleading standards. Because the appeal does not
challenge the district court’s reasoning, we affirm.
This case began when Mr. Brian Washington filed a purported “letter
of credit” seeking $4.2 trillion from the federal government. The district

*
Oral argument would not materially help us to decide this appeal, so
we have thus decided the appeal based on the appellate briefs and the
record on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

April 13, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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2

court could not discern a specific cause of action from the filing, but
opened a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Given the absence of an identifiable
claim, the court
 directed Mr. Washington to use a court-approved form for the
complaint and

 told Mr. Washington how to cure the pleading defect.

Mr. Washington filed an amended complaint, but it was just as
cryptic. The court thus dismissed the amended complaint under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8, which requires federal complaints to “simpl[y], concise[ly], and
direct[ly]” state a plausible claim for relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (d)(1).
On appeal, Mr. Washington again asks us to discharge all of his “public
debt” without saying what was wrong with the district court’s ruling.
When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 8, we ordinarily apply the
abuse-of-discretion standard. United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare
of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010). But arguments not
clearly made in an opening brief are waived even when the appellant is
pro se. Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 911 (10th Cir. 2012). Though a pro se
litigant’s filings are construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520–21 (1972) (per curiam), the court cannot act as an advocate for pro se
litigants, Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840–41
(10th Cir. 2005); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Even under the most liberal construction, Mr. Washington’s brief
makes only a conclusory assertion of error. By failing to address the
district court’s reasoning, Mr. Washington has waived appellate review of
the dismissal under Rule 8.
The absence of any challenge to the district court’s reasoning is fatal
because “we will not question the reasoning of a district court unless an
appellant ‘actually argue[s]’ against it.” Clark v. Colbert, 895 F.3d 1258,
1265 (10th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Phillips v. Calhoun,
956 F.2d 949, 954 (10th Cir. 1992)). We thus affirm the dismissal.
1

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge

1
Despite the affirmance, we grant leave to proceed in formal pauperis.

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