United States of America v. Michele Vincent Gatti

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHELE VINCENT GATTI,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 19-4088
(D.C. No. 2:19-CR-00093-TC-BCW-12)
(D. Utah)
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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Before MORITZ, KELLY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
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Defendant Michele Vincent Gatti appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to vacate the magistrate judge’s order detaining him pending trial. Mr. Gatti
was among twenty-seven individuals charged by criminal complaint with conspiracy
to distribute controlled substances. After a hearing, a magistrate judge determined
Mr. Gatti was subject to the rebuttable presumption of detention in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e)(3) and ordered him detained based on the presumption of detention, the
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 10, 2021
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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danger he posed to the community in light of his criminal history, and the nature of
the charges and evidence against him. Shortly after that, Mr. Gatti was indicted on
the violations that had been charged by complaint.
Two months after his detention hearing, Mr. Gatti filed a motion to revoke the
detention order, arguing that the rebuttable presumption of detention in § 3142(e)(3)
did not apply to him when he was charged by complaint. The district court held a
hearing and denied the motion to revoke detention as moot because Mr. Gatti was
eventually indicted on the same criminal charges that were originally lodged by
complaint and because he was not seeking release and did not dispute that his
detention at that point was proper. The court emphasized at the hearing that
Mr. Gatti was specifically disclaiming that he was seeking release, that he conceded
the presumption of detention applied now that he was indicted, and that he conceded
he could not rebut the presumption of detention. The court repeatedly offered to hold
a new detention hearing to reconsider Mr. Gatti’s detention, but Mr. Gatti
consistently represented that was not the relief he sought and that he recognized he
would be detained even if a new hearing were held. Under the circumstances, the
district court determined that his motion for revocation of detention was moot:
Mr. Gatti was not actually asking the court to review his detention status, and he was
not seeking release. Therefore, deciding the issue Mr. Gatti urged—whether the
presumption of detention applied when he was charged only by complaint—would
redress no injury and have no effect in the real world. See Brown v. Buhman,
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822 F.3d 1151, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2016). The court also analyzed and rejected
Mr. Gatti’s claim that his situation fell within an exception to the mootness doctrine.
We agree with the district court that Mr. Gatti’s motion to revoke his order of
detention was moot under the circumstances, which would normally lead us to affirm
the district court’s order. But because this appeal is now doubly moot, we dismiss it
rather than affirm. After the appeal was filed, Mr. Gatti changed his plea; he pleaded
guilty to the felony information against him and has now been sentenced. Both the
authority for Mr. Gatti’s detention and his motion for revocation of that detention
were pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142, which governs release or detention pending trial.
Now that he has pleaded guilty and been sentenced, that section of the Bail Reform
Act no longer governs his release or detention. Statutory authority for release or
detention pending sentencing or appeal is found in § 3143, which entails different
standards. Because Mr. Gatti’s detention is no longer pursuant to § 3142 or subject
to the standards set forth in that section, there is no longer a live controversy
regarding whether the district court was correct to deny as moot his motion to revoke
detention under § 3142. In other words, the question of whether the district court
was correct to deny the motion for revocation of detention under § 3142 is moot.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. 1
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
1 The motion for argument is denied as moot.
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