Oranda Lueras v. Commissioner, Ssa

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
ORANDA LUERAS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER, SSA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 21-2043
(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-01069-GJF)
(D. N.M.)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Oranda Lueras appeals from the district court’s decision upholding the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for Supplemental
Security Income (SSI). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we affirm the district court’s judgment.
I. Background
Ms. Lueras filed for SSI in December 2016, alleging disability based on a
variety of physical and mental impairments. An administrative law judge (ALJ)
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment
is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 27, 2022
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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found Ms. Lueras had impairments that resulted in some limitations, but that those
impairments did not preclude all work. The ALJ arrived at that conclusion after
reviewing Ms. Lueras’s medical record and other documentation, considering the
written opinions of three non-treating doctors and psychologists, and listening to the
testimony of Ms. Lueras and a vocational expert.
A. Mental Health Records 1 and Opinion Evidence
The record includes two mental health treatment assessments of Ms. Lueras:
a February 2015 intake assessment, and an October 2015 psychological assessment.
In the intake assessment, Ms. Lueras was diagnosed with generalized anxiety
disorder. In the October assessment, a therapist described Ms. Lueras as alert and
attentive with no indications of excessive distractibility, and capable of tracking the
conversation normally. The therapist further observed she appeared of average
intelligence and that while her affect was blunted, her attitude was open and
cooperative, her memory intact, and her thought processes intact and organized.
The remaining treatment records pertain to Ms. Lueras’s physical complaints.
To the extent those records reflect anything about Ms. Lueras’s mental health, her
treatment providers routinely observed her to be pleasant and cooperative, alert and
oriented, having fair judgment, and showing no decrease in ability to concentrate.
1 Because Ms. Lueras’s arguments on appeal involve only mental impairments,
our discussion here focuses on those portions of the record involving her mental
health.
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Ms. Lueras also completed a “Function Report-Adult” form as part of the
administrative proceedings. It mostly reflects her physical ailments, but she also
described having social phobia, PTSD, personality conflicts and anger, and disliking
being around other people. Despite these complaints, she said she gets along “ok”
with authority figures such as police, landlords, bosses, or teachers, and that she had
never been fired from a job due to problems getting along with others. R. Vol. II
at 227.
The ALJ also considered the opinions of two doctors and a psychologist.
Paula Hughson, M.D., conducted a consultative psychiatric examination of
Ms. Lueras in March 2017, as part of the administrative proceedings. She observed
that Ms. Lueras’s affect was “restricted but congruent,” that she was “[d]ramatically
hypoactive,” and that she had limited insight but fair judgment. R. Vol. IV at 474,
477. Dr. Hughson found Ms. Lueras was “[a]ble to attend and concentrate,” was
“cognitively intact,” had logical thoughts, and could understand and remember short
and simple instructions. Id. at 475, 479. She found no evidence of delusions or
bizarre thinking. Ms. Lueras also told Dr. Hughson she could perform her activities
of daily living unassisted and was able to help her children get ready for school.
Dr. Hughson opined that Ms. Lueras had no more than moderate impairments in
sustained concentration and task persistence, social interaction, and adaptation. She
also opined that Ms. Lueras had marked limitations in her ability to interact with the
public and use public transportation.
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In July 2018, Dr. Hughson conducted a second examination of Ms. Lueras.
She again observed that Ms. Lueras was hypoactive, but that she was also pleasant
and cooperative, able to concentrate, had intact memory, and displayed linear and
relevant thought processes. Unlike her previous opinion, however, Dr. Hughson
opined that Ms. Lueras had several marked limitations that rendered her disabled.
By contrast, Scott Walker, M.D., reviewed Ms. Lueras’s medical record in
March 2017 and concluded she had only moderate limitations in functioning. He
opined that Ms. Lueras retained the capacity to: “understand, remember, and carry
out simple instructions”; “attend and concentrate sufficient to complete a routine
work day without significant interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms”;
“exercise reasonable judgment”; and “interact appropriately with coworkers[,]
supervisors and the general public on a superficial basis.” R. Vol. II at 87. Alvin
Smith, a state agency psychologist, reviewed Ms. Lueras’s medical record and agreed
with Dr. Walker’s assessment.
B. Administrative Proceedings and District Court Judgment
Ms. Lueras’s claim was denied initially, on reconsideration, and by the ALJ
after an administrative hearing. The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation
process for the consideration of disability claims. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048,
1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (summarizing steps). The ALJ found at step five that
Ms. Lueras possessed the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a range of
unskilled work. Citing testimony of a vocational expert that Ms. Lueras could
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perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, the ALJ
concluded Ms. Lueras did not satisfy the definition of disability.
The Appeals Council then denied Ms. Lueras’s request for review, making the
ALJ’s decision final for purposes of judicial review. See 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a).
Ms. Lueras appealed the ALJ’s decision to the district court, which affirmed it.
Ms. Lueras timely appealed, arguing the ALJ (1) improperly weighed Dr. Hughson’s
second opinion, and (2) failed to include in its analysis of Ms. Lueras’s RFC all the
limitations Dr. Walker identified.
II. Discussion
We review the ALJ’s decision to determine whether substantial evidence in the
record as a whole supports the factual findings and whether the ALJ applied the correct
legal standards. See Hendron v. Colvin, 767 F.3d 951, 954 (10th Cir. 2014).
“Substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). This “threshold . . . is not high.” Biestek
v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). “Evidence is insubstantial if it is
overwhelmingly contradicted by other evidence.” O’Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855,
858 (10th Cir. 1994). We may neither reweigh evidence nor substitute our judgment
for the Commissioner’s. See Hendron, 767 F.3d at 954.
A. Whether the ALJ Properly Weighed Dr. Hughson’s Opinions
We hold the ALJ did not err in giving less weight to Dr. Hughson’s opinions.
An ALJ must consider the “consistency between [an] opinion and the record as a
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whole.” Goatcher v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 52 F.3d 288, 290
(10th Cir. 1995). Here, the ALJ found that Dr. Hughson’s second opinion, in which
she identified marked limitations in Ms. Lueras’s capacity for unskilled work, was
inconsistent with the larger medical record, which regularly described Ms. Lueras as
fairly well groomed, pleasant and cooperative, alert and oriented with intact insight,
having fair judgment, and having normal mood and affect with no decrease in ability
to concentrate. We hold the ALJ’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence.
Not only was Dr. Hughson’s opinion inconsistent with the larger medical
record, but the ALJ also found her opinions contained internal inconsistencies. See
White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 907 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming ALJ’s disregard of
treating physician’s opinion based on discrepancies between physician’s opinion and
observations during examination). For example, despite her conclusion that
Ms. Lueras had marked limitations in her ability to attend and concentrate,
Dr. Hughson observed that Ms. Lueras was “[a]ble to attend and concentrate” for
purposes of the two-hour examination. R. Vol. V at 904. The ALJ also discounted
Dr. Hughson’s opinion based on her failure to explain the difference between her
assessments in March 2017, when she found that Ms. Lueras had only moderate
limitations, and in July 2018, when she found Ms. Lueras had marked limitations that
rendered her disabled. Again, we discern no error in these conclusions and hold they
were supported by substantial evidence.
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B. Whether the ALJ Failed to Account for the Limitations Identified by
Dr. Walker
Ms. Lueras contends that in assessing her RFC, the ALJ did not account for the
moderate limitations Dr. Walker identified, including that Ms. Lueras is limited to
occasional and superficial interactions with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.
Ms. Lueras argues the ALJ omitted from the RFC analysis the limitation concerning
coworkers and supervisors. We hold that even if the ALJ’s RFC finding did not
adequately account for the supervisor/coworker limitation, the error was harmless.
We may hold an ALJ’s error harmless “where, based on material the ALJ did
at least consider (just not properly), we could confidently say that no reasonable
administrative factfinder, following the correct analysis, could have resolved the
factual matter in any other way.” Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir.
2004). Here, the jobs relied upon by the ALJ to conclude that Ms. Lueras could
perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy—price tagger
and photocopy machine operator—involve very little interaction with either
coworkers or supervisors. Indeed, as the ALJ confirmed with the vocational expert,
those jobs are listed in a category that require “the least amount of contact with
anyone.” R. Vol. II at 60. Because there is no actual conflict between the limitations
identified by Dr. Walker and the jobs identified by the vocational expert and relied
upon by the ALJ, any oversight by the ALJ in including these limitations was
harmless error.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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