United States of America v. Ronnie Gerald Wiggins

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONNIE GERALD WIGGINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 25-6013
(D.C. No. 5:23-CR-00388-G-1)
(W.D. Okla.)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, KELLY, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Around midnight in late October of 2022, the Norman, Oklahoma
police dispatch received 911 calls reporting a white Mercedes driving
erratically. Two officers located Ronnie Gerald Wiggins in the vehicle
shortly thereafter while he was waiting in a McDonald’s drive-thru line.
The officers spoke to Wiggins and initiated a warrant check. They quickly
determined Wiggins wasn’t drunk but, prior to ending the traffic stop, the
officers learned Wiggins had a warrant out for his arrest for a probation
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be
cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 21, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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violation on a prior felony conviction. The officers arrested Wiggins and
searched his vehicle, wherein they found a firearm. For this, Wiggins was
ultimately indicted on one count of felon in possession of a firearm and the
enhanced penalty provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
Wiggins was tried and convicted before a jury.
On appeal, Wiggins challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress the search and seizure of the firearm from his vehicle and the
district court’s application of ACCA’s enhanced penalty provision.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the denial of the
motion to suppress but vacate Wiggins’ sentence and remand for
resentencing.
I
Shortly after midnight on October 30, 2022, the Norman Police
Department received two 911 calls about a Mercedes SUV driving
erratically and changing speeds randomly. Officers Robertson and Walker
were dispatched and located the Mercedes in a McDonald’s drive-thru line.
Officer Robertson approached the vehicle’s passenger window and spoke to
Wiggins, who was alone in the Mercedes and sitting in the driver’s seat. The
officer asked for Wiggins’ identification, then relayed Wiggins’ information
to dispatch to initiate a warrant check. Officer Robertson stepped away from
the vehicle and told Officer Walker that Wiggins “probably just sucks at
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driving” and that Wiggins didn’t exhibit physical signs of being inebriated.
R. I at 56.
Officer Robertson then performed a modified horizontal gaze
nystagmus (HGN) test on Wiggins to look for signs of intoxication. After
Wiggins passed the test, Officer Robertson told him that he could leave once
the warrant check came back. About a minute later, dispatch reported a
possible outstanding arrest warrant for Wiggins. Officer Robertson then
directed Wiggins to move his vehicle out of the drive-thru line. Wiggins
complied, parking the SUV in front of a nearby dumpster in the parking lot.
Both officers followed his vehicle across the property on foot. About four
minutes later, dispatch confirmed that Wiggins had a “full extradition
warrant out of Texas for a probation violation on a murder conviction.” Id.
at 57. Officer Robertson requested that dispatch send a third officer, then
ordered Wiggins out of the vehicle and attempted to cuff him. Wiggins
physically resisted but was ultimately subdued and arrested. The officers
then found a Sig Sauer pistol, ammunition, and magazines in the Mercedes
during an impound search.
Wiggins was indicted with one count of felon in possession of a
firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the ACCA enhanced penalty provision,
18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The indictment listed four of Wiggins’ prior convictions
to support the ACCA enhanced penalty provision: (1) Texas first degree
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murder, (2) New Mexico armed robbery, (3) federal bank robbery, and (4)
Oklahoma robbery with a firearm. While the crime with which Wiggins was
indicted comes with a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years
imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8), the ACCA enhanced penalty provision,
when applicable, provides for a statutory minimum sentence of 15 years
imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Thus, the applicability of the ACCA
enhanced penalty provision had significant sentencing implications for
Wiggins.
Before the district court, Wiggins moved to suppress the firearm found
in his vehicle. Wiggins did not challenge the initial traffic stop but asserted
that the officers unlawfully prolonged the detention when they kept him at
the scene while they waited for the warrant check to come back from
dispatch. The district court denied Wiggins’ motion after holding a
suppression hearing, finding that the officers did not exceed the scope of the
detention authority and, alternatively, that the inevitable discovery
doctrine applied.
Wiggins proceeded to a two-part trial. The jury found him guilty of
violating § 922(g)(1) at the first stage. At the second stage, the jury found
that Wiggins had been previously convicted on all four prior crimes listed
in the indictment, thus triggering the application of the ACCA
enhancement.
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At sentencing, Wiggins objected to consideration of his New Mexico
armed robbery conviction as a predicate offense for the ACCA enhancement.
The district court overruled the objection. The district court then sentenced
Wiggins to 240 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
Wiggins timely appealed.
II
On appeal, Wiggins challenges (1) the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress, and (2) the imposition of the ACCA enhanced penalty
provision at sentencing. We will address each challenge in turn.
A
We begin with Wiggins’ challenge to the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. He does not challenge the validity of the initial traffic
stop at the McDonald’s drive-thru and does not challenge any of the district
court’s factual findings. Rather, he argues that the officers exceeded the
constitutionally permissible scope of the initial detention by continuing to
detain Wiggins after the HGN test while they waited for the warrant check
to come back from dispatch. He also argues that the district court legally
erred in finding that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied because the
prosecution presented no evidence at the suppression hearing concerning
what the officers would have done if they had not continued to detain
Wiggins.
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In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress “we consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the [government], assess factual
findings for clear error, and analyze legal conclusions de novo.” United
States v. Campbell, 156 F.4th 1019, 1023–24 (2025). An officer may “initiate
an investigatory detention” when he “has a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting an individual may be involved in criminal activity.” Id.
at 1024 (quotation omitted). “[I]nvestigatory detentions ‘must be
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances prompting the stop.”’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Young, 99 F.4th 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2023)).
“There is no bright-line rule to determine whether the scope of police
conduct was reasonably related to the goals of the stop; rather our
evaluation is guided by common sense and ordinary human experience.”
Young, 99 F.4th at 1148 (quoting United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188,
1193 (10th Cir. 2009)). When determining whether officers impermissibly
exceeded the scope of an investigatory stop, courts consider the “underlying
justification,” whether “additional reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
came to light during the detention,” and whether the officers “diligently
pursued the mission of the stop.” Id. at 1148–49 (quotation omitted).
“Authority for the [traffic stop] ends when the tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are – or reasonably should have been – completed.” Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). These tasks may appropriately
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involve “certain unrelated checks” including “checking the driver’s license,
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver,
and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at
355. Such “‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop’ do not violate
the Fourth Amendment even in the absence of reasonable suspicion” or
officer safety concerns. United States v. Ramdial, No. 24-6213, 2025 WL
2682624, at *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355);1 accord Young, 99 F.4th at 1149 (“[P]olice
officers may check to see whether a detainee is a wanted person,
irrespective of the circumstances of that detention . . . even in the absence
of objective safety concerns because [officers are] entitled to determine
whether [the detainee was] evading justice.” (citations and quotation marks
omitted)). A “lawfully initiated traffic stop,” therefore, “becomes
unreasonable ‘when an officer (1) diverts from the traffic-based mission of
the stop to investigate ordinary criminal conduct, (2) in a way that ‘prolongs’
(i.e., adds time to) the stop, and (3) the investigative detour is unsupported
by any independent reasonable suspicion.’” United States v. Dawson, 90
1 We cite unpublished decisions for their persuasive value only and do
not treat them as binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
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F.4th 1286, 1291 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th
1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022)).
Wiggins asserts that, because officers stopped him to investigate if
“he was driving under the influence,” the stop became unreasonable once
the officers realized that Wiggins was not intoxicated. Op. Br. at 29. We are
not persuaded for two reasons.
First, as the district court noted, Wiggins was stopped because of 911
calls that reported Wiggins’ vehicle “being driven erratically” and
“increasing and decreasing speeds randomly.” R. I at 55. Given these facts,
we see no reason to artificially narrow the purpose of the stop to an
investigation into only drunk driving, as Wiggins would like us to do. After
all, erratic driving could imply more than one type of criminal offense.2
Second, even if reasonable suspicion for the stop had been dispelled
once Wiggins passed the HGN test, the “officer’s mission” for the stop
“include[d] both deciding whether to issue a ticket and the ordinary tasks
incident to the stop – in this case, determining whether,” Dawson, 90 F.4th
2 In reply and at oral argument, Wiggins disputed whether the 911
callers’ complaints described reckless driving under Oklahoma law. See
Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-901(A). We need not decide this question because an
officer is permitted to begin an investigatory detention upon reasonable
suspicion that “an individual is involved in criminal activity,” but is not
required to have conclusive evidence satisfying the elements of a specific
offense. Campbell, 156 F.4th at 1024.
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at 1292 (emphasis in original), Wiggins had any “outstanding warrants” for
his arrest, Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355.
Here, Officer Robertson initiated the warrant check through dispatch
about a minute after he first made contact with Wiggins and prior to
conducting the HGN test. The warrant check came back less than five
minutes into the encounter. At no point did Officer Robertson “divert[] from
[his] traffic-based mission . . . to investigate ordinary criminal conduct”;
rather, he merely conducted “‘ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop’”
that Wiggins concedes was lawfully initiated. Dawson, 90 F.4th at 1291
(quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355). For these reasons, we find that no
Fourth Amendment violation occurred and affirm the district court’s denial
of Wiggins’ motion to suppress.3
B
Wiggins’ second challenge on appeal is to the district court’s
application of the ACCA enhanced penalty provision at sentencing. Wiggins
initially presented two arguments in support of this challenge. First, he
argued that his Texas armed robbery conviction should not be considered
an ACCA predicate. Second, he argued that the district court plainly erred
3 Wiggins also challenges the district court’s alternative grounds for
denying his motion to suppress: inevitable discovery. Because we find no
Fourth Amendment violation, we need not decide this question or opine on
its propriety.
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by allowing a probation officer to testify during trial about the nature and
circumstances of the New Mexico and federal robbery offenses based on his
knowledge of the contents of the presentence investigation report. Then,
after this court issued its opinion in Campbell, Wiggins additionally argued
that his prior conviction for Oklahoma robbery with a firearm should also
not be considered an ACCA predicate.
None of Wiggins’ challenges on appeal were made before the district
court at sentencing, so we review for plain error. See United States v.
Venjohn, 104 F.4th 179, 183 (10th Cir. 2024). To succeed on plain error, “a
defendant must show ‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects the party’s
substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Moore, 30 F.4th 1021, 1025 (10th Cir. 2022)).
Application of the ACCA enhanced penalty provision requires prior
convictions on three “violent felon[ies],” also referred to as predicate
offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). ACCA defines a “violent felony” in several
ways including, as relevant here, via the “so-called elements clause.”
Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 424 (2021) (plurality opinion). Under
the elements clause, an offense qualifies as a predicate violent felony “if it
‘has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.
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§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). Courts use the categorical approach to “decide whether an
offense satisfies the elements clause.” Id. The categorical approach is
applied by ignoring the facts underlying the offense and instead “focusing
on the elements of the crime of conviction.” Campbell, 156 F.4th at 1028
(quoting United States v. Deiter, 890 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 2018)). “If
any . . . of the acts criminalized” by the relevant statute “do not entail [the]
kind of force” specified by the elements clause, it does not “categorically
match the federal standard, and so cannot serve as an ACCA predicate.”
Borden, 593 U.S. at 424.
The district court considered four of Wiggins’ prior convictions to be
qualifying predicates: (1) Oklahoma robbery with a firearm, (2) New Mexico
armed robbery, (3) federal bank robbery, and (4) Texas first degree murder.
We focus on Wiggins’ challenges to his prior convictions for Oklahoma
robbery with a firearm and Texas first degree murder.4
First, Wiggins argues that the district court plainly erred by counting
his prior conviction for Oklahoma robbery with a firearm as a predicate
offense under ACCA. In Campbell, this court held that Oklahoma robbery
with a firearm was not categorically a violent felony on a plain error
4 Because we find these challenges meritorious, we will not reach
Wiggins’ arguments regarding his New Mexico robbery and federal bank
robbery prior convictions.
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analysis. 156 F.4th at 1032–33. The Government concedes plain error
regarding this prior conviction. We rightfully accept this concession and,
applying Campbell, agree that Wiggins prevails on this predicate challenge.
Second, Wiggins argues that the district court plainly erred by
counting his prior conviction for Texas first degree murder as a predicate
offense under ACCA. Neither this circuit nor the Fifth Circuit has
announced in a binding opinion whether this offense is categorically a
violent felony and thus an ACCA predicate. However, following a remand
by the Fifth Circuit “for further consideration in light of” the Supreme
Court’s decision in Borden, the Northern District of Texas in Vickers v.
United States held that Texas first degree murder is not categorically a
violent felony. No. 3:15-cv-3912, 2024 WL 1863114, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
29, 2024); see also United States v. Vickers, No. 18-10940, 2022 WL 780421
(5th Cir. 2022). The Government did not appeal the Northern District of
Texas’s opinion on remand in Vickers. Here, the Government again concedes
plain error regarding Wiggins’ prior conviction for Texas first degree
murder.
In light of the Government’s concessions that both of these offenses
are not categorically violent felonies and that the district court plainly erred
by counting them toward Wiggins’ three ACCA predicates, only two
qualifying predicates remain and thus the district court’s application of
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ACCA’s enhanced penalty provision was erroneous. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1). Furthermore, an “illegal sentence . . . ‘trigger[s] per se,
reversible, plain error.” United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th
Cir. 2017) (second alteration in original). Wiggins’ sentence of 240 months’
imprisonment is unlawful absent the application of the ACCA enhancement
because the maximum sentence for Wiggins’ underlying conviction, felon in
possession of a firearm, is 15 years or 180 months. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8); see
also Titties, 852 F.3d at 1275 (noting illegal sentences are those that exceed
the relevant statutory maximum). We therefore vacate Wiggins’ sentence
and remand for resentencing without application of the ACCA enhanced
penalty provision.
III
For the reasons above, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
Wiggins’ motion to suppress, VACATE the district court’s sentence as to
Count I, and REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Entered for the Court
Richard E.N. Federico
Circuit Judge
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