Abigail Marbut v. Matthew Phillips, et al

FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-13309
____________________
ABIGAIL JEAN MARBUT,
Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
MATTHEW PHILLIPS,
in his individual capacity,
JOSHUA CASH,
in his individual capacity,
KIRBY COLLIER,
in his individual capacity,
JUSTIN PENA,
in his individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees,
MICHAEL DAVID LECROY,
in his individual capacity and official capacity as a Sargent in the
Henry County Police Department,
Defendant.
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13309
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00776-VMC
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR , Chief Judge, ABUDU, Circuit Judge, and
C ONWAY ,* District Judge.
WILLIAM PRYOR , Chief Judge:
This appeal requires us to decide whether four police offic-
ers are entitled to qualified immunity from a complaint that they
violated the Fourth Amendment when they seized a suspected
overdose victim. After Abigail Marbut fell unconscious, her mother
called 911 because she feared that Marbut had overdosed on the
drug GHB. Police officers and medical professionals arrived as Mar-
but began to stir in the back seat of a vehicle parked near her apart-
ment. But Marbut refused to accept any aid and abruptly informed
one of the officers that she was going inside to use the restroom. A
scuffle ensued as Marbut attempted to move past the officer, and
three other officers joined the fray. Marbut suffered a broken arm
during the struggle. She sued the officers for unlawful detention
and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
district court granted summary judgment for the officers based on
qualified immunity. Because the officers did not violate Marbut’s
clearly established Fourth Amendment rights, we affirm.
* The Honorable Anne C. Conway, United States District Judge for the Middle
District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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I. BACKGROUND
The record includes footage from multiple bodycam videos.
We recount the facts “in the light depicted by the video[s].” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007). Where the video evidence is not
clear, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to Marbut.
Baxter v. Santiago-Miranda, 121 F.4th 873, 883 (11th Cir. 2024).
On the afternoon of May 20, 2021, Abigail Marbut rode with
her mother, Renee, from her apartment to the grocery store. Mar-
but became “incoherent” as Renee drove back and “passed out”
before Renee reached Marbut’s residence. Unable to rouse her,
Renee called 911 to report that Marbut was “unresponsive.” An op-
erator dispatched police officers and medical personnel to the
scene.
Officer Matthew Phillips was among the first to arrive. He
observed Marbut unconscious in the back seat of a Jeep parked be-
hind the apartment. Renee explained to Officer Phillips what she
had witnessed on the drive home and stated that the situation
“freak[ed] [her] out” and was “the scariest thing [she had] ever seen
in [her] life.” She also stated that Marbut might have overdosed on
the drug “GHB,” short for gamma-hydroxybutyric acid. GHB is a
“sedative-hypnotic” that “can produce drowsiness, dizziness, nau-
sea, visual disturbances, unconsciousness, seizures, severe respira-
tory depression[,] and coma.” United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329,
1331 (11th Cir. 2002). The parties agree that a GHB overdose “usu-
ally requires emergency medical treatment.” Marbut began to stir
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13309
about 30 seconds after Officer Phillips arrived. Officer Phillips com-
mented that Marbut appeared to be “on the nod,” which meant
“her body [was] trying to put her to sleep but she [was] trying to
stay awake to fight the effects of whatever was taken.”
Amanda Pitts, an advanced emergency technician, and
Adam Bedford, a paramedic, arrived shortly thereafter. Marbut
“couldn’t answer any of [their] questions” when they began their
assessment. “She kept lapsing a lot of stuff she was trying to say, or
the stuff she said didn’t make any sense. It was just noises [and]
moaning, or she . . . wouldn’t give . . . an answer at all.”
Renee stated that Marbut had been unconscious for approx-
imately 20 minutes and reiterated her suspicion that Marbut was
under the influence of drugs. Renee stated that Marbut would be
“going to rehab” and “I’m not putting up with this no more.”
Renee’s boyfriend likewise stated that “I’ve gotta get her in rehab
or a mental institution or something.”
Marbut exited the Jeep four minutes after she began to stir.
She later admitted that she became “very agitated” because Renee
had called 911 and she did not want “to get checked out at the hos-
pital.” Video footage shows her circling the Jeep while shouting
“I’m not going,” “I haven’t done anything,” and “I’m not doing it.”
Officer Phillips asked Bedford if Marbut “ha[d] to go” to the hospi-
tal, and Bedford responded that “technically we[’ve] got to take
her.” As Officer Phillips conversed with Bedford, Marbut posi-
tioned herself between a hatchback and a sedan parked in adjacent
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24-13309 Opinion of the Court 5
spaces next to her apartment building. The two vehicles were just
a few feet apart from each other and several feet in front of the Jeep.
By this time Officer Justin Pena had arrived. Officer Pena at-
tempted to speak with Marbut near the trunk of the sedan, and Of-
ficer Phillips walked around to the front of it. Officers Joshua Cash
and Kirby Collier appeared a few minutes later, with Officer Cash
standing next to Officer Phillips and Officer Collier standing near
Officer Pena. Pitts, Bedford, and another medic also stood near Of-
ficer Pena.
Marbut stayed between the hatchback and the sedan for five
minutes as medics and officers urged her to go to the hospital. She
managed to provide her name, address, and birthday in response
to renewed questioning from Pitts but could not remember her
birth year. Pitts then stated that Marbut had two options: go to the
hospital with the medics or go there with the officers. Marbut re-
fused, and Pitts repeated her ultimatum. Marbut continued to insist
there was “nothing wrong” with her. Officer Pena interjected that
Marbut did not “have a choice,” and Marbut shouted that she “did
not do anything wrong.”
Three minutes into the back-and-forth, Pitts told Officer
Pena that “[w]e would like to take her so she can be evaluated but
if she can tell us who she is and answer all our questions properly
[then] technically we are not allowed to take her.” Pitts opined less
than a minute later that Marbut was “sound of mind” because she
could “answer her name, date of birth, [and] where she’s at.” Of-
ficer Pena asked Pitts and the medic standing next to her how they
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would like to proceed. The medic said that he wanted to “get [Mar-
but] up to the truck and check her out,” so Officer Pena tried again.
But Marbut again refused. Pitts then told Officer Pena that “if [Mar-
but] doesn’t want to come with us she doesn’t have to.” Officer
Pena responded that he would do “whatever you guys want to do.”
Twenty seconds passed before Marbut abruptly turned to-
ward Officer Phillips and said she needed to use the restroom. Mar-
but “had to go by Officer Phillips, who was standing between [the
hatchback and the sedan] parked close together in the driveway,”
to reach the restroom. Video makes clear that Marbut attempted
to pass Officer Phillips on his left side, that Officer Phillips’s left
hand was resting on the hatchback when Marbut began approach-
ing him, and that Marbut reached Officer Phillips within two sec-
onds of her announcement that she intended to go inside.
When Marbut reached Officer Phillips, he placed his right
hand on her left arm and told her to “hold on, hold on.” Marbut
repeated that she needed to use the restroom and extended her left
hand toward Officer Phillips’s chest. Officers Phillips, Collier, and
Cash later described this movement as a “push,” and Marbut de-
scribed it as an attempt to “turn[] sideways” to “get away” from
Officer Phillips. A video records Officer Phillips moving back fol-
lowing the contact as Marbut withdraws her arm—consistent with
the officers’ description of a push. Officer Phillips then yelled “do
not put your hands on me!” and grabbed Marbut by the right arm,
pulling it behind her back.
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The officers struggled to subdue Marbut for the next few
minutes. Officer Phillips maintained control of her right arm, and
Officer Pena gained control of her left arm. Marbut continued to
resist and kneed Officer Collier as he moved in. Officer Phillips
then noticed that Marbut’s right arm was broken and informed his
colleagues. The officers immediately eased up, only for Marbut to
struggle more. Officers Cash and Collier managed to handcuff Mar-
but’s left arm to her belt loop as she shouted profanities. But Mar-
but struggled still and kicked Officer Cash in the process.
Eventually, Marbut cooperated enough for Officer Collier
to walk her to a gurney. Paramedics transported Marbut to a
nearby hospital, and doctors there confirmed that she had “suffered
a fracture of the humerus bone in her right arm.” Marbut now has
a “permanent injury to the radial nerve in her right arm” that
causes “weakness” and “a loss of motion at the elbow and shoul-
der.”
Marbut sued Officers Phillips, Cash, Collier, and Pena for al-
leged violations of the Fourth Amendment committed under color
of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the officers seized her
“without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” She alleged that
they used excessive force in seizing her. And she alleged that Offic-
ers Cash, Collier, and Pena should have intervened when Officer
Phillips broke her arm.
The officers moved for summary judgment based on quali-
fied immunity, and the district court granted them summary judg-
ment. It ruled that the officers had probable cause to execute a
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13309
“mental-health seizure.” It ruled that the officers used objectively
reasonable force under the circumstances. And it ruled that there
was no duty to intervene. Absent any constitutional violation, the
district court concluded the officers were “entitled to qualified im-
munity . . . as a matter of law.”
Marbut filed this appeal. She continues to contend that the
four officers lacked a sufficient basis to seize her, that Officer Phil-
lips used excessive force, and that the other officers should have
intervened. But she no longer contends that Officers Cash, Collier,
and Pena used excessive force.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo whether officers are entitled to summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. Aguirre v. Seminole County,
158 F.4th 1276, 1297 (11th Cir. 2025). We may affirm a summary
judgment on any ground supported by the record. Mata Chorwadi,
Inc. v. City of Boynton Beach, 66 F.4th 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2023).
III. DISCUSSION
Qualified immunity shields from suit a police officer acting
within his discretionary authority unless a plaintiff establishes that
“the officer violated a constitutional right” that was “clearly estab-
lished” at the time of the alleged violation. Stryker v. City of Home-
wood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Marbut does not dispute that the officers
acted within their discretionary authority. So the question for us is
whether the officers violated her clearly established constitutional
rights.
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24-13309 Opinion of the Court 9
We divide our discussion into three parts. We first explain
that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity from Marbut’s
unlawful-seizure claim. We next explain that Officer Phillips is en-
titled to qualified immunity from Marbut’s excessive-force claim.
We then explain that the other officers are entitled to qualified im-
munity from Marbut’s intervention claim.
A. The Officers Enjoy Qualified Immunity from the
Unlawful-Seizure Claim.
“The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasona-
ble seizures.” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022)
(alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). A seizure occurs when an officer uses “physical force or [a]
show of authority” that would lead a “reasonable person [to] feel
[she is not] free to terminate the encounter.” May v. City of Nahunta,
846 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2017) (citations and internal quota-
tion marks omitted). A seizure is unreasonable when “the circum-
stances, viewed objectively, [do not] justify” it. Brigham City v. Stu-
art, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (emphasis omitted) (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
The district court ruled that Officer Phillips seized Marbut
when he “prevented her from leaving . . . to go to the restroom”
and that the other officers joined the seizure when they “physically
restrained” her. The officers do not dispute these rulings. In both
instances, the show of authority and physical force applied by the
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officers made clear that Marbut was not “free to terminate the en-
counter.” May, 846 F.3d at 1327 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Although Marbut can prove a seizure, she cannot prove that
the officers seized her “in violation of [her] clearly established
[Fourth Amendment] rights.” Ingram, 30 F.4th at 1250. “To be
clearly established, a right must be well-established enough that
every reasonable official would have understood that what he is
doing violates that right.” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296
(11th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In
other words, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity if it is
at least “arguable” that a seizure was permissible. Alston v.
Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1166
(11th Cir. 2000).
We affirm on two separate grounds. First, the officers had
an arguable basis to seize Marbut under the emergency-aid doc-
trine. Second, the officers alternatively had probable cause to be-
lieve that she had committed a crime.
1. The Officers Had an Arguable Basis to Seize Marbut
under the Emergency-Aid Doctrine.
Police officers ordinarily execute searches and seizures in
connection with suspected crimes. But the Fourth Amendment
also permits officers to search and seize in response to non-criminal
emergencies. In Brigham City, for example, the Supreme Court held
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that “law enforcement officers may enter a home without a war-
rant” when they have “an objectively reasonable basis for believ-
ing” that an occupant needs “emergency assistance.” 547 U.S. at
403, 406. This “emergency aid doctrine” reflects the common-sense
principle that “preserv[ing] life or avoid[ing] serious injury is justi-
fication for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
emergency.” Id. at 401, 403 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
392 (1978)).
Some emergency-aid cases involve “[m]ental-health sei-
zures.” Ingram, 30 F.4th at 1250. We have stated that these seizures
comply with the Fourth Amendment when officers “have probable
cause to believe [a] person is dangerous either to himself or to oth-
ers.” Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 905 (11th Cir. 2011). And we
have applied this standard to seizures conducted inside and outside
of the home. See Ingram, 30 F.4th at 1247–50 (reciting probable-
cause standard where officers stopped a suicidal plaintiff in “a cot-
ton field behind [his] house” and applied force when they “reached
the yard”); May, 846 F.3d at 1325–28 (reciting probable-cause stand-
ard where officer seized an unstable plaintiff “in her bedroom”).
The district court ruled there was “probable cause to exe-
cute a mental-health seizure” because the officers had sufficient
reason to believe that Marbut “would be endangering herself ” if
she “left the scene without treatment.” The parties dispute
whether that conclusion is consistent with our precedents. But the
Supreme Court recently abrogated the probable-cause standard
employed by those precedents.
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Shortly before oral argument in this appeal, the Supreme
Court held in Case v. Montana that “probable-cause decisions” do
not apply to “emergency-aid situations.” 146 S. Ct. 500, 507 (2026).
The petitioner in Case faced charges for assaulting a police officer
after officers entered his home without a warrant to perform “a
welfare check on a suicidal male.” Id. at 504 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The petitioner argued that the trial
court should have suppressed “all evidence obtained as a result of
the home entry” because the officers lacked “probable cause to be-
lieve [he was] seriously injured or imminently threatened with
such injury.” Id. at 504, 507 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). But the Supreme Court declined “to put a new probable-
cause spin” on the emergency-aid doctrine. Id. at 507. Because
“[t]he probable-cause standard . . . is peculiarly related to criminal
investigations,” it is not appropriate “in the non-criminal, non-in-
vestigatory setting” when officers intervene to provide emergency
assistance. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
proper standard in that setting is instead the inquiry established by
Brigham City: whether “officers ha[ve] . . . an ‘objectively reasona-
ble basis for believing’ that their intervention [is] needed to prevent
serious harm.” Id. at 508 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400).
“Although we acknowledge the strength of the prior panel
precedent rule in this circuit, the decision in [Case] is clearly on
point and has undermined our precedent to the point of abroga-
tion.” United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2009)
(alterations adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Our prior caselaw directly conflicts with Case by imposing a
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24-13309 Opinion of the Court 13
probable-cause requirement even though the purpose of mental-
health seizures is not “to investigate suspected criminal activity.”
Roberts, 643 F.3d at 905. We imported the probable-cause require-
ment from two out-of-circuit decisions, both of which involved a
“welfare check” in response to reports of a possible suicide attempt.
See id. (first citing Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt,
555 F.3d 324, 328, 334 (4th Cir. 2009); and then citing Monday v.
Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997)). Case clarified that the
standard in that scenario is objective reasonableness, not probable
cause. 146 S. Ct. at 504, 507.
That Case addressed a warrantless entry into a home instead
of a seizure outside of the home does not make it any less control-
ling. Cf. Lopez, 562 F.3d at 1312–13 (holding that intervening Su-
preme Court decision “govern[ed] whether the time limit for filing
a notice of appeal is jurisdictional even though [it] addressed a dif-
ferent subsection of the same rule of procedure”). The Supreme
Court has explained that “[t]emporarily keeping a person from en-
tering his home . . . is considerably less intrusive than police entry
into the home itself.” Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336 (2001).
Case reaffirmed that principle by “respect[ing] as ever the ‘first
among equals’ status the Fourth Amendment affords the home.”
146 S. Ct. at 507 (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)).
Because officers under Case can intrude upon the sanctity of the
home when they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believ-
ing” that intervention is needed to “prevent serious harm,” id. at
508 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), the Fourth
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Amendment necessarily affords officers the same power when ex-
ecuting emergency seizures outside the home, United States v. Tous-
saint, 838 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir. 2016). Our precedents imposing a
probable-cause requirement in emergency-aid situations are “no
longer good law.” Lopez, 562 F.3d at 1311.
Applying the Case standard, the officers are immune if it is
“arguable” that they had an objectively reasonable basis to con-
clude that seizing Marbut was necessary to avoid serious harm. Al-
ston, 954 F.3d at 1318 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The objective-reasonableness standard is less demanding than
probable cause, see Case, 146 S. Ct. at 507, which itself “is not a high
bar,” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 899 (11th Cir. 2022) (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted). We evaluate “[t]he ob-
jective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct” by “looking at the
totality of the circumstances.” Case, 146 S. Ct. at 508 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). We should not “oversimplif[y]
a complex situation” with the benefit of hindsight. Id. Nor should
we ignore “the need for a prompt assessment of sometimes ambig-
uous information concerning potentially serious consequences.”
United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2002) (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted). As in other Fourth
Amendment cases, officers responding to an emergency are not
“required to sift through conflicting evidence or resolve issues of
credibility” in the heat of the moment. Huebner v. Bradshaw, 935
F.3d 1183, 1188 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “People could well die in emergencies if police
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24-13309 Opinion of the Court 15
tried to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial
process.” Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1340 (citation omitted).
It is at least arguable that the officers could seize Marbut in
accordance with these principles. Binding precedent holds that the
emergency-aid doctrine justifies Fourth Amendment intrusions
when necessary “to assist a drug overdose victim.” United States v.
Brand, 556 F.2d 1312, 1314, 1318–19 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J.).
And a reasonable officer on the scene could conclude that Marbut
needed emergency assistance following a suspected overdose. In-
deed, Marbut concedes that the officers were “entitled to believe”
her mother’s statement that she might have overdosed on GHB.
She also conceded in the district court that a GHB overdose “usu-
ally requires emergency medical treatment.” Those concessions,
coupled with on-site observations that Marbut was unconscious in
the Jeep and could not answer basic questions for several minutes,
support an emergency-aid seizure.
To be sure, Marbut later showed some signs of improve-
ment. She eventually remembered her name, address, and birth-
day, which prompted Pitts to opine that she was “sound of mind.”
Pitts also stated that “if she can tell us who she is and answer all our
questions properly [then] technically we are not allowed to take
her.” But denying the officers qualified immunity based on those
details would require us to “oversimplif[y] a complex situation.”
Case, 146 S. Ct. at 508.
Marbut still could not remember her birth year. Nor was
there a definitive medical consensus that it was safe for her to leave
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the scene when she abruptly announced her intent to go inside.
Pitts had stated four minutes earlier that Marbut had no choice but
to go to the hospital. Then, less than a minute before Marbut’s at-
tempted departure, another medic suggested that Marbut still
needed attention when he informed the officers that he wanted to
“get her up to the truck and check her out.”
Extended observation of Marbut “might eventually” fore-
close a reasonable belief that she required emergency assistance.
Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014). But “the
[brief] period in this case hardly sufficed in that regard.” Id. at 403–
04 (holding that officers did not lose reasonable suspicion of drunk
driving when suspect drove more carefully for five minutes “after
[his] vehicle was first spotted by an officer”). Considering “the need
for a prompt assessment” of the “potentially serious consequences”
if Marbut left without an examination and the “ambiguous infor-
mation” available to the officers regarding the extent of her intoxi-
cation, Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1339 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), seizing her was not unconstitutional “beyond de-
bate.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1303.
Marbut alternatively suggests that her seizure was unlawful
because Georgia’s mental-health statute prevents a peace officer
from transporting “a mentally ill person” to a physician or hospital
for “involuntary treatment” unless “the person is committing a pe-
nal offense” or “the peace officer has consulted . . . with a physician
[who] . . . authorize[d] the peace officer to transport the individual
for an evaluation.” G A . C ODE ANN. § 37-3-42(a). But the officers
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never transported Marbut to a physician or a hospital against her
will. And the Fourth Amendment does not transform alleged vio-
lations of state law into constitutional violations. See Daniels v. Wil-
liams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986); Hughes v. Locure, 166 F.4th 121, 131
(11th Cir. 2026) (Pryor, C.J., concurring). Marbut’s state-law argu-
ments do not overcome the officers’ qualified immunity.
2. The Officers Had Probable Cause to Believe that
Marbut Committed a Crime.
Even if the emergency-aid doctrine did not justify a seizure,
the officers could seize Marbut because they had probable cause to
believe she committed a criminal offense. We have long recog-
nized that “any crime for which a reasonable policeman would
have probable cause will support [an] arrest,” whether or not an
officer identified the crime in the moment. United States v. Thomas,
160 F.4th 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2025); Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608
F.3d 724, 735 (11th Cir. 2010). It is a crime under federal and Geor-
gia law to possess GHB. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); Hillary J. Farias and
Samantha Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-172, § 3, 114 Stat. 7, 8–9; G A . C ODE ANN. §§ 16-13-30(a), 16-
13-25(5)(A). And Marbut conceded in her briefing that the officers
were “entitled to believe” her mother’s report about a potential
overdose on GHB. Because “[p]robable cause does not require con-
clusive evidence and is not a high bar,” Washington, 25 F.4th at 899
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), the mother’s re-
port and the other information the officers collected at the scene
authorized a seizure.
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18 Opinion of the Court 24-13309
B. Officer Phillips Enjoys Qualified Immunity
from the Excessive-Force Claim.
A seizure that is lawful at its inception can become unlawful
if an officer uses excessive force. May, 846 F.3d at 1330. Force is not
excessive under the Fourth Amendment when it is “reasonably
proportionate to the need for [it].” Ingram, 30 F.4th at 1251 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). We evaluate proportional-
ity by considering “the severity of the crime, the danger to the of-
ficer or others, and the risk of flight.” Id. (alteration adopted) (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted). More generally, we
“consider[] the need for application of force, the relationship be-
tween the need and amount of force used, and the extent of the
injury inflicted by the . . . officer.” Helm v. Rainbow City, 989 F.3d
1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021). “[T]he only perspective that counts”
for this analysis “is that of a reasonable officer on the scene at the
time the events unfolded.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “[W]e do not view an officer’s actions with the
20/20 vision of hindsight,” and “we make special allowance for
them in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving situations.” Powell v.
Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 921 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
Officer Phillips did not use excessive force. Because he could
reasonably believe he had a right to seize and arrest Marbut, he had
a concomitant “right to use some degree of physical coercion or
threat thereof ” to carry out the seizure. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396 (1989); Ingram, 30 F.4th at 1251. Officer Phillips had only a
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24-13309 Opinion of the Court 19
few seconds to calculate the appropriate response as Marbut ab-
ruptly turned toward him, announced that she was heading inside,
and attempted to move past him in a confined space. A “reasonable
officer on the scene at the time,” Helm, 989 F.3d at 1273 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), could perceive in this “rap-
idly evolving situation[],” Powell, 25 F.4th at 921 (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted), that physically restraining Marbut
was necessary to maintain the seizure.
Moreover, the method that Officer Phillips employed to re-
strain Marbut—grabbing her arm and pulling it behind her back—
was “reasonably proportionate to the need.” Ingram, 30 F.4th at
1251 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have
held that the use of de minimis force, “without more, will not sup-
port a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000). And we
have held that techniques similar to those used by Officer Phillips
are de minimis forms of physical restraint. See Myers v. Bowman, 713
F.3d 1319, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “grabb[ing] [the
plaintiff] by the arm, forc[ing] him to the ground, [and] plac[ing]
him in handcuffs” was “no more severe than the force that we have
described” as de minimis in prior cases); Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d
1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that handcuffing technique
used by officer who “grabbed [the] plaintiff’s arm, twisted it around
[his] back, [and] jerk[ed] it up high to the shoulder” was “a rela-
tively common and ordinarily accepted non-excessive way to de-
tain an arrestee”). We have also recognized that established exam-
ples of de minimis force do not cease to be de minimis when they
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20 Opinion of the Court 24-13309
produce unexpected injuries. See Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1351 (find-
ing de minimis force where handcuffing “caused the displacement
of a key bone fragment” that required “amputation of the arm be-
low the elbow”).
Marbut acknowledges that “the Fourth Amendment per-
mits officers to use some degree of physical coercion in performing
an arrest or other permitted detention.” And she offers no response
to our precedents holding that similar uses of force were de minimis.
Although Marbut insists that she “posed no danger to Officer Phil-
lips” and did not flee, a reasonable officer in his position could in-
terpret her sudden pivot in his direction and the extension of her
arm toward his chest as a forceful attempt to “terminate the en-
counter” by entering her apartment prematurely. May, 846 F.3d at
1327 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Officer Phil-
lips then used a standard handcuffing technique to restrain Marbut
as she attempted to leave. And Officer Phillips could have hand-
cuffed Marbut even without her break for the apartment because
he had probable cause to believe that she unlawfully possessed
GHB. See Brown, 608 F.3d at 735; Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1351.
Marbut’s other arguments fare no better. She protests that
Officer Pena told her she was “not in trouble.” But “the existence
of probable cause [to execute an arrest] is determined by objective
standards and not on the basis of what police officers [subjectively]
think.” Thomas, 160 F.4th at 1183 (alteration adopted) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). She also asserts that Officer
Phillips acted excessively because he used a “Kimura arm lock” that
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24-13309 Opinion of the Court 21
can break arms. Yet the police report she cites to support that prop-
osition states that Officer Pena used the Kimura arm lock on her
uninjured arm, and Marbut does not argue on appeal that Officer
Pena deployed excessive force. Nor does the video footage reveal
any use of force—Kimura arm lock or otherwise—that exceeds
what our de minimis cases have described as “common and ordi-
nar[y].” Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1351. Reviewing the totality of the
circumstances as a reasonable officer would have perceived them,
Officer Phillips did not use excessive force.
C. The Other Officers Enjoy Qualified Immunity
from the Intervention Claim.
“An officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take
reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of ex-
cessive force . . . can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” Crenshaw
v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Marbut alleges that Officers Cash,
Collier, and Pena should have stopped Officer Phillips from using
excessive force. But Officer Phillips acted reasonably. So the other
officers “had no attendant obligation to intervene.” Id. at 1294.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of the officers.
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