Stephen Lillo v. Darrell A. Bruhn

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 4, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 09-15180
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00247-CV-3-MCR/EMT
STEPHEN LILLO,
as Personal Representative
of the Estate of
John R. Lillo, Jr.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DARRELL A. BRUHN,
MATTHEW M. HOLT,
RICHARD S. BROWN,
EDMUND K. ROSSI,
HOWARD HARRAN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 4, 2011)
Before BLACK, MARTIN and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Stephen Lillo, as personal representative of the estate of his brother John R.
Lillo, brought several claims against nine Fort Walton Beach Police Department
officers and two Fort Walton Beach Fire Department firefighters for alleged
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following discovery and a hearing, the district
court concluded the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and thus granted
summary judgment in their favor. In its order granting summary judgment, the
district court sua sponte raised the issue of the firefighters’ right to qualified
immunity and instructed Lillo to respond and show a genuine issue of material fact
for trial on his claims against the firefighters. Following Lillo’s response, the
district court determined the firefighters were also entitled to qualified immunity
as a matter of law. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs,
and having the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.1
First, there was no error on the part of the district court when it sua sponte
raised the issue of qualified immunity for the firefighters. The district court put
Lillo on notice that he had to come forward with evidence regarding the
firefighters. It was within the district court’s authority to subsequently determine
that the firefighters were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986).
We review a district court’s rulings on motions for summary judgment de novo,1
applying the same legal standards that bound the district court. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382
F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004).

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Second, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the
officers and firefighters based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects
municipal officers from liability in § 1983 actions as long “as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). The goal of the qualified immunity test is to “avoid excessive disruption
of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary
judgment.” Id. As such, courts are to resolve “immunity questions at the earliest
possible stage in litigation.” David Case, Associated Investigators, Inc. v.
Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The record
does not support a conclusion that the conduct of the officers and firefighters, who
were acting within their discretionary authority, amounted to a clearly established
constitutional violation.
AFFIRMED.
3

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