USA v. Lugo-Gutierrez

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 30, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-12870
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00071-RAL-TBM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FELIX JOSE LUGO-GUTIERREZ,
a.k.a. Jose Lugo-Gutierrez,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 30, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Felix Jose Lugo-Gutierrez appeals his 36-month sentence, imposed above
his applicable guidelines range, after he pleaded guilty to a violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a) and (b)(1) for being an unlawful alien found in the United States after
deportation for a felony offense. On appeal, Lugo-Gutierrez argues that his
sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the court failed
to adequately explain its reasons for imposing an upward variance.
We review a final sentence for reasonableness, applying the deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct.
586, 591, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we
will not reverse a district court so long as the district court’s ruling “does not
constitute a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244,
1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). Whether a sentence is reasonable is
guided by the factors outlined by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States
v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2008). The factors included in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need
to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the
kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range;
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(8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the
need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to
provide restitution to victims.
United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)). The burden of establishing that a sentence is unreasonable lies
with the party challenging the sentence. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1189.
In determining whether a sentence is reasonable, we first must determine
whether the sentence was procedurally reasonable. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.
Ct. at 597. Factors we must consider in determining procedural reasonableness
include whether the district court properly calculated the guidelines range,
improperly treated the Guidelines as mandatory, failed to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, selected a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failed to
adequately explain its chosen sentence. Id. After determining that the sentence is
procedurally reasonable, we then must consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence. Id. A sentence is substantively reasonable if, under the totality of
the circumstances, it achieves the purposes of § 3553(a). See Pugh, 515 F.3d at
1191. A sentence may be substantively unreasonable where a district court
“unjustifiably relied on any one § 3553(a) factor, failed to consider pertinent
§ 3553(a) factors, selected the sentence arbitrarily, or based the sentence on
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impermissible factors.” United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir.
2009).
When a district court decides that a variance is appropriate, “it should
explain why that variance is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient
justifications.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir.) (quotation
omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2847 (2009); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)
(providing that a sentencing court, when imposing a sentence outside the
applicable guidelines range, must state in open court the reasons for its imposition
of the chosen sentence and the specific reason for the variance). “The
justifications must be compelling enough to support the degree of the variance and
complete enough to allow meaningful appellate review.” Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1238
(quotations omitted). The district court need not, however, provide an
extraordinary justification for a sentence outside the guidelines range. Id.
Although we may consider the extent of the deviation, we must “give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,
justify the extent of the variance.” United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
In determining a reasonable sentence, the district court may consider facts
that already have been taken into account in calculating the defendant’s guidelines
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range. See id. at 1323–24 (providing that a district court could consider a
defendant’s prior offenses in deciding to impose an upward variance, even though
those offenses already were included in the defendant’s criminal history score);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”). In fashioning a reasonable
sentence, a district court “may . . . consider relevant facts concerning a defendant’s
background, character, and conduct.” United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1348
(11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
The district court followed the proper procedures in determining
Lugo-Gutierrez’s sentence and adequately explained why it believed that a
sentence within the guidelines range would not satisfy the § 3553(a) factors.
Thus, his sentence is procedurally reasonable. Lugo-Gutierrez’s 36-month
sentence is also substantively reasonable because the sentencing court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that an upward variance was necessary to serve
the purposes of § 3553(a). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s imposition
of a 36-month sentence.
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Lugo-Gutierrez’s indictment and judgment erroneously state that he was
deported for an aggravated felony, rather than a felony, although they correctly
reference the penalty provision for deportation following a felony conviction, 8
U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1). The parties did not raise this issue on appeal, but we may
remand with instructions to correct a clerical error in the judgment. United States
v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 822 (11th Cir. 2006). “Furthermore, it is fundamental
error for a court to enter a judgment of conviction against a defendant who has not
been charged, tried, or found guilty of the crime recited in the judgment.” Id.
(citation and quotations omitted).
Because the written judgment incorrectly states that Lugo-Gutierrez was
convicted for an aggravated felony, rather than a felony, we remand for correction
of that clerical error.
Upon a thorough review of the entire record on appeal, and after
consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm in part and remand in part.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED IN PART.
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