Guillermo Ramirez v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Company, a foreign corporation

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 13, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-10035
Non-Argument Calendar
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D. C. Docket No. 8:09-cv-00321-VMC-TBM
GUILLERMO RAMIREZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY,
a foreign corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(December 13, 2011)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, HULL and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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This is an appeal from a district court’s judgment entered on a jury verdict
in a product liability case. The plaintiff-appellant, Guillermo Ramirez
(“Ramirez”), alleged in his complaint that he used E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Company’s (“Du Pont”) product Benlate in conjunction with his farming
operations. Ramirez asserted that Benlate is a defective product because it
contains a known carcinogen: Atrazine. Ramirez filed his complaint alleging strict
liability and negligence. He also contended that the use of Benlate caused him to
contract cancer.
The case was tried to a jury and the jury, on special interrogatories, returned
a verdict favorable to Du Pont. Specifically, although the jury found that Benlate
was a defective product, it did not find that the Benlate was the cause of Ramirez’s
cancer. The district court, after denying Ramirez’s Rule 50(b) Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure motion for judgment as a matter of law and new trial on damages,
or in the alternative, Rule 50(b) and Rule 59(a) motion for new trial, entered a
judgment on the jury’s verdict. Ramirez then perfected this appeal.
This court reviews a district court’s determination of a motion for judgment
as a matter of law or new trial de novo. Ross v. Rhodes Furniture, Inc., 146 F.3d
1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998); Quick v. Peoples Bank, 993 F.2d 793, 797 (11th Cir.
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1993). We review a district court’s Daubert rulings under an abuse of discretion1
standard. McClain v Metabolife International, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th
Cir. 2005).
After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we see no reason
to disturb the jury’s verdict and the final judgment entered for Du Pont. First,
Ramirez argues that the verdict in the case was inconsistent because it determined
that Du Pont’s product, Benlate, was defective, but that such product was not the
cause of Ramirez’s injuries. We agree with the district court that Ramirez’s
argument lacks merit because defect and causation are separate elements of the
causes of action at issue, and it was proper for the jury to evaluate them separately.
Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the verdict was not inconsistent.
We also agree with the district court that the jury’s verdict was not contrary
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the case. The record supports that
the jury was presented with numerous plausible reasons for determining that
Benlate did not cause Ramirez’s cancer. For example, the jury heard that when
Ramirez sprayed his crops, he rode inside an enclosed tractor cab, wore protective
clothing, including goggles, a mask, a jumpsuit, gloves and boots, and had
minimal exposure to the chemicals. Additionally, the jury was presented with
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).1
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evidence demonstrating that Ramirez had a history of diabetes, obesity, high
cholesterol, high blood pressure and a family history of cancer. Moreover, the
jury heard that Ramirez had a history of smoking cigarettes. Finally, the jury
heard expert testimony tending to show that the Benlate in question did not
contain contaminates at a level high enough to cause Ramirez’s injuries.
The law is clear in this circuit that a district court should only grant a
judgment as a matter of law or new trial when the verdict is against the clear
weight of the evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice. See Lipphardt v.
Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001);
Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984). We agree
with the district court’s finding that Ramirez failed to satisfy his high burden for
obtaining a new trial or a judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the weight of
the evidence.
Finally, Ramirez attacks Du Pont’s expert, Dr. Cohen by contending that the
testimony of Dr. Cohen should have been stricken. We disagree. Dr. Cohen is
one of the world’s leading experts in cancer and chemical causation and he
considered the type of scientific and factual information that experts in his field
would reasonably rely upon. The opinions he offered at trial were not speculative,
and he did not make improper assumptions. Accordingly, we see no abuse of
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discretion in the district court’s permitting Dr. Cohen to testify as an expert
witness and in refusing to strike Dr. Cohen’s opinions.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment entered on
the jury’s verdict.
AFFIRMED.
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