Dr. Isaac Brunson v. DeKalb County Schools

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10177
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
DR. ISAAC BRUNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOLS,
Defendant-Appellee,
DR. R. STEPHEN GREEN et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10177
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-03819-WMR
____________________
Before W ILSON, L UCK , and B LACK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Isaac Brunson, proceeding
pro se, appeals (1) the magistrate
judge’s orders partially granting Brunson’s motion for an extension
and denying Brunson’s motion for sanctions; (2) the district court’s
order dismissing Stephen Green, Linda Woodard, Angelica Collins,
and Jocelyn Harrington (the individual defendants); and (3) the dis-
trict court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of DeKalb
County Schools (DCS) on his claim of age discrimination in hiring.
Brunson asserts several issues on appeal, which we address in turn.
I. MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDERS
To the extent Brunson is challenging on appeal the magis-
trate judge’s February 18, 2021, order partially granting his motion
for an extension of discovery and May 4, 2021, order denying his
motion for sanctions against DCS related to that motion, we lack
jurisdiction.
See Wood v. Raffensperger, 981 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2020) (stating we review our own jurisdiction
de novo). In
United States v. Renfro, we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the
part of an appeal that challenged a magistrate judge’s pretrial dis-
covery ruling because the appellant failed to timely object to the
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22-10177 Opinion of the Court 3
ruling before the district court. 620 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 1980).1
It reasoned the defendant was “[i]n essence . . . appealing a magis-
trate’s decision directly to this Court,” and emphasized that “[t]he
law is settled that appellate courts are without jurisdiction to hear
appeals directly from federal magistrates.”
Id. We have continued
to apply
Renfro as a jurisdictional rule.
United States v. Brown, 342
F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003).
Brunson did not appeal either of these magistrate judge’s or-
ders to the district court. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to re-
view these orders.
II. INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
Brunson asserts the district court improperly dismissed the
individual defendants because they, as administrators, were agents
of DCS and could be sued under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967 (ADEA).
The district court did not err in dismissing the claims against
the individual defendants.
See Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335
(11th Cir. 2003) (reviewing a district court’s ruling on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion
de novo)
. The ADEA makes it unlawful for an
employer to refuse to hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate
against an individual at least 40 years old with respect to
1 In
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10177
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a). We have acknowledged that em-
ployees may not be sued in their individual capacities under the
ADEA.
Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995). Ad-
ditionally, Brunson’s claims against the individual defendants in
their official capacities were unnecessary and redundant because he
also filed the same claims against DCS.
See Busby v. City of Or-
lando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting suits against gov-
ernment officials and the government unit are “functionally equiv-
alent,” and, accordingly, suits against individuals in their official ca-
pacities are unnecessary because the governmental unit can be
sued directly).
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Brunson contends the district court improperly granted
summary judgment for DCS because there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Harrington knew of his application for
the open teacher position and when she became aware of
Brunson’s application. He also argues he established a “convincing
mosaic” of age discrimination because he showed that Harrington
knew of his interest in the open position and that another older
applicant was told to avoid interviewing with Harrington.
A. Pretext
Brunson failed to show DCS’s proffered reason for not hir-
ing him was pretextual.
See Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1332
(11th Cir. 2013) (explaining in an ADEA action relying on
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22-10177 Opinion of the Court 5
circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff may establish age discrimina-
tion through the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-03 (1973), burden-shifting framework—if a plaintiff establishes
a
prima facie case of discrimination, and the employer articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the employee
then bears the burden to show that the employer’s reason is a pre-
text for discrimination). DCS’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason
for not hiring Brunson was that Harrington was unaware of
Brunson’s application for the open music teacher position until af-
ter she had already decided to hire John Jeffrey Jenkins for the po-
sition. Harrington stated she interviewed Jenkins on January 18,
pulled applications for the last time on January 30, told Human Re-
sources she wanted to hire Jenkins on February 13, learned of
Brunson’s interest in the position through his handwritten letter on
February 19, and confirmed with Human Resources that she
wanted to hire Jenkins on February 20. Brunson’s evidence failed
to contradict Harrington’s testimony because he presented evi-
dence he told Radika Brown, not Harrington, of his interest in the
position before February 19 and only expressed his interest directly
to Harrington for the first time on February 19. Brunson’s claim
that Harrington should have checked the online application portal
daily fails to show she actually checked it daily and does not con-
tradict Harrington’s testimony. Harrington and Brunson agree she
learned of his interest in the open position on February 19, but at
that point, Harrington was in the final stages of solidifying Jenkins’s
application so he could be hired.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10177
Brunson testified he submitted a letter to Harrington on
February 19 expressing his interest in interviewing for the open po-
sition and that Harrington told him in her office the next day to
return the following day to interview with her, which was the same
day Harrington finalized the hire of Jenkins. While Harrington tes-
tified she did not recall that conversation with Brunson, Brunson’s
testimony, construed in the light most favorable to him, supports
a finding that Harrington learned Brunson applied for the position
before she hired Jenkins. Even if this calls into question the truth-
fulness of DCS’s proffered reason, Brunson also had to show that
DCS’s true reason for the hiring decision was age discrimination in
order to prove pretext, which he failed to do.
See St. Mary’s Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (stating to establish pretext,
the plaintiff must show that: (1) the reason offered was false; and
(2) discrimination was the real reason for the employer’s actions);
Flowers v. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1337-38
(11th Cir. 2015) (stating even if a plaintiff’s evidence supports an
inference the proffered reason is “pretext of
something,” summary
judgment is appropriate if the plaintiff does not produce evidence
the reason was pretext of discrimination).
B. Convincing Mosaic
Despite Brunson’s arguments a jury should decide whether
he pieced together a “convincing mosaic,” the district court, at the
summary judgment stage, had the authority to determine whether
he sufficiently pieced together a “convincing mosaic.”
See Smith
v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011)
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22-10177 Opinion of the Court 7
(providing a plaintiff may also survive summary judgment by pre-
senting “a convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that sup-
ports a reasonable inference that the employer intentionally dis-
criminated against him). And the district court did not err in con-
cluding he failed to do so.
See Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d
1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (stating a “convincing mosaic” may exist
where evidence shows, among other things, “(1) suspicious timing,
ambiguous statements, and other bits and pieces from which an
inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn, (2) systemati-
cally better treatment of similarly situated employees, and (3) that
the employer’s justification is pretextual” (quotation marks and el-
lipsis omitted)). Brunson showed he was qualified for the position,
he was in a protected class, and Harrington knew of his application
once she received his letter. Brunson also presented an anecdote
of an older applicant who was told to go around Harrington.
These “bits and pieces,” however, are not enough to support an
inference of discrimination.
See id. Brunson’s evidence did not
show pretext, ambiguous statements, suspicious timing, or a sys-
tematic pattern of discrimination.
See id. Brunson’s qualifications,
Harrington learning of his application after she made up her mind
to hire Jenkins, and the anecdote about an older applicant are not
sufficient to piece together a “convincing mosaic” of age discrimi-
nation.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting sum-
mary judgment to DCS on Brunson’s ADEA claim.
See Alvarez v.
Royal Atl. Developers,
Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010)
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10177
(stating we review the grant of summary judgment
de novo, apply-
ing the same legal standards as the district court).
DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.
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