Shawn C. Leftwich v. State Farm Insurance Company, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10213
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
SHAWN C. LEFTWICH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
LARRY J. WATTS,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03703-MHC
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10213
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Before L UCK , ANDERSON, and E DMONDSON , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Shawn Leftwich, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”) and Larry Watts,
a State Farm adjuster. The district court determined that Left-
wich’s civil action was time-barred by a suit-limitation provision in
the applicable insurance policy.2 No reversible error has been
shown; we affirm.
Briefly stated, this civil action stems from water-related
property damage sustained by a townhouse Leftwich rented in Lo-
ganville, Georgia (“Property”). The Property was insured by a
renter’s insurance policy issued by State Farm (“Policy”). Pertinent
to this appeal, the Policy included a suit-limitation provision that
contained this language: “Any action by any party must be started
within one year after the date of loss or damage.”
1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518
F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings. See
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
2 The district court also concluded that Leftwich’s claims against Watts were
subject to dismissal for failure to effect proper service of process. Leftwich
raises no challenge to that ruling on appeal. Nor does Leftwich make any sub-
stantive argument challenging the district court’s order denying Plaintiff’s mo-
tion for reconsideration. As a result, neither of those rulings are properly be-
fore us.
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22-10213 Opinion of the Court 3
During this litigation, Leftwich has said consistently that she
first noticed excess moisture and an unusual “smell of mold” in the
Property on 2 May 2019. That day, Leftwich reported these condi-
tions to the property management company’s maintenance depart-
ment. On 5 May 2019, Leftwich contacted the City of Loganville’s
Department of Community Affairs (“City”) about the mold smell.
In June 2019, the City determined that the moisture level in the
Property exceeded acceptable levels. Leftwich says the City later
provided her with the results of a mold inspection that purportedly
showed the presence of mold in the Property on 2 May 2019.
On 10 July 2019, Leftwich filed a claim with State Farm un-
der the Policy. Leftwich claimed loss of use of the Property due to
mold and excess moisture levels. State Farm denied the claim on
26 July 2019.
On 8 July 2020, Leftwich filed this civil action in Georgia
state court. Defendants removed the case to federal district court.
Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment.
Leftwich filed no response.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The district court determined that the complained-of
water damage occurred -- at the latest -- on 2 May 2019. Because
Leftwich filed her lawsuit more than one year later, the district
court concluded that Leftwich’s lawsuit was barred by the Policy’s
suit-limitation provision.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, and we view the evidence and all reasonable factual
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10213
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Sum-
mary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
We are bound by the substantive law of Georgia in deciding
this diversity case. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938). Under Georgia law, an insurance policy -- like all contracts
-- “must be construed according to its plain language and express
terms.” See Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kephart, 439 S.E.2d 682,
683 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). “Unless otherwise defined in the contract,
terms in an insurance policy are given their ordinary and custom-
ary meaning.” W. Pac. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davies, 601 S.E.2d 363, 367
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
On appeal, Leftwich first contends that the district court
erred in concluding that the Policy’s one-year limitation period be-
gan to run on 2 May 2019. Leftwich says she first learned about the
water damage in August 2019 after Leftwich received documents
subpoenaed in a separate civil action involving her landlord. Ac-
cording to Leftwich, the one-year limitation period thus began to
run in August 2019. We disagree.
The undisputed evidence in the record demonstrates that
Leftwich noticed an unusual “smell of mold” and excess moisture
levels in the Property -- and reported her concerns to the Property’s
maintenance department -- on 2 May 2019. Dissatisfied with the
maintenance department’s response, Leftwich then reported the
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22-10213 Opinion of the Court 5
smell to the City three days later. In the light of Leftwich’s com-
plaints about the mold smell and excess moisture in the Property
in early May 2019 -- and Leftwich’s assertion that a mold inspection
detected the presence of mold in the Property on 2 May 2019 -- the
district court committed no error in determining that the com-
plained-of water damage occurred (at the latest) on 2 May 2019.
We also reject Leftwich’s argument that the Policy’s one-
year limitation period should begin to run on the date State Farm
denied her claim (on 26 July 2019) instead of on the date of “loss or
damage” to the Property. Georgia law makes clear that courts
must enforce unambiguous contracts as written. See Thornton v.
Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 695 S.E.2d 642, 646 (Ga. 2010);
Kephart, 439 S.E.2d at 683 (“No construction of an insurance con-
tract is required or even permissible when the language is plain,
unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpreta-
tion.”).
Here, the plain language of the Policy’s suit-limitation pro-
vision provides unambiguously that a party must commence a law-
suit “within one year after the date of loss or damage.” Applying
the ordinary and customary meaning of the words “loss” and
“damage,” the one-year limitation period began to run on the date
the water damage occurred -- not the date on which State Farm
denied Leftwich’s insurance claim. In Thornton, the Georgia Su-
preme Court concluded that similar policy language was “clear and
unambiguous” and “plainly require[d] the insured to file suit within
one year of the loss.” See Thornton, 695 S.E.2d at 643, 646 (involving
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10213
a suit-limitation period providing that “[n]o action can be brought
unless the policy provisions have been complied with and the ac-
tion is started one year after the date of the loss”).
Under the unambiguous terms of the Policy, Leftwich had
one year after 2 May 2019 in which to file her lawsuit against State
Farm. Because Leftwich filed her lawsuit in July 2020 -- more than
two months after the suit-limitation period expired -- the district
court concluded properly that Leftwich’s civil action was time-
barred under the Policy. We affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
AFFIRMED.
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