Joseph Modeste v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10711
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JOSEPH MODESTE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-01360-CEM-LHP

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10711
____________________
Before J ORDAN, L AGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Modeste, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district
court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We granted a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) as to: (1) whether the state trial court unreasonably ap-
plied Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 53 (2010), when it found that the
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings Modeste received
adequately informed him of his right to have counsel present dur-
ing his police interrogation; and (2) whether the district court erred
in finding that his trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to in-
vestigate and present evidence regarding the history and reputa-
tion for violence of one of Modeste’s victims because Modeste
could not show he was prejudiced by such omission. After review,
we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
In 2004, a state grand jury indicted Modeste with two counts
of first-degree murder with a firearm stemming from the deaths
of Arthur and Betty Williams. After his arrest, police officers Ser-
geant Tony Nova and Detective Torrance Slaughter interrogated
Modeste. At the beginning of the interrogation, Sergeant Nova
stated:

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22-10711 Opinion of the Court 3
I mean you have the right to remain silent. . . . I’m
sure you know all these . . . rights. . . .
You know anything you say can be used held against
you in a court of law. . . . You’re entitled to talk to an
attorney and if you want one you can ask for an attor-
ney. If you can’t afford one, you know, they can ap-
point you one. . . . Of course you . . . you can talk to
an attorney first before talking to us. You know I . . .
can tell you that. . . we’ll start talking after you . . .
you understand these things, . . . Torrance is . . . he’s
straight up when he talks to you that way. Under-
stand what I’m saying?
Modeste replied, “Alright,” and Sergeant Nova continued:
If at any time you feel uncomfortable or think we’re
trying to persuade you to say something you stop
talking bro. This is all on you. We’re gonna give you
. . . we’re giving you an opportunity to, you know, to
say what you gotta say. . . . You . . . understand what
those things are . . . the things . . . I told you? Okay.
. . . do you understand that we’re not trying to force
you to talk either.
Modeste replied, “Right,” and Sergeant Nova stated, “That
is totally up to you.” Modeste again replied, “Alright.” Then, Ser-
geant Nova asked, “So I’m gonna ask you straight up . . . do you
wanna talk to us?” To which Modeste replied, “I ain’t got no prob-
lem.” Officers then handed Modeste a form outlining his Miranda
rights. Modeste expressed that he had dyslexia, and officers ver-
bally confirmed with Modeste that he understood his rights, asking

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10711
him if he understood that he had the right to remain silent. Mod-
este stated, “Right.” Sergeant Nova stated, “and you did . . . you do
say you wanna talk to us, you can sign this and that’s all it says is
that you wanted to talk to us. It’s up to you.” Modeste stated, “I
don’t think I have a problem with it,” and signed the Miranda form.
Sergeant Nova checked the boxes on the Miranda form indicating
that Modeste understood his rights and that Modeste wanted to
speak to officers, and Modeste again verbally confirmed that he un-
derstood the Miranda form.
Modeste continued speaking with the officers and told them
that he rented an apartment to Arthur and his wife Betty, but they
stopped paying rent, so Modeste tried to evict them. The day of
the incident, Arthur and Betty invited Modeste over to the apart-
ment under the guise that they would pay their past due rent, but
when Modeste entered the apartment, Arthur threw a machete and
a bar stool at him as Betty yelled at him. Modeste then showed the
couple the firearm that he regularly carried with him, explaining
that he had been attacked and shot in the past, and always carried
a firearm for protection. Modeste stated that after Arthur threw
the bar stool at him, Betty handed Arthur a knife, prompting Mod-
este to begin shooting toward the couple to protect himself. Dur-
ing the initial shooting, Betty fell and Arthur escaped the apartment
through a broken window. Modeste followed Arthur outside and
continued shooting at him. When officers asked why Modeste kept
shooting at Arthur as he ran away, Modeste explained that he
thought that he and his family would have died if Arthur and Betty

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22-10711 Opinion of the Court 5
survived because of Arthur’s criminal history of being involved
with gangs and selling drugs on the property.
Modeste later moved to suppress the statements he made to
police, arguing that the officers did not clearly inform him that he
was entitled to counsel during the interrogation, in violation of Mi-
randa. The trial court initially granted Modeste’s motion to sup-
press on that basis. The state appealed this decision, and Florida’s
Fifth District Court of Appeal (hereinafter, “Florida appellate
court”) reversed the trial court, finding that Modeste’s Miranda
warnings were sufficient. State v. Modeste, 987 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Modeste appealed and the Florida Supreme
Court reversed, agreeing with the trial court that Modeste’s Mi-
randa warnings were inadequate. Modeste v. State, 4 So. 3d 1217
(Fla. 2009). In so finding, the Florida Supreme Court relied on its
then-precedent in State v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2008), where
the court concluded that a defendant’s Miranda warnings were in-
sufficient where officers did not explicitly inform the defendant that
he had a right to have counsel present during questioning.
As a result, the Florida appellate court vacated its prior opin-
ion and affirmed the trial court’s order granting Modeste’s motion
to suppress. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted a petition for writ of certiorari to review the Powell deci-
sion. This prompted the state to move the Florida appellate court
to withdraw its mandate and hold the case in abeyance until Powell
had been resolved. The Florida appellate court granted the state’s
motion.

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10711
Then, in 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the Powell deci-
sion. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010). The Court held that an
officer’s statement to a suspect during an interrogation that he had
the right to consult an attorney before answering any questions,
and that the suspect could invoke that right at any time during the
interview, satisfied Miranda. Id. at 53. Following this decision, the
Florida appellate court reversed the trial court’s order granting
Modeste’s motion to suppress and directed the trial court to recon-
sider the motion in light of the new Powell1 decision. State v. Mod-
este, 66 So. 3d 386 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
Upon remand, the trial court denied Modeste’s motion to
suppress, reasoning that he was adequately informed that he was
entitled to an attorney and that he could speak to his attorney be-
fore and during the interrogation. Relying on Powell, the court
found that the Miranda warnings given to Modeste did not suggest
a limitation on his right to an attorney, but instead conveyed that
his right to an attorney became effective prior to questioning.
Modeste’s case proceeded to a jury trial in January 2014. At
trial, Modeste testified that when he started renting to Arthur, he
was concerned about the fact that Arthur had just been released
from prison. He stated that although he was bothered by that fact,
he did not want to turn his back on someone in need, and Arthur
ultimately seemed like a nice guy. Once Arthur and Betty moved
in, Modeste felt that his relationship with the couple began to
1 Moving forward, references to Powell in this opinion refer to the Su-
preme Court decision, rather than the now overturned Florida decision.

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22-10711 Opinion of the Court 7
deteriorate. According to Modeste, Arthur stopped paying rent
and began selling drugs at the apartment, which prompted Mod-
este to begin eviction paperwork. Modeste also stated that he dis-
covered Arthur siphoning electricity from another apartment into
his apartment, causing Modeste to call the police and have Arthur
arrested. On one occasion, Arthur threatened to kill Modeste if he
came onto the property.
Modeste also called St. George Philogene to testify. Phi-
logene helped Modeste with his apartment’s roofing needs. On
one day, he and another individual went to finish a roofing job at
Modeste’s apartment. Philogene borrowed Modeste’s van to go to
the apartment, and when he and his assistant began setting up his
equipment on the roof, a man appeared on the roof with a gun in
his hand. Philogene stated the man came up the ladder, stood on
the roof and looked around, and then left all while holding a gun.
Philogene and his assistant left the roof and refused to finish the
job, and told Modeste it was too dangerous for them to continue
working. Philogene could not confirm the identity of this man af-
ter looking at an autopsy picture of Arthur.
Ultimately, the jury found Modeste guilty of the lesser in-
cluded offenses of second-degree murder on both counts. In April
2014, the trial court sentenced him to 55 years’ imprisonment for
each offense, to be served concurrently.
Modeste appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in deny-
ing his motion to suppress because his Maranda warnings did not
convey that he had the right to have an attorney present during his

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10711
interrogation. The Florida appellate court affirmed Modeste’s con-
victions and sentences in an unelaborated per curiam opinion in
March 2016. Modeste filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
the Supreme Court, which the Court denied. Modeste v. Florida, 580
U.S. 845 (2016).
Following other filings not relevant to the current appeal,
Modeste filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion
for post-conviction relief. He argued, among other things, that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of Ar-
thur’s propensity for, and specific acts of, violence in order to pre-
sent an adequate self-defense theory. He contended that his trial
counsel failed to adequately investigate Arthur’s prior history of
drug use, drug dealing, and violence, and that such failure preju-
diced his defense. The post-conviction court denied most of Mod-
este’s claims but granted him an evidentiary hearing, in relevant
part, on his claim that his trial counsel failed to investigate Arthur’s
history of violence.
An evidentiary hearing was held in March 2019. There,
Modeste’s daughter testified that, on one occasion, she heard Mod-
este and Arthur arguing. Because she was in a car and not physi-
cally with Modeste, she only heard Arthur yelling, and although
she could not hear specific words, it sounded negative.
Next, Gaveale Hansley testified that he used to sell crack-co-
caine to tenants in Modeste’s apartments, including Arthur. He
witnessed Modeste and Arthur arguing outside the apartment on

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22-10711 Opinion of the Court 9
one occasion about unpaid rent, and he heard Arthur threaten to
cut off Modeste’s legs.
Modeste also testified that, prior to trial, he discussed with
his attorney the fact that Arthur had recently been released from
prison. When Modeste rented the apartment to Arthur, he did not
know that Arthur had such a long criminal record, and he did not
learn about Arthur’s fourteen felony convictions for drug-related
offenses until after the trial. However, while Arthur lived in the
apartment, he told Modeste that he had quit his job with a moving
company and was going to make money selling drugs. Modeste
told Arthur that he could not sell drugs on the property, and Arthur
told Modeste that, if he ever came back to the apartment, he would
cut Modeste’s legs off. Modeste also knew that Arthur had a ma-
chete. He explained that he spoke to his attorney about his inter-
actions with and fear of Arthur before trial.
On cross-examination, the state asked Modeste what prior
acts of violence he believed his trial counsel should have introduced
at trial. Modeste pointed to an incident in which Arthur chased a
roofer at the apartment complex with a gun. However, Modeste
confirmed that the jury did hear evidence of that incident.
Finally, the state called Modeste’s trial counsel to testify, who
stated that he researched Arthur’s background and knew Arthur
was a convicted felon, but he was not aware of any prior violent
criminal acts Arthur committed that could have been introduced at
trial. On cross-examination, he stated that he did not believe

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10711
Arthur’s prior drug convictions were relevant to the issue of self-
defense.
After the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court de-
nied Modeste’s remaining claims. The court determined that Ar-
thur’s prior, non-violent drug convictions were not relevant to a
theory of self-defense and, in any event, Modeste did not have
knowledge of specific acts of violence committed by Arthur be-
yond those Modeste already testified to at trial. Thus, Modeste’s
counsel did not perform deficiently nor could Modeste demon-
strate prejudice. Modeste appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 mo-
tion, and the Florida appellate court affirmed in an unelaborated
per curiam opinion.
Modeste then filed the present 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas peti-
tion, in which he argued, among other things, that: (1) his constitu-
tional rights were violated when officers did not properly apprise
him of his right to have counsel present during questioning, in vi-
olation of Miranda and Powell; and (2) his trial counsel performed
ineffectively for failing to investigate and introduce evidence about
Arthur’s prior history of violence. The state opposed Modeste’s
petition.
Ultimately, the district court denied Modeste’s habeas peti-
tion. The court first found that the trial court’s denial of Modeste’s
motion to suppress was not an unreasonable application of Mi-
randa or Powell because the warnings given to Modeste could rea-
sonably be understood to establish the time at which his right to
have an attorney present became effective, and the warning could

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22-10711 Opinion of the Court 11
not be understood as a restriction upon Modeste’s right to counsel
during questioning. Thus, the state court’s denial was not objec-
tively unreasonable, an unreasonable application of Miranda or
Powell, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the facts.
To Modeste’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the dis-
trict court ruled that the state court’s denial of the claim was not
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), or an unreasonable determination of
the facts. It noted that no evidence was presented at the evidentiary
hearing demonstrating that Arthur had any prior violent felony
convictions, and Modeste himself did not learn about Arthur’s
fourteen prior drug convictions until after trial. Moreover, Mod-
este’s counsel did present evidence that Arthur had been released
from prison shortly before renting an apartment from Modeste
and had threatened Modeste before the incident. Thus, Modeste
could not establish deficient performance or prejudice. As a result,
the court denied the petition and declined to issue a COA.
Modeste moved this Court for a COA, which this Court
granted with respect to whether the police’s interrogation of Mod-
este violated Miranda and Powell, and whether Modeste’s trial coun-
sel performed ineffectively for failing to investigate and present ev-
idence regarding Arthur’s history and reputation for violence on
the basis that such evidence was barred by Florida law.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2254 ha-
beas petition, ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the

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12 Opinion of the Court 22-10711
district court’s determination that the state court acted in accord-
ance with federal law, reasonably applied federal law, and made
reasonable factual findings. Williams v. Allen, 598 F.3d 778, 788
(11th Cir. 2010). It is the petitioner’s burden to establish his enti-
tlement to habeas relief. Id.
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (“AEDPA”), a federal court may only grant habeas relief with
respect to a claim adjudicated in state court if the state court’s de-
cision was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su-
preme Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasona-
ble determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court’s decision is “contrary to clearly established
federal law if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistin-
guishable from a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States and nevertheless arrives at a result different from its prece-
dent.” Reese v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1286 (11th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state court unrea-
sonably applies clearly established federal law if it identifies the ap-
propriate legal rule but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the
case, or when it unreasonably extends or declines to extend, a legal
principle from a Supreme Court case to a new context. Id.
“[C]learly established law” under § 2254(d) refers to the holdings of
the Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision.
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61 (2004). Where the

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22-10711 Opinion of the Court 13
Supreme Court has not given a clear answer to the question pre-
sented, the state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied
clearly established federal law. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120,
126 (2008). Essentially, the state court’s decision “must be so obvi-
ously wrong that its error lies beyond any possibility of fairminded
disagreement.” Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025,
1034 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A state court’s factual findings are presumed correct. Wil-
liams, 598 F.3d at 788. The petitioner can only overcome this pre-
sumption of correctness by rebutting it with clear and convincing
evidence. Id. As such, our review of a state court’s factual findings
is even more deferential than a clear error standard of review. Id.
“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court
believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether
that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher
threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). “A state
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal ha-
beas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the cor-
rectness of the state court’s decision.” Franks v. GDCP Warden,
975 F.3d 1165, 1176 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Even when left with a “firm conviction” that the state
court’s decision was incorrect, we cannot grant a habeas relief un-
less the state court’s decision was “objectively unreasonable.”
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).

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14 Opinion of the Court 22-10711
When the final state court to adjudicate the merits of a peti-
tioner’s claim affirms or denies a lower court’s decision without
explaining its reasoning, the federal habeas court should “look
through” the unelaborated decision to the last reasoned state court
decision that provides relevant reasonings. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.
Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). Then, the federal habeas court should as-
sume that the unexplained decision adopted that same reasoning.
Id.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The State Court Did Not Act Contrary to, or Unreason-
ably Apply, Miranda or Powell.
Before the start of a custodial interrogation, an individual
must be given their Miranda warnings, which includes the right to
have an attorney present during questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
479. Law enforcement officers must clearly inform the individual
that “he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the law-
yer with him during interrogation.” Id. at 471. After receiving
these warnings and having the opportunity to exercise his rights,
“the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer questions or make a statement.” Id. at 479.
However, “unless and until such warnings and waiver are demon-
strated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against him.” Id.
There is no exact formulation of the Miranda warnings that
must be given and reviewing courts “need not examine Miranda
warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an

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22-10711 Opinion of the Court 15
easement.” Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989). Rather,
in evaluating the sufficiency of a Miranda warning, courts should
determine whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect
his Miranda rights. Id.
In Powell, police gave the following warnings to the defend-
ant: “You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any
of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be
appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You
have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want dur-
ing this interview.” 559 U.S. at 53-54. The Supreme Court deter-
mined that the police’s statement that the defendant had a right to
talk to an attorney before answering questions, taken together with
the second statement that the defendant had the right to exercise
his rights at any time during the interrogation, “reasonably con-
veyed” to the defendant his “right to have an attorney present, not
only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times.” Id. at 62. The
Court noted that, under these warnings, it would be counterintui-
tive for a defendant to believe that his attorney would not be pre-
sent throughout the interrogation because that would require him
to exit and reenter the interrogation room between each question
to seek his attorney’s advice. Id. at 62-63.
Moreover, the Court determined that the term “before” in
the warnings “merely conveyed when [the defendant’s] right to an
attorney became effective—namely, before he answered any ques-
tions at all,” and did not indicate any restriction on counsel’s pres-
ence once the questioning began. Id. at 63. Instead, the warnings

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16 Opinion of the Court 22-10711
stated that the defendant could seek his attorney’s advice before
responding to “any of the officers’ questions” and “at any time . . .
during the interview,” and therefore, they properly “communicated
that the right to counsel carried forward to and through the inter-
rogation.” Id. (brackets omitted).
On appeal, Modeste argues that the state court unreasona-
bly applied Powell when it determined he was properly informed of
his right to have counsel present during his interrogation, as re-
quired by Miranda. He argues that the warnings given by police in
this case were not analogous to those given in Powell because the
warnings in this case did not include a “catch-all” phrase, and the
use of the word “before” in this case could only be read as a limita-
tion upon his right to counsel during the interrogation.
Here, we conclude that the state court did not act contrary
to, or unreasonably apply, clearly established federal law when it
concluded that Modeste was adequately informed of his right to
have counsel present during his interrogation. Officers gave Mod-
este the following warnings: “Of course you . . . you can talk to an
attorney first before talking to us. . . . we’ll start talking after
you . . . you understand these things, . . . If at any time you feel
uncomfortable or think we’re trying to persuade you to say some-
thing you stop talking bro. This is all on you. . . . do you under-
stand that we’re not trying to force you to talk either.” Under Pow-
ell, it was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to con-
clude that the use of the words “first” and “before” in Modeste’s
Miranda warnings informed him that his right to counsel attached

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22-10711 Opinion of the Court 17
before the interrogation began and was not limited thereafter.
When reading these statements collectively, it was not unreasona-
ble for the state court to conclude that Modeste had been reasona-
bly apprised of his right to counsel during the interrogation. Duck-
worth, 492 U.S. at 203; Powell, 559 U.S. at 53-54, 62-63.
Although Modeste’s warning did not contain a “catch-all”
provision identical to that in Powell, the officers informed Modeste
that he could stop questioning at any time and indicated that they
would only question him “after” he understood his rights. The
warnings could not be read as a restriction upon Modeste’s right to
counsel. Powell, 559 U.S. at 63. Thus, the state court’s decision was
not objectively unreasonable, and habeas relief on this ground is
unwarranted. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76.
B. Modeste’s Counsel Did Not Provide Ineffective Assis-
tance.
To establish ineffective assistance, a petitioner must show
that: (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient;” and (2) “the defi-
cient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687. Counsel’s performance is presumed reasonable, and to over-
come this presumption, the petitioner must demonstrate “that no
competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel”
took. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000)
(en banc). Prejudice occurs when “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

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18 Opinion of the Court 22-10711
Importantly, when analyzing a claim of ineffective assis-
tance under § 2254(d), our review is “doubly” deferential to coun-
sel’s performance. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
Thus, under § 2254(d), “the question is not whether counsel’s ac-
tions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any rea-
sonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential
standard.” Id.
We have explained that “state courts are the final arbiters of
state law, and federal habeas courts should not second-guess them
on such matters.” Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1355
(11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is a federal constitutional
claim, when the validity of the claim that counsel failed to raise
turns on state law, we must defer to the state’s construction of its
own law. Pinkney v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 876 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th
Cir. 2017). Importantly, trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective
for failing to raise meritless arguments. Bolender v. Singletary, 16
F.3d 1547, 1573 (11th Cir. 1994).
Under Florida law, a defendant may introduce evidence of
the victim’s character to show that the victim of the crime was the
aggressor and that the defendant acted in self-defense. Hedges v.
State, 667 So. 2d 420, 422-23 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). To
properly introduce such evidence at trial, the defendant must have
known “of the victim’s violent acts or of his violent reputation at
the time of the alleged offense.” Id. The “defendant’s knowledge
of a victim’s specific acts of violence is a precondition to

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22-10711 Opinion of the Court 19
admissibility.” Antoine v. State, 138 So. 3d 1064, 1076 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2014).
On appeal, Modeste contends the district court erred in
denying his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the
character evidence he wanted to introduce was not barred under
Florida law and the failure to present such evidence prejudiced his
defense. To the issue of prejudice, he contends that Arthur’s pro-
pensity for violence was the crux of his self-defense theory, and the
failure to explore and explain that issue to the jury negatively im-
pacted his defense to the jury. He also asserts that the district court
made two erroneous factual findings: (1) that no evidence pre-
sented at the evidentiary hearing demonstrated that Arthur had vi-
olent felony convictions and that Modeste did not learn of Arthur’s
felony convictions until after the shooting, and (2) that Modeste’s
counsel did present evidence of Arthur’s past violence.
Here, the district court did not err in finding that Modeste’s
trial counsel was not ineffective. As an initial matter, the district
court did not make independent factual findings, but instead de-
ferred to the state court’s factual findings, as required under the
AEDPA. Williams, 598 F.3d at 788. The record clearly reflects that
Modeste did not know if Arthur had violent felony convictions and
did not know that Arthur had fourteen felony drug convictions un-
til after trial, and trial counsel introduced evidence at trial of the
threats Arthur made toward Modeste. Thus, Modeste’s challenge
against the district court’s factual findings, or reliance on the state
court’s factual findings, is meritless.

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-10711
Additionally, the district court did not err in concluding that
the state court’s denial of Modeste’s ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
Strickland. First, Modeste’s counsel did present evidence of Ar-
thur’s violent tendencies through the testimony of Philogene and
Modeste. Modeste also mentioned Arthur’s recent release from
prison and sale of drugs on the property. Additionally, had Mod-
este’s counsel moved to introduce any additional evidence of Ar-
thur’s violent tendencies, such motion would have been denied.
The record evidence shows that Modeste did not know of Arthur’s
fourteen felony convictions until after trial, and he did not have any
knowledge of any other of Arthur’s alleged violent tendencies.
Modeste’s knowledge of Arthur’s specific acts of violence is a pre-
condition to admissibility, meaning Modeste’s counsel could not
have made a meritorious argument at trial to bring in this pur-
ported evidence. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1076. As such, Modeste’s
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not raising a meritless ar-
gument. Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1573.
For the same reasons, Modeste cannot establish prejudice.
The jury heard evidence of Arthur’s past violent behavior, and
Modeste cannot establish that, had the jury heard more, the out-
come of his proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. Thus, habeas relief on this ground is not warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, we AFFIRM the district
court’s denial of Modeste’s § 2254 habeas petition.

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