Scott Hardwick, et al v. Correcthealth Bibb LLC, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10878
____________________
SCOTT HARDWICK,
DAWN HARDWICK,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
CORRECTHEALTH BIBB LLC,
MICHAEL PARROTT,
ROBBIE JOINER,
SHERIFF,
SCOTT CHAPMAN,
Defendants-Appellees,
MICHELLE DELATORRE et al.,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10878
Defendants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00127-MTT
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR , Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR , Circuit Judge, and
C OOGLER ,∗ Chief District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Scott and Dawn Hardwick appeal a summary judgment or-
der rejecting their claims that Michael Parrott and Robbie Joiner,
county law enforcement officers, violated their constitutional
rights under the Second, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See
42 U.S.C. § 1983. We earlier ordered the parties to address whether
that order was appealable even though it left several claims pend-
ing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Hardwicks argued that we have ju-
risdiction in part because, after they filed a notice of appeal in this
Court, they attempted to voluntarily dismiss the claims pending in
the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). We
ordered that the jurisdictional issues be carried with the case. But
in the light of an intervening precedent, Esteva v. UBS Fin. Servs Inc.
∗ Hon. L. Scott Coogler, Chief District Judge for the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
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22-10878 Opinion of the Court 3
(In re Esteva), 60 F.4th 664, 677–78 (11th Cir. 2023), it is clear that
we lack jurisdiction, so we dismiss this appeal.
Ordinarily, this Court exercises jurisdiction over final orders
that address all pending claims and parties in a suit, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, but the district court did not issue such a final order. “An
order adjudicating fewer than all the claims in a suit, or adjudicat-
ing the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, is not a
final judgment from which an appeal may be taken, unless the dis-
trict court properly certifies as final under Rule 54(b), a judgment
on fewer than all claims or parties.” Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v.
Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 2012) (alteration adopted)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court
expressly declined to resolve some of the Hardwicks’ pending
claims in the summary judgment they now appeal. Nor did the dis-
trict court issue a Rule 54(b) certification. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 54(b).
The Hardwicks propose three alternative bases for appellate
jurisdiction, all of which fail. First, the Hardwicks argue that the
summary judgment order is immediately appealable because it
granted and denied qualified and official immunity as to certain de-
fendants. Under the collateral order doctrine, orders denying offi-
cial or qualified immunity are sometimes immediately appealable.
See Hall v. Flournoy, 975 F.3d 1269, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2020). But the
Hardwicks appeal the decision to grant qualified immunity to de-
fendants Parrott and Joiner, and an order granting qualified immun-
ity is not immediately appealable. See Winfrey v. Sch. Bd. of Dade
Cnty., 59 F.3d 155, 158 (11th Cir. 1995). And the Hardwicks lack
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10878
appellate standing to appeal that order insofar as it denied immun-
ity with respect to unrelated and unresolved claims because it did
not affect the Hardwicks “in a personal and individual way,” Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barrow, 29 F.4th 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2022)
(citation omitted), and they “may not appeal to protect the rights
of others,” Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted).
Second, the Hardwicks argue that they may immediately ap-
peal the summary judgment order because they sought injunctive
relief against certain defendants, and the district court denied that
relief against those defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (providing
appellate jurisdiction for certain orders refusing injunctions). But
we have appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders denying
injunctive relief only when the appellant establishes a “serious, per-
haps irreparable, consequence” from the refusal and when the ap-
pellant could not effectually challenge the court’s order on appeal
from a final judgment. See United States v. City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d
968, 973 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450
U.S. 79, 84 (1981)). And the Hardwicks have not even attempted to
satisfy this burden.
Third, the Hardwicks argue that even if the summary judg-
ment order was not final when issued, it became final when all par-
ties signed a voluntary stipulation of dismissal that purported to
dismiss the pending claims. See Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d
1222, 1228–29 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining that we sometimes have
jurisdiction to review “interlocutory decisions that were part of a
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22-10878 Opinion of the Court 5
series of orders that effectively terminated the entire litigation” (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted)). But this argument
fails because the purported stipulation of dismissal was invalid. The
stipulation of dismissal applied to some, but not all, of the claims in
the Hardwicks’ complaint, and we have repeatedly held that “a vol-
untary dismissal purporting to dismiss a single claim is invalid, even
if all other claims in the action have already been resolved.” Esteva,
60 F.4th at 677–78; accord Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d
954, 957–58 (11th Cir. 2018); see F ED. R. C IV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (al-
lowing the parties to dismiss an “action,” not “claims”). The Hard-
wicks argue that our decision in Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., controls
here, but our holding there was limited to voluntary dismissals by
court order under Rule 41(a)(2), see 965 F.3d at 1230, and has no
bearing on this appeal.
We DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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