Fagale S. Grant v. Elmore County Board of Education, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11448
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
FAGALE S. GRANT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ELMORE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
DALE BAIN,
in his Official and or Individual capacities as
member of of the Elmore County Board of
Education,
DAVID JONES,
in his Official and or Individual capacities as
member of of the Elmore County Board of
Education,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11448
LEISA FINLEY,
in her Official and or Individual capacities as
member of of the Elmore County Board of
Education,
WENDELL SAXON, et al.,
in his Official and or Individual capacities as
member of of the Elmore County Board of
Education,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00058-JTA
____________________
Before NEWSOM, GRANT and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Fagale Grant, an African-American female who
formerly worked as a teacher, appeals the grant of summary judg-
ment to the defendants, including seven members of the Elmore
County Board of Education, Board Superintendent, Richard Den-
nis, and the Elmore County Board of Education (the “Board”), on
her claims of,
inter alia, race and age discrimination. Grant argues
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22-11448 Opinion of the Court 3
that she presented a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evi-
dence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that the defend-
ants intentionally discriminated against her based on her race and
that led to the termination of her employment. Additionally, Grant
argues that she has met her burden in showing a
prima facie case
of age discrimination, in addition to also presenting a “convincing
mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would allow a reasonable
jury to infer that the defendants intentionally discriminated against
her based on her age in connection with her termination.1 Having
read the parties’ briefs and reviewed the record, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s 2 grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
I.
When appropriate, we will review a district court’s order
granting summary judgment
de novo, “viewing all the evidence,
and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving
party.”
Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th
Cir. 2005).
1 Grant also alleged claims of discrimination based on disability and violation
of her First Amendment and due process rights. Following a concession by
Grant, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on
those claims. Because she does not challenge the district court’s disposition of
those claims on appeal, she has abandoned them.
United States v. Campbell,
26 F.4th 860, 872-73 (11th Cir. 2022) (
en banc),
petition for cert. denied, 143 S.
Ct. 95 (2022).
2 The parties consented to have a magistrate judge enter a dispositive final
judgment in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11448
However, an issue that was not raised in the district court
and is raised for the first time on appeal in a civil case is considered
forfeited, and we will not address its merits absent extraordinary
circumstances.
Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324,
1331-32 (11th Cir. 2004);
Campbell, 26 F.4th at 872-73. “But once
a party has preserved an issue, it may make any argument in sup-
port of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise argu-
ments they made below.”
United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278,
1306-07 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). Similarly, is-
sues not raised in an appellant’s initial brief are deemed abandoned
and will not be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances.
Campbell, 26 F.4th at 872-73;
see Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating an appellant must
clearly and specifically identify in her brief any issue she wants the
appellate court to address). Moreover, a district court's judgment
should be affirmed if an appellant fails to challenge each of the
court's independent, alternative grounds for its ruling.
Id.
The record here demonstrates that Grant argues for the first
time on appeal that she established a “convincing mosaic” of cir-
cumstantial evidence allowing a jury to infer the defendants’ inten-
tional race discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C. §
1981; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As she has not argued that extraordi-
nary circumstances exist warranting an examination of the issue on
the merits, however, we conclude that she has forfeited the argu-
ment on appeal.
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22-11448 Opinion of the Court 5
Additionally, Grant fails to challenge the district court’s find-
ing that she did not establish a
prima facie case of race discrimina-
tion under
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Although the evidence showed that her
employment ended after she announced an intent to voluntarily
retire, there was no evidence that she suffered an adverse employ-
ment action or that the defendants treated a similarly situated com-
parator more favorably than her. Thus, she has abandoned any
challenge to this argument on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants as to
Grant’s claims of race discrimination.
II.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), prohibits certain actions by an employer, in-
cluding the termination of an employee based on her age, which
must be age 40 or older.
Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC,
746 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014);
see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). A
plaintiff may support a claim under the ADEA through either direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence.
Mazzeo, 746 F.3d at 1270
. To
ultimately prevail, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was the
“but-for” cause of the challenged employer decision.
Id.
A plaintiff can employ different frameworks to survive sum-
mary judgment by using circumstantial evidence to support her
ADEA claim.
See Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir.
2013) (ADEA case discussing the frameworks under
McDonnell
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11448
Douglas and
Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328
(11th Cir. 2011)). Most commonly, a plaintiff alleging that her age
was her employer’s only motivation in discriminating against her
uses the burden-shifting framework established in
McDonnell
Douglas. Under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting frame-
work, a plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case of age dis-
crimination.
Mazzeo, 746 F.3d at 1270. If the plaintiff does so, the
burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment
action.
Id. If the defendant articulates at least one such reason, the
plaintiff is then given the opportunity to show that the employer’s
stated reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.
See id.
In age discrimination cases, there are several ways to prove
a
prima facie case within the greater
McDonnell Douglas frame-
work, and the appropriate method depends on the facts of the case.
See id. at 1270-71. Under a discriminatory-discharge theory, a
plaintiff may establish a
prima facie case by showing that: (1) she
was a member of a protected group; (2) she was subject to an ad-
verse employment action; (3) a substantially younger person filled
the position from which the plaintiff was fired; and (4) she was qual-
ified for the job in question.
Id. at 1270 (citation omitted). By con-
trast, under a reduction-of-force analysis, a plaintiff may show that
where the employer eliminated her position: (A) she belonged to a
protected group; (B) she was qualified for the position held or to
assume another position at the time of discharge; and (C) sufficient
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the
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22-11448 Opinion of the Court 7
employer intended to discriminate based on age through its em-
ployment decision.
Id. at 1271. Generally, a discriminatory-dis-
charge analysis is appropriate where the plaintiff’s position exists
after she was terminated and filled by a younger person, and a re-
duction-in-force analysis is appropriate where the employer elimi-
nates the plaintiff’s position.
See id. at 1270-71.
We presume that resignations are voluntary, unless an em-
ployer forces the employee to resign by coercion, duress, or mis-
representation of a material fact.
Hargray v. City of Hallandale,
57 F.3d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1995). There are several factors a
court should consider in evaluating whether a resignation was
forced, including whether the employee: (1) was given some alter-
native to resignation; (2) understood the nature of the choice given;
(3) had a reasonable time in which to choose; (4) was allowed to
choose the effective date of the resignation; and (5) had the advice
of counsel.
Id. A resignation may be voluntary even when the only
other alternative is facing possible termination for cause.
Id.
The record shows that the district court did not err in grant-
ing summary judgment on Grant’s age discrimination claim be-
cause Grant voluntarily set in motion the events which resulted in
her retirement. Grant was aware that the school Superintendent
annually distributed a memorandum in February asking teachers
whether they would return the following school year, which ena-
bled the system to identify upcoming vacancies, advertise those po-
sitions, and hire as needed. Having decided in December of 2016
to retire, she responded to the Superintendent’s inquiry by
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11448
indicating that she would retire and by providing a letter affirming
this decision. Grant took no affirmative steps to rescind this or to
inform the Board or the Superintendent that her retirement was
contingent upon receiving disability retirement. Thus, considering
the totality of the circumstances, Grant’s separation from employ-
ment was the natural result of her own action and was not a result
of coercion, duress, or misrepresentation of a material fact.
Har-
gray, 57 F.3d at 1568. Additionally, Grant’s “convincing mosaic”
argument fails for the same reason discussed above, as she failed to
preserve that argument for appeal. Thus, we affirm in this respect
as well.
Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af-
firm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defend-
ants on Grant’s claims of race and age discrimination in her em-
ployment.
AFFIRMED.
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