Edward Dane Jeffus v. Jeffrey F. Mahl

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12040
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
EDWARD DANE JEFFUS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JEFFREY F. MAHL,
Judge, 18th Judicial Circuit Court,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-01393-CEM-LHP
USCA11 Case: 22-12040 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2024 Page: 1 of 8

-- 1 of 8 --

2 Opinion of the Court 22-12040
____________________
Before WILSON, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Pro se Florida prisoner Edward Dane Jeffus appeals the dis-
missal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim
and the denial of his motion to alter or amend the judgment and
amend his complaint pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 15(a).
Where appropriate, we review de novo a district court’s sua
sponte dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure
to state a claim. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th
Cir. 2001). Additionally, we review denials of Rule 59(e) motions
as well as Rule 15(a) motions to amend a complaint for abuse of
discretion. Lambert v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir.
2001); Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). We
may affirm a district court’s judgment on any basis supported by
the record. Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks, Inc., 528 F.3d
839, 844 (11th Cir. 2008).
Pursuant to § 1915A, a court shall review, as soon as practi-
cable, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). A court shall dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a
claim. Id. § 1915A(b)(1). The same standards that apply to a dis-
missal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) apply to dismissals under
§ 1915A. Leal, 254 F.3d at 1278-79. To prevent dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a
USCA11 Case: 22-12040 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2024 Page: 2 of 8

-- 2 of 8 --

22-12040 Opinion of the Court 3
claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[A] claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Filings by pro se litigants, “however inartfully pleaded,” are
to be liberally construed and must be held to a less stringent stand-
ard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, district
courts may not rewrite deficient pleadings in order to sustain an
action, and complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted must still be dismissed. See Campbell v. Air Jamaica
Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014). Additionally, even pro
se litigants will be deemed to have abandoned a claim by: (1) mak-
ing only passing reference to it, (2) raising it in a perfunctory man-
ner without supporting arguments and authority, (3) referring to it
only in the “statement of the case” or “summary of the argument,”
or (4) the references to the issue are mere background to the appel-
lant’s main arguments. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739
F.3d 678, 681-82 (11th Cir. 2014). Additionally, unpublished opin-
ions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only insofar
as their legal analysis warrants. Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc.,
487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007).
Further, if the district court’s order rested on two or more
independent, alternative grounds, the appellant must challenge all
of the grounds to succeed on appeal. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
USCA11 Case: 22-12040 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2024 Page: 3 of 8

-- 3 of 8 --

4 Opinion of the Court 22-12040
When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the
grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is
deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it
follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed. See id.
Sua sponte dismissals for failure to state a claim are prohib-
ited when: (1) the defendant has not answered and the plaintiff still
has the right to amend, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; (2) the plain-
tiff brought his claim in good faith; and (3) the district court failed
to provide the plaintiff notice of its intent to dismiss the complaint
or offer the plaintiff an opportunity to respond. Am. United Life Ins.
Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1056-57 (11th Cir. 2007). However,
“[t]here is an exception to [the] general rule against dismissal with-
out notice if the complaint is patently frivolous or if reversal . . .
would be futile.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a
claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the
complaint before the district court dismisses the action with preju-
dice.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in
part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th
Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d
1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019). However, the court need not grant a
plaintiff leave to amend his complaint when further amendment
would be futile. Silberman, 927 F.3d at 1133. Leave to amend is
futile when the complaint as amended would still be dismissed. Id.
The question in such cases is not whether the plaintiff has stated a
USCA11 Case: 22-12040 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2024 Page: 4 of 8

-- 4 of 8 --

22-12040 Opinion of the Court 5
claim, but instead, “when all is said and done, he can do so.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for private citizens
against persons acting under color of state law for violating their
constitutional rights and other federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It
only imposes liability for a defendant’s “own personal actions.” See
Holloman ex. rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir.
2004).
Under Rule 59, a party may ask a district court to reconsider
an earlier ruling. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A Rule 59(e) motion
must be based upon “newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors
of law or fact.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007).
It may not be used to relitigate old matters or raise arguments or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the initial en-
try of judgment. Id.
“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from dam-
ages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial ca-
pacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). However, state judges are not immune from
declaratory relief in a § 1983 action. Id. at 1240. To warrant such
relief, a plaintiff must show: (1) that there was a violation, (2) that
there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if relief is not
granted, and (3) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Id. at
1242. Appealing a judge’s ruling or seeking the extraordinary writ
USCA11 Case: 22-12040 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2024 Page: 5 of 8

-- 5 of 8 --

6 Opinion of the Court 22-12040
of mandamus both constitute adequate remedies at law. Id. at
1243.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “lower federal
courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over fi-
nal state-court judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1268
(11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). We have cautioned
against broadly construing Rooker-Feldman and held that the doc-
trine should be confined only to “cases brought by state-court los-
ers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments ren-
dered before the district court proceedings commenced and invit-
ing district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted).
Following initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the dis-
trict court dismissed Jeffus’s complaint sua sponte for failure to
state a claim. It framed the “crux” of Jeffus’s claims as being that
Judge Mahl “ha[d] failed to correct [Jeffus’s] sentence in accordance
with state law and entered an order prohibiting his pro se filings in
the state appellate court.” It then determined that Jeffus’s equal
protection claim challenged the validity of his confinement or its
duration, as opposed to the circumstances of his confinement, and,
therefore, the claim could only be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ha-
beas corpus petition. It further found that he failed to state a claim
for a violation of his right to access the courts, because Judge Mahl
had not entered the order prohibiting further pro se filings in the
state appellate court. It concluded by noting that Judge Mahl
would also be entitled to judicial immunity from damages.
USCA11 Case: 22-12040 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2024 Page: 6 of 8

-- 6 of 8 --

22-12040 Opinion of the Court 7
Following Jeffus’s Motion to Supplement and Motion to
Amend, the district court found that he failed to show that newly
discovered evidence or a manifest error of law or fact rendered the
dismissal of the complaint improper. As to his claim for denial of
access to the courts, it explained that the Clerk predicated its refusal
to open an appeal from Judge Mahl’s orders on the Fifth DCA’s
Spencer order, as opposed to any action taken by Judge Mahl, and
the Clerk’s actions could not be imputed to Judge Mahl under §
1983. It further found that, despite the Fifth DCA’s order prohibit-
ing further pro se filings, he failed to demonstrate that he lacked an
adequate remedy at law, because he could have appealed the Fifth
DCA’s order to the Florida Supreme Court or sought a writ of man-
damus.
As to his equal protection claim, the court found that Jeffus
failed to allege that Judge Mahl discriminated against him based on
a constitutionally protected interest. It also determined that, to the
extent that he requested that the court invalidate the Spencer1 or-
ders and consider the claims that he raised in state court challeng-
ing his sentence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would preclude re-
view of the state court decisions. Therefore, it concluded that Jef-
fus failed to demonstrate an entitlement to relief under Rule 59(e),
and amendment of the complaint would be futile.
1 In State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court
determined that courts may restrict pro se filings only after providing the liti-
gant with notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.
USCA11 Case: 22-12040 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2024 Page: 7 of 8

-- 7 of 8 --

8 Opinion of the Court 22-12040
Here, Jeffus cites to no binding caselaw or any other support
for his arguments, alleging broadly that the district court made er-
roneous findings and ignored and/or overlooked various allega-
tions he made against the defendant. Even construing his argu-
ments liberally, Jeffus also attacks only one of the grounds upon
which the district court based its findings—the applicability of judi-
cial immunity—and cites only to nonbinding and distinguishable
caselaw in doing so. Without more, Jeffus is entitled to no relief.
Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681-82. Had he not abandoned his challenge
to the district court’s finding with respect to the absence of an ade-
quate remedy at law, his appeal still fails because he was still able
to challenge the Fifth DCA’s 2017 order by appealing to the Florida
Supreme Court under Spencer or seeking a writ of mandamus.
Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242-43. Additionally, the district court properly
found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded its own review
of the state court’s decisions regarding his confinement. Nicholson,
558 F.3d at 1270.
Because Jeffus’s § 1983 complaint was properly dismissed for
failure to state a claim and his motion to amend properly denied
for failure to identify any newly-discovered evidence or manifest
errors of law or fact or show that amendment would not be futile,
we therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 22-12040 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2024 Page: 8 of 8

-- 8 of 8 --