USA v. Julius Arline

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12056
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JULIUS ARLINE,
a.k.a. Jewls,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00125-KKM-TGW-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12056
____________________
Before G RANT, L UCK , and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER C URIAM :
Julius Arline appeals his sentence for sex trafficking of a mi-
nor on procedural error, substantive unreasonableness, and Eighth
Amendment grounds. The government moved to dismiss Arline’s
appeal or to summarily affirm his sentence, contending that
(1) Arline signed a plea agreement waiving any procedural error or
substantive reasonableness challenges to his sentence; (2) his
Eighth Amendment dispute is a substantive reasonableness chal-
lenge in disguise and so it is waived too; and (3) Arline hasn’t estab-
lished an Eighth Amendment violation. After careful review, we
grant the government’s motion to dismiss to the extent Arline ar-
gues that his sentence was the result of procedural error and was
substantively unreasonable, deny the motion to extent Arline ar-
gues that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, and grant
the government’s motion to summarily affirm Arline’s sentence.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2022, Arline pleaded guilty to one count of sex traf-
ficking of a minor. His plea agreement included a sentence-appeal
waiver under which Arline expressly waived the right to appeal his
sentence on “any ground” except “(a) the ground that the sentence
exceeds the defendant’s applicable guidelines range as determined by
the [district c]ourt pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines; (b) the ground that the sentence exceeds the statutory
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3 Opinion of the Court 22-12056
maximum penalty; or (c) the ground that the sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.”
At Arline’s sentencing hearing, the district court adopted his
presentence investigation report, which—based on a total offense
level of 43 and a criminal history category of III—calculated a
guideline sentence of life imprisonment. Because Arline himself
had faced sexual abuse as a child, and to avoid an unwarranted sen-
tencing disparity with Arline’s co-defendant (who pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a minor and would later
be sentenced to 97 months’ imprisonment), the district court var-
ied downward and sentenced Arline to 480 months’ imprisonment.
Arline did not object on any grounds to his sentence or the manner
in which it was imposed. This is Arline’s appeal.
DISCUSSION
Arline raises three challenges on appeal: (1) the district court
procedurally erred, both by misapplying certain sentencing guide-
lines and by “fail[ing] to adequately explain” Arline’s sentence as
compared to his co-defendant’s; (2) his sentence was substantively
unreasonable, given that he was sexually abused as a child and “per-
haps less culpable (and certainly not more culpable)” than his co-
defendant; and (3) “the canyon” between his and his co-defendant’s
sentences violated the Eighth Amendment’s “proportionality prin-
ciple.”
As a threshold matter, Arline neither acknowledges nor con-
tests his sentence-appeal waiver. But we will enforce an appeal
waiver that was made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12056
Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1993). Whether a defend-
ant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal is a ques-
tion of law we review de novo. Id. at 1352. To establish that an
appeal waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, the govern-
ment must show that either “(1) the district court specifically ques-
tioned the defendant about the waiver; or (2) the record makes
clear that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance
of the waiver.” United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th
Cir. 2008). There is also a “strong presumption” that the state-
ments a defendant makes under oath during a plea colloquy are
true. Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir.
2014) (citation omitted).
Here, the record is clear both that Arline understood the sig-
nificance of the waiver and that the district court specifically ques-
tioned him about it. See Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1066. Arline initialed
each page of his plea agreement and, with his attorney, signed the
final page indicating “that [the] defendant fully understands its
terms.” Additionally, after Arline was sworn at his change of plea
hearing, the magistrate judge confirmed that nothing affected
Arline’s ability to understand the proceeding. Arline and the mag-
istrate judge then engaged in the following colloquy:
THE COURT: I also want to emphasize paragraph 7.
First[,] I will tell you that even though you are plead-
ing guilty, you have a right to appeal your sentence,
but under paragraph 7 you limit the extent to which
you can appeal your sentence. Under paragraph 7[,]
you can only appeal if the sentence exceeds the
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5 Opinion of the Court 22-12056
guideline range as determined by the [district c]ourt
under the guidelines, or if the sentence exceeds the
statutory maximum penalty, or if the sentence vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which prohibits excessive fines and
cruel and unusual punishment. Those are the only
three things about your sentence that you can appeal.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And[,] in particular[,] what you can-
not appeal is the way the [district c]ourt calculates the
sentencing guidelines. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, I’ll add, if the [g]overnment
should appeal first[,] then you also could appeal at
that point. Do you understand that provision?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any question about it?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: And are you agreeing to it freely and
voluntarily as to the—as part of this plea agreement?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Based on this record, and applying the strong presumption
that the statements Arline made under oath were true, see
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12056
Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1217, we are satisfied that Arline know-
ingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence.
Accordingly, we must dismiss Arline’s appeal to the extent
his arguments do not fall within one of the three exceptions to his
sentence-appeal waiver. See United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166,
1169 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A waiver of the right to appeal includes a
waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debatable legal issues—
indeed, it includes a waiver of the right to appeal blatant error.
Waiver would be nearly meaningless if it included only those ap-
peals that border on the frivolous.” (footnote omitted)). Arline’s
first two contentions—that the district court procedurally erred in
sentencing him and his sentence was substantively unreasonable—
do not fall within an exception. He neither argues (nor could ar-
gue) that his 480-month sentence exceeded either the “guidelines
range as determined by the [district c]ourt” or “the statutory maxi-
mum penalty”—both of which are life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(b)(2). We therefore partly grant the government’s motion
to dismiss because Arline’s procedural error and substantive unrea-
sonableness arguments are waived. See Howle, 166 F.3d at 1169.
His Eighth Amendment argument, on the other hand, falls
within the third exception to his sentence-appeal waiver (an appeal
on the ground “that [his] sentence violates the Eighth Amendment
to the Constitution”). The government contends that we should
dismiss this third contention too, because Arline is merely attempt-
ing to “circumvent his sentence-appeal waiver by cloaking his [sub-
stantive] reasonableness challenge in Eighth Amendment garb.”
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7 Opinion of the Court 22-12056
We are unpersuaded. To be sure, Arline’s Eighth Amend-
ment argument (that “the canyon that exists between” his and his
co-defendant’s sentences is “incomprehensible”) is similar to his
substantive reasonableness argument (that “[o]nly an error in the
assessment of the underlying facts” can explain why his co-defend-
ant received such a significantly lower sentence). However,
Arline’s reasonableness and Eighth Amendment challenges appear
in separate sections of his brief, and he articulates distinct legal
standards for each. Further, in making his Eighth Amendment ar-
gument, Arline cites the narrow proportionality principle and
other Eighth Amendment caselaw. In short, Arline plainly asserts
a distinct Eighth Amendment challenge in his brief.
Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2005),
which the government cites in support of dismissal, does not con-
vince us otherwise. In Williams, we declined to consider a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, lodged by a prisoner
who had waived his right to appeal his sentence “directly or collat-
erally,” except on specific grounds not implicated in his 28 U.S.C.
section 2255 motion. Id. at 1341–42. In doing so, we adopted our
sister circuits’ holdings that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, en-
tered into voluntarily and knowingly, pursuant to a plea agree-
ment, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack, in a col-
lateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel during sentencing.” Id. at 1342. But even if we
read Williams, as the government urges, as broadly prohibiting a
defendant from “circumvent[ing] his sentence-appeal waiver by
cloaking” a waived challenge in unwaived “garb,” that’s not what
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12056
happened here. Arline’s Eighth Amendment argument was not a
waived substantive reasonableness challenge in disguise. We thus
deny the government’s motion to dismiss it.
That said, we agree with the government that summary af-
firmance of Arline’s sentence is appropriate. Summary disposition
is proper when “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as
a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to
the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d
1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). Because Arline did not raise the Eighth
Amendment issue in the district court, we review for plain error.
United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005). To pre-
vail under the plain error standard, Arline must show: (1) there
was error in the district court’s determination; (2) the error was
plain; (3) the error has affected his substantial rights; and (4) “the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Moore, 22 F.4th 1258, 1264–
65 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). An error is not considered
plain “unless it is contrary to explicit statutory provisions or to on-
point precedent in this [c]ourt or the Supreme Court.” United States
v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United
States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Arline has not shown plain error. That’s because he hasn’t
demonstrated that his sentence “is contrary to explicit statutory
provisions” or our (or the Supreme Court’s) “on-point precedent.”
See id. To the extent Arline contends that the difference between
his and his co-defendant’s sentences violates the Eighth
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9 Opinion of the Court 22-12056
Amendment, we’ve never held that the Eighth Amendment re-
quires identical sentences for co-defendants. Cf. Edwards v. United
States, 795 F.2d 958, 961 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Co-defendants need
not necessarily receive the same sentence.”). And to the extent he
argues that his sentence violated the proportionality principle,
we’ve held that, “[i]n general, a sentence within the limits imposed
by statute is neither excessive nor cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment.” United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1024
(11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Indeed, we have never found
that an adult’s non-capital sentence violates the Eighth Amend-
ment, United States v. Bowers, 811 F.3d 412, 432 (11th Cir. 2016), and
we have specifically upheld as constitutional statutory-maximum
life sentences imposed for sex trafficking crimes. See, e.g., United
States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1342–43 (11th Cir. 2014). There-
fore, because the government is “clearly right as a matter of law,”
see Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162, we summarily affirm
Arline’s sentence.
GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PARTLY
GRANTED AND PARTLY DENIED; GOVERNMENT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE GRANTED;
SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
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