Alonzo Bernard McAffee v. City of Clearwater, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12320
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ALONZO BERNARD MCAFFEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF CLEARWATER,
JASON MOORE,
in his individual capacity ,
JOSEPH MAY,
in his individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12320
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02763-SDM-SPF
____________________
Before J ILL PRYOR , L UCK , and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Alonzo Bernard McAffee appeals the district court’s
order dismissing his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious
prosecution. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I.
In the early morning hours of August 3, 2017, McAffee was
standing in his front yard while listening to music, smoking a ciga-
rette, and talking on the phone. Two men, whom McAffee did not
recognize, ran toward him. The two men were City of Clearwater
police officers Jason Moore and Joseph May. Although McAffee
was not engaged in any criminal conduct and did nothing to inter-
fere with the officers, the officers arrested McAffee, asserting that
he had run away from them and disobeyed their commands to stop
running.
McAffee faced both state and federal charges arising out of
this incident. Based on the officers’ reports that McAffee had run
from them and disobeyed their commands, he was charged in Flor-
ida state court with resisting an officer without violence. A few
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22-12320 Opinion of the Court 3
months after the incident, a state prosecutor filed a nolle prosequi
stating that further prosecution was not warranted.
Shortly before the state court charges were dismissed,
McAffee was charged in federal district court with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. McAffee faced this charge based on Moore
and May’s report that they found a firearm in McAffee’s pocket
when he was arrested. In the federal criminal case, McAffee filed a
motion to suppress, arguing that his arrest was unlawful. The dis-
trict court granted McAffee’s motion to suppress, and in April 2018,
the district court dismissed the indictment.
In November 2021, McAffee filed a civil lawsuit against
Moore and May in federal district court. He brought several claims
against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including claims for
false arrest, use of excessive force, and malicious prosecution. Re-
garding the malicious prosecution claim, the complaint alleged that
the officers “intentionally, knowingly, and maliciously provided
false statements to prosecuting authorities which formed the basis”
of the federal criminal case against McAffee. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 66, 96.1
The officers filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. They
argued that the § 1983 false arrest and excessive force claims were
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. They explained that
these claims accrued on August 3, 2017, when the officers arrested
McAffee, and the applicable limitations period was four years.
1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12320
Because McAffee waited more than four years from the date the
claims accrued, the officers argued, the claims were untimely.
The officers acknowledged that McAffee’s § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims appeared to be timely. They nevertheless ar-
gued that these claims should be dismissed because the complaint
failed to state a claim for relief.
After the officers filed the motion to dismiss, McAfee re-
ceived leave to file an amended complaint. In the amended com-
plaint, he made the same general allegations about the August 3
incident in which he was arrested. But in the amended complaint,
unlike the original complaint, McAffee alleged that due to the of-
ficers’ false report, he had been charged in Florida state court with
resisting an officer without violence. Nowhere did the amended
complaint mention the federal criminal charges against him. And
in the amended complaint McAffee asserted § 1983 claims only for
malicious prosecution.
The officers moved to dismiss the amended complaint. As
relevant for our purposes, the officers argued that the amended
complaint failed to state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution
because the “alleged constitutional violations occur[red]
before the
institution of a judicial proceeding.” Doc. 24 at 8 (emphasis in orig-
inal).
The district court granted the motion to dismiss. It explained
that McAffee failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution be-
cause his claims arose out of “events . . . that occurred before the
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22-12320 Opinion of the Court 5
prosecution began.” Doc. 29 at 2. The court dismissed the § 1983
malicious prosecution claims with prejudice.2
This is McAffee’s appeal.
II.
We review
de novo a district court order granting a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, accepting the com-
plaint’s allegations as true and construing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
See Fox v. Gaines, 4 F.4th 1293, 1295 (11th
Cir. 2021).
III.
McAffee argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
§ 1983 claims for malicious prosecution. A § 1983 malicious prose-
cution claim has two basic elements: the plaintiff must prove that
(1) “the defendant violated [the plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment
right to be free from seizures pursuant to legal process” and (2) “the
criminal proceedings against [the plaintiff] terminated in his favor.”
Luke v. Gulley, 50 F.4th 90, 95 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The central issue in this appeal is whether, assum-
ing the allegations in in the amended complaint are true, any
2 In the amended complaint, McAffee also brought state-law malicious prose-
cution claims against the officers and the City of Clearwater. The district court
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. Because
McAffee raises no argument on appeal challenging the district court’s decision
not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, we discuss the state-law claims no
further.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12320
Fourth Amendment violation was a “seizure[] pursuant to legal
process.”
Id.
We have previously identified the types of deprivations of
liberty that qualify as seizures pursuant to legal process and give
rise to § 1983 malicious prosecution claims.
See Williams v.
Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020). We have recognized
that “warrant-based seizures” as well as “seizures following an ar-
raignment, indictment, or probable-cause hearing” qualify as sei-
zures pursuant to legal process.
Id. In contrast, a plaintiff who is
subjected to a warrantless arrest but is not detained after the com-
mencement of judicial proceedings generally does not suffer a sei-
zure pursuant to legal process.
See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382
F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004). Although a person suffers a seizure
at the time of the warrantless arrest, the seizure is not pursuant to
legal process because it “occur[s] prior to the time of arraignment”
and the commencement of the judicial proceedings.
Id.3
In
Kingsland, a plaintiff who was subjected to a warrantless
arrest but not placed in detention after the commencement of ju-
dicial proceedings argued that she suffered a seizure pursuant to
legal process because she was required to adhere to certain condi-
tions while on pretrial release.
See id. at 1235–36. She pointed out
3 A plaintiff claiming that an officer made a warrantless arrest without proba-
ble cause may have a § 1983 claim for false arrest.
See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at
1226. But McAffee’s amended complaint included no § 1983 false arrest claim
alleging that a constitutional violation occurred at the time of the warrantless
arrest.
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22-12320 Opinion of the Court 7
that after the judicial proceedings commenced, she was required to
post a bond and appear in proceedings to defend herself in court.
Id. at 1235. We rejected this argument, concluding that these “nor-
mal conditions of pretrial release” did not impose a seizure for pur-
poses of a malicious prosecution claim.
Id. at 1236. We explained
that for a condition of pretrial release to constitute a seizure, the
plaintiff must show “some significant, ongoing deprivation of lib-
erty, such as a restriction on [his] right to travel interstate.”
Id.
Here, McAffee argues that his amended complaint stated a
claim for § 1983 malicious prosecution because he alleged that the
officers “falsely” stated to “prosecuting authorities that . . . McAffee
resisted arrest . . . and those false allegations[] caused the State of
Florida to commence criminal prosecution” against him. Appel-
lant’s Br. at 11. But to state a claim for malicious prosecution, the
amended complaint also had to allege that McAffee suffered an un-
constitutional “seizure pursuant to legal process.”
Williams,
965 F.3d at 1158 (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude
that the amended complaint failed to state a claim for relief because
there was no allegation that any seizure occurred after the com-
mencement of the state judicial proceedings. Indeed, there was no
allegation that McAffee was arrested pursuant to a warrant. And
there was no allegation that he was subjected to a seizure following
an arraignment, indictment, or probable-cause hearing in the state
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12320
criminal case.4 Absent any allegation that McAffee suffered a sei-
zure pursuant to legal process in the state court action, we agree
with the district court that he failed to state a claim for relief.5
See
id.;
Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1236.
4 The fact that McAffee’s original complaint alleged that he faced federal crim-
inal proceedings arising out of this same incident does not help him. When he
filed the amended complaint, the initial complaint, which referenced the fed-
eral criminal case, “became a legal nullity,” and the allegations in the initial
complaint “were no longer a part of [McAffee’s] averments against” the offic-
ers.
Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, we do not consider
the federal criminal proceedings in our analysis of whether McAffee stated a
claim.
5 In his appellant’s brief, McAffee also suggests that the district court erred in
dismissing his complaint with prejudice. His arguments about why the district
court erred in entering a dismissal with prejudice are identical to the argu-
ments he raises in challenging the district court’s determination that he failed
to state a claim for relief. And, as we explained above, the district court did not
err in concluding that he failed to state a claim for relief.
To the extent McAffee is arguing that the district court should have granted
him leave to file a second amended complaint instead of entering a dismissal
with prejudice, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
We reach this conclusion because in the district court McAffee never sought
leave to file a second amended complaint or argued that he could cure the
defects in his amended complaint in a subsequent pleading.
See Urquilla-Diaz
v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1057 n.14 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that district
court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint when the plaintiff “never made a motion to amend his complaint,
nor did he ever suggest how he could cure his defective complaint in a subse-
quent pleading”).
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22-12320 Opinion of the Court 9
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district
court.
AFFIRMED.
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