Robert L. Rehberger v. Henry County, Georgia, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12873
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ROBERT L. REHBERGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HENRY COUNTY, GEORGIA,
STATE OF GEORGIA,
STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12873
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-mi-00030-JPB
____________________
Before J ORDAN, NEWSOM , and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Rehberger, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s order (1) sua sponte dismissing his petition as frivolous, pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and (2) advising him that he
remained subject to an earlier order that required court preap-
proval of any future filings. On appeal, Rehberger reiterates at
length his contentions from his “Amended Petition” regarding the
underlying state court criminal judgment against him being void,
the fact that various courts have failed to exercise their proper ju-
risdiction, and the fact that he has never been able to properly pre-
sent evidence. He also asserts, in passing, that restrictions on filing
or heightened pleading requirements are normally disfavored,
should be strictly construed, and cannot be used to deny funda-
mental rights such as adequate, effective, meaningful access to the
courts. He further contends that frivolity reviews under § 1915 ap-
ply only to incarcerated people or prisoners.
We review a district court’s dismissal of a claim as frivolous
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for abuse of discretion. Bilal v. Driver, 251
F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2001). When a district court reviews
a complaint for frivolity under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), it not only has
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22-12873 Opinion of the Court 3
“the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose fac-
tual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 327 (1989) (discussing § 1915(d), now recodified at § 1915(e)).
Section 1915 authorizes federal courts to allow civil and
criminal litigation to proceed without prepayment of fees. 28
U.S.C. § 1915; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324. Both prisoners and non-pris-
oners may file for in forma pauperis status pursuant to § 1915 and
can have their complaints screened for dismissal under § 1915(e).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (e); see also Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347
(11th Cir. 2004).
The federal IFP statute is intended to provide indigent liti-
gants with “meaningful access to the federal courts.” Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 324. But “meaningful access” does not mean unlimited ac-
cess, and federal courts are required to dismiss complaints filed IFP
if the plaintiff’s poverty allegations are untrue, or if the plaintiff’s
complaint is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Federal courts may sua sponte dismiss on these
grounds prior to issuance of process. See id. (stating that the case
should be dismissed “at any time”); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324.
A district court will consider a claim to be frivolous “if it is
without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349.
In other words, the complaint will be properly dismissed as
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12873
frivolous if it “has little or no chance of success.” Carroll v. Gross,
984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
Rehberger has abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of
his petition because, even liberally construed, his appellate brief
makes at most passing references to § 1915. An appellant abandons
a claim where he presents it only in “passing references” or “in a
perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and author-
ity.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir.
2014). “[S]imply stating that an issue exists,” without providing rea-
soning and citation to authority that the appellant relies on, “con-
stitutes abandonment of that issue.” Id. (quoting Singh v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009)). Simply stating, as Re-
hberger does, that § 1915 does not apply to him—without any fur-
ther reasoning or argument—is insufficient. Regardless, the district
court’s earlier order requiring preapproval of filings is valid. “Con-
siderable discretion necessarily is reposed in the district court”
when it drafts such orders. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074
(11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam). One of the only restrictions
that we have placed on pre-filing injunctions is that litigants cannot
be “completely foreclosed from any access to the courts.” Mar-
tin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1385–87 (11th Cir. 1993).
The district court’s pre-filing instructions here left Re-
hberger with sufficient access to the courts. In Cofield v. Alabama
Public Services Commission, we considered a similar order requiring
an “overly litigious” prisoner, who had brought 105 suits against
various prison officials and companies, to pay full filing fees and
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22-12873 Opinion of the Court 5
seek pre-filing approval of any complaints or papers. 936 F.2d 512,
513–14 (11th Cir. 1991). We determined that the pre-filing screen-
ing of claims left sufficient access to the courts, as arguable claims
could still move forward, and the procedure was not an excessive
response to Cofield’s clear abuse of the system, as he still had some
access to the courts. Id. at 518. The same is true here. Because
Rehberger still had access to the courts, the district court’s order
was not an excessive response to his vexatious litigation.
AFFIRMED.
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