Yunis Adon El v. Carl McGehee, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13756
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
YUNIS ADON EL,
Moor Beneficiary
a.k.a. Yunis Adon El Express Trust,
d.b.a. Jonah Addis,
d.b.a. Yunis Adon El,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CARL MCGEHEE,
In His Individual Capacity,
MCCALLA RAYMER LEIBERT PIERCE, LLC,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13756
NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-03957-LMM
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, G RANT, and BRASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Yunis Adon El appeals from the district court’s sua sponte dis-
missal of his pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as friv-
olous and for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted and the district court’s denial of his request for injunctive
relief. Adon El alleged wrongful foreclosure, violation of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, violation of the Truth in Lending
Act, breach of contract, slander of title, slander of credit, intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress, failure to join a party,
deprivation of religious freedom, violation of federal trust and lien
laws, joint venturer liability, wrongful conduct, and forfeiture of
estate. Adon El also petitioned for an ex parte temporary restraining
order. He brought these claims against Carl McGehee; McCalla
Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC; and Navy Federal Credit Union.
Adon El argues on appeal that the district court erred because his
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22-13756 Opinion of the Court 3
complaint was based on specific factual allegations and asserted a
legally cognizable right of action when construed liberally in the
manner we instruct district courts to view pro se pleadings. Adon
El’s arguments fail. Therefore, we affirm the district court.
We review “a district court’s dismissal of an in forma pauperis
action as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for [an] abuse of discre-
tion.” Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (Mitchell I), 294
F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (citing Bilal v.
Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)). We review a district
court’s dismissal of an in forma pauperis action for failure to state a
claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) using the same standard as when re-
viewing a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)—that is, de novo,
viewing the allegations in the complaint as true. See Mitchell v. Far-
cass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). We review the denial of
an ex parte temporary restraining order for an abuse of discretion.
See Daker v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t Corr., 820 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir.
2016) (citing Forsyth County v. U.S. Army Corps Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 1032,
1039 (11th Cir. 2011)) (reviewing the denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion for an abuse of discretion). We “give liberal construction to
the pleadings of pro se litigants, [but] ‘we nevertheless [] require[]
them to conform to procedural rules.’” Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d
826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296,
1304 (11th Cir. 2002)).
When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the district
“court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that” the action “is frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13756
on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
“For purposes of a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), ‘[a] claim is
frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.’” Mitch-
ell I, 294 F.3d at 1315 (alteration in original) (quoting Bilal, 251 F.3d
at 1349). When making a frivolousness determination, the district
court may not only “dismiss a claim based on an indisputably mer-
itless legal theory” but also “pierce the veil of the complaint’s fac-
tual allegations and dismiss those claims [] [for which the] factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327 (1989). This includes “claims of infringement of a legal interest
which clearly does not exist” and “claims describing fantastic or de-
lusional scenarios.” Id. at 327–28.
“A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not enti-
tled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). A complaint
need not have “‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it [] [must have]
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the ele-
ments of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.,
550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557). Further,
the claims within the complaint must be facially plausible, which
occurs “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
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22-13756 Opinion of the Court 5
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at
556).
The district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing Adon
El’s pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B) because it asserted friv-
olous claims and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Adon El failed to distinguish which defendants he was
bringing any particular claim against, failed to allege facts with
specificity, and failed to support bare legal conclusions. In short,
Adon El failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim, and his
claims are frivolous. The district court did not err in either its friv-
olousness determination or its failure-to-state-a-claim determina-
tion, and either of these bases is sufficient to support the district
court’s order.
Additionally, because the district court properly dismissed
Adon El’s complaint on these grounds, it did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying his request for injunctive relief because there was
not a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims.
See Forsyth County, 633 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Siegel v. LePore, 234
F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
Lastly, although Adon El raised various issues in post-judg-
ment motions, we do not have jurisdiction to review Adon El’s
post-judgment motions because he did not file a separate notice of
appeal or amend his previously filed one to address them. See
Weatherly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 2013).
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Adon El’s com-
plaint and its denial of injunctive relief.
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