LaNitra Jeter v. Jefferson County District Attorney, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13983
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
LANITRA JETER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOE ROBERTS,
Dep. D.A., et al.,
Defendants,
JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13983
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-01863-ACA
____________________
Before J ILL PRYOR , NEWSOM , and B RANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
LaNitra Jeter appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of her former employer, Danny Carr, in his
official capacity as the District Attorney (“DA”) of Jefferson
County, Alabama, as to her claims of retaliation under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).1
Jeter argues that she established a prima facie case of retaliation and
the district court erred in determining that the four-month delay
between her protected activity and the DA’s termination of her
employment was too attenuated to satisfy the causation element
of a retaliation claim. She also argues that the district court erred
in concluding that, even if Jeter did establish a prima facie case, she
could not establish that the DA’s proffered reasons for Jeter’s
termination—Jeter’s extensive history of untrustworthiness and
the DA’s need to run a skeleton crew in light of the Covid-19
pandemic—were pretextual. Because we agree with the district
1 Jeter initially brought multiple claims against multiple defendants, but
eventually she substituted Carr as the sole defendant.
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22-13983 Opinion of the Court 3
court that Jeter failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation,
we affirm the district court’s summary judgment order.
I. Background
Jeter, a black woman, was hired as a Victim Services Officer
(“VSO”) with the Jefferson County DA’s Office in April 2019. VSOs
could use three different types of leave: vacation leave, sick leave,
and comp time. New VSOs did not have any vacation or sick leave
when they started, but they earned 8 hours of vacation and 8 hours
of sick leave per month. To earn comp time, however, VSOs were
required to obtain permission to alter their schedules by combining
their two 15-minute breaks into a 30-minute lunch and then
working through their 1-hour lunch break. This practice allowed
VSOs to earn 1.5 hours of comp time for the additional hour of
work they performed.
During her first few months of employment, Jeter began to
suffer from health problems that required her to use a substantial
amount of leave time so that she could attend medical
appointments. By September 2019, Jeter’s frequent absences
caught the attention of Michael McCurry, the DA Office’s chief
administrator, who discussed his concerns with Jeter’s supervisor,
Judy Yates. McCurry had found that as of September 19, 2023, Jeter
had used all 40 hours of her sick leave, all 40 hours of her vacation
leave, and 62 hours of her 66.75 hours of comp time. McCurry and
Yates concluded that Jeter was abusing the discretionary comp
time policy. Accordingly, Yates informed Jeter that she was
suspending her ability to earn comp time.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13983
In addition to concerns over Jeter’s use of comp time, Jeter’s
superiors also became concerned about Jeter’s truthfulness because
of a fabricated story Jeter told Yates and other employees.
Specifically, on September 16, 2019, Jeter took comp time to attend
what she said was a mediation involving her husband and his ex-
wife in a domestic relations case. When she returned from comp
leave, Jeter told Yates and other VSOs that she got angry at her
husband’s ex-wife during the mediation, threw her to the ground,
and was placed in handcuffs by a bailiff until she calmed down.
Yates passed along this story to McCurry, who reached out to the
judge and mediator assigned to Jeter’s husband’s case. The judge
and mediator confirmed that Jeter’s story was fabricated and that
no mediation had even taken place on September 16, 2019. As their
supervisor, Yates maintained files of all VSOs and would update
their files with memos regarding workplace incidents as necessary.
Accordingly, Yates documented Jeter’s untruthfulness regarding
her husband’s mediation as well as her absence issues.
On November 12, 2019, Jeter met with Carr to complain
about her comp time being taken away.2 Jeter told Carr that she
felt she was being treated unfairly on account of her race,
specifically she was the only black VSO and the only VSO to have
their ability to earn comp time restricted. Yates was not present at
this meeting and testified that she did not know about Jeter’s racial
2 Carr testified that he did not remember the meeting occurring, but conceded
for the purpose of summary judgment that the court must accept as true that
the meeting happened because Jeter testified that it took place.
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22-13983 Opinion of the Court 5
discrimination complaint to Carr until after Jeter was terminated.
The same day that Jeter met with Carr, Jeter also requested to meet
with Yates to discuss the possibility of reinstating her ability to earn
comp time. After Jeter’s meeting with Yates, Yates allowed Jeter
to begin accruing comp time again.
Over the next few months, Yates continued to document
concerns regarding Jeter’s actions. In addition to these
documented memos, Joe Roberts, the Chief Deputy DA, testified
that Yates would verbally update him regarding concerns about
Jeter’s performance. Some examples of these concerns included
Jeter (1) failing to clock out on her lunch breaks; (2) clocking in a
half hour earlier than allowed without requesting permission; and
(3) lying about her whereabouts by clocking into courtrooms that
were later found to be empty. Despite these concerns, Roberts
testified that there was no urgency to terminate Jeter’s
employment and that it was not unusual for an employee to have
issues go on for a while before termination because leadership
wanted to help employees become better and more productive.
In March of 2020, in response to the Covid-19 pandemic,
Carr and Roberts decided to implement a staffing plan that would
limit the number of people physically present in the DA’s office on
any given day. The plan required one VSO to be physically present
at any time, and the identity of the VSO would change daily. That
same month, Carr and Roberts discussed Jeter’s issues and Carr
made the decision to terminate Jeter. Roberts requested a memo
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13983
from Yates highlighting Jeter’s issues that Carr would reference in
his meeting with Jeter.
Yates completed the memorandum on March 13, 2020. The
memorandum listed in bullet format multiple issues with Jeter,
including, for example: (1) Jeter’s abuse of the leave system and
taking time away from work; (2) Jeter’s failure to follow the chain
of command; (3) Jeter’s telling of fabricated stories; (4) Jeter’s use
of office time to deal with her husband’s and son’s legal issues; (5)
Jeter sleeping while observing a trial; (6) her leaving the building
without signing out or telling others that she would not be
available; and (7) her lying about her whereabouts. Carr did not
investigate whether these issues were true or not, taking them at
Yates’s word. On March 16, 2020, Carr terminated Jeter’s
employment with the DA’s office.
After her termination, Jeter, proceeding pro se, filed the
instant lawsuit against Carr, Roberts, Yates, McCurry, and the
Jefferson County DA’s Office, alleging that the DA’s Office
engaged in race discrimination by not allowing her to accrue comp
time like her white counterparts and retaliated against her by firing
her after she complained about the alleged discriminatory conduct.
[Doc. 1]. After obtaining counsel, Jeter filed the operative Third
Amended Complaint (“TAC”), bringing two counts: a claim for
racial discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and a
retaliation claim under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the
Jefferson County DA’s Office only. Carr was then substituted in
place of the DA’s office as the sole defendant.
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After being substituted as the sole defendant, Carr moved
for summary judgment on both counts of Jeter’s TAC. Jeter “[did]
not contest Carr’s motion for summary judgment as to her claims
that she was terminated based on her race,” leaving only her
retaliatory termination claim. The district court determined that
Jeter could not make out a prima facie case of retaliation under the
McDonnell Douglas3 framework for a Title VII claim because four
months had elapsed between her alleged protected activity and her
termination. The district court also determined that even if Jeter
could establish a prima facie case, that Carr had provided two
legitimate reasons for terminating Jeter’s employment that were
not retaliatory—the continuing problems with her employment as
outlined in Yates’s memo and the Covid-19 staffing plan—and that
Jeter could not show that these reasons were pretextual. Finally,
the district court determined that Jeter had failed to present a
convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence of retaliation.
Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Carr. Jeter timely appealed.
3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327,
1333 (11th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is proper if there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Id. All submitted evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
III. Discussion
On appeal, Jeter argues that the district court erred in finding
that she had not (1) established a prima facie case of retaliation
under Title VII; and (2) shown that Carr’s motives were
pretextual.4 After review, we affirm the district court’s grant of
4 Jeter also made a passing reference at the end of her pretext argument to an
alternative “convincing mosaic” theory of discrimination. As we have recently
noted, “a ‘convincing mosaic’ is a metaphor, not a legal test and not a
framework.” Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1311 (11th Cir.
2023). No matter how a plaintiff intends to show discrimination, “the ultimate
question in a discrimination case is whether there is enough evidence to show
that the reason for an adverse employment action was illegal discrimination.”
Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 941 (11th Cir. 2023). Therefore, the
only question for a court at summary judgment is “whether the evidence
permits a reasonable factfinder to find that the employer retaliated against the
employee.” Berry, 84 F.4th at 1311. As discussed herein, a reasonable juror
could not conclude that Carr retaliated against Yates.
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22-13983 Opinion of the Court 9
summary judgment because Jeter did not establish a prima facie case
of retaliation.
Under Title VII, an employer may not retaliate against an
employee because that employee has opposed any practice made
unlawful under that law, or because that employee has made a
charge or participated in a proceeding thereunder. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a). Where, as here, a plaintiff brings a retaliation claim
based on circumstantial evidence, the claim is analyzed under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Ring v. Boca Ciega
Yacht Club, Inc., 4 F.4th 1149, 1163 (11th Cir. 2021). “Under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, to avoid summary judgment a
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). To establish a prima facie
case of retaliation, Jeter “must show that (1) she engaged in
statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse action;
and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected
expression.” Id. (quotations omitted).
For purposes of determining whether a plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, we have construed the causation
requirement broadly such that “a plaintiff merely has to prove that
the protected activity and the negative employment action are not
completely unrelated.” Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d
1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). One way a
plaintiff satisfies the causation requirement is by showing that the
employer knew of the statutorily protected activity and that there
was a close temporal proximity between the employer’s awareness
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13983
and the adverse action. Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th
Cir. 2004). If there is a substantial delay between the protected
activity and the adverse action, however, the retaliation claim fails
as a matter of law absent any other evidence showing causation.
Id. We have held that standing alone, “[a] three to four month
disparity between the statutorily protected expression and the
adverse employment action is not enough” to establish causation.
Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).
Nevertheless, the causation element of a prima facie case may still
be established if a party “present[s] evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find” that a causal connection existed
between the protected activity and the adverse action. Id.
Here, Jeter has not established a temporal connection or any
additional circumstantial evidence supporting a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse action. Jeter met
with Carr on November 12, 2019, to complain about the alleged
racial discrimination she faced, and she was fired on March 16,
2020, a period exceeding four months. Accordingly, absent
additional evidence, Jeter cannot establish that her termination was
causally connected to her complaint of racial discrimination. See,
e.g., Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364.
Jeter offers four pieces of circumstantial evidence which she
argues supports a showing of causation: (1) the rarity of
terminations in the DA’s office; (2) Roberts’s testimony that there
was no urgency to terminate Jeter based on her problems;
(3) Yates’s continuing conversations with Roberts regarding Jeter’s
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performance and Yates’s filing of memos in Jeter’s file after Jeter’s
November meeting with Carr; and (4) the Covid-19 pandemic
offering the first opportunity for Carr to terminate Jeter’s
employment.
None of these pieces of “circumstantial evidence” is
convincing. With respect to the first two pieces of circumstantial
evidence, Jeter does not explain how the rarity of terminations or
the lack of urgency to fire her establish a causal connection in light
of her employment issues. Furthermore, the probative value of
these assertions is undermined by Roberts’s further testimony that
employee issues could “go on for a while” before termination
because Carr, Roberts, and their staff sought to help struggling
employees improve their performance before making the decision
to fire them. Yates similarly testified that she did not want to write
up Jeter after every infraction because she felt Jeter had potential
to be a very good VSO and wanted Jeter’s employment to “work
out.” With respect to Yates’s continual monitoring of Jeter’s
performance, Jeter does not explain how an ongoing evaluation of
her performance is related to her complaint, particularly in light of
the fact that Yates began documenting Jeter’s issues two to three
months prior to Jeter’s meeting with Carr. Finally, Jeter’s
argument that the Covid-19 pandemic offered the first opportunity
for Carr to fire Jeter is completely speculative and in any event,
unsupported by the record which shows that Jeter had
performance issues in December 2019, January 2020, and February
2020. Thus, Carr could have terminated Jeter’s employment at
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multiple times between November 2019 and March 2020, and been
justified in doing so.
Because Jeter cannot establish a causal relationship between
her protected activity and her termination, she cannot establish a
prima facie retaliation claim. Because she has not established a
prima facie case, we need not address Jeter’s argument that Carr’s
motives were pretextual. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s granting of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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