USA v. Ryan Felton

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-14215
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RYAN FELTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-00347-JPB-JSA-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 1 of 18

-- 1 of 18 --

2 Opinion of the Court 22-14215
Before WILSON, BRANCH , and J ULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals the 70-month sentence he received after
pleading guilty to numerous counts of wire fraud, money launder-
ing, and securities fraud related to two cryptocurrency schemes
that resulted in investor losses of over two million dollars. Defend-
ant argues the sentence is procedurally and substantively unreason-
able because the district court erred by applying a sophisticated
means enhancement and declining to adjust his offense level for
acceptance of responsibility. After careful review, we reject De-
fendant’s arguments and AFFIRM his sentence.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged in a November 2021 superseding in-
dictment with sixteen counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343, ten counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957, and two counts of securities fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78j and 78ff. He pled not guilty, and a jury trial commenced in
July 2022. After three days of trial, however, he reversed course
and pled guilty to most of the charges asserted against him.
Based on the factual proffer submitted in support of the plea
and the undisputed facts in the presentence report (“PSR”), the
charges stemmed from two cryptocurrency schemes Defendant
conducted between August 2017 and August 2018 involving pro-
jects known as FLik and CoinSpark. Investors lost a total of ap-
proximately $2.5 million in the two schemes.
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 2 of 18

-- 2 of 18 --

22-14215 Opinion of the Court 3
Defendant founded FLiK with the purported purpose of
funding and creating a platform to stream television and film pro-
jects.1 He then promoted the sale of “FLiK tokens”—a type of cryp-
tocurrency—to investors in various online platforms and in an ini-
tial coin offering (“ICO”).2 In these promotional materials, Defend-
ant misrepresented that FLiK investment proceeds would be used
to fund television and film projects, that celebrities and other well-
known figures were involved in the project, that Defendant was in
discussion with major film studios to obtain content for FLiK, and
that the United States military had agreed to carry FLiK as a stream-
ing platform available to nearly two million service members. De-
fendant admitted that these representations were false, and expert
testimony established that most if not all the proceeds raised from
the purchase of FLiK tokens were diverted to Defendant’s personal
use. Defendant also represented that FLiK tokens would appreci-
ate, and he encouraged investors to wait until the tokens reached a
peak resale price before selling them. Those representations were
part of Defendant’s scheme to artificially inflate or “pump” the
value of FLiK cryptocurrency so he could later sell or “dump” his
own holdings of the currency at an elevated price.
1 Defendant was working as a television and film producer when he created
FLiK.
2 An ICO is a way to raise investment capital by offering to issue cryptocur-
rency coins or tokens to investors. See https://www.sec.gov/securities-top-
ics/ICO. The SEC advises on its website that the digital assets offered for sale
in an ICO “bring increased risk of fraud and manipulation because the markets
for these assets are less regulated than traditional capital markets.”
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 3 of 18

-- 3 of 18 --

4 Opinion of the Court 22-14215
In addition to FLiK, Defendant created another cryptocur-
rency called CoinSpark, which he promoted and sold to investors
online and in a separate ICO. Defendant falsely represented in the
promotional materials for CoinSpark that investors would receive
a dividend, that CoinSpark’s financial statements would be audited,
and that any unsold tokens would be disposed of to keep the price
and demand for CoinSpark currency high. He also made other mis-
representations in connection to CoinSpark, including spreading
false information in an article he published under a fake name. As
with the FLiK scheme, Defendant diverted most of the CoinSpark
investment proceeds to his personal use via a convoluted process
of converting his CoinSpark holdings into dollars and transferring
those funds into multiple and various types of cryptocurrency and
financial accounts. Defendant used the funds generated from both
CoinSpark and FLiK to buy luxury goods, including a home, vehi-
cles, and jewelry.
The PSR assigned Defendant a base offense level of 7 for his
wire and securities fraud counts pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(a)(1). It
added 16 levels under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I) because the loss caused
by the offense exceeded $1.5 million but was less than $3.5 million,
2 levels under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii) because the offense was
committed through mass marketing, and 2 levels under USSG
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) because the offense involved sophisticated
means. Explaining the sophisticated means enhancement, the PSR
noted that Defendant’s offense involved creating two unique cryp-
tocurrencies, promoting the sale of those cryptocurrencies by
means of repeated and elaborate misrepresentations to investors,
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 4 of 18

-- 4 of 18 --

22-14215 Opinion of the Court 5
and orchestrating a pump and dump scheme with respect to the
currencies that enabled him to sell his holdings of them at an in-
flated price. Adjusting for the enhancements, the PSR calculated
Defendant’s offense level as 27 for his wire and securities fraud
counts.
The PSR assigned Defendant a base offense level of 27 for
his money laundering counts, per the guidelines instruction to ap-
ply the base offense level for the underlying offense from which the
laundered funds were derived. It added 1 level under USSG
§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(A) because Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957, resulting in an adjusted offense level of 28. Grouping all of
Defendant’s counts as instructed by USSG § 3D1.2(c), the PSR cal-
culated Defendant’s adjusted offense level as 28. It declined to ap-
ply an acceptance of responsibility adjustment under USSG § 3E1.1,
explaining that despite his guilty plea, Defendant had put the Gov-
ernment to its burden of proof by “denying the essential factual el-
ements of guilt for three days of a [j]ury trial.”
The PSR assigned Defendant a criminal history score of I af-
ter describing various convictions for minor driving offenses in ad-
dition to two convictions involving theft and false statements. It
listed several additional charges involving domestic violence, theft
by receiving stolen property, criminal impersonation, and con-
tempt of court, but those charges were dismissed and did not factor
into Defendant’s criminal history score. Based on a criminal his-
tory score of I and a total offense level of 28, the PSR calculated
Defendant’s guidelines range as 78 to 97 months. It noted that the
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 5 of 18

-- 5 of 18 --

6 Opinion of the Court 22-14215
statutory maximum on the wire fraud and money laundering
counts was 20 years, that the statutory maximum on the securities
fraud counts was 10 years, and that none of the counts required a
mandatory minimum.
Defendant objected to the PSR on two grounds that are rel-
evant here.3 First, he argued that the sophisticated means enhance-
ment the PSR recommended applying under USSG
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) was not warranted, and that his adjusted offense
level should thus be 26 instead of 28. Second, he argued he was
entitled to a 2-level reduction in his offense level pursuant to USSG
§ 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. Together, these adjust-
ments would have resulted in an offense level of 24 and a recom-
mended guidelines sentence of 51 to 63 months.
The district court rejected both of Defendant’s sentencing
arguments. Noting that the relevant guideline defines sophisti-
cated means as “especially complex or especially intricate offense
conduct,” the court found the Government had shown such con-
duct “in spades” in this case. In support of its finding, the court
emphasized that Defendant had used his expertise in digital assets
and cryptocurrency platforms, as well as his specialized knowledge
about managing various types of accounts and creating compa-
nies—including companies outside the United States in lucrative
foreign markets—to commit the offenses underlying his convic-
tions. The court explained further that the numerous
3 Defendant also objected to the amount of restitution recommended in the
PSR, but that objection is not relevant to this appeal.
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 6 of 18

-- 6 of 18 --

22-14215 Opinion of the Court 7
misrepresentations Defendant had used to “pump and dump” both
cryptocurrencies were indicative of a complex and sophisticated
scheme.
As to acceptance of responsibility, the court found that De-
fendant had not shown a downward adjustment was warranted.
The court stressed the delay in Defendant’s decision to plead guilty,
coming as it did in the middle of a complex trial and after the Gov-
ernment had secured the presence of multiple international wit-
nesses and a cryptocurrency expert. It also noted that Defendant
had not demonstrated any of the other indicators of acceptance of
responsibility set out in the guidelines, such as voluntarily termi-
nating or withdrawing from the offense conduct, offering to pay
restitution, surrendering to the authorities, assisting the authori-
ties, or undertaking post-offense rehabilitation efforts.
After ruling on the objections, the district court adopted the
findings and recommendations in the PSR, including its calculation
of Defendant’s total offense level of 28 and his guidelines range of
78 to 97 months. The court subsequently heard arguments from
the parties as to their recommendations for a reasonable sentence
considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Defendant asked the
court to vary down and sentence him to 46 months, and the Gov-
ernment asked for a sentence in the middle of the guidelines range.
Ultimately, the court varied down slightly and sentenced Defend-
ant to 70 months as to each count of conviction, to be served con-
currently and to be followed by a 3-year term of supervised release.
The court stated that this sentence was made in view of the
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 7 of 18

-- 7 of 18 --

8 Opinion of the Court 22-14215
§ 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstance of the of-
fense and the need to afford adequate deterrence and protect the
public, among other factors, and that it was “sufficient but not
greater than necessary to comply with the directives of [§] 3553(a).”
It affirmed that its sentence would have been the same regardless
of its ruling on the disputed guidelines issues it resolved in favor of
the Government.
Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that it is procedur-
ally and substantively unreasonable because the district court erred
when it applied the sophisticated means enhancement and when it
declined to adjust his offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
As discussed below, we conclude that the district court did not err
in its sophisticated means analysis or in its refusal to apply a deduc-
tion for acceptance of responsibility, and that Defendant’s sentence
is otherwise procedurally and substantively reasonable. Further,
and even assuming the court erred in either regard, it is clear any
error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s 70-month
sentence.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We use a two-step process to review the reasonableness of a
sentence imposed by the district court. See United States v. Cubero,
754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014). First, we determine whether the
sentence is procedurally sound. See id. Assuming it is, we then
examine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable given
the totality of the circumstances and the sentencing factors set out
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 8 of 18

-- 8 of 18 --

22-14215 Opinion of the Court 9
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).4 Id. At both steps of the process, the party
challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing it is unrea-
sonable. See United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir.
2008).
When engaging in the above two-step analysis, we review
de novo any purely legal questions regarding the guidelines. See
Cubero, 754 F.3d at 892. On the other hand, we review for clear
error the district court’s factual findings, including its findings con-
cerning whether the defendant used sophisticated means to com-
mit an offense. United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th
Cir. 2010). Likewise, we review for clear error the district court’s
“determination of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.”
United States v. Andres, 960 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2020). Clear
error review “is deferential.” Ghertler, 605 F.3d at 1267 (quotation
marks omitted). It requires us to leave the district court’s findings
undisturbed unless we are “left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
4 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant, (2) the need to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense, (3) the need for deterrence, (4) the need to protect
the public, (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed education or
vocational training or medical care, (6) the kinds of sentences available, (7) the
sentencing guidelines range, (8) pertinent policy statements of the sentencing
commission, (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and
(10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 9 of 18

-- 9 of 18 --

10 Opinion of the Court 22-14215
II. Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness
A. Procedural Reasonableness
As noted, Defendant argues on appeal that the district court
committed procedural error by applying a 2-level sophisticated
means enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). The so-
phisticated means enhancement applies when an offense “involved
sophisticated means and the defendant intentionally engaged in or
caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means.” USSG
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). “Sophisticated means” in this context is defined
to mean “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct
pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” USSG
§ 2B1.1, Application Note at 9(B). The guidelines instruct that
“[c]onduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, through
the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial
accounts . . . ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.” Id. But that
is just one example of conduct that qualifies. See United States v.
Feaster, 798 F.3d 1374, 1380 (11th Cir. 2015). Other facts can indi-
cate sufficiently complex or intricate conduct to support the en-
hancement, for example a defendant’s use of inside information
and targeted, repetitive acts over a long period of time to execute
and conceal the fraud. See id. at 1382.
Defendant acknowledges that his offense conduct was
“seemingly complex” because it involved cryptocurrency. Never-
theless, he argues it did not “rise to the level of sophistication” con-
templated by § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) because it was no more sophisti-
cated than what would be required to execute any cryptocurrency
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 10 of 18

-- 10 of 18 --

22-14215 Opinion of the Court 11
scheme. We are unpersuaded. The guidelines do not require an
extra level of complexity to support a sophisticated means en-
hancement in cases involving inherently sophisticated offenses
such as the cryptocurrency scheme Defendant orchestrated here.
See USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) and Application Note 9(B). The gov-
erning analysis is instead whether the offense conduct is “especially
complex or especially intricate.” Id.
As the district court found, there are numerous indicators of
such complexity and intricacy here. Defendant created two entities
that for all intents and purposes were fictitious, and he made nu-
merous and repeated misrepresentations concerning those entities
over the course of nearly a year that were well-planned and tar-
geted to extract funds from investors. Some of these misrepresen-
tations were made in furtherance of a “pump and dump” scheme
whereby Defendant persuaded investors to refrain from selling
FLiK and CoinSpark cryptocurrencies so he could later sell his own
holdings of these currencies at artificially inflated prices. Through-
out the scheme, Defendant used complex transfers of digital and
traditional assets through multiple and various types of online plat-
forms and accounts to divert nearly all the investment funds to his
personal use and to conceal the fraud. During that time, the
scheme resulted in a loss of approximately $2.5 million.
Given the above facts, we are not “left with a definite and
firm conviction” that the district court erred when it applied the
sophisticated means enhancement in this case. See Ghertler, 605
F.3d at 1267 (quotation marks and citation omitted). On the
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 11 of 18

-- 11 of 18 --

12 Opinion of the Court 22-14215
contrary, we agree with the district court that Defendant’s offense
conduct falls squarely within the definition of sophisticated means
as used in the guidelines and as applied by this Court. See Feaster,
798 F.3d at 1382 (noting that the defendant had taken advantage of
her inside information to conduct a fraud scheme through varied
and repeated affirmative acts of concealment over a two year pe-
riod of time, indicating sophistication); United States v. Barrington,
648 F.3d 1178, 1199 (11th Cir. 2011) (upholding a sophisticated
means enhancement where the defendants gained access to their
university registrar’s password protected grading system via a
scheme that involved a “great deal of planning and inside infor-
mation” and “multiple, repetitive . . . steps to deceive and exploit”
the system (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Bane, 720
F.3d 818, 826–27 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding there was sufficient sup-
port for a sophisticated means enhancement where the defendant’s
healthcare fraud scheme required the use of multiple corporate en-
tities and an intricate daily paper trail to conceal).
Defendant also argues the district court procedurally erred
by refusing to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility un-
der USSG § 3E1.1. The guidelines call for a 2-level reduction when
the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
for his offense” and an additional 1-level reduction when the de-
fendant notifies the Government of his intention to plead guilty in
time to avoid a trial. See USSG § 3E1.1. Defendant concedes he is
not entitled to a 3-level reduction, but he argues that his guilty plea
on the third day of trial and the fact that he admitted his conduct
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 12 of 18

-- 12 of 18 --

22-14215 Opinion of the Court 13
without minimizing or trying to mitigate it warrants a 2-level re-
duction.
Again, we disagree. The guidelines make clear that a de-
fendant is not entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibil-
ity as a matter of right simply because he pleads guilty. See USSG
§ 3E1.1, Application Note 3 (“A defendant who enters a guilty plea
is not entitled to an adjustment under this section as a matter of
right.”). Instead, the defendant must “clearly demonstrate” his ac-
ceptance of responsibility. USSG § 3E1.1(a). Yet, a guilty plea after
three days of a jury trial during which the Government presented
most of its case in chief is essentially all Defendant offers in support
of his request for the reduction here. See United States v. Wright,
862 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that a defendant must
present more than just a guilty plea to meet his burden of establish-
ing acceptance of responsibility).
As the district court noted, all the other indicators of ac-
ceptance of responsibility set out in the guidelines are lacking in
Defendant’s case. Specifically, Defendant did not voluntarily with-
draw from his conduct, pay restitution before being adjudicated
guilty, voluntarily surrender to the authorities, assist the authori-
ties, or undertake any significant post-offense rehabilitative efforts.
See USSG § 3E1.1, Application Note 1. Furthermore, while the en-
try of a guilty plea prior to commencement of trial combined with
a truthful admission of the conduct comprising the offense of con-
viction is significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility, De-
fendant did not plead guilty until after three days of a jury trial that
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 13 of 18

-- 13 of 18 --

14 Opinion of the Court 22-14215
necessitated extensive preparation by the Government. The lack
of timeliness in Defendant’s conduct manifesting acceptance of re-
sponsibility is another factor that weighs against an adjustment
here. See id., Application Note 1(H).
The district court correctly recognized that Defendant’s de-
cision to go to trial did not per se preclude him from receiving an
acceptance of responsibility adjustment. See United States v. Whyte,
928 F.3d 1317, 1335 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The reduction may be avail-
able, in a rare case, even when the defendant proceeds to trial[.]”
(quotation marks omitted)). But it did not err—and it certainly did
not clearly err—when it determined that given the timing of De-
fendant’s plea and the lack of any other indicators that Defendant
had accepted responsibility, an adjustment pursuant to USSG
§ 3E1.1 was not warranted in this case. See United States v. Williams,
408 F.3d 745, 757 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that the sentencing
judge’s determination as to acceptance of responsibility “is entitled
to great deference on review” because that judge is “in a unique
position to evaluate” the issue. (quotation marks omitted)).
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Defendant’s substantive reasonableness argument is based
on the same alleged procedural errors discussed above, and thus
fails for the same reasons. We note further that there is no other
basis upon which to overturn Defendant’s sentence as substan-
tively unreasonable. We will overturn a sentence as substantively
unreasonable only if the district court has committed “a clear error
of judgment” in weighing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 14 of 18

-- 14 of 18 --

22-14215 Opinion of the Court 15
applying them to the facts and circumstances of the case. See United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010). Such an error
may occur if the district court fails to consider relevant factors,
gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or
weighs the factors unreasonably. Id. at 1189. However, this Court
has emphasized that the “decision about how much weight to as-
sign a particular sentencing factor is committed to the sound dis-
cretion of the district court.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d
1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The record here reflects that the district court conducted an
individualized assessment of the facts and the § 3553(a) factors at
sentencing, balanced the competing considerations—specifically
weighing the nature and circumstances of Defendant’s offense, the
need to protect the public from schemes like Defendant’s, and de-
terrence considerations, among other factors—and ultimately de-
termined that a below guidelines sentence of 70 months was war-
ranted by the specific facts of this case. No error appears in the
record that would warrant a reversal of the sentence on substantive
reasonableness grounds.
III. Harmless Error
Although we conclude that the district court did not err by
imposing the sophisticated means enhancement or declining to re-
duce Defendant’s offense level for acceptance of responsibility, we
note that any such error would have been harmless. The court ex-
plained at sentencing that it would have imposed a 70-month sen-
tence in Defendant’s case regardless of how it resolved the
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 15 of 18

-- 15 of 18 --

16 Opinion of the Court 22-14215
guidelines disputes about the sophisticated means enhancement
and acceptance of responsibility adjustment. Thus, even assuming
the court erred in either regard, Defendant’s sentence is due to be
affirmed unless he can show that it would have been substantively
unreasonable under the lower guidelines range that would have
applied if his objections had been sustained. See United States v.
Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
court need not decide a guidelines enhancement issue if the trial
court makes clear it made no difference to the ultimate sentence
imposed and the sentence is substantively reasonable under the
lower guidelines range advocated by the defendant). Defendant
has not made the required showing here.
If the district court had sustained both of Defendant’s objec-
tions, his offense level would have been lowered by 4 levels to 24,
resulting in a guidelines range of 51 to 63 months. Defendant does
not offer any argument on appeal as to why a 70-month sentence
would be substantively unreasonable under the slightly lower 51 to
63-month guidelines range that would apply if his sentencing ob-
jections had been sustained, and there is no support for such an
argument in the record. Again, a sentence is substantively unrea-
sonable only if the district court has committed a clear error, such
as failing to consider relevant sentencing factors, giving significant
weight to an improper factor, or weighing the factors unreasona-
bly. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. As discussed above, the district court
did not commit any of those errors here. It carefully weighed the
relevant § 3553(a) factors, applied the factors to the agreed upon
facts in the case, and thoroughly explained its decision to impose a
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 16 of 18

-- 16 of 18 --

22-14215 Opinion of the Court 17
70-month sentence as “sufficient but not greater than necessary to
comply with the directives of [§] 3553(a)” regardless of how De-
fendant’s sentencing objections were resolved. Furthermore, the
70-month sentence is well below the statutory maximum twenty-
year penalty available on Defendant’s wire fraud and money laun-
dering counts and the ten-year penalty available on his securities
fraud counts, another indicator of reasonableness. See United States
v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
Assuming the 51 to 63-month guidelines range applied, the
district court’s sentence of 70 months would be a slight variance
upward. This Court does not presume that a sentence outside the
guidelines range is unreasonable, however. See United States v.
Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2023). Rather, a district
court has “considerable discretion” in weighing the § 3553(a) fac-
tors and deciding whether they “justify a variance and the extent of
one that is appropriate.” Id. at 1266 (quotation marks omitted).
The district court acted within its discretion here when it imposed
a 70-month sentence based on the seriousness of Defendant’s of-
fense, as well as the importance of imposing just punishment, pro-
tecting the public from these types of schemes, and affording ade-
quate deterrence, among other factors. See id. That is true whether
the guidelines range is 78 to 97 months, which the court found to
require a slight variance downward, or 51 to 63 months, which the
court indicated at sentencing would require a slight variance up-
ward. For this additional reason, Defendant’s sentence must be af-
firmed.
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 17 of 18

-- 17 of 18 --

18 Opinion of the Court 22-14215
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s sentence is
AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 22-14215 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 18 of 18

-- 18 of 18 --