USA v. Harrison Barrus

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10154
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HARRISON BARRUS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cr-60255-RNS-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10154
Before J ORDAN, L AGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Harrison Barrus, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to modify the
conditions of his supervised release, brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(2), in which he sought to modify his supervised release
conditions to “no conditions.” He argues that the imposition, or
potential revocation, of supervised release violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause because those actions constitute a second
prosecution or punishment. After careful review, we affirm.
We review the denial of a motion for modification of
supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cordero,
7 F.4th 1058, 1070 (11th Cir. 2021). Under the abuse-of-discretion
standard, we will reverse only if it we have a “definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in the conclusion it reached.” United States v. Moran, 573
F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations and brackets omitted).
“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes
an error of law.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).
The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides
that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “This
guarantees against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction, and multiple punishments for the same
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23-10154 Opinion of the Court 3
offense.” United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009).
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude punishment
imposed on revocation of supervised release, however, since it
constitutes a modification of the original sentence. See United States
v. Woods, 127 F.3d 990, 992–93 (11th Cir. 1997) (examining a
Double Jeopardy challenge in the context of a revocation of
probation while citing cases about revoking supervised release
because the two procedures are essentially the same); Johnson v.
United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (“Treating postrevocation
sanctions as part of the penalty for the initial offense . . . avoids
[Double Jeopardy] difficulties.”).
Moreover, supervised release is a form of punishment that
“Congress prescribes along with a term of imprisonment as part of
the same sentence.” Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
1826, 1834 (2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583). Under § 3583(a), a
district court “may include as a part of the sentence a requirement
that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after
imprisonment.” United States v. Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267, 1275 (11th
Cir. 2023).
We recently joined the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits and
held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) was “not a vehicle to collaterally
attack the legality of a defendant’s sentence.” Cordero, 7 F.4th at
1070. Rather, Ҥ 3582(e) sets forth factors a court should consider
in determining whether to modify or terminate a condition of
supervised release and illegality or constitutionality is not one of
them.” Id. We held that arguments concerning the legality and
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10154
the constitutionality of a defendant’s sentence were “reserved
properly for direct appeal or a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate
sentence.” Id.
In United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), a plurality
of the Supreme Court held that application of § 3583(k)’s
mandatory five-year term of imprisonment, based on judicial fact
finding, violated the defendant’s jury trial rights because the
revocation sentence imposed resulted in a total sentence that
exceeded the statutory maximum. Id. at 2383–84. Thus, it struck
down 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which required a district court to impose
a minimum term of incarceration upon a finding of certain
violations of supervised release. Id. at 2374. Nevertheless, the
plurality clarified that its holding was “limited to § 3583(k),” and
that it was not addressing whether § 3583(e) implicated due process
concerns. Id. at 2383–84. Moreover, it added that “an accused’s
final sentence includes any supervised release sentence he may
receive.” Id. at 2379. In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer agreed
that § 3583(k) was unconstitutional, but he did not reach the issue
of § 3583(e)’s constitutionality. See id. at 2386 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion nor err in
denying Barrus’s motion. For starters, because Barrus was
challenging the illegality or constitutionality of his supervised
release conditions, a § 3583(e)(2) motion was the improper vehicle.
Cordero, 7 F.4th at 1070. Barrus did not file a direct appeal, nor did
he challenge the conditions of his supervised release conditions in
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23-10154 Opinion of the Court 5
a § 2255 motion. Id. As a result, the district court properly denied
Barrus’s § 3583(e)(2) motion.
But even if Barrus could raise his claim in a § 3583(e)(2)
motion, his claim that his supervised release term or conditions
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause would fail in any event.
Notably, Barrus did not challenge a specific condition of his
supervised release; rather, he broadly challenged his supervised
release term. Under the caselaw, supervised release -- or the
revocation of supervised release -- does not constitute a separate or
second punishment. Mont, 139 S. Ct. at 1834; Woods, 127 F.3d at
992–93. Likewise, Haymond confirmed that “an accused’s final
sentence includes any supervised release sentence he may receive.”
139 S. Ct at 2379. Thus, to the extent Barrus bases his Double
Jeopardy challenge on receiving “separate” sentences, he is
mistaken.
Finally, to the extent that Barrus has challenged the potential
revocation of his supervised release under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, this claim is not ripe for adjudication, and we will not
consider it. Under Article III of the Constitution, the federal courts
are constrained to decide only “actual cases or controversies,”
which means we will not adjudicate a claim that is unripe for
review. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088–89 (11th Cir.
2003). A claim is not ripe for review if it “rests upon contingent
future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)
(quotations omitted). In Zinn, we held that, although a prisoner’s
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10154
challenge to a particular supervised release condition was generally
ripe for review, speculative arguments concerning the
implementation of the condition were not. 321 F.3d at 1088–89,
90–92. Similarly here, any arguments Barrus has about any future
revocation proceeding is speculative and we will not consider it.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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