USA v. Quentin Anderson

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-12204
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
QUENTIN ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:22-cr-00005-CDL-MSH-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12204
Before NEWSOM , BRASHER , and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Quentin Anderson, a federal prisoner, appeals his convic-
tions for robbery under the Hobbs Act and a related conspiracy to
possess a firearm.1 Anderson argues that the district court wrongly
accepted his guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(b).2 He also argues that his counsel ineffectively assisted him un-
der Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Neither persuades
us.
The district court did not plainly err in accepting Anderson’s
plea because it was knowing and voluntary. And a direct appeal is
not the proper vehicle to bring an ineffective assistance claim. So
we affirm Anderson’s convictions and sentence.
I.
Anderson was charged with one count of robbery under the
Hobbs Act and one count of conspiring to possess a firearm during
and in relation to that robbery. He pleaded guilty to both counts.
His plea agreement listed the statutory maximums for each
count—20 years—and stated that the district court would not be
bound by his attorney’s or the probation office’s estimated sentenc-
ing range. Anderson stipulated in the plea agreement that the
1 Anderson also appeals his sentence but offers no argument on that front be-
sides the fact that it follows an unlawful conviction.
2 Anderson does not cite Rule 11, but that rule governs pleas.
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23-12204 Opinion of the Court 3
government could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he com-
mitted seven armed robberies.
At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court conducted a
plea colloquy and, in relevant part, asked if Anderson understood
that the sentence he received could differ from any estimate given
to him by his attorney, the probation officer, the government’s at-
torney, or anyone else. Anderson said yes. He also agreed to the
government’s factual description of the seven robberies. The court
accepted his guilty plea.
The probation office calculated his sentencing range—87 to
108 months—under the sentencing guidelines, basing its calcula-
tion on the one robbery to which Anderson pleaded guilty. But the
government objected, arguing that his sentencing range should be
based on the seven robberies to which he stipulated, which would
result in a range of 188 to 235 months.
At sentencing, the district court upheld the government’s
objection. There, Anderson’s counsel stated that she believed she
had advised Anderson incorrectly regarding the factual stipulation
in the plea agreement and had in fact been ineffective. The district
court sentenced Anderson to 200 months of imprisonment. Ander-
son never moved to withdraw his guilty plea, though he said that
the plea was based on an ineffective assistance of counsel.
II.
“A defendant who failed to object to the Rule 11 colloquy or
move to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing, must show plain
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12204
error on appeal.” United States v. Chubbuck, 252 F.3d 1300, 1302
(11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
III.
Anderson directly appeals his convictions on two grounds.
First, he says that the district court should not have accepted his
guilty plea because he did not knowingly plead guilty. Second, he
says that his conviction is invalid because his counsel ineffectively
assisted him. We address each in turn.
A.
“A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it
is voluntary and intelligent.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,
618 (1998). “Rule 11 expressly directs the district judge to inquire
whether a defendant who pleads guilty understands the nature of
the charge against him and whether he is aware of the conse-
quences of his plea.” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464
(1969). A defendant pleads knowingly and voluntarily, even if rely-
ing on his counsel’s erroneous sentencing prediction, when the dis-
trict court explains that the sentence it imposes may differ from
such a prediction. See United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 941 (11th
Cir. 2001).
Anderson complains that he did not knowingly plead guilty
because he relied on his attorney’s erroneous sentencing predic-
tion. But during Anderson’s plea colloquy, the district court ex-
plained that the sentence it imposes may differ from any prediction
Anderson received. Anderson agreed that he understood this point
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23-12204 Opinion of the Court 5
and pleaded guilty anyway. We therefore conclude that the district
court did not plainly err.
B.
For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted
defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was defi-
cient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. But “[w]e generally do not address inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal.” United States
v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2015). “Instead,
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is properly raised in a col-
lateral attack on the conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” United
States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).
We can address such a claim on direct appeal “in the rare instance
where the record is sufficiently developed.” Id. (cleaned up). But
the record is not sufficiently developed for review on direct appeal,
even when counsel makes statements on the record about commu-
nications with the defendants, when those statements “were not
made under oath” and “were not subject to cross-examination.”
United States v. Ahmed, 73 F.4th 1363, 1375–76 (11th Cir. 2023).
Here, although Anderson’s counsel informed the court that
she had incorrectly advised him that the stipulated robberies would
not count toward his guideline range calculation, the record is not
sufficiently developed for us to adjudicate that issue. She did not
make those statements under oath, nor was she subject to cross-
examination. Any claim Anderson wishes to raise would best be
raised in a § 2255 motion, where he would have the opportunity to
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12204
request an evidentiary hearing on his claim. Accordingly, we de-
cline to consider Anderson’s claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.
IV.
For the reasons above, Anderson’s convictions and sentence
are AFFIRMED.
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