Yoland Patrick v. April Louise Poree

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-12732
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
YOLAND PATRICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
APRIL LOUISE POREE,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-04236-VMC
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12732
Before WILSON, J ORDAN, and L AGOA , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Yoland Patrick (Yoland) is the former
manager of April Poree, a musical artist who records as “BOZZ
Lay’dee.” Yoland is married to Sherman Patrick (Sherman) who
worked as Poree’s producer. Yoland brought this copyright in-
fringement lawsuit based on Poree’s performance and use of the
song “I Do What I Want.” The song’s registration with the United
States Copyright Office lists Poree and Sherman as authors and Yo-
land as the holder of “Rights and Permissions.” Yoland appeals
from the district court’s denial of her motions for default judgment
and summary judgment. After a careful review of the record, we
AFFIRM.
I. Background
When Yoland worked as Poree’s manager, Poree and Sher-
man recorded a song titled “I Do What I Want.” The song was
registered with the United States Copyright Office in July 2019.
The registration for “I Do What I Want” lists April Poree and Sher-
man Patrick next to “Authorship on Application.” Both April Poree
and Sherman Patrick are also listed next to “Copyright Claimant.”
Yoland Patrick’s name is listed next to “Rights and Permissions” on
the Copyright Registration form.
After the copyright was registered, Poree performed “I Do
What I Want” and made the single available on streaming services.
Also, “I Do What I Want” was featured on an episode of Lizzo’s
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23-12732 Opinion of the Court 3
television show “Watch Out for the Big Grrrls.” In response, Yo-
land filed this lawsuit identifying herself as the “exclusive owner”
of the sound recording and alleging that Poree’s actions constitute
copyright infringement.
Poree failed to respond, defend her claims, or appear at any
district court proceedings, including a preliminary injunction hear-
ing. As a result, Yoland filed a motion for clerk’s default, which the
clerk’s office granted and entered “Clerk’s Entry of Default.” Yo-
land then filed a motion for default judgment, or in the alternative
summary judgment. The district court denied both motions based
on a lack of evidence that Yoland held a valid copyright, which pre-
vented her from stating a claim for copyright infringement. The
district court then directed the plaintiff to show cause “why her
Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.” Alt-
hough Yoland responded, the district court dismissed the action al-
together finding that Yoland “ha[d] not pointed to any additional
information or evidence that could result in a different outcome.”
Yoland timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
“We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for
default judgment for abuse of discretion.” Young v. Grand Canyon
Univ., Inc., 57 F.4th 861, 876 (11th Cir. 2023). A district court abuses
its discretion if it “applies an incorrect legal standard or makes find-
ings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Wilk, 572
F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2009).
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12732
Entry of a default is appropriate when a party “failed to plead
or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After a default is en-
tered, the clerk must enter a default judgment when the claim is for
a sum certain and the plaintiff requests that amount. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(b)(1). When a plaintiff requests something other than a sum
certain, it “must apply to the court for a default judgment,” which
a district court may enter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). We treat “a
motion for default judgment . . . like a reverse motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789
F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). “[A] default judg-
ment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir.
1997).
III. Applicable Law
Principles of copyright ownership and transfer are federal
law. Copyright interests “vest[] initially in the author or authors of
the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright
in the work.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). Copyright ownership is transfer-
rable. Id. § 201(d). An attempt to transfer copyright ownership is
only valid if “an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memoran-
dum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the
rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.” Id.
§ 204(a). We have interpreted this to mean that “[t]he Copyright
Act requires a writing for all exclusive transfers of copyright.” Lat-
imer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1235 (11th Cir. 2010).
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23-12732 Opinion of the Court 5
Owners of copyrights have “exclusive rights to do and to au-
thorize” specific actions under 17 U.S.C. § 106, and the scope of ex-
clusive rights in sound recordings is outlined in 17 U.S.C. § 114.
Registration of a copyright is a permissive action, and copyright
protection does not require registration. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a). An
applicant for copyright registration may, but does not need to, list
the name and contact information for a person or organization to
contact for permission to use the work. U.S. Copyright Office,
Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 622.1 Rights and
Permissions Information (3d ed. 2021).
To establish a prima facie case for copyright infringement, a
plaintiff must prove two things: “(1) ownership of a valid copy-
right, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original.” Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1232–33 (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
IV. Analysis
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
choosing to not enter a default judgment. The entry of clerk’s de-
fault does not automatically necessitate entering a default judgment.
Poree’s lack of response or defense made entering the clerk’s de-
fault appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Because Yoland did not
seek a sum certain, she had to move for default judgment. When
deciding whether to enter a default judgment, the district court
needed to determine whether Yoland had a valid copyright claim.
Therefore, the court properly considered the elements of a prima
facie copyright infringement claim. Bringing a copyright
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12732
infringement claim requires a plaintiff to own a valid copyright. See
Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1232–33. Yoland failed to establish copyright
ownership for “I Do What I Want.” Copyright ownership initially
vests in the authors or coauthors of a work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
Here, copyright ownership initially vested in Poree and Sherman
as cocreators of “I Do What I Want.”
Nothing in the record establishes that Yoland subsequently
acquired copyright ownership. Copyright registration is not nec-
essary for copyright interests to vest. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(a),
408(a). Poree and Sherman’s rights as authors vested before the reg-
istration rather than coming from the registration. Listing Yoland
under “Rights and Permissions” on the registration did not provide
her with the rights of copyright ownership. Rather, listing Yoland
there made her the person to contact for permission to use “I Do
What I Want.”
Further, Yoland did not receive copyright ownership via
transfer. An exclusive transfer of federal copyright requires a writ-
ten conveyance. 17 U.S.C. § 204; Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1235. Yo-
land’s affidavit references a “verbal agreement” with Poree that Yo-
land “would hold the exclusive rights and permissions for the Work
to direct the licenses and permissions for the Work.” The affidavit
from Sherman states that Poree “agreed to the transfer of her intel-
lectual property interest in the work.” Neither affidavit identifies
the statutorily required written transfer of copyright ownership.
By failing to prove ownership of a copyright, Yoland did not
establish a prima facie case for copyright infringement. Without a
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23-12732 Opinion of the Court 7
prima facie case, Yoland failed on her claim. We consider a com-
plaint without a claim as insufficient to support entering a default
judgment. See Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1370 n.41. Even when a dis-
trict court has entered a default, it must ensure that there is a valid
claim before entering a default judgment. Thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by not granting Yoland’s motion for de-
fault judgment.1
For the reasons discussed above, the decision of the district
court is AFFIRMED.2
1 Yoland’s brief mentions summary judgment in the alternative. Summary
judgment is appropriate when the movant has shown “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Here, Yoland has failed to meet the
prima facie case of copyright infringement and therefore cannot show she is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court did not err in deny-
ing her motion for summary judgment.
2 By affirming the dismissal of Yoland’s claims, we do not reach the district
court’s earlier denial of her motion for preliminary injunction mentioned in
her brief.
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