Patrick Mason v. Mobile County Circuit Clerk, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-12775
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
PATRICK LEON MASON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MOBILE COUNTY CIRCUIT CLERK,
STATE OF ALABAMA DHR, CSE,
FRANK SPRAGLIN,
ALABAMA LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY,
Drivers License Division,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12775
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-00185-KD-N
____________________
Before J ILL PRYOR , BRANCH, and BLACK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Mason, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s
sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim in his amended com-
plaint alleging violations of his due process right to access the
courts based on the denial of his request for a hearing to modify the
orders requiring him to pay child support and suspending his
driver’s license. Mason asserts several issues on appeal, which we
address in turn. After review, we affirm.
The district court did not err in determining Mason failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted and dismissing his
amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (providing an in forma pauperis action shall
be dismissed at any time if the court determines it fails to state a
claim for which relief may be granted); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d
1 “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). While pro se pleadings are liberally
construed and held to less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys,
they still must suggest some factual basis for a claim. Jones v. Fla. Parole
Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
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23-12775 Opinion of the Court 3
1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating we apply the standards govern-
ing dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to re-
view a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), reviewing the dismissal de
novo and taking all allegations in the complaint as true). As an ini-
tial matter, to the extent Mason asked the district court to review,
correct, or overturn the state child support and driver’s license sus-
pension orders against him, the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to review those claims under the Rooker-Feldman2 doc-
trine. See Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1208-10 (11th Cir. 2021) (ex-
plaining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional doctrine bar-
ring federal district courts from reviewing state-court decisions and
applies “[o]nly when a losing state court litigant calls on a district
court to modify or overturn an injurious state-court judgment”
(quotation marks omitted)). We affirm the dismissal of those
claims. However, Mason’s claims for money damages or seeking
declarations that his constitutional rights were violated by the de-
fendants’ conduct following the entry of the initial child support
judgment and driver’s license suspension order are not barred un-
der Rooker-Feldman. See id. at 1212-13 (explaining the injury the
plaintiff complains of “must be caused by the judgment itself,” and
when assessing whether a complaint is barred by Rooker-Feldman,
“[t]he question isn’t whether the whole complaint seems to chal-
lenge a previous state court judgment, but whether resolution of
2 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923), and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12775
each individual claim requires review and rejection of a state court
judgment”).
Next, Mason has not raised any challenge on appeal to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, which the district court
adopted, that his claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 3571, and 242 be
dismissed because those statutes do not authorize a private right of
action by way of civil enforcement. Accordingly, Mason has aban-
doned on appeal any challenge that those claims should have sur-
vived the district court’s dismissal. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian
Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating when an appellant
fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which
the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have aban-
doned any challenge of that ground, and the judgment is due to be
affirmed).
Under the only remaining statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
magistrate judge found, and the district court adopted without
adding to the findings from the Report and Recommendation
(R&R), that three of the four named defendants—the Child Sup-
port Enforcement Division of the State of Alabama’s Department
of Human Resources (DHR CSE), the Driver’s License Division
of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency (ALEA DLD), and
Sharla Knox, in her official capacity as the Mobile County Circuit
Court Clerk—are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983 and
are otherwise entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as
“arms of the state.” “Under the Eleventh Amendment, state offi-
cials sued for damages in their official capacity are immune from
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23-12775 Opinion of the Court 5
suit in federal court.” Jackson v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573,
1575 (11th Cir. 1994). The four factors that we observe to deter-
mine whether an entity is an “arm of the State” include: “(1) how
state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State
maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds;
and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.” My-
rick v. Fulton County, 69 F.4th 1277, 1294 (11th Cir. 2023).
The district court did not err in determining DHR CSE,
ALEA DLD, and Knox, in her official capacity are “arms of the
state” and entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Light-
foot v. Henry Cnty. Sch. Dist., 771 F.3d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 2014) (re-
viewing de novo whether an entity constitutes an arm of the state
under Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis). Alabama rou-
tinely treats the Department of Human Resources and circuit court
clerks as state agents entitled to sovereign immunity. See, e.g.
Poiroux v. Rich, 150 So. 3d 1027, 1036-38 (Ala. 2014) (explaining re-
covery against circuit court clerks would affect the financial status
of the state treasury and result in recovery of money from the
state); Ex parte Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., 999 So. 2d 891, 898 (Ala.
2008) (holding sovereign immunity precluded a civil action against
the child support payment center of the Alabama Department of
Human Resources). The ALEA is created and governed by Ala-
bama’s state code, Ala. Code § 41-27-1 (2018), and is also an arm of
the state, see Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1295. Accordingly, the district court
did not err in dismissing the claims against DHR CSE, ALEA DLD,
and Knox in her official capacity as the clerk of court.
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12775
Next, Mason attempts to argue, for the first time on appeal,
the defendants violated a requirement from the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC) by lacking a sufficient financing statement before
requiring him to pay child support. But Mason never mentioned
the UCC before the district court, so he has forfeited this argument
and this court need not consider it. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines
Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating generally, argu-
ments raised for the first time on appeal that were not presented in
the district court are deemed forfeited). None of the exceptions to
the forfeiture doctrine apply to warrant review because whether
the defendants needed to comply with the UCC is neither a pure
legal question nor an issue of public importance. See id.
Turning to Mason’s remaining arguments, his overarching
claim of the violation of a federal constitutional right is a due pro-
cess argument. To the extent his due process argument is based on
his claim he was denied access to the court via the Sixth Amend-
ment’s protections for trial rights in criminal prosecutions, he has
failed to state a claim of a § 1983 violation because the Sixth
Amendment’s rights are inapplicable to civil cases, including Ma-
son’s denial of a child support modification hearing. See United
States v. Approximately $299,973.70 Seized from a Bank of Am. Account,
15 F.4th 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment . . .
guarantees a criminal defendant the personal right to attend
trial. . . . But when it comes to civil litigation, where the Sixth
Amendment does not apply, history points in the other direc-
tion.”).
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23-12775 Opinion of the Court 7
To the extent Mason has attempted to argue a more general
due process violation related to his access to the courts, Mason has
had multiple opportunities and has still failed to allege a constitu-
tionally protected right to a hearing for the review of a child sup-
port order or how Frank Spraglin’s (a case worker for DHR CSE)
or Knox’s conduct caused the violation of that right. See Griffin v.
City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating to
bring a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must claim he was deprived of a
federal right by a person acting under color of state law); Zatler v.
Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (explaining § 1983
“requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the of-
ficial’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional depriva-
tion”). In the R&R, the magistrate judge warned that Mason’s fail-
ure to comply with the directive to clarify the disconnect between
his claims and his requests for relief would result in a sua sponte
dismissal. The magistrate judge also stated Mason should clarify
his causes of action and the defendants implicated. Even though
Mason filed an amended complaint that the magistrate judge ex-
plained generally complied with its directives, he still failed to al-
lege any facts to support a claim against Spraglin or Knox or con-
nect them to any deprivation of a federal right. The district court
did not err in sua sponte dismissing Mason’s claims under § 1983 for
failure to state a claim because he did not identify a federal right of
which the defendants deprived him.
AFFIRMED.
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