Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
HULU, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-1092
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California in No. 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-
PLA, Judge John A. Kronstadt.
______________________
Decided: January 29, 2026
______________________
F REDERICK D ING, Desmarais LLP, New York, NY, ar-
gued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by ALAN
K ELLMAN.
BRADLEY M. BERG , O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Newport
Beach, CA, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
sented by CAMERON WILLIAM WESTIN, BRETT J OHNSTON
WILLIAMSON; J OHN C. K APPOS , Dallas, TX; J ASON ZARROW ,
Los Angeles, CA.
______________________
Before P ROST , WALLACH , and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 2
CHEN, Circuit Judge.
Sound View Innovations, LLC (Sound View) appeals a
decision of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California granting summary judgment of
noninfringement in favor of Hulu, LLC (Hulu). See Sound
View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, No. 17-cv-04146-
JAK-PLA, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171867 (C.D. Cal. Sep.
25, 2023). The district court determined that Hulu does
not infringe method claim 16 of U.S. Patent No. 6,708,213
(’213 patent) because (1) the accused products do not
perform the claim limitations in the required sequence;
and (2) the accused products do not have the claimed
specialized buffer. Because we agree with the district court
that claim 16 requires that its first two steps be performed
in the order that they appear in the claim, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. The ’213 Patent
The now-expired ’213 patent—titled “Method for
Streaming Multimedia Information over Public Net-
works”—discloses methods and apparatuses that reduce
network latency while increasing the quality of media
streamed to the devices of end-user customers. ’213 patent,
Abstract. The invention improves upon prior streaming
and caching techniques by using intermediate helper serv-
ers (HSs)1 to cache content, coordinate distribution, and
adjust data transfer rates. See id. at col. 2, l. 64–col. 3, l.
10. This results in faster content availability and enhances
perceived quality for end-users.
1 The patent uses “helper servers” and “helpers”
interchangeably, abbreviating both of them as “HSs.” ’213
patent, col. 2, l. 64.
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 3
Figure 2 of the ’213 patent depicts an exemplary net-
work using the invention.
Id. at Fig. 2. This illustrative network has a content server
12, which serves multimedia content including text, audio,
video, and graphic images. Id. at col. 5, ll. 3–4. The net-
work also includes HSs 22–24, which “cache Internet re-
sources, such as those requested by client computers 26–40
that have been downloaded from the content server 12 to
allow localized serving of those resources.” Id. at col. 5, ll.
10–13. When an HS receives a Streaming Media (SM) ob-
ject request, only “one part of the requested SM object will
typically be stored in the local cache” of the HS. Id. at col.
5, ll. 21–23. “[U]pon receiving a request for an SM object
from a client, the HS is [therefore] required to retrieve the
non-stored portions of the SM object from the other HSs in
the network 22–24.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 25–29.
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 4
Claim 16 of the ’213 patent recites:
16. A method of reducing latency in a network hav-
ing a content server which hosts streaming media
(SM) objects which comprise a plurality of time-or-
dered segments for distribution over said network
through a plurality of helpers (HSs) to a plurality
of clients, said method comprising:
receiving a request for an SM object from
one of said plurality of clients at one of said
plurality of helper servers;
allocating a buffer at one of said plurality
of HSs to cache at least a portion of said
requested SM object;
downloading said portion of said requested
SM object to said requesting client, while
concurrently retrieving a remaining
portion of said requested SM object from
one of another HS and said content server;
and
adjusting a data transfer rate at said one of
said plurality of HSs for transferring data
from said one of said plurality of helper
servers to said one of said plurality of
clients.
Id. at claim 16.
II. Prior Proceedings
Sound View brought the present case against Hulu on
June 2, 2017, alleging infringement of six patents. Only
claim 16 of the ’213 patent remains at issue. Sound View
contended that Hulu infringed claim 16 by directing third-
party edge servers (the claimed “helper servers”) to
perform every step of the asserted claim. Sound View
argued that Hulu directed or controlled the content
delivery networks to allocate a local buffer at an edge
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 5
server. This local buffer then caches at least a portion of a
Hulu video and downloads (i.e., sends) that video portion
to a client while concurrently pre-fetching (i.e., retrieving)
another portion of the same video. After construing several
claim terms, the district court granted summary judgment
of non-infringement because Hulu’s edge servers do not
download and retrieve subsequent portions of the same SM
object in the same buffer.
On appeal, we affirmed the relevant claim
constructions, holding the applicants’ statements during
prosecution of the ’213 patent “limited claim 16 to using the
same buffer for the required concurrent downloading and
retrieval of portions of a requested SM object.” Sound View
Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 33 F.4th 1326, 1334–35
(Fed. Cir. 2022) (Hulu I). We also vacated the district
court’s summary judgment order and remanded with
instructions to adopt “an affirmative construction of
‘buffer’” that “could then be compared to the accused-
component ‘caches.’” Id. at 1336. We observed that “[i]t
appears that ‘buffer’ should be given the ordinary meaning
proposed by Sound View here and in the district court
based on a dictionary definition: ‘temporary storage for
data being sent or received.’” Id.
On remand, the district court construed the term
“buffer” to mean “short term storage associated with said
requested SM object,” Sound View Innovations, LLC v.
Hulu, LLC, No. 17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA, 2022 WL
20275657, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2022) (Remanded Claim
Construction Order), and granted Hulu leave to file a new
motion for summary judgment, J.A. 1587. In its summary
judgment ruling, the district court made two additional
claim construction determinations: (1) the first limitation
of claim 16 must be performed before the second limitation;
and (2) claim 16 requires a specialized buffer, not a generic
one. See J.A. 22–24. Finding that the accused products do
not satisfy claim 16 as construed, the district court again
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 6
granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of
Hulu. Id. at 25.
Sound View now appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
STANDARDS OF R EVIEW
We review a district court’s grant of summary
judgment under the law of the regional circuit. Vasudevan
Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 676
(Fed. Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit reviews an order
granting summary judgment de novo. Comite de
Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657
F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). In the Ninth Circuit,
“summary judgment is appropriate when, even ‘draw[ing]
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,’
there is no ‘genuine issue of material fact.’” Vasudevan,
782 F.3d at 676 (alteration in original and citations
omitted).
When reviewing a district court’s claim construction,
we review de novo “the ultimate question of the proper
construction of patent claims and the evidence intrinsic to
the patent.” Id. When considering extrinsic evidence, “we
review the subsidiary factual findings underlying the
district court’s claim construction for clear error.” Id.
“Whether an accused device infringes requires a two-
step analysis—the court first ‘determines the scope and
meaning of the patent claims asserted, and then the
properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly
infringing device.’” Hulu I, 33 F.4th at 1335 (quoting
CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless Inc., 10 F.4th
1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2021)). The second step of the
analysis is a question of fact. Absolute Software, Inc. v.
Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1129–30 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 7
D ISCUSSION
The district court granted summary judgment of
noninfringement on two independent grounds. Sound
View must therefore prevail on both grounds to prevail in
this appeal. For reasons explained below, we hold the
district court (1) erred in its construction of the claimed
term “buffer,” but (2) correctly construed claim 16 to
require a specific order of operation. Because the second
ground independently supports the grant of summary
judgment, we affirm.
I. General Purpose Buffer
As we noted in our prior opinion, the ordinary meaning
of “buffer” is “temporary storage for data being sent or
received.” Hulu I, 33 F.4th at 1336 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The district court, however, construed the
term “buffer” to mean “short term storage associated with
said requested SM object.” Remanded Claim Construction
Order, 2022 WL 20275657, at *1. It noted that the
language of claim 16—e.g., “allocating a buffer . . . to cache
at least a portion of the requested SM object”—indicates
that the buffer is “necessarily associated with the
requested SM object.” Id. at *5 (citing ’213 patent, col. 14,
ll. 39–40). The district court further observed that several
embodiments and the prosecution history disclose
allocating a buffer associated with the same SM object. Id.
at *6. According to the district court, this association
transforms the claimed buffer into a specialized buffer
dedicated to a single SM object. J.A. 23–24. Because the
buffers in the accused products are general purpose, the
district court determined they cannot be the specialized
buffers required by claim 16. Id. at 24. The district court
therefore concluded that the accused products do not
infringe claim 16. Id. We disagree that claim 16 requires
a specialized buffer.
“We generally give words of a claim their ordinary
meaning in the context of the claim and the whole patent
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 8
document.” World Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp., 769
F.3d 1120, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “[T]he
specification particularly, but also the prosecution history,
informs the determination of claim meaning . . . and even
if the meaning is plain on the face of the claim language,
the patentee can, by acting with sufficient clarity, disclaim
such a plain meaning or prescribe a special definition.” Id.
This means that “a claim term may be clearly redefined
without an explicit statement of redefinition” and “[e]ven
when guidance is not provided in explicit definitional
format, the specification may define claim terms by
implication such that the meaning may be found in or
ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.” Trs. of
Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811
F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (alteration in original)
(quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320–21
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
Nothing in the claim language describes the buffer as
a specialized buffer that must be associated with only one
SM object. See Hulu I, 33 F.4th at 1336 (“[T]here is no
definition [of a ‘buffer’] . . . in the ’213 patent itself.”).
Claim 16 merely recites “a buffer” that can “cache at least
a portion of” a requested SM object. ’213 patent, col. 14, ll.
39–40. The claim language does not suggest that this
buffer is exclusively assigned to store SM objects, much less
require the buffer to be exclusively reserved for a single SM
object. See id. at claim 16.
The specification does not clearly indicate a deviation
from the ordinary and customary meaning of the term
“buffer.” The “Client Request Aggregation” and
“RTP/RTSP” embodiments describe a “ring buffer” and
“buffer pool,” not a “buffer.” See id. at col. 5, ll. 55–65; id.
at col. 10, ll. 57–67. A ring buffer differs from a generic
buffer because it is allocated in anticipation that the “same
SM object” would be frequently requested. Id. at col. 5, ll.
63–65. To that end, a ring buffer maintains a sliding
window of a certain size, allowing it to more efficiently
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 9
service the same SM object within a time interval. See id.
at col. 6, l. 59–col. 7, l. 27. Similarly, a buffer pool is
different from a single buffer, as only the former has a
“management module” that specifically “attaches each new
incoming SM object request to an existing buffer.” Id. at
col. 10, ll. 33–36. To the extent that these specialized
buffers are associated with only one SM object, they are
structurally distinct from a generic buffer and do not
provide a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that the
general-purpose buffer in claim 16 should also be
associated with only one SM object. See Luminara
Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Trs. of Columbia, 811 F.3d at 1362–
64).
Hulu points to one statement in the prosecution
history, but it does not move the needle. During
prosecution, the patentee distinguished its invention from
the prior art by pointing out that its “invention
concurrently empties and fills the buffer, while the
DeMoney reference teaches filling the buffer only after the
buffer is empty.” Hulu I, 33 F.4th at 1334 (citation
omitted); J.A. 925. Though this statement describes using
the same buffer to concurrently download and retrieve an
SM object, it does not exclude the use of the same buffer to
store multiple requested SM objects.
In light of the intrinsic evidence, we see no reason to
depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of the word
“buffer.” The district court thus erred in narrowing the
claimed buffer to be a specialized buffer that is “associated
with” an SM object.
II. Implicit Ordering in Method Claim
The district court determined that claim 16 requires a
specific sequence for the first two recited steps: first
“receiving a request for an SM object from one of said
plurality of clients at one of said plurality of helper
servers,” then “allocating a buffer at one of said plurality of
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 10
HSs to cache at least a portion of said requested SM object.”
J.A. 22. It explained that “[a] buffer cannot be allocated to
cache a portion of a requested SM object if there is no
requested SM object.” Id. Because the accused products
do not perform the claim limitations in the correct
sequence, the district court concluded they do not infringe
claim 16. Id. at 24.
On appeal, neither party disputes that the accused
products do not perform the claim limitations in the order
required by the district court. See Appellant Br. 45–57;
Appellee Br. 18–19. The parties instead disagree on
whether claim 16 requires an order of steps. We conclude
that it does.
As a general rule, “[u]nless the steps of a method
[claim] actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily
construed to require one.” Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v.
Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted). However, “a claim ‘requires an ordering
of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or
grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order
written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires’
an order of steps.” Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Rsch. in
Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). Here, both the grammar and logic of claim 16
require the first limitation to be performed before the
second.
The first limitation of method claim 16 recites
“receiving a request for an SM object . . . ,” where the SM
object is initially a general SM object. ’213 patent, col. 14,
l. 36. The second limitation recites “allocating a
buffer . . . to cache . . . said requested SM object.” Id. at col.
14, ll. 39–40. Grammatically, “a request for an SM object”
in the first limitation provides an antecedent basis for “said
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 11
requested SM object” in the second.2 The past participle—
“requested”—acts as an adjective modifying the noun “SM
object,” describing a logical relationship: for “requested
SM object” to make sense, a request must have occurred
before the object can be described as “requested.” Indeed,
only after a request is received does the SM object acquire
the status of being “requested.”
In other words, “requested” is not only a grammatical
descriptor, but also is a status indicator reflecting a
completed action—the receiving of a request. Because the
second limitation expressly references “said requested SM
object,” it necessarily depends on the first limitation having
been performed. The buffer cannot be allocated to cache a
“requested” SM object if no request has been received.
“[B]ecause the language of . . . the step[] of its method
claim refer[s] to the completed results of the prior
step, . . . all of those steps [must be] performed in order.”
2 Sound View attempted to explain away the
inclusion of the past participle adjective “requested,”
reasoning that the patentee added the term “requested” to
reference the “SM object” in the claim limitation instead of
the one in the preamble. Oral Arg. at 8:47–9:15 (available
at https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/24-
1092_08082025.mp3) (Oral Arg.). But the preamble recites
multiple “SM objects” while both claim limitations recite
only one singular “SM object.” Therefore, a skilled artisan
would not need the inclusion of the term “requested” to
understand that “said SM object” refers to the single “SM
object” in the “receiving a request for an SM object”
limitation. Sound View’s concession that “it might very
well be” acceptable to remove the term “requested” and not
alter the meaning of the claim, Oral Arg. at 9:47–10:22,
reinforces our conclusion that “requested” is doing more
than just serving as a grammatical descriptor.
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 12
E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 473 F.3d 1213, 1222
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
Sound View argues that claim 16, unlike other
unasserted claims, does not recite an order. Appellant Br.
46. It points to claims 10 and 13 as examples of when the
grammar of the claims clearly envisioned the steps to be
performed in a specific sequence. According to Sound View,
claim 10, for example, uses numbers and letters to set out
the sequence of which the steps must be performed. See
’213 patent at claim 10. Claim 13, on the other hand, uses
conditional language to specify when “allocating a first ring
buffer” occurs—“upon receiving said first request.” Id. at
col. 13, ll. 63–65. Because the language of claim 16 does
not possess such grammatical structures, Sound View
contends that claim 16 is not limited in the same manner
as the other claims. Appellant Br. 46–47.
Sound View also asserts that a claim mandates a
specific sequence of the recited steps only if the latter step
cannot be performed, as written, without first performing
the earlier step. Id. at 48 (citing Interactive Gift, 256 F.3d
at 1343; Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Sound View relies on Loral
Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., which held that the claim
at issue required an order because “the insulation layer
must already be in place in order to align the barrier
regions with it during ion implantation.” 181 F.3d 1313,
1321 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Here, Sound View argues that it is
permissible to allocate a buffer before receiving a client
request for an SM object because the request merely
identifies which existing SM object to place into the buffer.
Appellant Br. 52–53. Thus, Sound View believes that the
grammar and logic of the claim language do not compel a
specific sequence for the steps of claim 16.
Finally, Sound View points to Figure 7B in the
specification to support its position that the steps of claim
16 could be performed in any order. Id. at 54–55.
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According to Sound View, Figure 7B shows a single buffer
embodiment where the HS (i.e., H 75) uses a pre-allocated
buffer (i.e., B1 79) that initially stores K 1 second (i.e., a
portion) of a SM object before receiving a request for either
the same or another SM object. Appellant Br. 55. Once it
receives a request from the client, it immediately sends the
K 1 second of SM object to the client “while concurrently
retrieving” more data. Id. Sound View asserts that this
embodiment follows an order of operations where the
buffer was already allocated before receiving a request for
a SM object. Id. Sound View argues that the district
court’s order-of-steps construction excludes this
embodiment and therefore must be erroneous. Id. at 55–
57.
We disagree with all three of Sound View’s arguments.
Claims 10 and 13 do not establish that claim 16’s steps can
be performed in any order. As a threshold matter, there is
“a presumption that distinct claims . . . have different
scopes.” World Class Tech., 769 F.3d at 1125 (citation
omitted). This presumption means “that the difference
between claims is significant,” and we should be wary of
importing limitations of one claim into another. Andersen
Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1369–70
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Claim 10
uses numbering and lettering for a specific purpose: to
cross-reference its own steps. The absence of such markers
in claim 16, however, does not compel the conclusion that
its steps may be performed in any sequence. Claim 13, on
the other hand, establishes a particular ordering of some
steps through conditional language, such as allocating a
buffer “upon receiving [a] first request.” ’213 patent, col.
13, ll. 64–65. Such conditional phrasing is unnecessary in
claim 16 because its grammar and logic, as explained
above, already impose an ordering. In sum, claims 10, 13,
and 16 simply use different ways to indicate that certain
claimed steps must be performed in a particular order.
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 14
Our caselaw on implicit ordering does not help Sound
View, as it does not require a finding that the performance
of the claimed steps would be inoperable if the steps are not
followed in the order they appear in the claim. Instead, we
look to the claim language and specification to determine
whether “the steps of a method claim had to be performed
in their written order because each subsequent step
referenced something logically indicating the prior step
had been performed.” Altiris, 318 F.3d at 1370 (citing
Mantech Env’t Corp. v. Hudson Env’t Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d
1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In other words, implicit
ordering exists when there are inherent logical
dependencies or functional relationships between the
recited steps of a method claim.
Sound View’s reliance on Figure 7B is misplaced
because that figure does not provide the necessary
information that maps onto the relevant portions of claim
16.3 As Sound View concedes, “nothing in the embodiment
describes any allocation occurring in response to a client
request.” Appellant Reply 14 (emphasis added). Indeed,
Figure 7B describes the “data transfer rate control”
involved in filling and draining an already pre-allocated
buffer. See ’213 patent, col. 8, ll. 20–21 (“FIGS. 7a and 7b
illustrate two network configurations which describe data
transfer rate control.”). The embodiment is therefore not
3 Sound View states that during prosecution, the
patentee specifically cited Figure 7B as providing support
for claim 16. Oral Arg. at 11:29–12:20. Accordingly, Sound
View argues that this embodiment should be given more
weight in our analysis on whether there is an implicit order
of the steps in claim 16. But the patentee merely
referenced Figure 7B as written description support for its
proposed amendment to claim 16, which added a new
limitation unrelated to the order of the first and second
limitations. See J.A. 924, 926.
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SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC v. HULU, LLC 15
directly applicable to how to understand the claimed
“allocating a buffer . . . to cache . . . said requested SM
object” limitation.
Even if this embodiment is relevant to our analysis,
Sound View does not describe how that embodiment’s pre-
allocated buffer “already contains the K 1 portion of the
requested SM object.” Appellant Br. 12; see also id. at 54–
55. Indeed, the written description simply “assume[s] that
the HS 75 initially has K 1 seconds of data in its buffer.”
’213 patent, col. 8, ll. 47–48. Because this embodiment
description skips over the relevant portion of the overall
process that potentially could map onto the first two steps
of claim 16, Figure 7B and its corresponding description
does not show an example of allocating a buffer to cache a
portion of an SM object before a request is made for that
SM object.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in construing claim 16 to
require a specific sequence of steps. Because the accused
products do not perform the claim limitations in the
required sequence, they do not infringe claim 16 of the ’213
patent.
We have considered Sound View’s remaining
arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
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