the Mosaic Company v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
THE MOSAIC COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
v.
INDUSTRIAL GROUP PHOSPHORITE, LLC,
Defendant-Appellant
PHOSAGRO PJSC, JSC APATIT,
Defendants
______________________
2024-1593
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of International
Trade in Nos. 1:21-cv-00117-JAR, 1:21-cv-00220-JAR,
1:21-cv-00221-JAR, Senior Judge Jane A. Restani.
______________________
Decided: December 5, 2025
______________________
D AVID J. ROSS , Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also
represented by STEPHANIE H ARTMANN.
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 2
J EREMY WILLIAM D UTRA, Squire Patton Boggs LLP,
Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant.
AUGUSTUS G OLDEN, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
sented by CLAUDIA B URKE, P ATRICIA M. M CCARTHY , BRETT
SHUMATE; J ARED MICHAEL CYNAMON, Office of the Chief
Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, United
States Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.
______________________
Before P ROST , REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
REYNA, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States
Court of International Trade, which affirmed the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce’s imposition of countervailing du-
ties on certain imports of phosphate fertilizers from Russia.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I.
Where the production of goods exported to the United
States benefited from subsidies bestowed by a foreign gov-
ernment, then the goods may be subject to a countervailing
duty when imported into the United States. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671. These duties “protect American firms from unfair
competition by setting off the amount certain export subsi-
dies foreign firms selling goods in the United States receive
from their governments.” Norsk Hydro Canada, Inc. v.
United States, 472 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006). For a
subsidy to be countervailable, it must meet certain require-
ments, two of which are at issue in this appeal.
First, a subsidy is countervailable when it is “specific”
to an enterprise or industry rather than generally availa-
ble. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A). A subsidy can be specific as a
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 3
matter of law, also referred to as “de jure” specific, whereby
the government legislates that a subsidy will apply specif-
ically to an enterprise or industry. Id. § 1677(5A)(D)(i). A
subsidy can also be specific as a matter of fact, also referred
to as “de facto” specific. Id. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii). A subsidy
may be de facto specific if one or more of the following fac-
tors exist:
(I) The actual recipients of the subsidy, whether
considered on an enterprise or industry basis, are
limited in number.
(II) An enterprise or industry is a predominant
user of the subsidy.
(III) An enterprise or industry receives a dispropor-
tionately large amount of the subsidy.
(IV) The manner in which the authority providing
the subsidy has exercised discretion in the decision
to grant the subsidy indicates that an enterprise or
industry is favored over others.
Id. Relevant to this appeal is the “predominant user” fac-
tor. Id. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II).
Second, a subsidy is countervailable when a foreign
government provides a specific financial contribution to a
party and that party benefits from the contribution. See 19
U.S.C. § 1677(5). One way that a party receives a benefit
is through the provision of goods or services at “less than
adequate remuneration” or “LTAR.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5)(E)(iv).
Commerce uses a benchmark price to determine if the
goods were sold at LTAR. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.511. Com-
merce follows a three-tiered hierarchy when determining
the appropriate benchmark. Id. Under tier one, Commerce
compares “the government price to a market-determined
price for the good or service resulting from actual transac-
tions in the country in question.” Id. § 351.511(a)(2)(i). If
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 4
no such transactions exist, Commerce moves to tier two
and compares “the government price to a world market
price where it is reasonable to conclude that such price
would be available to purchasers in the country in ques-
tion.” Id. § 351.511(a)(2)(ii). If no world market price is
available, Commerce moves to tier three and “assess[es]
whether the government price is consistent with market
principles.” Id. § 351.511(a)(2)(iii).
II.
Appellee The Mosaic Company (“Mosaic”) petitioned
Commerce to initiate a countervailing duty investigation
into whether the Russian government (“Russia”) was
providing countervailable subsidies to Russian producers
and exporters of phosphate fertilizers. One of the alleged
subsidies was the provision of natural gas at LTAR. On
July 30, 2020, Commerce granted the petition, noting the
period of investigation (“POI”) was from January 1, 2019 to
December 31, 2019. Commerce selected appellant Indus-
trial Group Phosphorite, LLC, (“EuroChem”) as a manda-
tory respondent. Commerce also selected PhosAgro PJSC
(“PhosAgro”), who is not a party to this appeal, as a man-
datory respondent.
As part of its investigation, Commerce issued question-
naires to Russia. First, Commerce broadly requested infor-
mation about the “regulated prices for natural gas in
Russia on a monthly basis during the POI.” J.A. 1966.
Russia responded by providing only “[r]egulated wholesale
gas prices for industrial consumers on a monthly basis in
2019.” J.A. 1972 (emphasis added).
Second, Commerce requested information about the
consumption of natural gas in Russia. Russia responded
that based on information provided by the Russian ferti-
lizer industry, the Russian fertilizer industry accounted for
4.7% of Russia’s total natural gas consumption in 2019.
J.A. 1024. Commerce then requested Russia to “[p]rovide
a detailed breakdown, by industry sector, of the volume
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 5
and value [for] consumption of natural gas in Russia dur-
ing the POI . . . .” J.A. 1785. Russia responded that it
“do[es] not maintain statistics on volume and value of nat-
ural gas consumption by industry sector,” and instead re-
lied on data from Gazprom. J.A. 1785–87. Gazprom is a
government-controlled company and the largest supplier of
natural gas in Russia. Russia provided a “Table 1,” which
displayed Gazprom’s data on volumes of gas transported
via its pipeline system during 2019. J.A. 1787. Table 1 is
displayed below, along with Russia’s explanation of the in-
formation displayed in the table. Id. The amounts con-
sumed are confidential and thus have been redacted.1
1 This version of Table 1 is from appellee Mosaic’s
public response brief and displays Mosaic’s removal of the
confidential information. See Mosaic Response Br. 10. The
groups displayed in Table 1 are not ordered in terms of
amount of natural gas received.
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 6
Table 1 displays twelve groups and the redacted
amount each group received of natural gas via Gazprom’s
pipeline system in 2019. Id. The agrochemical industry
received the largest amount of natural gas amongst the
groups which are categorized as an “industry,” i.e., the oil
industry, metallurgical industry, cement industry, and pet-
rochemical industry. Id. The groups that received more
natural gas than the agrochemical industry were electric-
ity, “[o]ther industries,” communal services, and house-
holds. Id. The remaining groups in Table 1, which each
received less than the agrochemical industry, were Gaz-
prom itself, “[a]utomotive, tractor and agricultural engi-
neering,” and “[a]gro-industrial complex.” Id.
Aside from Table 1, Russia provided Commerce with
other information concerning consumption of natural gas
throughout Russia based on Gazprom’s data. See, e.g.,
J.A. 1785–86. This included Gazprom’s annual report for
2016, which noted that, based on Russian law, “end con-
sumers buy gas at regulated prices which are differentiated
by consumer group (households vs industrial consumers).”
J.A. 1977. The report explained that “[i]n 2016, wholesale
gas prices for subsequent resale to household consumers
were . . . lower than wholesale gas prices for industrial con-
sumers.” Id.
As part of Commerce’s investigation, Mosaic, Euro-
Chem, and PhosAgro each submitted to Commerce pro-
posed benchmark data for determining whether the
provision of natural gas was done at LTAR. EuroChem and
PhosAgro jointly submitted benchmark prices for natural
gas from independent Russian natural gas producers.
J.A. 1668–1728; see also J.A. 1802–03. Mosaic submitted
data from the International Energy Agency (“IEA”) con-
cerning the Organization for Economic Cooperation & De-
velopment and the European Union countries’ natural gas
prices (the “IEA data”). J.A. 1034–1667.
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 7
On November 30, 2020, Commerce preliminarily deter-
mined that the provision of natural gas by Russia was a
countervailable subsidy. See Phosphate Fertilizers from
the Russian Federation, 85 Fed. Reg. 76,524 (Dep’t of Com-
merce Nov. 30, 2020); J.A. 1808; see also J.A. 1790. In so
deciding, Commerce found that the subsidy was de facto
specific because the agrochemical industry, which includes
the fertilizer industry, was “a predominant user” pursuant
to 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II). J.A. 1800–01. Based on
the data displayed in Table 1, Commerce noted several
points. First, it noted that “natural gas is heavily used in
the agro-chemistry sector and [Table 1] indicates that agro-
chemistry was in the top natural gas consuming groups for
2019.” J.A. 1800. Second, Commerce noted that the “agro-
chemical industrial sector accounted for the largest per-
centage of total domestic natural gas sales among
industrial groups for 2019.” Id. Third, Commerce engaged
in a comparison of natural gas usage between the agro-
chemical industry and “other industrial sectors.” Id.
Based on this comparison, Commerce concluded that the
agrochemical industry is “a predominant user.”
J.A. 1800–01. Commerce noted that non-industrial sectors
“such as households, electricity (utilities), and communal
services” comprised “a combined majority percentage of to-
tal natural gas consumption.” J.A. 1800.
Commerce also found that the provision of natural gas
by Russia was done at LTAR by relying on Mosaic’s IEA
data as a third-tier benchmark. J.A. 1801. In arriving at
this conclusion, Commerce first determined that there was
no adequate benchmark under tier one, which looks at
transaction prices in the country in question.
J.A. 1801–02. Commerce rejected EuroChem’s data based
on the prices of a privately-owned Russian natural gas pro-
ducer, Novatek, because those prices, along with the
greater market for natural gas, were distorted through
Russia’s predominant role in the market via Gazprom.
J.A. 1802.
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 8
Commerce next determined that there was no suitable
benchmark of a world market price of natural gas for a tier
two analysis. J.A. 1803. Specifically, Commerce rejected
Mosaic’s IEA data, which reflected European natural gas
export prices, as a benchmark. Id. Commerce did so be-
cause the record indicated that European natural gas is not
available for purchase in Russia, and thus, by extension
those prices would not be available to purchasers in Russia.
Id.
Commerce then turned to the tier three analysis, which
asks whether the government price is consistent with mar-
ket principles. J.A. 1804–06. Commerce determined that
Gazprom’s natural gas prices were not reflective of market
principles. J.A. 1805. Commerce found that Gazprom sells
its natural gas at regulated prices which are set to “ensure
the strategic interests, defense capability and security of
the state, protection of morality, health, rights and legiti-
mate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation.”
J.A. 1804 (citation modified). Thus, Commerce concluded,
Gazprom’s prices are set based on the “government’s social
and economic development goals rather than market prin-
ciples.” Id. Commerce then determined that Mosaic’s IEA
data was an appropriate proxy for a tier three benchmark.
J.A. 1805–06. Using that data, Commerce determined that
the provision of natural gas was done at LTAR. J.A. 1806.
On February 8, 2021, Commerce made its final deter-
mination, once again concluding that the provision of nat-
ural gas by Russia was a countervailable subsidy.
J.A. 1851–67. Commerce determined that the subsidy was
de facto specific and that Mosaic’s IEA data was an appro-
priate tier three benchmark. See id.
EuroChem appealed to the U.S. Court of International
Trade (“Trade Court”), which sustained Commerce’s de
facto specificity and LTAR determinations. J.A. 15. The
Trade Court remanded the case back to Commerce on is-
sues not relevant to this appeal. J.A. 28–34. After multiple
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 9
redeterminations by Commerce and subsequent remands
by the Trade Court, Commerce issued its final results on
October 11, 2023. J.A. 2011–41. On January 19, 2024, the
Trade Court sustained Commerce’s final results, entering
judgment in favor of Commerce. J.A. 73–74.
EuroChem appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review decisions of the Trade Court de novo and ap-
ply the same standard that the Trade Court applies in its
review of Commerce’s final countervailing duty determina-
tions. Sunpreme Inc. v. United States, 946 F.3d 1300, 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2020). Under that standard, we uphold Com-
merce’s determinations unless they are “unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law.” Id. (quotations omitted). We review
questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Loper Bright
Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 391–92 (2024). How-
ever, “when an agency exercises discretion granted by a
statute, judicial review is typically conducted under the
Administrative Procedure Act’s deferential arbitrary-and-
capricious standard.” Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v.
Eagle Cnty., CO, 605 U.S. 168, 179–80 (2025). “Under that
standard, a court asks not whether it agrees with the
agency decision, but rather only whether the agency action
was reasonable and reasonably explained.” Id. at 180.
D ISCUSSION
Appellant challenges Commerce’s de facto specificity
and LTAR determinations. We address each in turn.
I.
Appellant’s de facto specificity challenge turns on the
interpretation of “predominant user” at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II). See Appellant Br. 8–13; Reply Br. 2.
According to appellant, when determining whether the
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 10
industry at issue is a “predominant user” of the subsidy,
the statute requires Commerce to conduct a comparison of
the industry at issue against all users of the subsidy. Ap-
pellant Br. 10. Appellant argues that Commerce’s compar-
ison of the agrochemical industry against industrial users,
rather than all natural gas consumers within Russia, was
thus contrary to law. Id. at 13. For the following reasons,
we determine that under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II),
Commerce has reasonable flexibility in selecting the com-
parator group for its predominant usage determination.
No party disputes that if Commerce has such flexibility,
then the agrochemical industry is “a predominant user” of
the natural gas subsidy.2
We begin with the plain language of the statute. Johns-
Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed.
Cir. 1988). The statute provides that, “[w]here there are
reasons to believe that a subsidy may be specific as a mat-
ter of fact, the subsidy is specific if . . . [a]n enterprise or
industry is a predominant user of the subsidy.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II). This provision does not define “pre-
dominant user,” nor does any other provision within the
statutory framework. Contrary to appellant’s position, this
language cannot be interpreted as requiring Commerce to
compare subsidy usage of an industry against all users of
the subsidy. It does not prescribe any method that Com-
merce must employ when assessing whether an “enterprise
or industry” is “a predominant user.” Id. The plain text
merely requires that “[a]n enterprise or industry is a pre-
dominant user of the subsidy.” Id. Thus, we reject
2 Indeed, appellant concedes that if the statute could
be read to allow Commerce to compare predominant usage
against “a group of enterprises or industries,” i.e., a subset
of users, then “Commerce’s de facto specificity finding
would be correct.” Reply Br. 4 (emphasis in original).
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 11
appellant’s overly narrow reading that Commerce must de-
termine predominant usage based on a comparison of the
subject industry’s usage of the subsidy against all users of
the subsidy.
Given that the plain language of the statute does not
clarify what is a “predominant user of the subsidy,” we turn
to the legislative purpose of this provision. See Johns-Man-
ville, 855 F.2d at 1560. Here, based on the Statement of
Administrative Action (“SAA”) to the Urugay Round Agree-
ments Act, Congress clearly intended Commerce to have
flexibility in determining predominant usage.3 The SAA
notes that the “specificity test,” including de jure and de
facto specificity, “was intended to function as a rule of rea-
son” and as “an initial screening mechanism” to winnow
out “subsidies which truly are broadly available and widely
used throughout an economy,” such as “public highways
and bridges.” SAA, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 929 (1994)
(emphasis added), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040.
This is because “all governments . . . intervene in their
economies to one extent or another, and to regard all such
interventions as countervailable subsidies would produce
absurd results,” namely, “that almost every import enter-
ing the stream of American commerce [would] be counter-
vailed.” Id. at 929–30. Concerning de facto specificity,
“Commerce [is to] seek and consider information relevant
to all . . . [four] factors,” including the predominant usage
factor at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II). Id. at 931. As
such, based on the SAA, we hold that under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II), Commerce has reasonable flexibility
3 The SAA “shall be regarded as an authoritative ex-
pression by the United States concerning the interpreta-
tion and application of the Uruguay Round Agreement and
this Act in any judicial proceeding in which a question
arises concerning such interpretation or application.”
19 U.S.C. § 3512(d).
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 12
in assessing predominant usage. Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at
395 (noting that statutes may “empower an agency . . . to
regulate subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase
that leaves agencies with flexibility” (citation modified));
id. (explaining that a reviewing court ensures that the
agency has engaged in “reasoned decisionmaking” within
the boundaries of authority Congress delegated to the
agency).
Confirming our understanding of the statute is this
court’s clear and consistent position that Commerce has
reasonable flexibility in carrying out the de facto specificity
inquiry. For example, in AK Steel Corp. v. United States,
this court explained that “[d]eterminations of . . . dominant
use are not subject to rigid rules, but rather must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis taking into account all the
facts and circumstances of a particular case.” 192 F.3d
1367, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Gov’t of Quebec v.
United States, 105 F.4th 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2024); Royal
Thai Gov’t v. United States, 436 F.3d 1330, 1335–36 (Fed.
Cir. 2006). In AK Steel, the court relied on Commerce’s
1998 notice of proposed rulemaking concerning the de facto
specificity test, the rule which was eventually codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii). As the court noted, Commerce
stated that “the specificity test cannot be reduced to a pre-
cise mathematical formula” and “[i]nstead, the Depart-
ment must exercise judgment and balance various factors
in analyzing the facts of a particular case.” AK Steel, 192
F.3d at 1385 (citing Proposed Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg.
23,366, 23,368 (Int’l Trade Admin. May 31, 1998)). Thus,
under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II), Commerce has rea-
sonable flexibility when determining predominant usage.
Appellant argues that such a reading would violate the
very purpose of the de facto specificity test, which is to
avoid imposition of countervailing duties on subsidies
widely available and used in the subject country’s economy.
Reply Br. 5. Specifically, appellant argues that consumers
of natural gas in Russia included “every aspect of the
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 13
economy,” such as power generation, households, and in-
dustrial users. Appellant Br. 11–12. Appellant thus ar-
gues that Commerce’s decision to limit the comparator
group to only industrial users led to the very result that the
de facto specificity test was meant to prevent, i.e., imposi-
tion of a countervailing duty on a subsidy widely available
and widely used in the subject economy. Appellant Br. 11.
We reject appellant’s position. Commerce has flexibil-
ity under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II) to determine the
comparator group. But that flexibility is not unbounded,
nor does it provide Commerce with a loophole for rendering
all subsidies de facto specific. Rather, Commerce must en-
gage in reasoned decision making. Seven Cnty., 605 U.S.
at 179–80; Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 395; Royal Thai, 436
F.3d at 1336.
Here, Commerce’s decision to limit the comparator
group to industrial groups was sufficiently reasonable. The
record shows that, while natural gas was consumed econ-
omy-wide, the regulated price of natural gas differed be-
tween industrial and non-industrial users. First, when
Commerce broadly requested regulated natural gas prices,
Russia only provided regulated gas prices based on “indus-
trial consumers.” J.A. 1972. This indicates that Russia
understood there to be a difference between industrial and
non-industrial users of natural gas. See id. Second, Gaz-
prom noted in its 2016 annual report that “end consumers
buy gas at regulated prices . . . differentiated by consumer
group (households vs industrial consumers).” J.A. 1977.
Thus, given the difference in Russia’s treatment of pricing
of natural gas between industrial and non-industrial users,
it was within Commerce’s reasonable discretion to limit its
predominant usage analysis to only industrial users.
In sum, we hold that 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II)
does not mandate Commerce to compare the enterprise or
industry at issue with all users of the subsidy but rather is
authorized to exercise reasonable flexibility in determining
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 14
the comparator group under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5A)(D)(iii)(II). We further determine that Com-
merce’s predominant usage analysis was reasonable.
II.
Appellant next argues that Commerce’s determination
that Russia’s provision of natural gas was at LTAR was
flawed in two respects. Appellant Br. 7. We address each
in turn.
First, appellant argues that Commerce’s LTAR analy-
sis was flawed because Commerce should have first deter-
mined whether Gazprom’s natural gas prices were set in
accordance with market principles before relying on appel-
lee’s IEA data as a proxy tier three benchmark. Appellant
Br. 7, 14. Appellant’s argument fails. Commerce evaluated
whether Gazprom’s natural gas prices were based on mar-
ket principles but concluded they were not due to govern-
ment-created market distortions. J.A. 1804–05;
J.A. 1863–64.
Appellant argues that Commerce may only consider
“[g]overnment-created [market] distortion” when analyz-
ing whether there is an appropriate tier one benchmark
under 19 C.F.R. § 351.511(a)(2)(i). Appellant Br. 16. Not
so. Consideration of government-created market distortion
is not limited to a tier one analysis. 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.511(a)(2)(i)–(iii). Additionally, the tier three provi-
sion does not prohibit consideration of government-created
market distortions but rather broadly notes that Com-
merce “will normally . . . assess[] whether the government
price is consistent with market principles.” Id.
§ 351.511(a)(2)(iii). The provision further provides that
Commerce “may assess such factors as costs . . ., the gov-
ernment’s price setting methodology, possible price dis-
crimination, or a government price derived from actual
sales from competitively run government auctions . . . .”
Id. (emphasis added). That Commerce may assess certain
factors does not limit its analysis to only those factors.
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 15
Thus, we reject appellant’s position, which finds no support
in the regulation.
Second, appellant argues that Commerce’s LTAR de-
termination is legally erroneous because Commerce failed
to take steps allegedly required under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5)(E)(iv). Appellant Br. 17–20. Specifically, appel-
lant argues that the statute requires Commerce to adjust
appellee Mosaic’s IEA data to account for Russia’s natural
abundance of natural gas, and if no adjustment was neces-
sary, explain why so. Id. at 17–18. We disagree.
The statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(iv), plainly does not
require these two steps. The statute provides that when
determining whether the subject good or service was pro-
vided for LTAR, “the adequacy of remuneration shall be de-
termined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the
good or service being provided or the goods being purchased
in the country which is subject to the investigation or re-
view.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(iv). The statute then notes
that “[p]revailing market conditions include price, quality,
availability, marketability, transportation, and other con-
ditions of purchase or sale.” Id. Thus, Commerce’s legal
requirement is to broadly consider the adequacy of re-
numeration “in relation to prevailing market conditions for
the good or service” at issue in subject country. Id. We
reject appellant’s attempt to read in specific requirements
that find no support in the statute.4
4 Additionally, any challenge to the reasonableness
of Commerce’s use of appellee Mosaic’s IEA data, without
any allegedly necessary adjustments, as a tier three bench-
mark is forfeited on appeal as insufficiently developed.
Arunachalam v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 989 F.3d 988,
999 (Fed. Cir. 2021). “[M]erely stating disagreement with
the trial court does not amount to a developed argument.”
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MOSAIC COMPANY v. US 16
In sum, we determine that Commerce’s LTAR determi-
nation is in accordance with the tier three framework at 19
C.F.R. § 351.511(a)(2)(iii) and with 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5)(E)(iv).
CONCLUSION
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons discussed, we
affirm the Trade Court’s decision sustaining Commerce’s
countervailable duty determination.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
Costs against EuroChem.
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2006). As appellee United States notes, appellant fails to
argue on appeal a specific adjustment and fails to identify
useable data that it or any other respondent to Commerce’s
investigation placed on the record that would have allowed
Commerce to adjust the IEA data. United States Response
Br. 30. Thus, although appellant disagrees with Com-
merce’s decision to use the IEA data without any adjust-
ments, this mere disagreement is not a developed
argument challenging the reasonableness of Commerce’s
action and, thus, is deemed forfeited.
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