Leading Technology Composites, Inc. v. Mv2, LLC

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
MV2, LLC,
Defendant-Cross-Appellant
______________________
2024-2056, 2024-2102
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland in No. 1:19-cv-01256-CCB, Judge
Catherine C. Blake.
______________________
Decided: February 10, 2026
______________________
JESSE J. CAMACHO, Practus, LLP, Kansas City, MO, ar-
gued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by JEAN
LEWIS, JUSTIN AKIHIKO REDD, Kramon & Graham, PA, Bal-
timore, MD.
JAMES GOLLADAY, II, Tanner IP PLLC, Norfolk, VA, ar-
gued for defendant-cross-appellant. Also represented by
DANIEL A. TANNER, III; MATTHEW SIDNEY FREEDUS, ROSIE
DAWN GRIFFIN, Powers Pyles Sutter & Verville PC, Wash-
ington, DC.
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 1 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 1 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 2
______________________
Before PROST, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
STARK, Circuit Judge.
Leading Technology Composites, Inc. (“LTC”), owner of
U.S. Patent Number 8,551,598 (the “’598 patent”), sued
MV2, LLC (“MV2”) for patent infringement in 2019. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of MV2,
finding that its accused products were non-infringing. LTC
appeals. We affirm.1
I
LTC and MV2 are competitor-manufacturers of anti-
ballistic armored panels having commercial and military
uses. LTC’s ’598 patent, entitled “Armoring Panel for Re-
sisting Edge Impact Penetrations by Ballistic Projectiles,”
generally relates to “armoring sheets and panels which are
adapted for resisting penetrations by ballistic projectiles,
such as rifle filed bullets.” ’586 pat. at 1:7-9. LTC alleges
1 MV2 contingently cross-appeals portions of the fi-
nal judgment entered against it, including that assignor es-
toppel prevents MV2 from asserting its counterclaim that
the ’598 patent is invalid and the dismissal of MV2’s claim
that LTC improperly broadened the scope of its claims in
violation of 35 U.S.C. § 305. MV2 asks us to address its
counterclaim only if we “reverse[] the district court’s sum-
mary judgment decision in favor of MV2.” MV2 Resp. and
Cross-Open. Br. at 51. While “it is ordinarily necessary for
the district court, and this court on appeal, to address the
[invalidity] counterclaim even if noninfringement has been
found,” Solomon Techs., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm.,
524 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008), it is not necessary to
do so where, as here, the party formerly pressing the coun-
terclaim has effectively dropped its claim. We therefore
dismiss MV2’s cross-appeal as moot.
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 2 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 2 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 3
that MV2 infringes claim 7 of the ’598 patent, which re-
cites:
An armoring panel for resisting edge impact pene-
trations by ballistic projectiles, the armoring panel
comprising:
(a) a strata comprising an outer stratum,
an inner stratum, and a plurality of inter-
mediate stratums, each stratum among the
plurality of intermediate stratums com-
prising ballistic fibers, having a lateral
end, and having an oppositely lateral ex-
tension;
(b) at least a first durable sheet comprising
outer and inner oppositely lateral exten-
sions, the outer and inner oppositely lateral
extensions having lateral ends, the at least
first durable sheet further comprising a de-
lamination resisting tie section having
outer and inner ends and having an oppo-
sitely lateral surface, the delamination re-
sisting tie section’s outer and inner ends
being respectively formed wholly with the
outer and inner oppositely lateral exten-
sion’s lateral ends, and the delamination
resisting tie section spanning between the
outer and inner oppositely lateral exten-
sions’ lateral ends so that the delamination
resisting tie section’s oppositely lateral sur-
face directly laterally overlies the interme-
diate stratums’ lateral ends, the outer
stratum comprising the at least first dura-
ble sheet’s outer oppositely lateral exten-
sion, and the inner stratum comprising the
at least first durable sheet’s inner oppo-
sitely lateral extension;
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 3 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 3 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 4
(c) a bonding matrix interconnecting the
strata’s stratums;
wherein each of the strata’s stratums com-
prises a ballistic fiber material selected
from the group consisting of polyaramid fi-
bers, extended chain polyethylene fibers,
ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene
fibers, nylon fibers, graphite fibers, semi-
crystalline polystyrene fibers, alumino-
boro-silicate glass fibers, and magnesia-
alumina-silicate fibers;
wherein the bonding matrix comprises an
adhesive or bonding resin material selected
from the group consisting of phenolic resin,
polyester resin, rubber compound resins,
silicone resin, thermoplastic resins, poly-
epoxide, malamine, polyamides, polyvinyl
butol, and polyolefins;
wherein the strata further comprises a plu-
rality of second durable sheets, each sheet
among the plurality of second durable
sheets comprising an outer oppositely lat-
eral extension, an inner oppositely lateral
extension, and a delamination resisting tie
section spanning between lateral ends of
said each sheet’s outer and inner oppositely
lateral extensions, each sheet among the
plurality of second durable sheets overly-
ing the at least first durable sheet;
wherein each oppositely lateral extension
has a length, the lengths of the durable
sheets’ outer and inner oppositely lateral
extensions being less than the lengths of
the intermediate stratums’ oppositely lat-
eral extensions;
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 4 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 4 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 5
wherein the lengths of the durable sheets’
outer and inner oppositely lateral exten-
sions are at least one inch; and
further comprising outer and inner materi-
als saving voids, said voids respectively ex-
tending oppositely laterally from lateral
ends of the durable sheets’ outer and inner
oppositely lateral extensions.
Appx92 (Reexamination Certificate).
During claim construction, the district court construed
the preamble – “[a]n armoring panel for resisting edge im-
pact penetrations by ballistic projectiles” – as a limitation,
observing that both parties agreed it was limiting. The
court further explained that “[a]s no party request[ed] the
preamble to be construed, the court will not construe the
preamble.” J.A. 1106. Shortly thereafter, the district court
stayed the instant litigation while the Patent and Trade-
mark Office undertook an ex parte reexamination of the
’598 patent. The reexamination concluded with the cancel-
lation of claims 1-6 and issuance of an amended claim 7,
which is the claim asserted here.
After the litigation resumed, the parties filed cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment, which revealed a dispute as
to the scope and meaning of the preamble. LTC argued
that only the initial clause of the preamble, “[a]n armoring
panel,” was limiting, while the remainder (“for resisting
edge impact penetrations by ballistic projectiles”) was not.
J.A. 56. LTC further contended that if the district court
construed the entire preamble as a limitation, the “resist-
ing edge impact” portion should be given its plain and or-
dinary meaning, which, according to them, would mean the
limitation is satisfied if the “panels provide at least some
resistance.” J.A. 1953-54; see also J.A. 2585. For its part,
MV2 proposed that the entire preamble is limiting and that
the “for resisting” clause means “preventing complete pen-
etrations at the edge.” J.A. 2243-44 (internal emphasis
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 5 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 5 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 6
omitted). MV2 further argued that the amount of re-
sistance provided at the edge must be proven by ballistic
testing, and in no other manner.
The district court agreed that further construction was
necessary but otherwise rejected both parties’ positions.
Agreeing with MV2, it held that the entire preamble, and
not just the “armoring panel” portion, was limiting. It then
construed the “for resisting” clause as requiring that the
“edge protection should function to resist edge impact pen-
etrations at a level similar to the main body of the panel’s
resistance to penetrations of non-edge impacts.” J.A. 68.
Applying its construction, the district court concluded that
LTC had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to infringement. Hence, the court granted MV2 summary
judgment of non-infringement.
This appeal followed. The district court had jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338. We have jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
II
We review a district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment under the law of the regional circuit, here the Fourth
Circuit. See Treehouse Avatar LLC v. Valve Corp.,
54 F.4th 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 2022). The Fourth Circuit “re-
view[s] a district court’s decision to grant summary judg-
ment de novo, applying the same legal standards as the
district court, and viewing all facts and reasonable infer-
ences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ing party.” Harris v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 784 F.3d 954, 962
(4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To prove infringement, a patent owner must show, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that each limitation of a
patent claim, as construed by the court, is present in an
accused product. See Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Hel-
ena Lab’ys Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Claim
construction is an issue of law we review de novo. See Trs.
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 6 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 6 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 7
of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2016). Subsidiary fact findings made by a dis-
trict court in relation to its claim construction, and based
on extrinsic evidence, are reviewed for clear error. See id.
III
LTC argues that the district court erred in finding the
entirety of the preamble, including its “for resisting”
clause, is limiting. It adds, however, that even if we con-
clude the entire preamble is a limitation, the district
court’s construction is too narrow. Finally, LTC contends
that even under the district court’s construction, its evi-
dence is sufficient to support a finding of infringement and,
consequently, summary judgment is unwarranted. We ad-
dress each issue in turn.2
A
We agree with the district court that the entire pream-
ble, “[a]n armoring panel for resisting edge impact penetra-
tions by ballistic projectiles,” is limiting.
“Whether to treat a preamble as a limitation is a deter-
mination resolved only on review of the entire[] . . . patent
to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually
2 The parties devote a great deal of their briefing to
arguing about whether LTC engaged in “gamesmanship”
by changing its claim construction position after the reex-
amination and after the district court held MV2 could not
challenge the validity of the ’598 patent due to assignor es-
toppel. We need not assess whether LTC should have been
estopped from arguing at summary judgment that the pre-
amble was not in its entirety limiting. Reviewing the mat-
ter de novo, we conclude that the district court’s
construction is correct, making any purported error the dis-
trict court may have committed in considering LTC’s prior
statements regarding the preamble harmless.
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 7 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 7 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 8
invented and intended to encompass by the claim.” Cata-
lina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d
801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted; alterations in original). A preamble is limiting “if it
recites essential structure or steps, or if it is necessary to
give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Where, however, the body of a
patent claim defines a structurally complete invention and
uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use
for the invention, the preamble does not limit the claim.
See id.
Like the district court, we conclude that the entire pre-
amble, including the “for resisting edge impact penetra-
tions” clause, gives meaning to claim 7. The specification
explains that “[l]aminate composite[] armoring panels
which consist of layers or stratums of ballistic fibers are
known” in the prior art, but a “drawback or deficiency in
the performance of such laminate composite armoring pan-
els” is their vulnerability when struck at or near the edge
by a projectile such as a bullet. ’598 pat. at 1:15-16, 23-33.
This is because of “delaminations which occur at a panel
edge . . . disadvantageously lessen the ability of the panel
to suppress projectile penetrations.” Id. at 2:29-31. The
specification emphasizes that the main purpose of the in-
vention is to solve this problem. See id. at 2:32-34 (“The
functional delamination resisting tie of the instant inven-
tion advantageously resists such projectile’s delaminating
force.”). Hence, “the instant invention enhances or pre-
serves the ability of an armoring panel to suppress projec-
tile penetrations from bullets which impact at or near the
panel’s edge.” Id. at 2:34-37.
The specification makes repeated reference to this fea-
ture. See, e.g., id. at 3:15-18 (“[O]bjects of the instant in-
vention include the provision of an armoring panel for
resisting edge impact penetrations by ballistic projectiles
which incorporates structures as described above.”). The
edge resistance concept is contained in the invention’s title,
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 8 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 8 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 9
background, and summary. See id. at 1:1-3, 34-35, 53-55.
Treating the “for resisting” clause as limiting is needed to
ensure that the claim scope is commensurate with “what
the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass
by the claim.” Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, we agree with the district court that the en-
tire preamble is a claim limitation.
B
We further agree with the district court’s construction
of the preamble. The district court construed the “for re-
sisting” clause as requiring that the “edge protection
should function to resist edge impact penetrations at a
level similar to the main body of the panel’s resistance to
penetrations of non-edge impacts.” J.A. 68. This construc-
tion is supported by the specification, which states that
“the delamination resisting tie sections . . . of the outer and
inner durable sheets allow the armoring panel 1 to resist
penetrations by bullets which strike at or near the panel’s
lateral edge equally with the panel’s suppression of more
medially striking bullets.” ’598 pat. at 4:65-5:2 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 5:14-16 (“[T]he panel’s edge strike
bullet suppression capability may be equalized with the
panel’s mid-panel strike suppression capability.”) (empha-
sis added).
Additionally, the invention is described as preventing
delamination, which is the reason “bullets striking the
panel at or near its lateral edge pose a greater penetration
threat than those which may impinge at medial areas of
the panel.” Id. at 4:52-55. By addressing this problem, “the
instant invention . . . preserves the ability of an armoring
panel to suppress projectile penetrations from bullets
which impact at or near the panel’s edge.” Id. at 2:34-37.
LTC argues that nothing in the plain meaning of resist-
ing requires the ability to resist edge impact penetrations
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 9 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 9 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 10
at a level similar to the main body. Rather, in LTC’s view,
that the panels must be “for resisting” at the edge merely
requires that they do “not permit bullets to pass unim-
peded at the edges.” LTC’s Reply Br. at 1. Not only is
LTC’s proposed construction in significant conflict with the
specification; if adopted, it would render the “for resisting”
portion of the preamble essentially a nullity. See generally
J.A. 1954 (MV2’s expert, Dr. Maher, testifying: “Virtually
all materials resist penetration to some extent . . . [and] all
materials provide some resistance to a ballistic event.”) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). This would run afoul of
our general principle that “claims are interpreted with an
eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim.” Bicon,
Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Thus, again, we agree with the district court’s construc-
tion.
C
LTC argues that because the district court entered its
construction at the same time it ruled on the summary
judgment motions, and the court adopted and applied a
construction neither party had proposed, LTC was de-
prived of the opportunity to which it was entitled to show
a genuine dispute of material fact existed even under that
unanticipated construction. LTC’s argument relies heavily
on Moore v. Equitrans, L.P., 27 F.4th 211, 224 (4th Cir.
2022), which requires a party opposing a motion for sum-
mary judgment to be put “on notice that she had to come
forward with all of her evidence.” Moore addressed a sub-
stantially distinct situation. There the district court was
held to have erred because it acted sua sponte to enter sum-
mary judgment even though no party had moved for such
judgment and, therefore, no party had notice or an oppor-
tunity to present evidence to show a genuine dispute of ma-
terial fact. See id. at 225. Here, by contrast, MV2 moved
for summary judgment, putting LTC on notice that its in-
fringement case could end; and LTC had a full opportunity,
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 10 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 10 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 11
and every reason, to put forward evidence in response. Ad-
ditionally, MV2 had included in its motion papers a request
that the court construe the disputed term, putting LTC on
notice that the court might again evaluate whether the pre-
amble was limiting – and, if so, might further specify its
meaning.
LTC nonetheless argues that it was not on notice that
the district court may adopt a claim construction different
from the positions advanced in the parties’ respective brief-
ing. But LTC concedes, as it must, that the court may craft
its own construction that neither party proposed, given the
court’s obligation to construe the claims correctly. See
Exxon Chem. Pats., Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553,
1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding error where court “treated
the issue of claim interpretation as a matter of deciding
which of the two parties offered the correct meaning of the
claims,” even where neither party’s construction was cor-
rect, rather than independently determining meaning of
claims); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We have also repeatedly explained
that district courts may engage in “rolling” construction,
including during summary judgment. See Pressure Prods.
Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Greatbatch Ltd., 599 F.3d 1308,
1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding it procedurally proper for
the district court to supplement the definition of a claim
term during trial); see also Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
830 F.3d 1374, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he district court
used its case-management discretion to decline to find Wi-
LAN’s new construction barred and instead to make a mer-
its determination . . . [on the] motion for reconsideration.”).
Under these circumstances, there was nothing improper,
unforeseeable, or even unusual in the district court’s adop-
tion of the correct construction of the disputed term and
application of it to the evidence the parties put before it at
summary judgment.
Knowing these realities, and confronting MV2’s motion
for summary judgment of non-infringement, LTC had
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 11 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 11 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 12
notice, opportunity, and every incentive to marshal for the
district court whatever evidence it had that could have
demonstrated LTC could prove infringement under its own
construction and, alternatively, under MV2’s proposed con-
struction. It failed to do so.3 Rather, as the district court
rightly pointed out, “LTC stake[d] nearly everything on its
argument that the ‘resisting’ phrase of the preamble is not
a limitation and that, if it is, it should be interpreted
broadly.” J.A. 71. Having lost on that issue, LTC now as-
serts that two pieces of evidence create a genuine issue of
material fact relating to infringement.
The first piece of evidence is a 2017 email from Keith
Harrison, a partial owner of MV2, in which he states that
MV2’s panels have a “fiberglass U-channel” that “helps add
ballistic protection further out towards the edge of the ar-
mor panel” and further observes that “LTC has a patent on
this feature.” J.A. 2074; see also J.A. 2003 (Mr. Harrison
confirming in deposition he was being truthful in his
email). However, without discussing the degree of re-
sistance at the MV2 panel’s edge in comparison to the re-
sistance in the main portions of that panel, Mr. Harrison’s
email is not sufficient to support a judgment of infringe-
ment and, thus, is inadequate to defeat MV2’s motion for
summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
3 We note that the construction the court adopted,
and applied at summary judgment, makes it easier to prove
infringement than does MV2’s proposed construction, in
that the court’s construction does not require proof of “com-
plete” resistance to penetration at the edges and does not
mandate ballistic testing evidence. We do not confront,
however, the question of whether a nonmoving party faced
with an unexpected claim construction that makes it more
difficult to meet its burden than even its opponents’ pro-
posed construction entitles that party to a new opportunity
to be heard.
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 12 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 12 of 13 --

LEADING TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITES, INC. v. MV2, LLC 13
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“The mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position
will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the
jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party.]”).
LTC’s second piece of evidence is testimony from its ex-
pert, Dr. Cardi, regarding testing completed on LTC’s pan-
els. However, as the district court pointed out, in opposing
summary judgment LTC never cited Dr. Cardi’s report “to
support its argument that MV2’s panels embody the ‘resist-
ing’ limitation.” J.A. 74. LTC forfeited its opportunity to
rely on this evidence. See Hyatt v. Stewart, 148 F.4th 1376,
1383 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“[Appellant]’s argument is forfeited
because he failed to make it before the district court.”) In
any event, the district court sua sponte considered Dr.
Cardi’s uncited expert report, and concluded even this evi-
dence did not create a genuine dispute of material fact.
See, e.g., J.A. 74 (“Dr. Cardi does not describe the extent to
which MV2’s panels would resist edge impact penetra-
tions.”).
Therefore, LTC failed to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact, making summary judg-
ment of non-infringement appropriate.
IV
We have considered LTC’s remaining arguments and
find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, for the reasons ex-
plained above, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED AS TO THE MAIN APPEAL,
DISMISSED AS TO THE CROSS-APPEAL
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 24-2056 Document: 58 Page: 13 Filed: 02/10/2026

-- 13 of 13 --