Lynda De San Juan Resumadero v. Office of Personnel Management

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
LYNDA DE SAN JUAN RESUMADERO,
Petitioner
v.
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
Respondent
______________________
2025-1361
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. SF-0831-22-0093-I-1.
______________________
Decided: January 12, 2026
______________________
L YNDA D E SAN J UAN RESUMADERO, San Narciso, Zam-
bales, Philippines, pro se.
BRENDAN D AVID J ORDAN, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by
L ISA L EFANTE D ONAHUE, P ATRICIA M. MC CARTHY , BRETT
SHUMATE.
______________________
Before P ROST , CHEN, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Case: 25-1361 Document: 21 Page: 1 Filed: 01/12/2026

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RESUMADERO v. OPM 2
P ER CURIAM .
Lynda de San Juan Resumadero appeals a decision by
the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) affirming the
Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM’s) finding that she
is not entitled to a Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS)
survivor annuity. See Resumadero v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt.,
No. SF-0831-22-0093-I-1, 2024 WL 2050076, at *1
(M.S.P.B. May 7, 2024) (Final Order). For the following
reasons, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Resumadero applied for survivor annuity benefits
under CSRS based on her late husband’s federal service in
civilian positions with the U.S. Navy in the Philippines
from approximately 1946–48 and 1960–82. The full Board
concluded that Ms. Resumadero’s late husband, Pedro Re-
sumadero, did not qualify for a CSRS annuity because he
did not hold a Federal government position covered by
CSRS during his final two years of service, and conse-
quently, that Ms. Resumadero was not entitled to a CSRS
survivor annuity. Final Order, 2024 WL 2050076, at *4–5.
The Board issued its Final Order on May 7, 2024. Id.
at *1. The clerk of court received Ms. Resumadero’s peti-
tion for review on January 8, 2025. See ECF No. 1 at 5.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
D ISCUSSION
On appeal, the government contends that Ms. Re-
sumadero’s petition for judicial review is untimely because
it was received more than 60 days after the Board issued
its final decision. Informal Response Br. at 17–20. Ms. Re-
sumadero does not respond to this argument. See generally
Informal Reply Br. (addressing only the merits, not the pe-
tition’s timeliness).
We agree with the government that the petition is un-
timely. This Court has jurisdiction to review “an appeal
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RESUMADERO v. OPM 3
from a final order or final decision of the Merit Systems
Protection Board, pursuant to sections 7703(b)(1) and
7703(d) of title 5.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). Under
§ 7703(b)(1), “any petition for review shall be filed within
60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or
decision of the Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (emphasis
added). A petition for review is considered filed on the date
it is received by the clerk of court. Pinat v. Off. of Pers.
Mgmt., 931 F.2d 1544, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Fed.
R. App. P. 25(a)(2)(A)(i).
Ms. Resumadero’s petition was received on January 8,
2025—over eight months after the Board issued its Final
Order on May 7, 2024—well past the 60-day deadline. Ac-
cordingly, the petition is untimely.
While the Supreme Court has explained that
“§ 7703(b)(1)’s deadline is non-jurisdictional,” and that
“nonjurisdictional [timing rules] are presumptively subject
to equitable tolling,” Harrow v. Dep’t of Def., 601 U.S. 480,
489 (2024) (alteration in original), Ms. Resumadero has not
addressed the untimeliness of her petition, let alone
demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances stood in
her way. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)
(litigant seeking equitable tolling generally “bears the bur-
den of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pur-
suing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way”). Thus, even assuming eq-
uitable tolling were available in § 7703(b)(1) cases,1
1 The government argues that § 7703(b)(1) is not
subject to equitable tolling even if the time limit is not con-
sidered jurisdictional. See Informal Response Br. 17–19
(citing Oja v. Dep’t of the Army, 405 F.3d 1349, 1357–60
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). Because the outcome of this case does not
turn on the availability of equitable tolling in § 7703(b)(1)
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RESUMADERO v. OPM 4
Ms. Resumadero has not shown that equitable tolling ap-
plies here.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Ms. Re-
sumadero’s appeal as untimely and do not reach the mer-
its.
DISMISSED
COSTS
No costs.
cases generally, we express no opinion on that question
here.
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