Washington Windsor v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
WASHINGTON WINDSOR,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2025-1491
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 24-6701, Judge Grant Jaquith.
______________________
Decided: January 9, 2026
______________________
WASHINGTON YKJ W INDSOR, Suwanee, GA, pro se.
MATTHEW L EWIS , Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
WILLIAM J AMES G RIMALDI, P ATRICIA M. MC CARTHY , BRETT
SHUMATE.
______________________
Before P ROST , WALLACH , and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Case: 25-1491 Document: 22 Page: 1 Filed: 01/09/2026

-- 1 of 8 --

WINDSOR v. COLLINS 2
P ER CURIAM .
Pro se appellant Washington Windsor appeals from an
order of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veter-
ans Court”) denying his petition for a writ of mandamus.
We affirm.
I
Mr. Windsor served on active duty in the United States
Army from March 2015 until July 2015. S. App’x 10.1 In
August 2022, Mr. Windsor applied for vocational rehabili-
tation services (“VR&E”) under chapter 31, title 38 of the
United States Code. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 3100-3122.
In response to Mr. Windsor’s application, the Department
of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) scheduled an initial orientation
meeting for November 8, 2022. Mr. Windsor did not attend
the meeting, so the VA sent Mr. Windsor a letter attempt-
ing to reschedule and warning that if he did not contact the
assigned case manager within 10 days, the agency would
assume that he no longer wanted VR&E services. Mr.
Windsor did not contact the VA in the 10-day window.
Thus, on November 29, 2022, the VA sent him another let-
ter explaining that his VR&E claim was denied. The VA
expressly stated that Mr. Windsor could reapply for VR&E
services in the future.
Mr. Windsor timely appealed the denial to the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) in December 2022. On Sep-
tember 17, 2024, while his appeal before the Board was still
pending, Mr. Windsor filed a petition in the Veterans Court
seeking a writ of mandamus based on allegedly unlawful
delay by the VA in the resolution of his VR&E claims. On
1 S. App’x refers to the supplemental appendix filed
with the government’s informal response brief. See ECF
No. 11. We have also considered Mr. Windsor’s recently-
filed Memorandum In Lieu of Oral Argument. ECF No. 20.
Case: 25-1491 Document: 22 Page: 2 Filed: 01/09/2026

-- 2 of 8 --

WINDSOR v. COLLINS 3
October 30, 2024, before the Veterans Court resolved the
mandamus petition, the Board remanded Mr. Windsor’s
claim to the pertinent VA regional office “for correction of
a pre-decisional error,” as doing so was necessary to ensure
that the agency obtained all relevant records and could in-
clude them in the case file. S. App’x 9-12. On December
19, 2024, the Secretary filed his response to the mandamus
petition, arguing that the delay in adjudication of the
VR&E claim was not unreasonable and explaining that the
Board had already remanded the claim for further develop-
ment. On December 31, 2024, Mr. Windsor filed a reply
brief in support of his petition.
On January 31, 2025, the Veterans Court denied the
mandamus petition. The court first noted its authority to
issue writs of mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction under the
All Writs Act, including writs to “compel action of the Sec-
retary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”
S. App’x 1-2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); see also 38 U.S.C.
§ 7261(a)(2)); Cox v. West, 149 F.3d 1360, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (noting power to issue writ of mandamus in aid of
jurisdiction pursuant to All Writs Act extends to Veterans
Court). The court, however, ultimately concluded that Mr.
Windsor had not demonstrated entitlement to the extraor-
dinary remedy of mandamus under Martin v. O’Rourke,
891 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and Telecommunica-
tions Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79-80
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”).2
2 In Martin, we held that TRAC sets forth the proper
analytical framework to decide “whether [an] agency’s de-
lay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.” The six
TRAC considerations are:
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must
be governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress
Case: 25-1491 Document: 22 Page: 3 Filed: 01/09/2026

-- 3 of 8 --

WINDSOR v. COLLINS 4
The court found that three of the TRAC considerations
weighed against granting the petition. First, the court con-
cluded that the VA’s actions were not unreasonable under
the circumstances because the “VA has taken the appropri-
ate steps to adjudicate the petitioner’s pending appeal, to
include docketing his appeal with the Board and providing
him notice that his appeal was remanded by the Board for
additional development.” S. App’x 2. Second, Congress
had not set forth a specific timetable governing VA pro-
cessing of VR&E claims. Third, issuing the writ would, in
the court’s view, impact other VA activities because the de-
lay Mr. Windsor encountered was “the unavoidable result
of the ‘practical realities of the burdened veterans’ benefits
system.’” S. App’x at 3 (quoting Martin, 891 F.3d at 1347).
The court determined that two other TRAC considera-
tions favored Mr. Windsor: intolerance of delay when
health and human welfare are at stake, and the nature and
has provided a timetable or other indication of the
speed with which it expects the agency to proceed
in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may
supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays
that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic
regulation are less tolerable when human health
and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should con-
sider the effect of expediting delayed action on
agency activities of a higher or competing priority;
(5) the court should also take into account the na-
ture and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay;
and (6) the court need not find any impropriety
lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold
that agency action is unreasonably delayed.
Martin, 391 F.3d at 1345-46 (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at
80; internal quotation marks omitted).
Case: 25-1491 Document: 22 Page: 4 Filed: 01/09/2026

-- 4 of 8 --

WINDSOR v. COLLINS 5
extent of the interests prejudiced by delay (i.e., “human
health and welfare”). S. App’x 2-3.
The court concluded by acknowledging it was “sympa-
thetic to Mr. Windsor’s frustration with the speed at which
his appeal has proceeded.” S. App’x 3. It explained, how-
ever, that our precedents disfavor mandamus relief and,
accordingly, denied the petition.
Mr. Windsor timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un-
der 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a).
II
Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans
Court is limited by statute. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). We
review legal determinations, including the interpretation
of a regulation or statute, without deference, but have no
jurisdiction to review the Veterans Court’s factual determi-
nations or application of law to fact. We may, however, “re-
view the [Veterans Court’s] decision whether to grant [or
deny] a mandamus petition that raises a non-frivolous le-
gal question.” Beasley v Shinseki, 709 F.3d 1154, 1158
(Fed. Cir. 2013). In doing so, we “determine whether the
petitioner has satisfied the legal standard for issuing the
writ,” but we do not “review the factual merits of the vet-
eran’s claims.” Id. Ultimately, we review the Veterans
Court’s denial of a mandamus petition for abuse of discre-
tion. See Lamb v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (citing Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 403
(1976)).
III
Mr. Windsor presents three arguments on appeal, but
none warrants reversal.
First, Mr. Windsor asserts that the Secretary “materi-
ally misrepresented the procedural status” of his VR&E
claim by characterizing it as moot. Open. Br. at 6-7. Mr.
Windsor relatedly argues that the Veterans Court erred by
Case: 25-1491 Document: 22 Page: 5 Filed: 01/09/2026

-- 5 of 8 --

WINDSOR v. COLLINS 6
“allowing mootness to be declared while the harm re-
mained ongoing and unredressed.” Open. Br. at 17. But
the Veterans Court did not dismiss Mr. Windsor’s manda-
mus petition as moot; rather, it applied the correct legal
framework to deny the petition on the merits. Mr. Wind-
sor’s mootness arguments are, therefore, irrelevant.
Second, Mr. Windsor argues that the Veterans Court
gave undue “deference to unsworn, conclusory assertions
by the government” in determining that his claim had been
resolved by the intervening Board remand to the VA.
Open. Br. at 7, 12-13 These arguments are not supported
by the record. There is no indication that the Veterans
Court held or implied that Mr. Windsor’s VR&E claim was
“resolved” by the remand from the Board to the VA; the
Veterans Court noted, instead, that Mr. Windsor’s claim
was still pending before the agency. See S. App’x 1 (“[T]he
Board remanded the petitioner’s claim for further develop-
ment.”); see also id. (citing Board’s remand order); id. at 18-
20 (declaration of Board’s deputy vice chairman describing
procedural history, including that Mr. Windsor’s claim was
remanded to Board; not noting anywhere that his claim
had been resolved). There is simply no evidence that the
Veterans Court relied on evidence outside the record or on
unsworn attorney argument to justify its denial of Mr.
Windsor’s petition.
Finally, Mr. Windsor contends that the Veterans
Court’s abused its discretion in its assessment of the merits
of his mandamus petition. In his view, “every TRAC factor
tilts in favor of intervention” by the Veterans Court and an
order that the VA improperly delayed. Open. Br. at 12. We
have no jurisdiction to review the Veterans Court’s appli-
cation of the correct legal standard to the particular facts
presented by Mr. Windsor’s case. See Beasley, 709 F.3d at
1158 (holding we can “determine whether the [veteran] has
satisfied the legal standard for issuing the writ” but cannot
“review the factual merits of the veteran’s claim”). The
Veterans Court applied the correct legal standard. It
Case: 25-1491 Document: 22 Page: 6 Filed: 01/09/2026

-- 6 of 8 --

WINDSOR v. COLLINS 7
began by reciting the requirements for mandamus relief set
out by the Supreme Court in Cheney v. United States Dis-
trict Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004),3 and then turned
to the context-specific analysis we apply to mandamus pe-
titions predicated on unlawful agency delay under TRAC.
The Veterans Court concluded that “compelling action on
the part of the VA at this juncture would not be appropri-
ate, as [Mr. Windsor] still maintains . . . adequate alterna-
tive means to obtain the relief he seeks.” S. App’x 3. Mr.
Windsor has not explained how or why this determination
amounts to an abuse of discretion, and we conclude that it
does not. See Lamb, 284 F.3d at 1384 (concluding peti-
tioner “has not shown that, in denying mandamus, the Vet-
erans Court abused its discretion or committed other legal
error”).
In sum, Mr. Windsor is not entitled to mandamus re-
lief.
IV
We have considered Mr. Windsor’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive.4 Accordingly, we af-
firm the Veterans Court.
3 Under Cheney, a petitioner seeking mandamus
must demonstrate that: (1) he has “no other adequate
means to attain the relief he desires,” (2) “his right to issu-
ance of the writ is clear and indisputable,” and (3) issuance
of the “writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”
Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81 (internal citations, quotation
marks, and alterations omitted).
4 Mr. Windsor suggests the delay here was so egre-
gious that it amounts to a due process violation. However,
as we have explained, when a court “employing the TRAC
analysis, finds a delay unreasonable (or not unreasonable)
Case: 25-1491 Document: 22 Page: 7 Filed: 01/09/2026

-- 7 of 8 --

WINDSOR v. COLLINS 8
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
it need not separately analyze the due process claim based
on the same delay.” Martin, 891 F.3d at 1348-49 (quoting
and citing Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654,
660 (D.C. Cir. 2010); emphasis omitted). Mr. Windsor also
asserts the VA has not taken any post-remand action on
his VR&E claim, and we should factor this continuing de-
lay into our analysis. These developments are not in our
record.
Case: 25-1491 Document: 22 Page: 8 Filed: 01/09/2026

-- 8 of 8 --