NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
WASHINGTON WINDSOR,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2025-1988
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 25-664, Judge Joseph L. Falvey, Jr.
______________________
Decided: April 7, 2026
______________________
WASHINGTON YKJ WINDSOR, Saginaw, TX, pro se.
BLAKE WILLIAM COWMAN, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also repre-
sented by WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, PATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE; JONATHAN KRISCH, Y. KEN
LEE, Office of General Counsel, United States Department
of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
______________________
Case: 25-1988 Document: 29 Page: 1 Filed: 04/07/2026
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WINDSOR v. COLLINS 2
Before DYK, CHEN, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Washington Windsor appeals pro se a decision of the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”)
dismissing-in-part and denying-in-part a mandamus peti-
tion. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Windsor served in the Army from March 2015 to
July 2015. By statute, veterans who are discharged or re-
leased on conditions other than dishonorable are entitled
to compensation “[f]or disability resulting from personal in-
jury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for
aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease con-
tracted in line of duty” so long as the injury is not the result
of the veteran’s own willful misconduct or abuse of alcohol
or drugs. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 (wartime), 1131 (peacetime).
In December 2015, Mr. Windsor filed a claim for service-
connected benefits related to loss of teeth. On January 13,
2016, the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) notified
Mr. Windsor that it had denied his claim for service-con-
nected benefits. Mr. Windsor filed another application re-
lated to this claim in August 2022. The VA advised
Mr. Windsor that because this claim was previously de-
nied, he needed to complete a different form for review of
previously denied benefits.
Separate from service-connected benefits, under
38 U.S.C. § 1151, veterans are entitled to compensation for
negligent medical treatment caused by a VA employee or
in VA facilities “in the same manner as if such additional
disability . . . [was] service-connected.” 38 U.S.C.
§ 1151(a). On August 17, 2023, Mr. Windsor submitted an
application for benefits related to a 2023 dental surgery at
a VA facility that removed his upper teeth without provid-
ing implants. Apparently concluding that the 2023
Case: 25-1988 Document: 29 Page: 2 Filed: 04/07/2026
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WINDSOR v. COLLINS 3
application related to his previously denied service-con-
nected benefits claim, the VA informed Mr. Windsor that it
had decided this claim on January 13, 2016, and so he was
required to file any additional information related to this
claim on VA Form 20-0995 (Decision Review Request: Sup-
plemental Claim) for the VA to process it.
On January 30, 2025—more than a year after his last
correspondence with the VA on his section 1151 claim—
Mr. Windsor petitioned the Veterans Court for a writ of
mandamus. He requested that the Veterans Court compel
the VA (1) to immediately schedule a compensation and
pension examination for his service-connected dental inju-
ries; and (2) to mandate the VA’s expeditious adjudication
of Mr. Windsor’s section 1151 claim for negligent treat-
ment by the VA Medical Center. This appeal concerns only
the section 1151 claim.
After its review of Mr. Windsor’s mandamus petition
and records, the VA agreed that the 2023 application was
a section 1151 claim rather than a claim for service-con-
nected benefits. On April 16, 2025, the VA established a
section 1151 claim and submitted his claim for review. On
reply in the Veterans Court, Mr. Windsor altered his re-
quest for relief in light of the VA’s action and asked the
Veterans Court (1) to compel the VA to immediately com-
plete all the remaining steps of the section 1151 claim, in-
cluding to schedule and conduct a compensation and
pension examination; and (2) to direct the VA to substan-
tively adjudicate his section 1151 claim within 30 days.
On May 8, 2025, in a single-judge order, the Veterans
Court dismissed-in-part and denied-in-part Mr. Windsor’s
mandamus petition. With respect to the section 1151 claim
(the only claim raised in his appeal), it determined that the
“VA made a mistake in not establishing a section 1151
claim in August 2023 and it took a petition for VA to realize
Case: 25-1988 Document: 29 Page: 3 Filed: 04/07/2026
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WINDSOR v. COLLINS 4
and fix this mistake.” S.A. 5.1 However, it determined that
the VA’s establishment of the section 1151 claim after
Mr. Windsor filed his mandamus petition mooted any con-
troversy over the establishment of the claim and dismissed
the petition in this respect.
As to Mr. Windsor’s request to compel the VA to sched-
ule a compensation and pension examination for the sec-
tion 1151 claim and expedite its adjudication, the VA
denied the petition because “[n]ow that VA has established
this claim, there is an adequate alternative means for
Mr. Windsor to obtain the rest of his requested relief; that
is, for VA to schedule an exam for his section 1151 claim if
one is needed.” S.A. 5. The Veterans Court also concluded
that, under the factors outlined in Telecommunications Re-
search & Action Center v. Federal Communications Com-
mission, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”), there
was not unreasonable delay sufficient to warrant manda-
mus in this case, specifically as “Mr. Windsor has not
shown how the Court, through a writ, could expedite the
proceedings” because the “VA must still, in the first in-
stance, determine whether an exam is warranted under its
duty to assist.” S.A. 5. The Veterans Court therefore de-
nied the petition with respect to Mr. Windsor’s request to
order expeditious adjudication.
Mr. Windsor then filed a motion for a panel decision
and included with the motion a May 14, 2025, screenshot
of his claim status page, which he argued showed that the
VA had closed the section 1151 claim on May 2, 2025. On
June 6, 2025, the Veterans Court granted the motion for
panel review and ordered “that the single-judge order re-
mains the decision of the Court.” The same day, Mr. Wind-
sor filed a motion for full court review, which was denied
on July 10, 2025. After that motion was denied,
1 Citations to “S.A.” refer to the supplemental appen-
dix filed by the government in No. 25-1988, Dkt. No. 25.
Case: 25-1988 Document: 29 Page: 4 Filed: 04/07/2026
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WINDSOR v. COLLINS 5
Mr. Windsor concurrently filed a motion styled as a motion
to “recall the mandate and to vacate the Court’s final judg-
ment” in the Veterans Court and a notice of appeal in this
court. S.A. 131. The Veterans Court denied Mr. Windsor’s
motion to recall the mandate and vacate the judgment on
July 14, 2025.2
DISCUSSION
“[O]ur jurisdiction is limited in appeals from the Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims . . . .” Szemraj v. Principi,
357 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “‘This court has ju-
risdiction to review the [Veterans Court's] decision
whether to grant a mandamus petition that raises a non-
frivolous legal question . . . .’” Wright v. Collins, 157 F.4th
1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (quoting Beasley v. Shinseki,
709 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). When a mandamus
petition raises a nonfrivolous legal question, we “determine
whether the petitioner has satisfied the legal standard for
issuing the writ,” but do not “review the factual merits of
the veteran’s claims.” Beasley, 709 F.3d at 1158. We re-
view both a denial of a writ of mandamus and a denial of a
motion to recall the Veterans Court’s mandate and set
aside a judgment for abuse of discretion. Hargrove
v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 1377, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Maggitt
v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2 Mr. Windsor’s premature notice of appeal ripened
after the Veterans Court ruled on the motion to recall the
mandate and vacate the judgment (thus rendering a final
judgment), as “an adequate but premature notice of appeal
‘relates forward to the entry of the document that renders
an appeal possible.’” Parrish v. United States, 605 U.S.
376, 383 (2025) (quoting 16A WRIGHT & MILLER’S FED.
PRAC. & PROC. § 3950.5 (5th ed. 2019)).
Case: 25-1988 Document: 29 Page: 5 Filed: 04/07/2026
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WINDSOR v. COLLINS 6
Mr. Windsor challenges the Veterans Court’s decisions
related to his mandamus petition with respect to his sec-
tion 1151 claim in several respects.
First, Mr. Windsor argues that the Veterans Court le-
gally erred in its analysis of the TRAC factors by consider-
ing events that occurred after Mr. Windsor filed his
petition.3 But courts must consider events that occur after
3 The TRAC factors are:
(1) the time agencies take to make
decisions must be governed by a
“rule of reason”; (2) where Con-
gress has provided a timetable or
other indication of the speed with
which it expects the agency to pro-
ceed in the enabling statute, that
statutory scheme may supply con-
tent for this rule of reason; (3) de-
lays that might be reasonable in
the sphere of economic regulation
are less tolerable when human
health and welfare are at stake;
(4) the court should consider the ef-
fect of expediting delayed action on
agency activities of a higher or com-
peting priority; (5) the court should
also take into account the nature
and extent of the interests preju-
diced by delay; and (6) the court
need not “find any impropriety
lurking behind agency lassitude” in
order to hold that agency action is
unreasonably delayed.
Mote v. Wilkie, 976 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quot-
ing TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80).
Case: 25-1988 Document: 29 Page: 6 Filed: 04/07/2026
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WINDSOR v. COLLINS 7
the petition has been filed, for example, in determining
mootness or other situations where postpetition events
may bear on the petitioner’s right to relief. See, e.g.,
Ebanks v. Shulkin, 877 F.3d 1037, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(instructing Veterans Court to dismiss mandamus petition
as moot when veteran received his requested relief of a
Board hearing while case was pending on appeal in this
court); Martin v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (dismissing appeals of mandamus petitions as moot
when Board acted on veterans’ claims after their respective
mandamus petitions were denied). We therefore see no le-
gal error in the Veterans Court’s consideration of events
that occurred after Mr. Windsor filed his mandamus peti-
tion.
Second, Mr. Windsor argues that the panel decision is
flawed because it disregarded the new evidence included in
his motion for a panel decision—a May 14, 2025, screen-
shot of the VA website allegedly showing that the VA had
closed Mr. Windsor’s section 1151 claim. The VA appar-
ently disputes that the claim is closed and represents that
it remains open. Even if the claim has been closed, as the
Veterans Court determined, “there is an adequate alterna-
tive means for Mr. Windsor to obtain the rest of his re-
quested relief.” S.A. 5. That is, Mr. Windsor may request
higher-level review, file a supplemental claim, or file a no-
tice of disagreement. This demonstrates that Mr. Windsor
did not satisfy the legal standard for issuance of the writ,
which requires that “‘the party seeking issuance of the writ
[must] have no other adequate means to attain the relief
he desires.’” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Columbia,
542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for
N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)).4
4 On reply, Mr. Windsor argues that the panel deci-
sion is void because it was “entered without judicial author-
ity.” Informal Reply 7. That is so, he argues, because once
Case: 25-1988 Document: 29 Page: 7 Filed: 04/07/2026
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WINDSOR v. COLLINS 8
Third, Mr. Windsor contends that the Veterans Court
erred in denying his motion to recall the mandate and set
aside the judgment because the Veterans Court “possessed
both the jurisdiction and the duty to correct its own judg-
ment once it learned that the foundation of that judgment
was false,” Appellant’s Informal Br. 20, i.e., that his claim
had been closed. For the same reasons that the Veterans
Court properly denied relief initially, it did not err in deny-
ing the motion to recall the mandate and to vacate the judg-
ment.
Finally, to the extent that Mr. Windsor argues in his
mandamus petition that the Veterans Court should have
required the VA to expedite his claim, we also see no error.
To be sure, the Veterans Court did not lack the authority
to expedite Mr. Windsor’s claim. We read the Veterans
Court’s decision as also holding that there has been no un-
due delay in the processing of Mr. Windsor’s claim to war-
rant expeditious adjudication of his claim, and we see no
error in that conclusion. Like the Veterans Court, we
the Veterans Court granted panel review, it was obligated
to issue a new panel decision. This argument was forfeited.
“‘An issue that falls within the scope of the judgment ap-
pealed from but is not raised by the appellant in its opening
brief on appeal’ may properly be deemed waived.” Ban-
num, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (quoting Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co.,
166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). In any event, a
three-judge panel has the authority and discretion under
Veterans Court Rules of Practice and Procedure Rule 35 to
adopt the single-judge order as the order of the court, which
appears to be an established practice. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Collins, 2026 WL 237163, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2026);
Morris v. Collins, 2026 WL 237208, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29,
2026).
Case: 25-1988 Document: 29 Page: 8 Filed: 04/07/2026
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WINDSOR v. COLLINS 9
presume the VA will “promptly and properly adjudicate the
section 1151 claim.” S.A. 5.
We have considered Mr. Windsor’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 25-1988 Document: 29 Page: 9 Filed: 04/07/2026
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