Baltas v. Chapdelaine

22-2813-cv
Baltas v. Chapdelaine
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term 2024
Argued: January 31, 2025
Decided: September 3, 2025
No. 22-2813-cv
J OE B ALTAS, J ASON GOODE , KENYON L. J OSEPH PELLOT-C ASTELLANO,
RICHARD RICE , YARDLEY D AVIS, PHILIP RIVERA, N OAH GLADDING,
PETER TARASCO, J OSE O RTIZ ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
C AROL C HAPDELAINE, GIULIANNA MUDANO, AND ANGEL Q UIROS,
Defendants-Appellees.*
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut
No. 17-cv-242
Robert N. Chatigny, Judge.
Michael P. Shea, Chief Judge.
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption
accordingly.

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Before: C ARNEY , PARK , and N ARDINI , Circuit Judges.
Nine Connecticut inmates claim that their confinement in a
special housing unit called Q-Pod violated their constitutional rights.
They sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations
of their First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district
court (Chatigny, J.) granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on qualified-immunity grounds.
We affirm as to Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment and procedural
due process claims, as well as the free exercise claims of seven of the
nine Plaintiffs. But we reverse as to two Plaintiffs’ free exercise claims
alleging that Defendants denied their requests to participate in Native
American sweat lodge and smudging practices, which are congregate
religious services. Defendants offered no penological justification for
the denials—not to Plaintiffs, the district court, or this Court—so their
refusal to permit participation in religious congregation violated
clearly established law. The judgment and order of the district court
are AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part and the case is
REMANDED with instructions to deny Defendants’ motion as to Joe
Baltas’s and Joseph Tarasco’s denial-of-congregation claims. We also
VACATE the dismissal of Baltas’s and Tarasco’s state-law claims.
J AMES D URLING, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP, Washington, DC; William B. Michael,
Andrew Fishman, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

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ZENOBIA GRAHAM-DAYS, Assistant Attorney General, for
William Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut,
Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellees.
PARK, Circuit Judge:
Nine Connecticut inmates claim that their confinement in a
special housing unit called Q-Pod violated their constitutional rights.
They sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations
of their First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district
court (Chatigny, J.) granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on qualified-immunity grounds.
We affirm as to Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment and procedural
due process claims, as well as the free exercise claims of seven of the
nine Plaintiffs. But we reverse as to two Plaintiffs’ free exercise claims
alleging that Defendants denied their requests to participate in Native
American sweat lodge and smudging practices, which are congregate
religious services. Defendants offered no penological justification for
the denials—not to Plaintiffs, the district court, or this Court—so their
refusal to permit participation in religious congregation violated
clearly established law. The judgment and order of the district court
are affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case is remanded
with instructions to deny Defendants’ motion as to Joe Baltas’s and
Joseph Tarasco’s denial-of-congregation claims. We also vacate the
dismissal of Baltas’s and Tarasco’s state-law claims.

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I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1
Plaintiffs-Appellants are nine current or former inmates in
Connecticut’s MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution who were
detained in the prison’s “Q-Pod” housing unit between 2009 and
2016. Q-Pod, which is separate from the prison’s main building, has
60 cells with two bunks each. It is “used to house inmates who are
transitioning from more restrictive conditions of confinement, such as
punitive segregation, back to general population.” Special App’x at
4. Although Department of Corrections (“DOC”) regulations
consider Q-Pod a “reclassification unit,” Plaintiffs claim that it is a
“punitive unit” with more severe conditions than the prison’s
general-population wings. Joint App’x at 300.
Defendants-Appellees are Carol Chapdelaine, the prison
warden, Giulianna Mudano, the deputy warden, and Angel Quiros,
the district administrator at the time of the alleged confinement.
When a MacDougall-Walker inmate violates the Code of Penal
Discipline, he receives a “ticket” and time in the prison’s Restrictive
Housing Unit (“RHU”). The prison’s Inmate Handbook provides that
“[u]pon release from RHU and upon having been found guilty or
having pled guilty to a charge(s) under the Code of Penal Discipline,
inmates . . . will complete the remainder of their time on Unassigned
Status in” Q-Pod. Joint App’x at 95-96. The Handbook specifies that
inmates will stay in Q-Pod for 90 days for more severe infractions
1 The facts as set forth here are drawn from the record at summary
judgment and are not disputed except as noted.

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(Class A tickets) or 60 days for others (Class B tickets). Despite these
guidelines, Plaintiffs assert that they were often kept in Q-Pod for five
months or longer, with the longest specific allegation being nine
consecutive months in Q-Pod.
Plaintiffs also complain about five conditions of confinement in
Q-Pod. First, they claim to have faced significant isolation in Q-Pod.
Plaintiffs spent 22 out of 24 hours per day in their cells. During the
other two hours, Q-Pod inmates had access to an outdoor yard with
a basketball court. They were also permitted daily visitation. By
comparison, general-population inmates had three hours of
recreation. Although Q-Pod inmates generally had cellmates,
Plaintiffs allege that some were alone in their cells.
Second, Plaintiffs allege that their Q-Pod cells were unsanitary.
In particular, Q-Pod “had restrictions on flushing the toilet a certain
number of times in a given period, causing the toilets to be turned off
for two to three hours at a time.” Appellants’ Br. at 6. The parties
dispute the intervals on these timers, but Q-Pod inmates are advised
that they can flush the toilet two times in five minutes and then must
wait five minutes before flushing again; otherwise, attempting a third
flush within 10 minutes will lock the toilet for 30 minutes. Defendants
claim that other MacDougall-Walker units have these timers as part
of a municipal water-use agreement, but Plaintiffs deny this and also
claim that Q-Pod officers shut off Q-Pod inmates’ water for hours at
a time.
Third, Plaintiffs claim that Q-Pod officers deprived them of
medical care and drug and alcohol counseling. Although there is a
medical room in Q-Pod, Plaintiffs contend that they “would be denied

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medical treatment,” Joint App’x at 303, but none alleges a specific
instance of being denied care. Plaintiffs further claim that there was
no drug and alcohol counseling in Q-Pod.
Fourth, Plaintiffs claim that Q-Pod lacked vocational training,
job assignments, and education. The parties agree that these
opportunities are privileges that may be restricted as part of the
disciplinary process. And Plaintiffs do not challenge the disciplinary
process that resulted in their confinement in the RHU, but contend
that their privileges should not be restricted in Q-Pod because it is an
“arbitrary and capricious” sanction.
Fifth, Plaintiffs say that Q-Pod offered limited religious
services. Seven Plaintiffs claim at most that Q-Pod had “[s]egregated
& restricted religious services (if any at all).” See, e.g., Joint App’x at
122. But they fail to allege that they have sincerely held religious
beliefs, that they sought out religious services to exercise those beliefs,
or that Defendants denied any requests for such services.
Two Plaintiffs, however, claim that Q-Pod officials denied their
requests for Native American services. Baltas and Tarasco say they
requested but were denied access to “smudging,” a Native American
ceremony involving burning grasses and tobacco led by an elder or
spiritual leader. Prison officials denied Baltas’s grievance about
smudging, noting that “inmates in Q-unit do not smudge with [the
general] population. They are allowed to dry smudge in their cells
until they move to another unit. The Native American Chapl[a]in
does a service with the inmates in Q unit.” Joint App’x at 78. Tarasco
says he too was barred from smudging, as well as sweat-lodge
services, which involve group prayer in a special sauna at

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MacDougall-Walker. His former cellmate attests that Tarasco asked
a Native American Services Alder and a Q-Pod counselor about
access to those services. The counselor told Tarasco that the wardens
were aware of his request but might not be able to provide the services
due to staffing issues.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs sued on February 15, 2017, seeking damages and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Connecticut state law. As
relevant here, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants violated (1) the
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment; (2) the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of
law; (3) the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion; and
(4) the Connecticut Constitution. Defendants denied Plaintiffs’
allegations and asserted qualified immunity.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on qualified-immunity grounds on all federal claims,
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims, and denied Plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive relief as moot.
As to Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims, the district court
concluded that Q-Pod “did not impose a level of isolation sufficient
to support a constitutional claim.” Special App’x at 12. It also held
that Plaintiffs’ claims regarding toilet-flush restrictions fail because
“[t]emporary deprivations of toilet use that do not result in serious
physical harm or contamination do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.” Id. at 14. The district court concluded that,
in any event, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because
“Plaintiffs have not identified relevant case authority showing that

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the restrictive conditions they experienced in Q-Pod violated the
Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 16.
The district court also rejected Plaintiffs’ procedural due
process claims. First, the record was “insufficient to permit a
reasoned determination of whether plaintiffs can prove a state-
created liberty interest.” Special App’x at 18. Even assuming such an
interest, the district court concluded that “the conditions in Q-Pod
were not dramatically different from the conditions in general
population.” Id. at 19. Although Baltas and Tarasco had raised a
triable issue as to the deprivation of their religious services, the
district court concluded that Defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity because “Plaintiffs cite no relevant case authority clearly
establishing that confining them in Q-Pod without procedural
safeguards for the periods at issue violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 25.
Finally, the district court concluded that Defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ free exercise claims.
The court found that Baltas and Tarasco—but not the other
Plaintiffs—might “be able to prove that they were deprived of a
constitutional right to participate in congregate religious services.”
Special App’x at 30 (cleaned up). But Defendants were immune
because “[n]o relevant case authority has been cited or found that
addresses the First Amendment free exercise rights of inmates to
participate in sweat lodge or smudging services.” Id. at 32.
Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. The case was
subsequently reassigned and the district court (Shea, C.J.) denied that
motion on June 5, 2023. Plaintiffs timely appealed the grant of

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summary judgment. We granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and appointed counsel from our pro bono panel.2
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity because they violated clearly established law. We disagree
as to the Eighth Amendment and due process claims and affirm
Defendants’ qualified immunity on those claims. As for the First
Amendment claims, we also affirm the district court’s judgment for
Defendants on qualified immunity grounds, except we reverse and
remand as to two Plaintiffs’ denial-of-congregation claims.
A. Legal Standards
“We review a district court’s denial of a motion for summary
judgment sounding in qualified immunity de novo” and “draw all
factual inferences in favor of, and take all factual assertions in the light
most favorable to, the party opposing summary judgment.” Coollick
v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).
“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from
money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the
right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Even if an officer violated
a plaintiff’s clearly established rights, he “will still be entitled to
qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for him to believe
that his acts did not violate those rights.” Outlaw v. City of Hartford,
2 The Court thanks Plaintiffs’ pro bono counsel for their service.

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884 F.3d 351, 367 (2d Cir. 2018). These protections “balance[] two
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable
when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009).
“The Supreme Court has repeatedly told courts not to define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, instead
emphasizing that clearly established law must be particularized to the
facts of the case.” Francis v. Fiacco, 942 F.3d 126, 146 (2d Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up). “We do not require a case directly on point, but existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015) (quotation
marks omitted).
B. Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and
unusual punishment.” U.S. Const., amend. VIII. To make out an
Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiffs must prove (1) an “objectively,
sufficiently serious . . . denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities” and (2) that prison officials had a “sufficiently
culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
(cleaned up). Plaintiffs claim that the isolation and hygienic
conditions in Q-Pod violated their Eighth Amendment rights. But
Plaintiffs fail to identify cases clearly establishing that the alleged
isolation and toilet restrictions amounted to a sufficiently serious
deprivation.

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1. Isolation
Plaintiffs argue that their isolation in Q-Pod was cruel and
unusual punishment. They say the district court erred in granting
qualified immunity because “courts around the country have
increasingly held that conditions of confinement that result in
significant isolation—as plaintiffs experienced here—can satisfy the
objective element of the Eighth Amendment.” Appellants’ Br. at 51.
We disagree.
Q-Pod is not solitary confinement. Inmates are permitted two
hours of recreation in groups of up to thirty inmates, as well as daily
visitation. Q-Pod cells also house two inmates per cell, so Q-Pod is
not designed for complete social isolation. Still, granting Plaintiffs’
contention that some Q-Pod inmates had no cellmate, they faced up
to 22 hours per day of social isolation. The physical and psychological
consequences of long periods of social isolation may be severe, but
the 22 hours per day of isolation alleged by Plaintiffs is only one hour
more than the periods of isolation faced by inmates in the general
prison population, and the Supreme Court has never held that 22
hours per day of isolation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
In Hutto v. Finney, the Court recognized that “[c]onfinement in
a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to
scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.” 437 U.S. 678, 685
(1978). But that decision did not establish a bright-line rule. It instead
upheld a district court’s 30-day limit on punitive isolation in a “filthy,
overcrowded cell” with “a diet of ‘grue.’” Id. at 686-87. Those
“isolation” cells were not solitary in the social sense; the issue was

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overcrowding of the isolation cells. So Hutto does not clearly establish
law that supports Plaintiffs’ social-isolation claims.
This Court also has never held that such isolation is cruel and
unusual. In Reynolds v. Quiros—on which Plaintiffs rely—we noted
only that an inmate facing life in a solo cell for 21-22 hours a day
“could arguably prevail on his claims alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment.” 990 F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2021). But even there, we
vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the inmate
in light of disputed facts. Id. at 295. Dicta about disputed claims that
“could arguably prevail” does not clearly establish that the isolation
in Q-Pod violated the Eighth Amendment. And even if it did,
Reynolds post-dates the challenged conduct and thus cannot
undermine qualified immunity here. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (“A
Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when,
at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are
sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.” (emphasis
added) (cleaned up)).
Nor do other circuits’ decisions “clearly foreshadow[] a
particular ruling on the issue” of social isolation. Burns v. Martuscello,
890 F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs point to Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th
167 (3d Cir. 2022), in which the Third Circuit held that an inmate’s
“almost complete isolation for seven months by officials who knew
him to be seriously mentally ill” was a serious deprivation. Id. at 180.
But Clark involved the solitary confinement of a seriously mentally ill
inmate for all but three one-hour intervals per week. Id. at 173, 180.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019), fares

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no better. The Fourth Circuit held that “conditions of confinement on
Virginia’s death row—under which Plaintiffs spent, for years,
between 23 and 24 hours a day alone, in a small . . . cell” posed a
substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 357 (quotation marks omitted).
Q-Pod, by contrast, is not designed for solitary confinement and
provides more recreation time, as well as daily visitation.3
It is not clearly established that the level of social isolation in Q-
Pod violated the Eighth Amendment, so we affirm the district court’s
grant of qualified immunity as to these claims.
2. Toilet Restrictions
Plaintiffs argue that they endured unsanitary conditions
because Q-Pod “had restrictions on flushing the toilet a certain
number of times in a given period, causing the toilets to be turned off
for two to three hours at a time.” Appellants’ Br. at 6. They argue
that we have clearly established that such restrictions on toilet use
violate the Eighth Amendment. That is incorrect.
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has held that
shutting off toilet flushes “for two to three hours at a time” violates
the Eighth Amendment. In LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d
Cir. 1972), we recognized that “[c]ausing a man to live, eat and
perhaps sleep in close confines with his own human waste is too
debasing and degrading to be permitted.” Id. at 978. But that case
3 Even if these out-of-circuit cases were on point and clearly
foreshadowed a ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on the isolation issue, they too
would not undermine qualified immunity because they post-date Plaintiffs’
alleged Q-Pod detentions.

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involved a “Chinese toilet”—i.e., a grate in the ground that collected
waste in the open air until flushed by external control—which is far
more “degrading” than a toilet with a flush timer. Id. at 977. Plaintiffs
also point to Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2015), but that
case involved a deprivation of running toilet water for a week or
more. Id. at 66-67. Our caselaw does not clearly establish that a few
hours without a flushing toilet violates the Eighth Amendment, so we
affirm the grant of qualified immunity as to these claims.
C. Due Process Claims
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated their due process right
to be free from Q-Pod confinement. To make out a procedural due
process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a prisoner must
establish that (1) the state has created a liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause and (2) limits on that liberty interest
“impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995). Even if Plaintiffs had a cognizable liberty interest in
freedom from Q-Pod, the alleged durations and conditions of
confinement would not violate their due process rights.
1. Liberty Interest
Plaintiffs argue that they had a liberty interest in freedom from
Q-Pod confinement. Plaintiffs “must establish . . . that the state has
granted its inmates, by regulation or by statute, a protected liberty
interest in remaining free from that confinement or restraint.” Frazier
v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1996). They point to the DOC’s
Administrative Directives (“A.D.”) as creating a liberty interest in
freedom from unauthorized punishments. Under A.D. 9.5, an inmate

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receives a “ticket” for certain infractions, which they can contest at a
hearing. If guilt is established, the inmate serves time in the RHU.
Plaintiffs do not challenge the disciplinary proceedings that initially
landed them in the RHU. They instead challenge their post-RHU
transfer to Q-Pod. So any liberty interest must arise from Plaintiffs’
allegation that prison officials flouted regulations governing post-
RHU confinement to use Q-Pod as an “illegal and off-the-books form
of administrative segregation.” Joint App’x at 38.
The relevant regulations appear in MacDougall-Walker’s
Inmate Handbook and the DOC’s A.D. The Handbook provides that
“[u]pon release from RHU and upon having been found guilty or
having pled guilty to a charge(s) under the Code of Penal Discipline,
inmates . . . will complete the remainder of their time on Unassigned
Status in” Q-Pod. Joint App’x at 95-96. The Handbook states that
inmates will stay in Q-Pod for 90 days for a Class A ticket or 60 days
for a Class B ticket. A.D. 9.5 specifies the penalties that may be
imposed for a disciplinary infraction. Defendants say that any
confinement beyond these periods resulted from new violations, but
they do not identify a regulation that provides for extending Q-Pod
detention rather than reverting the inmate to the same disciplinary
process that led to their placement in the RHU. Defendants also deny
that conditions in Q-Pod amount to an unauthorized penalty.
Because this issue is contested, we assume without deciding that the
relevant regulations create a liberty interest in freedom from Q-Pod
confinement.

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Plaintiffs allege that they were confined in Q-Pod longer than
the Handbook permits4 and subject to penalties not set out in A.D. 9.5.
Again assuming that the relevant regulations create a liberty interest,
Plaintiffs may have alleged a deprivation of their right to be free from
Q-Pod confinement.
2. Atypical and Significant Hardships
Plaintiffs argue that they were “confined in Q-Pod for lengthy
periods of time and under particularly harsh and restrictive prison
conditions.” Appellants’ Br. at 42. For a deprivation of liberty to
amount to “atypical and significant hardship,” conditions must
“work a major disruption” in their environment. Sandin, 515 U.S. at
486. Relevant factors “include the extent to which the conditions of
the disciplinary segregation differ from other routine prison
conditions and the duration of the disciplinary segregation imposed
compared to discretionary confinement.” Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d
60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). “[E]specially harsh conditions
endured for a brief interval and somewhat harsh conditions endured
for a prolonged interval might both be atypical.” Sealey v. Giltner, 197
F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 1999).
Most of the challenged Q-Pod conditions do not significantly
“differ from other routine prison conditions.” Palmer, 364 F.3d at 64
4 Rivera says he spent nine consecutive months in Q-Pod. Gladding
says he was there for more than seven months consecutively and more than
a year in total. Baltas alleges almost five consecutive months of
confinement and over a year in total. Tarasco says that he was confined for
“about three months and a few days on a Class A Ticket.” Joint App’x at
118. And Rice says that he was confined for over three months.

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(quotation marks omitted). First, Q-Pod inmates have only one less
hour of recreation per day than other inmates in the general
population. We have never held that such a deprivation of recreation
and socialization constitutes an atypical and significant hardship,5
even for the intermediate durations of Q-Pod detention alleged by
Rivera and Gladding.6 To the contrary, the Supreme Court in Sandin
held that an inmate’s segregation—with an average of 50 minutes
each day out of the cell for 30 days—“did not present the type of
atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably
create a liberty interest” because it “did not work a major disruption”
compared to general-population inmates’ eight to twelve out-of-cell
hours. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 & n.8.
Second, Baltas and Tarasco claim that Q-Pod confinement
deprived them of access to requested religious services, but their
5 In Palmer, we affirmed a district court’s denial of qualified
immunity from an inmate’s procedural due process claim for 77 days in a
special housing unit without exercise, hygiene products, or visitation. 364
F.3d at 67. We explained that “it is possible that Palmer endured unusually
harsh SHU conditions that constituted an ‘atypical and significant
deprivation’ under Sandin.” Id. But the mere possibility of success on a
claim involving different conditions does not “place[] the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate” as needed to defeat qualified
immunity under current doctrine. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
6 Between 101 and 305 days is an “intermediate duration” of
confinement for which a district court must develop a “detailed record of
conditions of confinement relative to ordinary prison conditions.” Palmer,
364 F.3d at 65 (quotation marks omitted).

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allegations do not rise to a cognizable hardship under Sandin.7
Baltas’s longest alleged stay in Q-Pod was almost five months. But
there is no caselaw establishing that denial of religious services for
five months imposes an atypical and significant hardship. In Arce v.
Walker, 139 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1998), we rejected an inmate’s procedural
due process claim for eighteen days of segregation during which he
was “entitled to only one hour of exercise per day and could not
attend communal religious services.” Id. at 336. Although we
recognized that these conditions were more severe than those in the
general prison population, we held that the deprivations “were not
more onerous tha[n] those considered, and constitutionally
sanctioned in Sandin.” Id. To be sure, Baltas alleges a longer duration
of religious deprivation in Q-Pod. But our decisions do not clearly
establish a bright-line rule about when such deprivations are
actionable under Sandin.
Plaintiffs’ other alleged conditions also fail under Sandin.
Plaintiffs complain that Q-Pod officials prevented toilet flushes “for
two to three hours at a time.” Appellants’ Br. at 6. They further allege
that they were deprived of job and training opportunities, even
though they admit that the loss of those opportunities is based on an
inmate’s disciplinary record. And Plaintiffs allege inadequate
medical care, but fail to identify any injuries or specific deprivations
7 Seven other Plaintiffs allege that Q-Pod had “[s]egregated &
restricted religious services (if any at all).” But they do not allege an
atypical or significant hardship—or any hardship at all—because they do
not claim to hold religious beliefs or to have been denied access to requested
services for those beliefs. See infra Section II.D.

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of care. We have never held any of these conditions, whether alone
or together, to be an atypical or significant hardship.
We cannot say that every reasonable officer would know that
Q-Pod confinement, even for the longest periods alleged, violated
Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. Plaintiffs identify no
precedent clearly establishing that any of the alleged conditions
constitutes atypical and significant hardship for the alleged
durations. We thus affirm the district court’s grant of qualified
immunity as to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims.
D. First Amendment Claims
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion. To make out a free
exercise claim, a “prisoner must show at the threshold that the
disputed conduct . . . burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.”
Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 2014).8 But “[u]nder the
First Amendment, the law is less generous to plaintiff prisoners; a
generally applicable policy will not be held to violate a plaintiff’s right
to free exercise of religion if that policy is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.” Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 536 (2d
Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). Absent such a penological
8 We recently “join[ed] those circuits that have held that an inmate
does not need to establish a substantial burden in order to prevail on a free
exercise claim under § 1983.” Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 125 (2d Cir.
2023). But that was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ alleged
Q-Pod confinements in 2015 and 2016. See Wiggins v. Griffin, 86 F.4th 987,
993 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We have not decided whether the substantial burden
test survives Employment Division v. Smith.”).

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interest, “[i]t is well established that prisoners have a constitutional
right to participate in congregate religious services.” Salahuddin v.
Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993).
Seven of the nine Plaintiffs—Goode, Pellot-Castellano, Rice,
Davis, Rivera, Gladding, and Ortiz—fail to allege any burden on their
sincerely held religious beliefs. They allege only that Q-Pod had
“[s]egregated & restricted religious services (if any at all).” They do
not even claim that they hold religious beliefs, much less that
Defendants burdened their exercise of any such beliefs.9 So we affirm
the grant of qualified immunity on these Plaintiffs’ claims.
The remaining two Plaintiffs—Baltas and Tarasco—claim that
Defendants denied their requests to access congregate services for
their Native American religion. Defendants declined to offer any
penological justification for refusing Baltas and Tarasco access to
these services.10
9 Even if these Plaintiffs had alleged a burden on their sincerely held
religious beliefs, their claims fail because they do not allege that Defendants
knew or should have known that they had denied them access to their
desired religious services. See Wiggins, 86 F.4th at 997 (“[M]ere negligence
cannot support a First Amendment free exercise claim, . . . [but] deliberate
indifference clearly suffices.” (quotation marks omitted)).
10 These practices involve open flames and require close supervision.
See Baltas v. Jones, No. 3:21-CV-469, 2023 WL 8827880, at *20 (D. Conn. Dec.
21, 2023); Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1548 (8th Cir. 1996). But
Defendants have disclaimed on appeal any penological justification based
on those considerations. See Joint App’x at 146 (“Here, there has been no
limitation or denial of the plaintiffs’ rights to attend religious services, thus
no explanation of a pen[o]logical rationale is necessary.”).

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Tarasco claims he was “continually being denied [his]
Constitutional right to attend . . . Purification (sweat lodge)” and that
he “was not allowed to attend [his] religious practices or purifications
at all.”11 Joint App’x at 118. Tarasco’s former cellmate attests that
Tarasco spoke with a Q-Pod official and prison chaplain about his
desire to access sweat-lodge services, so the deprivation is not the
result of “[m]ere negligence.” Wiggins, 86 F.4th at 997. Plaintiffs
describe the sweat lodge as “a congregate Native American Religious
Practice that occurs at MacDougall on a monthly basis, where the gen.
pop inmates are permitted to attend.” Joint App’x at 330. Sweat-
lodge ceremonies may involve healers and participants sitting around
a steam-producing fire in a domed lodge. MacDougall-Walker is one
of the few state prisons to have a sweat lodge.
“It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right
to participate in congregate religious services.” Salahuddin, 993 F.2d
at 308. In the context of MacDougall-Walker, where general-
population Native American inmates hold congregate services in the
prison’s sweat lodge, no reasonable officer would think it lawful to
deny Tarasco this form of congregation absent a legitimate
penological purpose. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of qualified
immunity as to Tarasco’s sweat-lodge claim.
The district court granted qualified immunity because Plaintiffs
identified no caselaw that addresses the “free exercise rights of
inmates to participate in sweat lodge.” Special App’x at 32. Although
we agree with the district court that there is no clearly established
11 Baltas never alleged that he requested and was denied access to
sweat-lodge services.

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right to demand construction of a sweat lodge, see Baltas v. Erfe, No.
3:19-cv-1820, 2022 WL 4260672, at *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 15, 2022), there
is a clearly established right to access congregate religious services
where they already exist and are available. MacDougall-Walker had
a sweat lodge for Native American services and Defendants advanced
no penological justification for denying Tarasco access to religious
congregation there, so Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity.
Similarly, Baltas and Tarasco allege that prison officials denied
their requests for “smudging.” Smudging is a ritual involving
burning organic matter such as tobacco. The record indicates that
smudging is a congregate activity among MacDougall-Walker’s
general-population inmates. In response to Baltas’s grievance about
smudging, a prison official wrote that inmates in “Q-unit do not
smudge with [the general] population. They are allowed to dry
smudge in their cells until they move to another unit. The Native
American Chapl[a]in does a service with the inmates in Q unit.” Joint
App’x at 78.
At MacDougall-Walker, where the general population is
permitted to engage in congregate Native American smudging, no
reasonable officer would think it lawful to deny this form of religious
congregation absent penological justification.
The district court granted qualified immunity because Plaintiffs
presented no authority on the First Amendment right to smudging.
It is correct that there is no clearly established right to smudging or
tobacco use for religious services in prison. But see Williams v. Hansen,
5 F.4th 1129, 1135 (10th Cir. 2021) (recognizing a right to tobacco for

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religious services). But as with the sweat lodge, this analysis
overlooks the congregate nature of Baltas’s and Tarasco’s desired
smudging services and their availability to other Native American
inmates at MacDougall-Walker. And because Defendants failed to
offer any penological justification for denying Baltas and Tarasco
congregate smudging with the general population, we reverse the
grant of qualified immunity as to these denial-of-congregation
claims.12
E. State-Law Claims
Finally, the district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). But when federal claims are reinstated, “§ 1367(c)(3) no
longer provides a basis for declining to exercise jurisdiction over”
related state-law claims. Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 79
(2d Cir. 2003). In light of our decision to reinstate some of Baltas’s
and Tarasco’s federal claims, we vacate the district court’s dismissal
of their state-law claims, but offer no view as to other reasons the
district court might decide on remand to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.
12 Baltas’s and Tarasco’s general allegations about access to other
“Native American Services” do not defeat Defendants’ qualified immunity.
Although there is a clearly established right to congregate services, we
cannot say that every reasonable officer would know which Native
American services implicate that right. At any rate, absent an allegation
that Baltas or Tarasco requested access to particular services, they have no
viable First Amendment claim against the Q-Pod officers based on the
officers’ mere ignorance of their desired course of religious practice. See
Wiggins, 86 F.4th at 997-98.

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III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment and order granting
Defendants qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment
and procedural due process claims, as well as the Free Exercise claims
of seven of the nine Plaintiffs. But we reverse as to Baltas’s and
Tarasco’s free exercise claims because they allege denial of their
clearly established right to participate in congregate religious services
absent a legitimate penological justification. Accordingly, the
judgment and order of the district court are affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and the case is remanded with instructions to deny
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity
grounds as to Baltas’s and Tarasco’s denial-of-congregation claims
and to reinstate their state-law claims.

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