Singh v. Bondi

22-6077
Singh v. Bondi
In the
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
A UGUST TERM 2024
No. 22-6077
DHARWINDER S INGH ,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI , U NITED S TATES A TTORNEY G ENERAL,
Respondent.*
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
A RGUED: FEBRUARY 24, 2025
D ECIDED: JUNE 3, 2025
Before: R AGGI, MENASHI, and PÉREZ , Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Dharwinder Singh petitions for review of an order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals that affirmed the order of an
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney
General Pamela Bondi is automatically substituted for former Attorney
General Merrick B. Garland as the respondent.

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Immigration Judge denying his application for asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Singh
argues that the agency erred by making an adverse credibility
determination based solely on an inconsistency between his hearing
testimony and his statements during his border interview. Singh
acknowledges the inconsistency but claims that the agency failed to
evaluate the reliability of the border interview under the standards
identified in Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2004).
Before Congress enacted the REAL ID Act in 2005, our court
required the agency to evaluate a border interview using the
Ramsameachire factors. The BIA has subsequently held that the
totality-of-the-circumstances standard Congress adopted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) displaces the judge-made requirement that
previously applied. We agree with the BIA about the effect of the
REAL ID Act. Thus, while the Ramsameachire factors may be
appropriate for the agency to consider as part of the totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiry that § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) requires, those factors
are not independently controlling. In this case, because the agency
considered the argument that Singh raised about the reliability of the
border interview, it properly relied on the interview to make an
adverse credibility determination. Accordingly, we deny the petition
for review.
Judge Pérez concurs in the judgment in a separate opinion.
JATINDER S. G REWAL, East Elmhurst, NY (Anas J. Ahmed,
Jackson Heights, NY, on the brief), for Petitioner.
B RANDON T. C ALLAHAN, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation (Brian M. Boynton, Principal

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Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division;
Jennifer P. Levings, Assistant Director, Office of
Immigration Litigation, on the brief), United States
Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
MENASHI, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Dharwinder Singh, a citizen of India, petitions for
review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that
affirmed the order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Dharwinder Singh,
No. A 099 475 946 (B.I.A. Feb. 4, 2022), aff’g No. A 099 475 946
(Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. July 9, 2018).
Following a hearing and the admission of evidence, the IJ
denied Singh’s application for relief on the ground that he was not
credible in testifying about his flight from past persecution in India.
The IJ found him not to be credible because his hearing testimony that
he was attacked in India in August and November 2013 contradicted
what he told a border patrol agent after he was apprehended in the
United States. As summarized in a Department of Homeland Security
Form I-213, Singh told the border patrol agent that he fled India in
April 2013. Singh subsequently testified that he lied to the border
patrol agent at the advice of the individual who smuggled him to the
United States. The IJ found that Singh’s explanation was
unconvincing and determined that Singh was not credible. The BIA
affirmed the decision of the IJ.
Singh asks us to grant his petition for review because the
agency “made an erroneous credibility finding by basing it solely on
[Singh’s] statement to the border patrol without evaluating the

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statements under the Ramsameachire standard.” Petitioner’s Br. 16. As
Singh observes, we have previously identified factors that “the BIA
should use to evaluate the reliability of both the record of [a border
or] airport interview as a source of the alien’s statements, and the
statements themselves,” and held that “[t]hese aspects of the
interview must be deemed reliable before the BIA uses the interview
to assess the alien’s credibility.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d
169, 180 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
We agree with the BIA, however, that the subsequent
enactment by Congress of the REAL ID Act established a statutory
“presumption that interviews of this nature are proper to consider in
an adverse credibility determination.” Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 211, 215 (BIA 2018). That presumption displaced the contrary
presumption on which Ramsameachire relied: that a border or airport
interview is not proper to consider in an adverse credibility
determination unless it “bears sufficient indicia of reliability to
warrant its consideration by the agency.” Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585
F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing the Ramsameachire standard).
Because “the REAL ID Act was enacted after the Second Circuit’s
decision in Ramsameachire,” the agency correctly recognized that it
must apply the statutory standard of the REAL ID Act under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), which requires it to “assess the accuracy and
reliability of the interview based on the totality of circumstances,” and
is “not required to undertake an inquiry into the reliability of initial
interviews with Border Patrol agents using specifically enumerated
factors” from earlier judicial precedent. Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N.
Dec. at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Singh further argues that the agency “failed to take into account
that [Singh] was in fact under duress when he made statements to the
border patrol in his Form I-213” and that, “[b]y virtue of Matter of

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Barcenas, the IJ was precluded from using [Singh’s] border patrol
statements to hold him incredible.” Petitioner’s Br. 16 (citing Matter of
Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609 (BIA 1988)). This argument fails. Singh
did not claim before the agency—and he does not argue here—that
he was under any duress from government officials at his border
interview. The IJ considered and rejected Singh’s contention that he
made the statements in the border interview while under duress from
his smuggler. The BIA identified no error in the IJ’s finding, noting
that Singh could not “explain the means by which the smuggler
exerted duress on him.” Cert. Admin. R. 5. Because the record does
not compel a contrary conclusion regarding the purported duress,
that factual determination is “conclusive.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
And because Singh did not establish that the “Form I-213 contains
information that is incorrect or was obtained by coercion or duress,”
the form was “inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence to
prove alienage and deportability.” Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec.
at 611. We deny the petition for review.
BACKGROUND
On December 31, 2013, Singh entered the United States near
San Luis, Arizona, without valid entry documents and was placed in
removal proceedings. On December 23, 2014, Singh applied for
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, claiming that he had
suffered past persecution in India on account of his political opinion.
I
Shortly after being apprehended near the Mexico border, a
border patrol agent interviewed Singh at the Yuma Border Patrol
Station. Singh provided a detailed account of his eight-month journey
to the United States. He stated that he left his village “on April 21,
2013,” and traveled to New Delhi, where he met a man named

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“Jagdeep Kumar” who arranged for Singh’s travel to the United
States. Cert. Admin. R. 105. He stayed with Kumar for one week
before flying to Dubai, where a man named “Boss” took him to a
hotel. Singh stayed in Dubai for fifteen to twenty days before flying
to Managua, Nicaragua, where a man named “Eleven” sheltered
Singh in his home for three months. From Nicaragua, Singh flew to
Guatemala, where he joined three Chinese men who accompanied
him to Mexico. Singh traveled by bus and by car through Mexico until
he arrived at a house near the border. He stayed in the house for
twenty days before he walked across the border into Arizona.
In December 2014, Singh filed his application for asylum. In his
personal statement, he provided a different account of how he
reached the United States. Singh wrote that “[i]n December 2013 I left
India with the help of an agent. On December 31, 2013 I entered the
United States without proper inspection.” Id. at 507.1
At his hearing before the IJ in July 2018, Singh also provided an
account of his journey to the United States that differed from his
border interview. Singh testified that he left India in December 2013
and arrived in the United States later that month. See Cert. Admin. R.
69-70. He testified that he flew from Delhi to “Holland,” where he
“[s]tayed on the aircraft” before continuing to Cuba. Id. at 87-90. He
remained in Cuba for “a little bit more than ten days” before traveling
to Mexico, where he remained for “[f]ourteen, fifteen days.” Id. at 90.
Singh testified about why he left India. He said that he has been
a member of the Akali Dal Mann party since June 2011. In India, the
Akali Dal Mann party advocates for a separate Sikh state. Singh was
1 “Agent” in Singh’s account refers to his smuggler, not to a law
enforcement officer.

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an active member of the party and attended meetings, rallies, and
demonstrations.
In his testimony, Singh claimed that he was attacked by
members of the rival Akali Dal Badal party on two occasions. The first
attack occurred in August 2013. Members of the Akali Dal Badal party
drove up in a car and pulled Singh from his motorcycle. The rival
party members beat Singh with “wooden sticks” and “told [him] to
leave Akali Dal Mann party and join Akali Dal Badal party.” Id. at 506.
Singh claimed that “[t]hey threatened me [that] if I continue my
activities with Akali Dal Mann party they will kill me or will kill me
by police in [a] fake encounter.” Id. Singh attempted to report the
assault to the police, but the police accused him of fabricating the
incident. See id. at 76.2 Singh sustained “internal injuries and some
scratches on the ... legs,” and a doctor treated him with “tablets,” an
“injection,” and “ointment on the body.” Cert. Admin. R. 75.
The second attack purportedly occurred in November 2013
when Singh was “coming back from the fields.” Id. at 77. A group of
approximately ten people approached him and beat him with
“hockey sticks and baseball sticks” and told him to “[l]eave Akali Dal
Mann party and join Akali Dal Badal party.” Id. According to Singh,
the group “took out oil from one of the vehicle[s] and they pour[ed]
it on my body” and “tried to burn me up,” but the group dispersed
before doing so because witnesses were present. Id. The attackers told
Singh that “if you don’t stop working at … Akali Dal Mann party and
2 In his credible fear interview, Singh said that after the assault, the police
told him that “you’re trying to false claim” and that he should “just run
away.” Cert. Admin. R. 547. In his asylum application, Singh did not report
that he went to the police after the assault. See id. at 506-07. At the hearing,
Singh explained that he “forgot” to tell his attorney about his interaction
with the police because he “was in a lot of depression.” Id. at 86.

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… join Badal party we will burn you alive.” Id. Singh testified that he
treated his injuries at home but “policemen came to my house … and
took me to the police station,” where the policemen “started torturing
me physical[ly] and mentally.” Id. at 77-79. 3 Singh said that the
policemen released him the next day when his “father bribed them
for one hundred thousand rupees.” Cert. Admin. R. 80.
II
Following the hearing, the IJ denied relief. The IJ found that
Singh had not testified credibly. The IJ based the adverse credibility
determination on the inconsistency between Singh’s testimony and
his statements in his border interview. See id. at 41-42. When asked
about the inconsistency, Singh explained that at the time of the border
interview, he was “under depression” and “was scared” because the
federal agents “took [him] two, three places.” Id. at 91. Singh added
that he “was instructed” by his smuggler that he should “not tell [the]
correct thing to … anyone. It will be not good for us, and not good for
you.” Id. at 94. He said that his smuggler “told me that you don’t have
to tell the correct dates about your journey” and directed Singh to
“not tell anything correct about us.” Id. at 94-95.
The IJ found Singh’s explanation to be unconvincing. First, the
IJ did “not find any evidence that [Singh] was under duress at the
time” of his border interview. Id. at 41. Rather, the IJ found that if
Singh had repeated what his smuggler told him to say, that would
“indicate[] a willingness to lie at the direction of others,” which
3 In his asylum application, Singh said that the policemen urinated on him
and electrocuted him. He claimed that while he was being beaten by the
police, “the Akali Dal Badal member[s] were sitting there and drinking coca
cola.” Cert. Admin. R. 507. The policemen purportedly told him that “you
have not joined the party and we are going to take your life.” Id. at 547.

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undermined his credibility generally. Id. Second, “the account that he
apparently gave to border patrol agents as related in the Form I-213
is [a] very detailed and specific account,” which “means either that he
fabricated the account … or that it reflects what actually occurred on
his journey to the United States.” Id. at 41-42. “[N]either” possibility
“enhances his credibility.” Id. at 42.
The IJ observed that Singh’s “application was filed after the
enactment of the Real ID Act of 2005. And therefore, the credibility
provisions of the act govern this case. And under the act I am to apply
the totality of the circumstances test in making a credibility
determination.” Id. Under that test, the IJ explained, “I may consider
the applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account, and any
inconsistencies and statements without regard to whether or not they
go to the heart of the asylum claim.” Id. On such totality review, the
IJ determined that “the inconsistency clearly goes to the heart of the
asylum claim” and “goes to Respondent’s willingness to be truthful
and honest in his dealings with U.S. Government Officials.” Id.
The IJ considered evidence that Singh introduced to
corroborate his hearing testimony but accorded “diminished weight”
to statements from parties not subject to cross-examination or who
had an interest in Singh remaining in the United States. Id. These
statements—all written within two months of Singh’s hearing before
the IJ on July 9, 2018—included a letter from an official of the Akali
Dal Mann party dated May 25, 2018; a letter from Singh’s father dated
June 5, 2018; and notes from a doctor in India, each dated June 8, 2018,
stating that Singh was treated in August and November 2013.
Having determined that Singh failed credibly to establish past
persecution, the IJ additionally determined that he did not establish a
well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ considered late-filed

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photographs purporting to show Singh participating in political
demonstrations in the United States, but he concluded that Singh had
failed to show that his participation was known to the Indian
government or that, even assuming his participation was known, the
Indian government would respond to that participation with
persecution.
Singh appealed to the BIA on the ground that the IJ had
erroneously relied on the border interview to make an adverse
credibility finding. In his brief to the BIA, he explained that
“statements made to the border patrol by the respondent ‘warrant
[the] close examination called for by Ramsameachire.’” Id. at 15
(quoting Ming Zhang, 585 F.3d at 724). He enumerated the
Ramsameachire factors for evaluating the reliability of a border
interview and argued that, because the IJ failed to consider those
factors, “the IJ made an erroneous credibility finding by basing it
solely on respondent’s statement to the border patrol without
evaluating the statements under the Ramsameachire standard.” Id. at
16.
Additionally, Singh argued that “[t]he IJ failed to take into
account that the respondent was in fact under duress when he made
statements to the border patrol in his Form I-213” and this failure
rendered the Form I-213 inadmissible under BIA precedent. Id. (citing
Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609). Under that precedent, a Form
I-213 “is inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence to prove
alienage and deportability” only “[a]bsent any indication that a Form
I-213 contains information that is incorrect or was obtained by
coercion or duress.” Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 611.
The BIA rejected these arguments in an opinion dated February
4, 2022. First, the BIA explained that “consistent with the REAL ID

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Act, which was enacted after Ramsameachire, Immigration Judges
‘should assess the accuracy and reliability of the interview based on
the totality of the circumstances, rather than relying on any one factor
among a list or mandated set of inquiries.’” Cert. Admin. R. 5 (quoting
Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 215). “Under the REAL ID Act,
there is a presumption that interviews of this nature are proper to
consider in an adverse credibility determination,” so “[i]n assessing
the interview, we consider the totality of the circumstances presented,
based on the evidence presented and the arguments raised by the
parties.” Id. at 4 (quoting Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 214-15).
Second, although Singh claimed that he was under duress from
the smuggler during the border interview, the IJ “did not clearly err
in rejecting the respondent’s explanation.” Id. at 5. Although Singh
testified “that he was scared,” he “has not sufficiently explained how
or why the smuggler was exerting duress on him such that the
respondent gave a false account of his travels.” Id. Even assuming that
Singh’s “explanation is plausible,” such “mere plausibility is not
sufficient to establish that the Immigration Judge clearly erred in
rejecting this explanation.” Id. at 6; see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of
the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.”). Because Singh’s “statement at the border” describing
“[a]n April 2013 departure from India would preclude [him] from
establishing that he was persecuted later that year in that country,” it
amounted to “a statement against … his interest in establishing … his
eligibility for asylum. The record thus plausibly supports viewing this
inconsistency as undercutting the respondent’s claim to credibly be a
refugee.” Cert. Admin. R. 6. The BIA dismissed Singh’s appeal, and
Singh petitioned this court for review of its decision.

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LEGAL STANDARDS
“When the BIA issues an opinion, the opinion becomes the
basis for judicial review of the decision of which the alien is
complaining.” Bhagtana v. Garland, 93 F.4th 592, 593 (2d Cir. 2023)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “When the decision of the BIA is
consistent with the decision of the IJ, we may consider both decisions
‘for the sake of completeness.’” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 112 (2d
Cir. 2021) (quoting Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
2006)). Because Congress has specified that “the administrative
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B), we review the agency’s decision for “substantial
evidence” and “must defer to the factfinder’s findings based on ‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion,’” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.
2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
“The scope of review ‘under the substantial evidence standard
is exceedingly narrow, and we will uphold the BIA’s decision unless
the petitioner demonstrates that the record evidence was so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find him eligible
for relief.’” Singh, 11 F.4th at 113 (quoting Mu Xiang Lin v. DOJ, 432
F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2005)). “By contrast, we review legal conclusions
de novo.” Id.
The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General
“may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum … if the
Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General determines
that such alien is a refugee,” meaning that “race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or
will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant” in his

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or her country of nationality. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b). Even without a grant of asylum, the Attorney General
must withhold from removing an alien to a particular country “if the
Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The regulations implementing the
CAT further provide that removal will be withheld or deferred if the
applicant establishes that “it is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
DISCUSSION
In his petition for review, Singh renews his argument that the
agency “made an erroneous credibility finding by basing it solely on
[Singh’s] statement to the border patrol without evaluating the
statements under the Ramsameachire standard.” Petitioner’s Br. 16. He
further argues that the agency “failed to take into account that [Singh]
was in fact under duress” from the smuggler “when he made
statements to the border patrol in his Form I-213” and that, “[b]y
virtue of Matter of Barcenas, the IJ was precluded from using [Singh’s]
border patrol statements to hold him incredible.” Id.
Singh is correct that, in cases arising before the effective date of
the REAL ID Act, our court treated consideration of the Ramsameachire
factors as a mandatory procedural requirement whenever the agency
relied on a border or airport interview to make an adverse credibility
determination. See infra note 5. We agree with the BIA, however, that
the REAL ID Act establishes “a presumption that interviews of this
nature are proper to consider in an adverse credibility
determination.” Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 215. By contrast,

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Ramsameachire relied on the opposite presumption: that a border or
airport interview is not proper to consider in an adverse credibility
determination unless it “bears sufficient indicia of reliability to
warrant its consideration by the agency.” Ming Zhang, 585 F.3d at 725
(describing the Ramsameachire standard). Because “the REAL ID Act
was enacted after the Second Circuit’s decision in Ramsameachire,” the
agency must apply the statutory standard of the REAL ID Act under
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), which requires it to “assess the accuracy
and reliability of the interview based on the totality of circumstances,
rather than relying on any one factor among a list or mandated set of
inquiries.” Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 215. In other words,
the agency is not required to forgo consideration of a border interview
based on “specifically enumerated factors” such as those identified in
Ramsameachire. Id. (quoting Ye v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2017)).
Rather, the agency properly considers the totality of the
circumstances—which might include the Ramsameachire factors as the
factfinder deems relevant—in deciding what weight, if any, to give
statements made in a border interview.
As we have previously held, “our previous holdings regarding
the standards governing review of credibility findings by IJs remain
good law with regard to asylum applications filed before May 11,
2005”—the effective date of the REAL ID Act—while “[a]sylum
applications filed after May 11, 2005 would be governed by the
standards established in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).” Liang Chen v.
U.S. Atty. Gen., 454 F.3d 103, 108 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, the agency “should address any arguments
raised regarding the accuracy and reliability of the interview and
explain why the arguments are or are not persuasive.” Matter of J-C-
H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 215. In this case, the agency considered and
rejected Singh’s argument that he made the statements in the border

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interview while under duress from the smuggler who told him not
“to tell the correct dates about your journey” because doing so would
“not [be] good for you.” Cert. Admin. R. 94. Nothing in the record
shows that Singh understood these instructions as conveying threats
that forced him to lie rather than advice about how lying might best
secure entry into the United States. Because the record does not
compel the conclusion that Singh’s statements in the border interview
were made under duress, we conclude that the adverse credibility
determination was supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).
I
When Ramsameachire was decided in 2004, no statute governed
the IJ’s authority to make an adverse credibility determination.
Accordingly, we and other circuits developed judge-made standards
for how such determinations could be made.4 We said that a border
or “airport interview is an inherently limited forum for the alien to
express the fear that will provide the basis for his or her asylum claim,
and the BIA must be cognizant of the interview’s limitations when
using its substance against an asylum applicant.” Ramsameachire, 357
F.3d at 179. We identified factors that “the BIA should use to evaluate
the reliability of both the record of the [border or] airport interview as
4 See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 161 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (“As there are no
explicit evidentiary standards for granting asylum in the INA, standards
for determining the credibility of an asylum applicant and the necessity for
evidence corroborating an applicant’s testimony have evolved through the
case law of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and federal courts.
Because these standards are not consistent across federal appellate courts,
different results have been reached in similar cases, depending on the court
that hears the case.”).

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a source of the alien’s statements, and the statements themselves.” Id.
at 180. We enumerated the factors as follows:
First, a record of the interview that merely summarizes
or paraphrases the alien’s statements is inherently less
reliable than a verbatim account or transcript. Second,
similarly less reliable are interviews in which the
questions asked are not designed to elicit the details of
an asylum claim, or the INS officer fails to ask follow-up
questions that would aid the alien in developing his or
her account. Third, an interview may be deemed less
reliable if the alien appears to have been reluctant to
reveal information to INS officials because of prior
interrogation sessions or other coercive experiences in
his or her home country. Finally, if the alien’s answers to
the questions posed suggest that the alien did not
understand English or the translations provided by the
interpreter, the alien’s statements should be considered
less reliable.
Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Moreover, we held that “[t]hese aspects of the interview
must be deemed reliable before the BIA uses the interview to assess
the alien’s credibility.” Id. (emphasis added). We later extended this
requirement from border and airport interviews to credible fear
interviews because “credible fear interviews are more similar to
airport interviews than asylum interviews and therefore warrant the
close examination called for by Ramsameachire.” Ming Zhang, 585 F.3d
at 724. We treated consideration of the factors as a mandatory
procedural requirement and therefore vacated agency decisions that

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relied on such interviews without considering the Ramsameachire
factors.5
Congress subsequently adopted a statutory standard that
governs adverse credibility determinations in the immigration
context. The REAL ID Act specified, as relevant here, that IJs
“[c]onsidering the totality of circumstances, and all relevant factors,
may base a credibility determination” on:
the consistency between the applicant’s … written and
oral statements (whenever made and whether or not
under oath, and considering the circumstances under
which the statements were made), the internal
consistency of each such statement, the consistency of
such statements with other evidence of record … and any
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without
regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
5 See, e.g., Zhen Hui Ye v. DOJ, 159 F. App’x 243, 245 (2d Cir. 2005) (vacating
the agency decision because “the IJ considered Ye’s airport interview” but
“did not explain whether she examined the airport interview under the
factors laid out in Ramsameachire” and explaining that, “[i]n making her
credibility determination, the IJ must explain whether she examined the
airport interview under the factors laid out in Ramsameachire”); Yu Qiao
Wang v. Gonzales, 190 F. App’x 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that “the IJ
erred by using Wang’s airport interview to assess his credibility” because
“[t]he IJ did not explain whether it did[] in fact examine the airport
interview under the factors laid out in Ramsameachire”) (footnote omitted);
Hui Mei Li v. BIA, 204 F. App’x 985, 987 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]o the extent that
the BIA relied on Li’s airport interview when it adopted and affirmed the
IJ’s credibility decision, such reliance was inappropriate because the BIA
failed to evaluate the reliability of the airport interview.”) (citing
Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 180).

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falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or
any other relevant factor.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).
This statutory standard displaces the judge-made standards
that had previously been developed.6 The permissive language of
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) that authorizes the IJ to rely on any inconsistency
in the record overrides prior case law that required the agency to
6 The REAL ID Act abrogated case law holding that “[a]n adverse credibility
finding must be based on issues that go to the heart of the applicant’s
claim.” Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Kondakova v.
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 792, 796 (8th Cir. 2004) (“While minor inconsistencies and
omissions will not support an adverse credibility determination,
inconsistencies or omissions that relate to the basis of persecution are not
minor but are at the heart of the asylum claim.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Contrary to
our precedent, the BIA did not explain why this omission, assuming one
exists, is significant or goes to the heart of Singh’s asylum claim.”); Secaida-
Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that inconsistencies
that “do not concern the basis for the claim of asylum or withholding, but
rather matters collateral or ancillary to the claim,” cannot “form the sole
basis for an adverse credibility finding”). The sponsor of the REAL ID Act
explained that the Act overrode these judge-made requirements because
“the ninth circuit is preventing immigration judges from denying asylum
claims when it is clear that the alien is lying.” 151 Cong. Rec. H549 (daily
ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). We have explained
that “our previous holding that an IJ may not base an adverse credibility
determination on inconsistencies and omissions that are ‘collateral or
ancillary’ to an applicant’s claims has been abrogated by the amendments
to the statutory standard imposed by the REAL ID Act. For cases filed after
May 11, 2005, the effective date of the Act, an IJ may rely on any
inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination
as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ establishes that an asylum
applicant is not credible.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.
2008) (citation omitted).

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19
apply a judge-made test before relying on border, airport, or credible
fear interviews in the record. See Ming Zhang, 585 F.3d at 721-25;
Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 179-80. As the BIA has explained, the REAL
ID Act establishes “a presumption that interviews of this nature are
proper to consider in an adverse credibility determination.” Matter of
J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 215. Ramsameachire, however, relied on the
opposite presumption: that a preliminary interview is not proper to
consider in an adverse credibility determination unless it “bears
sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its consideration by the
agency.” Ming Zhang, 585 F.3d at 725.
Recognizing that the statutory standard must govern, we have
held that “our previous holdings regarding the standards governing
review of credibility findings by IJs remain good law with regard to
asylum applications filed before May 11, 2005”—the effective date of
the REAL ID Act—while “[a]sylum applications filed after May 11,
2005 would be governed by the standards established in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).” Liang Chen, 454 F.3d at 108 n.3 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the BIA correctly decided in this case that, “consistent
with the REAL ID Act, which was enacted after Ramsameachire,
Immigration Judges should assess the accuracy and reliability of the
interview based on the totality of circumstances” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) “rather than relying on any one factor among a list
or mandated set of inquiries” from case law predating the Act.
Cert. Admin. R. 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A
In adopting the REAL ID Act, “Congress has carefully
circumscribed judicial review of BIA decisions” by expressly
affording IJs discretion to reach adverse credibility determinations on
any inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood in the record—subject to

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20
review for substantial evidence—and effectively precluding courts
from requiring a preliminary consideration of judge-made factors
before relying on inconsistencies in border interviews. Garland v.
Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 365 (2021). It is well established that “a
reviewing court is ‘generally not free to impose’ additional judge-
made procedural requirements on agencies that Congress has not
prescribed and the Constitution does not compel.” Id. (quoting Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)).
The Supreme Court has emphasized that we do not “hear direct
appeals from Article II executive agencies.” Id. at 367. Rather, we
follow a “collateral review process Congress has prescribed, initiating
a new action in the federal courts,” in which the agency is the
respondent. Id. A petition for review is therefore not “an ‘appeal’ akin
to that taken from the district court to the court of appeals, or from
the IJ to the BIA.” Id. We are authorized to provide remedies against
the agency as a party to the dispute but do not oversee it as an inferior
judicial tribunal. See Vera Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114, 125 (2d Cir.
2024) (“Agencies are not courts.”) (alteration omitted) (quoting Garcia
v. Garland, 64 F.4th 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2023)).
Congress provided that an IJ “may” make an adverse
credibility determination based on inconsistent statements in the
record. The IJ did so here based on the inconsistencies between the
border interview and the hearing testimony. We must accept the IJ’s
factfinding, including an adverse credibility determination, as
“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “We defer
therefore to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality
of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could
make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
That is the basis on which we may decide that an adverse credibility

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21
determination was erroneous—but the record here does not meet that
standard.
B
Other circuits have reached the same conclusion in light of the
REAL ID Act. In Ye v. Lynch, the First Circuit considered a petition for
review challenging the denial of immigration relief following an
adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies between a
border interview and testimony at the asylum hearing. 845 F.3d at 41-
42. The petitioner “argue[d] that the border interview was unreliable
and urge[d]” the First Circuit “to assess its reliability under the
Second Circuit standard as set forth in Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357
F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2004).” Id. at 44. The First Circuit rejected that
request:
This Circuit does not require IJs to undertake an inquiry
into the reliability of initial interviews with Border Patrol
agents using specifically enumerated factors. … Section
101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act outlines how IJs must make
credibility determinations, and was added following the
decision in Ramsameachire. Section 101(a)(3) specifically
allows IJs to consider “the consistency between the
applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements
(whenever made and whether or not under oath, and
considering the circumstances under which the
statements were made).” … [T]he BIA’s reliance on the
[interview] was reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence.
Id. at 44-45 (citations omitted).
The Fifth Circuit has similarly considered the argument that a
credible fear interview was “unreliable under the factors set forth in
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2004),” and that

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22
“the BIA and IJ erred by failing to specifically evaluate the reliability
of [the credible fear interview] under those factors before considering
it in rendering an adverse credibility determination.” Avelar-Oliva v.
Barr, 954 F.3d 757, 764 (5th Cir. 2020). The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the agency had not erred. While the Fifth Circuit “has cited the factors
set out in Ramsameachire” in a case applying the substantial evidence
standard to uphold an adverse credibility determination, it has “not
expressly adopted a rule requiring consideration of specific factors in
assessing the reliability of a [credible fear interview].” Id. at 765 (citing
Singh v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 2018)).
C
Importantly, the BIA has also addressed this question. 7 In
Matter of J-C-H-F-, the BIA addressed the status of Ramsameachire
following the adoption of the REAL ID Act. See 27 I. & N. Dec. at 212-
13. The BIA concluded that “although the factors listed in
Ramsameachire are proper considerations for assessing the reliability
of an interview, the Immigration Judge should assess the accuracy
and reliability of the interview based on the totality of circumstances,
rather than relying on any one factor among a list or mandated set of
inquiries.” Id. at 215. The BIA emphasized that under the REAL ID
Act, “there is a presumption that interviews of this nature are proper
to consider in an adverse credibility determination.” Id. And the BIA
expressly agreed with the First Circuit:
7 Cf. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 374 (2024) (“[I]n an agency
case in particular, the reviewing court will go about its task with the
agency’s body of experience and informed judgment, among other
information, at its disposal. An agency’s interpretation of a statute … may
be especially informative to the extent it rests on factual premises within
the agency’s expertise.”) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation
omitted).

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23
In Ye, the First Circuit rejected the argument that it
should adopt these factors. Noting that the REAL ID Act
was enacted after the Second Circuit’s decision in
Ramsameachire, the court declined to employ a checklist
or require specific dispositive considerations that must
be addressed. The First Circuit stated that Immigration
Judges are not required “to undertake an inquiry into the
reliability of initial interviews with Border Patrol agents
using specifically enumerated factors.” We agree.
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, in the BIA’s view, while an IJ “should
address any arguments raised regarding the accuracy and reliability
of the interview and explain why the arguments are or are not
persuasive,” he or she is “not required” to employ any “specifically
enumerated factors.” Id.
Consistent with this precedent, an IJ may consider the factors
described in Ramsameachire when making an adverse credibility
determination in light of “the totality of the circumstances.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). And a reviewing court might consider similar
factors when deciding whether substantial evidence supports the
agency’s decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). But such consideration
by the reviewing court may occur only as part of applying the
substantial evidence standard. “The only question for judges
reviewing the BIA’s factual determinations is whether any reasonable
adjudicator could have found as the agency did.” Ming Dai, 593 U.S.
at 368. And “a reviewing court must uphold [its] decision unless a
reasonable adjudicator would have been compelled to reach a
different conclusion.” Id. at 369. A reviewing court may not police the
agency’s compliance with “judge-made procedural requirements …
that Congress has not prescribed and the Constitution does not
compel.” Id. at 365.

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24
For that reason, Singh is incorrect that the agency erred by
relying on a border interview to make an adverse credibility finding
without considering the Ramsameachire factors. The agency is “not
required to undertake an inquiry into the reliability of initial
interviews with Border Patrol agents using specifically enumerated
factors.” Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 215 (internal quotation
marks omitted). To prevail on a petition for review, the petitioner
cannot rely on the agency’s failure to conduct a Ramsameachire review
before considering a border interview in assessing credibility. Rather,
the petitioner must show that, considering the record as a whole, the
adverse credibility determination was unsupported by substantial
evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Under the substantial evidence
standard, we must “defer … to an IJ’s credibility determination
unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Whether a reasonable fact-finder could
do so is the “only question” before us. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 368.
II
We conclude that substantial evidence supported the adverse
credibility determination in this case. Singh’s statement in his border
interview that he “left his village on April 21, 2013,” Cert. Admin. R.
105, contradicted his testimony at the hearing that he left India in
“December 2013,” id. at 69. And he provided inconsistent accounts of
his travel from India to the United States between the two statements.
Singh does not dispute the inconsistencies. In fact, he
acknowledges that his account in the border interview “logically
nullif[ies] his asylum claim.” Petitioner’s Br. 20. Instead, Singh argues
that the agency failed to resolve the inconsistencies in his favor by
recognizing that he was “depressed and scared and under duress”

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25
during the border interview. Id. at 17. But the agency considered and
rejected Singh’s explanation that he lied during the border interview
based on pressure from the smuggler. The IJ found that Singh was not
under duress from the smuggler at the time of the border interview
and, in any event, Singh’s lying based on the smuggler’s instructions
“indicates a willingness to lie at the direction of others” that
undermines his credibility. Cert. Admin. R. 41. In upholding the IJ’s
decision, the BIA noted that Singh could not “explain the means by
which the smuggler exerted duress on him.” Id. at 5. Because Singh
did not establish that his “Form I-213 contains information that is
incorrect or was obtained by coercion or duress,” the form was
sufficiently “trustworthy and admissible as evidence” of
inconsistencies that undermined Singh’s credibility and thereby
could “prove … deportability.” Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. at
611.
As the BIA observed, the “mere plausibility” of Singh’s
explanation for the inconsistencies would not be enough to entitle
him to relief. Cert. Admin. R. 6. The conclusion applies with even
more force under the substantial evidence standard applicable here:
“[a] petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his
inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.”
Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). Singh has
not made that showing. The IJ was not compelled to conclude that the
lengthy and detailed account of his travels from India to the United
States that Singh provided in his border interview was false, much
less that the account resulted from fear, depression, or the duress of
the smuggler. Even if that account were false, the IJ still would not be
compelled to credit Singh’s completely different account in his
hearing testimony.

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26
Because Singh cannot “demonstrate[] that the record evidence
was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find”
that Singh was credible despite the inconsistencies between the
border interview and his testimony, Singh, 11 F.4th at 113 (quoting
Mu Xiang Lin, 432 F.3d at 159); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167, the adverse
credibility determination is “conclusive,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).8
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.
8 Moreover, the IJ was not “required” to ask Singh about the inconsistencies.
Petitioner’s Br. 20. The government elicited Singh’s explanation for the
inconsistencies during cross-examination, and an IJ need not “duplicate the
questions of the government when the government has already noted
testimonial flaws on cross-examination.” Zhi Wei Pang v. Bureau of
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 448 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2006). The obligation
of the IJ is to “ensure that the record as a whole is adequately developed to
permit her to offer specific and cogent reasons for her credibility
determination.” Id. at 117 (Raggi, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).

-- 26 of 39 --

22-6077
Singh v. Bondi
MYRNA PÉREZ , Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
Petitioner Dharwinder Singh admitted to the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that
he intentionally lied to a border patrol agent when he arrived in the United States,
on the advice of the person who smuggled him into the country. Of course, an IJ
is permitted to consider undisputed, uncoerced, intentional lies to federal agents
in determining the credibility of an applicant for immigration relief. Accordingly,
I concur in the judgment.
I write separately, however, because neither Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357
F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2004), nor any other precedent of this Court, is in conflict with
this panel’s disposition. This case could have been decided by a non-precedential
summary order.
I.
In affirming the IJ’s decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”),
correctly applied our longstanding precedent, including Ramsameachire. Petitioner
then distorted Ramsameachire to fashion a rule that has never been endorsed by a
precedential decision of this Court. The majority opinion correctly rejects
Petitioner’s argument because it is inconsistent with both the REAL ID Act of 2005
and with our existing precedent. Before today, the guidance we provided in
Ramsameachire and its progeny was consistent with the REAL ID Act, and after

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2
today, those cases continue to provide the guideposts for certain credibility
determinations in removal proceedings under the Act.
To understand why, it is important first to clarify what Ramsameachire says.
Our holding comprised four components that, in combination, have guided this
Court and the agency for decades. First, we enumerated four factors “that the BIA
should use to evaluate the reliability of both the record of [a border] interview . . .
and the statements themselves.” Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 180; see Maj. Op. at 16
(quoting factors). Second, we stated that the purpose of “[e]xamining the interview
in light of these factors” was to “focus the agency’s inquiry on whether the record
of the interview accurately reflects the alien’s statements, whether the alien had a
full opportunity to express him- or herself, and whether the alien’s statements are
likely to reflect his or her actual beliefs and fears.” Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 180.
Third, we stated, “[t]hese aspects of the interview must be deemed reliable before
the BIA uses the interview to assess the alien’s credibility.” Id. Fourth, we stated
that the “factors described above are not exhaustive,” but “they provide the
analytical framework for assessing the reliability of [a border] interview.” Id.
In context, the import of these four statements is clear. The three “aspects
of the interview” that “must be deemed reliable” are those enumerated in the prior

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3
sentence: The record must be accurate, the non-citizen must have had a chance to
articulate his claim, and the non-citizen’s statements must be probative. The four
non-exhaustive, enumerated “factors” are simply examples of the kinds of things
an adjudicator can and should consider in making those reliability determinations.
Petitioner argues instead that Ramsameachire imposes its four “factors” as a
rigid checklist that “must be” satisfied in every case, but to arrive at that reading
one must chop up, rearrange, and ignore portions of Ramsameachire’s holding. See
Maj. Op. at 16 (quoting the first and third components above and ignoring the
second and fourth). On Petitioner’s account, which the majority opinion accepts,
this Court created a “presumption[] that a border or airport interview is not proper
to consider,” id at 19, even though Ramsameachire itself is premised upon the
proposition that “the [border] interview . . . will usually provide a reliable record
of the alien’s basis for seeking asylum.” 357 F.3d at 179. In sum, Ramsameachire
itself refutes Petitioner’s argument, and this case could have been resolved
without breaking any new ground.
II.
As the majority opinion notes, shortly after we decided Ramsameachire,
Congress enacted the REAL ID Act. For asylum, withholding of removal, and

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4
other forms of relief, the Act clarified the burden of proof, the role of corroborating
evidence, and the proper considerations in making a credibility determination. See
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101, 119 Stat. 231, 302–06 (codified in
relevant part at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(4), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1158(b)(1)(B)). As relevant
to this appeal, the Act permits an IJ to base an adverse credibility finding upon
any inconsistent statement or omission that a non-citizen or a witness makes,
regardless of whether the inconsistency involves “the heart of the applicant’s
claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).1 As the majority opinion explains, Maj. Op. at
18 n.6, that aspect of the Act abrogated our prior case law insofar as we had held
that an IJ should consider “an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood [only if it]
goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” See Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d
67, 77 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534
F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (acknowledging this abrogation).
But whether or not a statement goes to the heart of a non-citizen’s claim,
nothing in the statute abrogates the proper method for assessing its reliability. To
the contrary, the REAL ID Act permits IJs to make adverse credibility findings on
1 For ease of reference, though my observations apply equally to the different forms of immigration relief
for which the Act prescribes a standard for adverse credibility determinations, in the remainder of this
concurrence, I cite to § 1158(b)(1)(B) only, which governs asylum claims.

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5
a variety of bases, including based on any inconsistent statement or omission by a
non-citizen, regardless of whether the inconsistency involves “the heart of the
applicant’s claim.” § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). But the REAL ID Act requires IJs, in making
such determinations, to do so “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, and
all relevant factors.” Id. (emphasis added). More specifically, the Act permits IJs to
base credibility determinations on, among other things, “the consistency between
the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements,” but it requires IJs to do so
“considering the circumstances under which the statements were made.” Id. (emphasis
added). These aspects of the statute requiring assessment of reliability are phrased
as mandatory, not permissive, instructions to factfinders. See H.R. Rep. No. 109–
72, at 167 (2005) (“[A]lthough [§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)] would allow an adjudicator to
base an adverse credibility determination on any of the factors set forth therein,
such a determination must be reasonable and take into consideration the
individual circumstances of the specific witness and/or applicant.”).
The upshot is simple. If a particular Ramsameachire factor is irrelevant or
undisputed in a given case, then of course the IJ can ignore it. That has always
been true.2 But if one of the factors laid out in Ramsameachire is one of the “relevant
2 See Mohammed v. Garland, No. 19-66, 2021 WL 3085141, at *1 (2d Cir. July 22, 2021) (“Although we have
cautioned against reliance on airport or border interviews as a basis for an adverse credibility

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6
factors” or “circumstances under which the statements were made” that the REAL
ID Act commands the IJ to consider, then the IJ is not free to ignore it.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). A contrary rule would conflict far more seriously with the
statute Congress enacted than Ramsameachire ever did. Of course, that the IJ must
consider the relevant Ramsameachire factors does not mean the IJ must recite each
one to confirm that it did so. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir.
2009). The IJ need only make a sufficient record to enable the BIA and this Court
to evaluate its findings under the applicable standards of review.
III.
The linchpin of our role as a reviewing court is to reconcile the requirement
that the agency “[c]onsider[] . . . all relevant factors,” under the totality of the
circumstances, with the permissive bases, including the consistency of statements
made during a border interview, upon which an ultimate credibility finding may
rest. See § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). We are obligated to “review the agency’s factual
findings, including adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial
evidence standard, treating them as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
determination because they ‘take place immediately after an alien has arrived in the United States, often
after weeks of travel, and may be perceived by the alien as coercive or threatening, depending on the alien's
past experiences,’ Mohammed does not dispute the reliabity [sic] of the record.” (alteration adopted)
(quoting Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 179)).

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7
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)); accord Maj. Op. at 23. However, it would not be
accurate to say that the substantial evidence standard insulates decisions based on
adverse credibility determinations. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76 (“[T]he fact
that an IJ ‘has relied primarily on credibility grounds in dismissing an asylum
application cannot insulate the decision from review.’” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 335 (2d Cir.
2006))). As this Court recently reaffirmed, when we evaluate an adverse credibility
determination, “the ‘unless . . . compelled’ standard” imposes at least three
meaningful requirements on the agency. Singh v. Garland, 6 F.4th 418, 426 (2d Cir.
2021). Specifically, it “requires that the IJ articulate ‘specific’ and ‘cogent’ reasons
for finding an applicant not credible, that the reasons provided by the IJ ‘be
supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record when
considered as a whole,’ and that they ‘bear a legitimate nexus to the adverse
credibility finding.” Id. (alterations adopted) (quoting Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at
76–77).
The Ramsameachire analysis fits comfortably within that overall framework
for judicial review of agency decision-making. As discussed above, the purpose

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8
of the Ramsameachire analysis is only to ensure that “the record of the interview
accurately reflects” the non-citizen’s statements, the non-citizen “had a full
opportunity to express him- or herself,” and the non-citizen’s “statements are
likely to reflect his actual beliefs and fears.” Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 180. Thus,
if one of the specific “reasons” cited by the IJ for an adverse credibility finding is
an inconsistency between a non-citizen’s border interview and another statement,
the Ramsameachire factors bear directly on whether that reason is “both (1)
supported substantial evidence in the record and (2) logically related to the
applicant’s credibility.” Singh, 6 F.4th at 426. Far from “impos[ing] additional
judge-made procedural requirements on agencies that Congress has not
prescribed and the Constitution does not compel,” a proper understanding of
Ramsameachire conforms the agency’s decision-making to the statute. Cf. Maj. Op.
at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357,
365 (2021)); cf. also id. at 18 (describing Ramsameachire as imposing a “judge-made
test”). It also ensures that in accordance with Congress’s mandate, our review
under the applicable standard remains both meaningful and properly cabined.

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9
IV.
The majority opinion is therefore unnecessary to align our jurisprudence
with the REAL ID Act, and it is also unnecessary even to resolve the controversy
before us. Singh’s border interview statements about his April 2013 departure
from India, and his detailed account of months spent travelling to the United
States, conflict irreconcilably with his subsequent claim that he was persecuted in
India in September and November 2013. Certified Administrative Record
(“CAR”) at 69–70, 74–80, 105–06. To explain his inconsistency, Singh told the IJ
only that he was instructed by the person who smuggled him into the country, “do
not tell [the] correct thing to . . . anyone.” Id. at 94. Singh never explained how
that person placed him under “duress,” and the IJ reasonably rejected that
explanation, finding Singh’s evident “willingness to lie at the direction of others”
undermined, rather than supported, his credibility. Id. at 41.
Beyond his specious claim of “duress,” Singh never claimed his border
interview was unreliable in any relevant way. He did not assert that the record
was unreliable, that he was denied an opportunity to express himself, or that he
was prevented from expressing his “actual beliefs and fears.” Cf. Ramsameachire,
357 F.3d at 180. Singh’s testimony gave the IJ no reason to doubt the reliability of

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10
any pertinent aspect of the interview, and no plausible reading of Ramsameachire
required the agency to scrutinize the interview further before relying on it.
V.
Years of experience following the REAL ID Act’s passage, up to and
including Singh’s own case, underscore how Ramsameachire and the Act work
together in practice, and why the majority opinion’s intervention is unnecessary.
In Ming Zhang v. Holder—which addressed an agency decision to which the
REAL ID Act did not apply retroactively—we held the Ramsameachire factors are
relevant to evaluating credible fear interviews as well as airport interviews. See
585 F.3d 715, 724–725 (2d Cir. 2009). If there were any doubt at that point about
whether Ramsameachire created a rigid checklist to be followed in all cases, we
clarified that the agency “need not engage in ‘robotic incantations’ or make any
talismanic references to ‘close examination’ or ‘special scrutiny.’” Id. at 725. And,
even though the case was decided after the REAL ID Act’s passage, we gave no
indication that the analysis would change in future cases to which the Act applied.
More recently, the BIA reached virtually identical conclusions in a case with
which the majority opinion appears to agree. See Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec.
211 (2018); Maj. Op. 13–14, 22–24. In Matter of J-C-H-F-, the agency explained that

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11
the Act’s “broad language encompasses statements made in border and airport
interviews, as long as the [IJ] takes into account any issues regarding the
circumstances under which they were made.” Id. at 213. Recognizing the Act’s
emphasis on the totality of the circumstances, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), the
BIA agreed with the First Circuit that IJs need not “employ a checklist” or cycle
through a “mandated set of inquiries.” Id. at 215. Importantly, however, the BIA
acknowledged that “the factors listed in Ramsameachire are proper considerations for
assessing the reliability of an interview.” Id. (emphasis added).
In the years since, we have often recognized the continued utility of the
Ramsameachire factors, where relevant, in innumerable, albeit non-precedential,
decisions. See, e.g., Singh v. Garland, No. 22-6329, 2024 WL 5054850, at *1 n.1 (2d
Cir. Dec. 10, 2024); Ali v. Garland, No. 22-6287, 2024 WL 1252983, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar.
25, 2024); Sun v. Garland, No. 21-6130, 2023 WL 5273786, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 16,
2023); Villacorta v. Garland, No. 21-6045, 2023 WL 2854221, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 10,
2023); Smajlaj v. Garland, No. 18-3406, 2022 WL 710892, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 10, 2022);
Mohammed v. Garland, No. 19-66, 2021 WL 3085141, at *1 n.1 (2d Cir. July 22, 2021).
The majority opinion takes issue with a few stray phrases, devoid of context, from
a small handful of pre-REAL ID Act summary orders. See Maj. Op. at 17 n.5. But

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those decisions do not compel a different understanding of Ramsameachire. To the
extent those cases contain inartful phrasing, they are non-precedential and identify
numerous other issues with the agency’s decision-making. More importantly,
they shed no light on the role Ramsameachire plays in cases governed by the Act.
Finally, in this very case, the agency explicitly reaffirmed and applied Matter
of J-C-H-F-, and conducted just the kind of Ramsameachire analysis that this Court
has endorsed. See CAR at 4–6. That is, the agency gave the Ramsameachire factors
the weight they were due in the totality of the circumstances analysis, but did not
assign them talismanic significance. It would suffice to resolve this case to say that
the agency properly applied not just Ramsameachire and Ming Zhang, but also the
agency’s own precedent, as we generally require it to do. See Paucar v. Garland, 84
F.4th 71, 87 (2d Cir. 2023); Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152, 168 (2d Cir. 2022). Nothing
more need be said to bring either the agency’s decision-making or our own
precedent into alignment with the requirements imposed by Congress.
* * *
Ramsameachire has always stood for the simple proposition that the agency
cannot use evidence of a non-citizen’s prior statements against him if that evidence
is unreliable, and it has never required formulaic recitation of a list of factors to

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the exclusion of other relevant considerations. See Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 180;
Ming Zhang, 585 F.3d at 725. Ramsameachire highlights important considerations
both for the agency—which must consider “all relevant factors” including the
“circumstances under which the statements were made” under the REAL ID Act,
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)—and this Court—which must evaluate credibility findings to
ensure they are “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence,”
Singh, 6 F.4th at 426 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, properly
understood, Ramsameachire occupies a vital role in evaluating the credibility of
applicants for immigration relief, and neither the majority’s opinion nor the REAL
ID Act suggests any reason to change that. The language of the majority opinion
unnecessarily muddles the proper application of this Act to the straightforward
case before us. Ramsameachire has never allowed petitioners who, like Singh, admit
that they willfully lied at their border interviews, to escape the consequences of
adverse credibility determinations. For that reason, I concur in the judgment.

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