United States v. Concepcion

23-6337-cr(L)
United States v. Concepcion
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term 2024
Submitted: December 20, 2024
Decided: June 4, 2025
No. 23-6337-cr(L)
U NITED S TATES OF AMERICA
Appellee,
v.
MARTIN C ONCEPCION
Defendant-Appellant.*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
No. 19-cr-883
J. Paul Oetken, Judge.
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set
forth above.

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United States v. Concepcion
Before: C ALABRESI, PARK, and NATHAN, Circuit Judges.
A jury convicted Martin Concepcion of offenses related to sex
trafficking a minor. On appeal, Concepcion raises two arguments.
First, he claims that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)—which exempts the
government from proving that a defendant knew or recklessly
disregarded the age of a sex-trafficking victim when the defendant
had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim—is void for
vagueness. Second, he claims that the district court erred by not
providing the jury with a special verdict form. We reject both
arguments. Section 1591(c) is not unconstitutionally vague, and the
district court did not err in its use of a general verdict form. The
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Bobbi C. Sternheim, Law Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim,
New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
David J. Robles, Sarah L. Kushner, Olga I. Zverovich,
Assistant United States Attorneys, for Damian Williams,
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, New York, NY, for Appellee.

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PARK, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Martin Concepcion of offenses related to sex
trafficking a minor. On appeal, Concepcion raises two arguments.
First, he claims that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)—which exempts the
government from proving that a defendant knew or recklessly
disregarded the age of a sex-trafficking victim when the defendant
had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim—is void for
vagueness. Second, he claims that the district court erred by not
providing the jury with a special verdict form. We reject both
arguments. Section 1591(c) is not unconstitutionally vague, and the
district court did not err in its use of a general verdict form. The
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In October 2019, Martin Concepcion met Camilla Rodriguez—
a sixteen-year-old runaway—outside of a Bronx bodega.1 Along with
his roommates Michael Valdez and Ryan Diaz, Concepcion invited
Rodriguez to join them at a liquor store and then come home with
them. At their apartment, Concepcion and Valdez served Rodriguez
drug-laced alcohol, brought her into a bathroom, and filmed
themselves having sex with her. Afterward, Concepcion told
Rodriguez that she was “part of the group now.”
Concepcion explained to Valdez and Diaz that Rodriguez was
“the bag”—i.e., a way to make money. So that same night, the three
1 “Camilla Rodriguez” is the name under which the victim testified.
The parties refer to her as “Minor Victim-1.”

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men set to work prostituting her. They took explicit photographs of
Rodriguez and posted them to a website called CityXGuide.com, with
Concepcion drafting advertisements, setting prices, and teaching
Valdez and Diaz how to upload content. And they messaged directly
with interested parties. By the next night, they had lined up four
clients.
A sex-trafficking operation ensued. Each night for three weeks,
Concepcion, Valdez, and Diaz prostituted Rodriguez to multiple
men. They dressed her in lingerie, taught her to screen for police, and
took cash from her after each session. They also advertised Rodriguez
as part of a “two-girl special” with another prostitute. In total, they
solicited more than a thousand clients.
The operation involved violence. While Rodriguez was with
clients in Valdez’s bedroom, Concepcion, Valdez, and Diaz waited in
the apartment, armed with a gun. After Rodriguez once escaped to a
friend, the group sent her threatening text messages and searched for
her on the streets. When Rodriguez gave Concepcion “attitude,” he
struck her in the face. For his part, Valdez attacked Rodriguez on
multiple occasions.
When Rodriguez first met the group, she claimed to be
eighteen. But a woman trafficked with her warned Concepcion that
Rodriguez “looked young.” Separately, Diaz admitted to Valdez that
Rodriguez “give[s] me young vibes.” Suspicious of her age,
Concepcion and Valdez eventually asked Rodriguez about her “baby
face.” In response, Rodriguez confirmed that she was only sixteen.
Still, the operation continued.

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On October 21, 2019, Concepcion and Valdez used an
Instagram livestream to flaunt cash earned from their trafficking.
While playing with a gun, Valdez accidentally shot Concepcion’s
hand. Injured, Concepcion left the apartment and never returned,
ending his formal involvement with the operation. But Valdez
continued the scheme with other co-conspirators and remained in
contact with Concepcion.
Early in November 2019, Rodriguez attempted another escape.
But Valdez found her on the street and forced her back to the
apartment, where he beat her and threatened to shoot her. For the
next several days, Valdez locked Rodriguez inside his bedroom,
making her urinate into cups.
On November 7, 2019, law enforcement agents found
Rodriguez swollen and bruised. On November 8, Valdez texted
Concepcion to “lay low” because “feds ran up in my crib[] . . . for that
lil bitch.” Appellee’s Br. at 8. Two days later, officers arrested Valdez
and Diaz. But Concepcion remained a fugitive for the next eleven
months, until his arrest in October 2020.
B. Procedural History
In April 2022, the government filed a three-count indictment
against Concepcion. Count One charged him with sex-trafficking
conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). Count Two charged
him with sex trafficking a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. And
Count Three charged him with conspiracy to use interstate commerce
to promote unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
In July 2022, Concepcion proceeded to trial. After the close of
evidence, Concepcion moved for a judgment of acquittal on Count

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Two under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, arguing that “the
government should have to prove that the defendant had knowledge
that the victim was 16 years old, and we don’t believe that the
government sufficiently can show that.” Appellee’s Br. at 14. The
district court denied the motion without prejudice.
At the charge conference, Concepcion objected to language in
Count Two stating that the knowledge element of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)
could be satisfied by actual knowledge that the victim was underage,
“reckless disregard” of that fact, or a “reasonable opportunity to
observe” the victim. He argued that the phrase “reasonable
opportunity to observe” is “unconstitutionally vague” because “it’s
left to a multitude of interpretations that really affect . . . due process
rights.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 138, at 447. He also objected on similar grounds
to the government’s proposed instructions that, “[w]hen considering
whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the
victim, you should use the ordinary, everyday definitions of these
terms . . . [and] may find that the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to observe the victim if the defendant had in person, face-
to-face interaction with the victim.” Id. at 446 (quotation marks
omitted). The district court overruled both objections, finding that
the instructions were “consistent with Second Circuit case
law . . . saying . . . one or two opportunities to physically observe
someone is enough for reasonable opportunity.” Id. And in
explaining each element of the charged offenses, the district court
provided the jury with a general verdict form.
In August 2022, a jury found Concepcion guilty on all three
counts. In March 2023, the district court sentenced him to 144 months
of imprisonment, with a five-year term of supervised release.

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II. DISCUSSION
Concepcion argues that the sex-trafficking statute underlying
his conviction is unconstitutionally vague. He also claims that the
district court erred by using a general verdict form instead of a special
verdict form. We reject both arguments.
A. Statutory Framework
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1591 as part of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (“TVPA”), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464 (2000). The TVPA aimed “to combat trafficking in persons,
a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are
predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.” United States
v. Raniere, 55 F.4th 354, 360 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a)
(2000)). Two of its provisions—subsections (a) and (c)—are relevant
here. Under § 1591(a):
Whoever knowingly . . . in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce . . . recruits, entices, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains,
patronizes, or solicits by any means a person . . . knowing,
or . . . in reckless disregard of the fact, . . . that the person
has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to
engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b).
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (emphasis added). And § 1591(c) provides:
In a prosecution . . . in which the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to observe the person so recruited,
enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained,

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maintained, patronized, or solicited, the Government
need not prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly
disregarded the fact, that the person had not attained the
age of 18 years.
Id. § 1591(c) (emphasis added).
That is how § 1591 reads today. But “as originally enacted the
statute required the government to prove the defendant knew the
child victim was a minor.” United States v. Duong, 848 F.3d 928, 932
(10th Cir. 2017). So until 2008, § 1591(c) did not exist and § 1591(a)
applied only to those who sex trafficked minors “knowing . . . that the
person has not attained the age of 18 years.” 114 Stat. at 1487
(emphasis added).
That changed when Congress passed the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (the
“TVPRA”), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5044 (2008), to
“enhance measures to combat trafficking in persons.” The TVPRA
made two key amendments to the statutory scheme. First, it added
another way to prove mens rea under § 1591(a)—i.e., if someone sex
trafficked minors knowing “or in reckless disregard of” of the victim’s
age. Id. at 5069 (emphasis added). Second, it created a new
provision—§ 1591(c)—providing that in a “prosecution under
subsection (a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity
to observe” the victim, the government “need not prove that the
defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.”
Id. (emphasis added).

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In the wake of the TVPRA, courts struggled with a “perceived
tension” between § 1591(a) and § 1591(c). See, e.g., United States v.
Williams, 564 F. App’x 568, 570 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014). But in an issue of
first impression, this Court held that Ҥ 1591(c) supplies an alternative
to proving any mens rea with regard to the defendant’s awareness of
the victim’s age.” United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 32 (2d Cir.
2012). We explained that the “most natural” reading of § 1591(c) is
that “proof that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
observe the victim may substitute for proof that the defendant knew
the victim’s underage status.” Id. And we noted that our reading
gave effect to the “obvious goal” of § 1591(c): to “reduce the
government’s burden where the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to observe the victim.” Id.
But Robinson did not immediately end the debate. Other
circuits upheld § 1591(a) convictions under § 1591(c)’s opportunity-
to-observe standard, but “acknowledged the difficulties with the
[2008 amendment’s] syntactical structure.” United States v. Copeland,
820 F.3d 809, 813 n.7 (5th Cir. 2016). The Eleventh Circuit, for instance,
construed § 1591 as requiring either that a defendant knew the victim
was underage or that a defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
observe and recklessly disregarded the victim’s age. See United States
v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 2014). And the Sixth Circuit
did the same. See United States v. Jackson, 622 F. App’x 526, 528 (6th
Cir. 2015) (“[I]n a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the
person . . . [r]eckless disregard of the victims’ age is sufficient to
obtain a conviction.” (quotation marks omitted)).

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So Congress again amended the statute. Adopting our decision
in Robinson, Congress added to § 1591(c) the words “reckless[]
disregard[].” Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-22, 129 Stat. 227, 239 (2015); see also United States v. Rico, 619
F. App’x 595, 598 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Congress has now amended the
statute to comport with the Second Circuit’s approach.”). In so doing,
“Congress made clear that, when the government proves that the
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim, it need
not prove either actual knowledge or reckless disregard.” United
States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2019).
B. Void-for-Vagueness Challenge
A criminal statute is void for vagueness if it “fails to provide a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is
so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously
discriminatory enforcement.” Rubin v. Garvin, 544 F.3d 461, 467 (2d
Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has
conceived of this doctrine as “a basic principle of due process,”
Slattery v. Hochul, 61 F.4th 278, 294 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks
omitted), as well as “a corollary of the separation of powers—
requiring that Congress, rather than the executive or judicial branch,
define what conduct is sanctionable and what is not,” Sessions v.
Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148, 156 (2018).
“[W]e review de novo challenges to the constitutionality of a
statute.” United States v. Suquilanda, 116 F.4th 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2024).
“Vagueness challenges typically concern a statute ‘as applied’ to the
challenger, who professes that the law in question cannot
constitutionally be applied to the challenger’s individual

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circumstances.” United States v. Requena, 980 F.3d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 2020)
(quotation marks omitted). “But a party may also challenge a statute
as vague on its face, asserting that it is so fatally indefinite that it cannot
constitutionally be applied to anyone.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Here, Concepcion focuses on a facial challenge, but also raises an as-
applied challenge. Neither survives.
1. As-Applied Challenge
We begin with the as-applied challenge. See Vasquez v. Garland,
80 F.4th 422, 435 (2d Cir. 2023) (“Absent First Amendment concerns,
we assess vagueness challenges to a statute as applied, rather than
facially.”). In an “ordinary ‘as-applied’ claim,” the challenger “asserts
that a law cannot constitutionally be applied to [his] individual
circumstances.” Copeland v. Vance, 893 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 2018).
That argument is futile for Concepcion.
In October 2019, Concepcion embarked on three weeks of
intimate conduct with Rodriguez. He had sex with her. He dressed
her in lingerie and makeup. He took explicit pictures of her, which
he used for digital advertisements and kept on his iCloud account.
He taught her what to say to clients. Each night, he collected her
money and shared her bed. He asked her about her “baby face.” And
in time, he learned directly from her that she was sixteen years old.
Such contact supplied more than a reasonable opportunity to
observe Rodriguez. We have held that two in-person interactions—
involving a “face-to-face discussion” and the collection of money—
suffice under § 1591(c). United States v. Alcius, 952 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir.
2020). So three weeks living and sleeping together unquestionably
satisfies the statutory requirement. Accordingly, Concepcion’s

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conduct is “clearly proscribed” by the statute, United States v. Scott,
979 F.3d 986, 993 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted), so he
cannot claim to have been deprived of “a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited,” Rubin, 544 F.3d at 468 (quotation marks
omitted).
2. Facial Challenge
“[W]e have often declined to entertain facial challenges where
the challenger asserts no infringement of First Amendment or other
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.” Requena, 980 F.3d
at 40. But “[n]either the Supreme Court nor our Court has definitively
resolved whether facial vagueness challenges not based on the First
Amendment may proceed against statutes that can constitutionally be
applied to the challenger’s own conduct.” Id. So we next consider
Concepcion’s facial challenge to “facilitate [its] definitive rejection.”
Id.
To “succeed on a facial challenge, ‘the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.’” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 265 (2d
Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
That makes facial attacks “the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. And this case is no different.
As discussed above, the statute is not vague in the context of
Concepcion’s own circumstances.
But more fundamentally, the phrase “reasonable opportunity
to observe” is hardly vague. It neither “fails to provide a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited” nor is “so
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory

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enforcement.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). To
the contrary, it uses “familiar legal concepts that have played an
integral role in defining proscribed conduct over the years.” Mozie,
752 F.3d at 1283. Indeed, we have already made clear that § 1591(c)
refers to “in person . . . interactions enabl[ing one] to form her own
assessment of [a victim’s] age.” Alcius, 952 F.3d at 87.
The language of § 1591(c) is also unlike language in statutes
that are unconstitutionally vague. For example, the Supreme Court
has “struck down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the
defendant’s conduct was ‘annoying’ or ‘indecent’—wholly subjective
judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or
settled legal meanings.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 306; see Coates v.
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-
874 (1997). So too statutes whose “archaic language”—criminalizing
“vagabonds,” “common night walkers,” and “habitual loafers”—
“fail[ed] to give . . . fair notice” of the proscribed conduct and
“encourage[d] arbitrary and erratic arrests.” Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 n.1, 162 (1972) (quotation marks
omitted). And more recently, the Supreme Court has voided clauses
that required “divining [whether] the conduct entailed in a crime’s
ordinary case” posed a “substantial risk,” because such analyses prove
“excessively speculative” and “essentially inscrutable.” Sessions, 584
U.S. at 160-61 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Those examples bear little resemblance to § 1591(c). Far from
spawning confusion, a “reasonable opportunity to observe” lends
itself to straightforward interpretation. That is because the “terms
used in the phrase are not esoteric or complicated terms devoid of

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common understanding.” Rico, 619 F. App’x at 599 (quotation marks
omitted). So the “likelihood that anyone would not understand any
of those common words seems quite remote.” Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703, 732 (2000).
Concepcion maintains otherwise. He offers three arguments
for why § 1591(c) is unconstitutional. All fail.
First, Concepcion takes issue with the fact that the statute does
not define “reasonable opportunity to observe” or its components.
But a statutory term is not impermissibly vague simply because it
lacks a statutory definition. See, e.g., United States v. Wedd, 993 F.3d
104, 124 (2d Cir. 2021) (rejecting a vagueness challenge against an
undefined statutory term); Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 222-23,
227-29 (2d Cir. 2008) (same). To be sure, the absence of a statutory
definition can be a relevant consideration in the void-for-vagueness
inquiry. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. Still, “the plain meaning of the
[statute]’s wording,” VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179,
188 (2d Cir. 2010), the use of “familiar legal concepts,” Mozie, 752 F.3d
at 1283, and—as explained below—a scienter requirement defeat a
vagueness challenge.
Second, Concepcion raises a series of hypotheticals. Noting
that § 1591(c) does not make clear whether to focus on “the
reasonableness of the opportunity to observe, or the reasonableness
of the conclusion drawn from observation,” he considers whether the
phrase encompasses “hearing” and “social interaction,” then asks
whether the statute exempts blind defendants from prosecution.
Appellant Br. at 17-18 (quotation marks omitted). That leads him to
question, among other things, whether the statute accounts for

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victims who lie about their age. And on the basis of those inquiries,
Concepcion concludes that § 1591(c) “fails to provide the requisite
guidelines to ensure consistent enforcement.” Id. at 18.
But “[i]t will always be true that the fertile legal imagination
can conjure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of disputed
terms will be in nice question.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 110 n.15 (1972) (cleaned up). “Condemned to the use of words,
we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.”
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (quotation marks
omitted). So “speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical
situations not before the Court will not support a facial attack on a
statute when it is surely valid in the vast majority of its intended
applications.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 733 (quotation marks omitted). That is
the case here.
Third, Concepcion argues that § 1591(c) allows the government
to criminalize mere negligence. But that ignores that § 1591(a) still
includes a scienter requirement, which helps to “mitigate a law’s
vagueness.” Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 499 (1982). Under § 1591(a), the government must show that
the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that that the victim
“[would] be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a). So even if § 1591(c) imposes “strict liability with regard to
the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s age,” Robinson, 702 F.3d at
26, it “does not make § 1591 a strict liability criminal offense,” United
States v. Koech, 992 F.3d 686, 688 (8th Cir. 2021). See also Copeland, 820
F.3d at 812 n.6 (“§ 1591 does not actually impose ‘strict liability’

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because the statute, throughout its revisions, has retained a
traditional scienter requirement.”).
Nor does § 1591(c) create a new type of offense.
“Subsection (c) . . . does not state a separate offense; it expressly refers
to ‘prosecution[s] under subsection (a)(1)’ and it provides ‘an
alternative to proving any mens rea with regard to the defendant’s
awareness of the victim’s age.’” United States v. Graham, 707 F. App’x
23, 27 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Robinson, 702 F.3d at 32). Arguing
otherwise misapprehends § 1591(a)’s relationship with § 1591(c). “By
its plain terms, § 1591(c) does not delineate prohibited acts, it
rationally modifies how the government may prove § 1591(a)(1)’s
mens rea requirements when the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to observe the age of his sex trafficking victim.” Koech,
992 F.3d at 690.
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the argument
that § 1591(c) is void for vagueness. See Koech, 992 F.3d at 690 (“[T]he
term reasonable opportunity to observe provide[s] a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.” (quotation
marks omitted)); Whyte, 928 F.3d at 1331 (foreclosing claims that “the
‘undefined and elusive concept’ of a ‘reasonable opportunity to
observe’ is unconstitutionally vague”). And the Ninth Circuit has
gestured at the same in an unpublished opinion that endorsed as
“persuasive” Robinson’s reading of the statute. Rico, 619 F. App’x at
598-99. Today, we join our sister circuits. Section 1591(c) is not void
for vagueness, so Concepcion’s first challenge fails.

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C. Verdict-Form Challenge
Concepcion’s second claim is that the district court erred by not
providing the jury with a special verdict form. That argument is
meritless.
If a defendant “failed to object . . . to the District Court’s use of
a general verdict form, we review the[] claim[] on appeal under a
plain error standard,” granting relief only “if there was (1) error, (2)
that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Bell, 584 F.3d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks omitted).
With respect to Count Two, the district court instructed the jury
that the government needed to prove three elements beyond a
reasonable doubt: “Prohibited Conduct (Element One), Age of Minor
(Element Two), and In or Affecting Interstate Commerce (Element
Three).” Appellant Br. at 21. The district court further explained that:
[A]s to the victim’s age, the government can satisfy its
burden of proof by proving beyond a reasonable doubt
any one of the following: One, that the defendant
actually knew that the victim at issue was under the age
of 18. Two, except as to the act of advertising, that the
defendant was in reckless disregard of the fact that the
victim was under the age of 18. Or three, if the defendant
himself recruited, enticed, harbored, transported,
provided, obtained, maintained, patronized, or solicited
the victim at issue, but not if the defendant only

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advertised the victim at issue, that the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to observe the victim.
App’x at 56-57 (emphasis added).
According to Concepcion, those instructions required special
findings. Without such a verdict sheet, he insists, we are left with four
ambiguities that “undermine[] the certainty of the verdict.”
Appellant Br. at 25. First, whether the jury found Concepcion guilty
of § 1591(a)(1) or § 1591(a)(2). Second, whether the government
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Concepcion benefited from
“advertising” Rodriguez. Third, whether the government was
relieved of the need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Concepcion knew or recklessly disregarded that Rodriguez was not
eighteen. And fourth, whether the jury’s findings were indeed
unanimous.
We disagree. This Court has a “stated preference for special
interrogatories in particularly complex criminal cases.” United States
v. Ogando, 968 F.2d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 1992). But outside of such cases,
we have emphasized “the criminal law’s historical preference for
general verdicts” and “traditional distaste for special interrogatories.”
United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886, 891 (2d Cir. 1988). And while
the Supreme Court has stopped short of holding “that special verdicts
in criminal cases are never appropriate,” it has “call[ed] for caution”
in “the absence of a Criminal Rule authorizing special verdicts” and
suggested that special verdict forms are best used in “complex [RICO]
cases.” Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465, 472 & n.11 (2010) (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Pimentel, 346 F.3d 285, 305 (2d Cir.
2003) (“[W]e also strongly encourage the use of special verdict forms

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23-6337-cr(L)
United States v. Concepcion
in cases alleging multiple racketeering acts to facilitate appellate
review.”).
This is not a complex criminal case requiring a special verdict
form. We “commit the decision of whether and how to utilize special
interrogatories . . . to the broad discretion of the district court,”
eschewing “bright-line rules for determining when such
interrogatories should be employed.” Ogando, 968 F.2d at 149. So a
“district court’s refusal to require a special verdict” cannot “provide
an independent basis for reversing an otherwise valid conviction.”
United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 83 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted).
Concepcion never objected below to the use of a general verdict
form. Although he now argues that the need for special findings is
“built into the statute,” he identifies no deficiency in the district
court’s instructions. Appellant Br. at 25. Nor does he point to
anything in the record to overcome the “presumption that jurors
follow the instructions they are given.” United States v. Abu-Jihaad,
630 F.3d 102, 133 (2d Cir. 2010). We thus find no error—let alone plain
error—in the district court’s decision to use a general verdict form.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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