Mid Vermont Christian School v. Saunders

24-1704
Mid Vermont Christian School v. Saunders
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term 2024
Argued: April 9, 2025
Decided: September 9, 2025
No. 24-1704
MID V ERMONT C HRISTIAN S CHOOL , A.G., M.G.,
C HRISTOPHER GOODWIN, BETHANY GOODWIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ZOIE S AUNDERS, J ENNIFER DECK S AMUELSON,
C HRISTINE B OURNE , H ARTLAND S CHOOL B OARD,
RANDALL GAWEL , WAITS RIVER V ALLEY (UNIFIED
#36 E LEMENTARY ) S CHOOL B OARD, J AY N ICHOLS,
Defendants-Appellees.*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Vermont
No. 2:23-cv-652
Geoffrey W. Crawford, Judge.
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as
set forth above.

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Before: W ESLEY , S ULLIVAN, and PARK , Circuit Judges.
Mid Vermont Christian School forfeited a girls’ playoff
basketball game to avoid playing a team with a transgender athlete.
The school believes that forcing girls to compete against biological
males would affirm that those males are females, in violation of its
religious beliefs. In response to the forfeit, the Vermont Principals’
Association (“VPA”) expelled the school from all state-sponsored
extracurricular activities. Plaintiffs Mid Vermont and several
students and parents sued, bringing a Free Exercise claim and seeking
a preliminary injunction to reinstate the school’s VPA membership
and for other relief. The district court (Crawford, J.) denied the
motion. We conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing
that the VPA’s expulsion of Mid Vermont was not neutral because it
displayed hostility toward the school’s religious beliefs; Plaintiffs are
therefore likely to prevail on their Free Exercise claim. Because
Plaintiffs also satisfy the remaining requirements for injunctive relief,
the order of the district court is REVERSED, and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings and with instructions to grant
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction insofar as it seeks Mid
Vermont’s reinstatement in the VPA.
D AVID A. C ORTMAN, John J. Bursch, James A. Campbell,
Christopher P. Schandevel, Jacob Reed, Ryan J. Tucker,
Alliance Defending Freedom, Lawrenceville, GA,
Washington, DC, Lansdowne, VA, and Scottsdale, AZ,
for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

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S TEVEN J. ZAKRZEWSKI , Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani,
Hartford, CT, Pietro J. Lynn, Lynn, Lynn, Blackman &
Toohey, P.C., Burlington, VT, for Defendants-Appellees.
Duncan F. Kilmartin, Newport, VT, for Amicus Curiae
Citizens for Self-Governance.
Adam J. Hunt, Morrison & Foerster LLP, New York, NY,
for Amici Curiae National Education Association, Public
Funds Public Schools, National School Boards Association,
American Federation of Teachers.
Alexandra Zaretsky, Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae
Americans United for Separation of Church and State.
PARK, Circuit Judge:
Mid Vermont Christian School forfeited a girls’ playoff
basketball game to avoid playing a team with a transgender athlete.
The school believes that forcing girls to compete against biological
males would affirm that those males are females, in violation of its
religious beliefs. In response to the forfeit, the Vermont Principals’
Association (“VPA”) expelled the school from all state-sponsored
extracurricular activities. Plaintiffs Mid Vermont and several
students and parents sued, bringing a Free Exercise claim and seeking
a preliminary injunction to reinstate the school’s VPA membership
and for other relief. The district court (Crawford, J.) denied the
motion. We conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing
that the VPA’s expulsion of Mid Vermont was not neutral because it

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displayed hostility toward the school’s religious beliefs; Plaintiffs are
therefore likely to prevail on their Free Exercise claim. Because
Plaintiffs also satisfy the remaining requirements for injunctive relief,
the order of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings and with instructions to grant Plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction insofar as it seeks Mid Vermont’s
reinstatement in the VPA.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. Mid Vermont’s Expulsion
The Vermont Principals’ Association (“VPA”) regulates
middle- and high-school extracurriculars in Vermont. It counts
among its members every public and private high school in the state,
describes itself as “an administrative arm of the State,” App’x at 563,
and performs public functions on behalf of the Agency of Education,
see 16 V.S.A. §§ 245(a), 1693(b). The parties agree that the VPA is a
state actor.
Mid Vermont Christian School (“Mid Vermont”) is a private,
Christian pre-K through 12th-grade school in Quechee, Vermont.
Founded in 1987, it seeks to “glorify God by preparing each student
for college, career, and Christian ministry through a program of
academic excellence established in Biblical truth.” App’x at 86. As
part of its religious practice, it believes that “sex is God-given and
immutable and that God created each of us either male or female.” Id.
at 238. Mid Vermont joined the VPA around the same time it fielded

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its first basketball team during the 1993–94 school year and has been
a member ever since.
In 2023, Mid Vermont’s girls’ varsity basketball team made the
state playoffs. And in the first round of the tournament, they were
scheduled to face off against the Long Trail School (“Long Trail”),
whose team featured a biological male. Concerned about “[f]airness
and the safety of the girls,” Mid Vermont asked the VPA to stop the
transgender athlete from playing. App’x at 233. The VPA denied the
request, claiming that such an accommodation would violate its
policies concerning “gender identity and participation,” the Vermont
Public Accommodations Act, and the Agency of Education’s “Best
Practices For Schools For Transgender And Gender Nonconforming
Students.” Id. at 235. The VPA Policy on Gender Identity provides
students “the opportunity to participate in VPA activities in a manner
consistent with their gender identity.” Id. at 142.
On February 20, 2023, Mid Vermont forfeited its game against
Long Trail. The school explained its decision in a press release:
We withdrew from the tournament because we believe
playing against an opponent with a biological male
jeopardizes the fairness of the game and the safety of our
players. Allowing biological males to participate in
women’s sports sets a bad precedent for the future of
women’s sports in general.
App’x at 237.
Two days later, the VPA’s Executive Director—Jay Nichols—
testified before Vermont’s House Education Committee in support of
H.258, a bill that would prevent private, religious schools from

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receiving public funding. Nichols opened his remarks by explaining
that “we should never provide any tax dollars to schools that . . . look
away from the common decency of all students being welcomed.”
App’x at 181. And while complaining about schools whose curricula
feature “Christian values,” Nichols discussed Mid Vermont’s forfeit
against Long Trail:
A state approved Christian private school sends a letter
to the VPA asking that another school no longer be
allowed to play a transgender identifying
youth . . . . [T]his Christian school forfeits so they won’t
have to play against this team that has a transgender
student . . . . The VPA followed the law, of course, and
our policies, and will continue to ensure this child and all
transgender student athletes have equal access to
educational opportunities the same as all Vermont
children should have. Thank goodness the student in
question didn’t attend that religious school . . . but what
if they did? Would we be okay with that blatant
discrimination under the guise of religious freedom?
Id. at 182.
Three weeks after the forfeit, the VPA announced the
“immediate determination of ineligibility for Mid-Vermont Christian
in VPA sanctioned activities and tournaments going forward.” App’x
at 178. That expulsion barred Mid Vermont from participating in any
VPA extracurricular activity, from girls’ and boys’ sports to co-
educational, non-athletic events like spelling bees, science fairs,
drama festivals, and debate competitions.

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2. Administrative Appeal
Mid Vermont responded to the expulsion by writing to the
VPA and the VPA’s Activities Standards Committee (“Committee”).
It pointed out that the VPA violated its own policies by failing to
provide Mid Vermont with written notice of its alleged violation, a
recommended penalty, and the option to file an appeal. The letter
also explained that Mid Vermont forfeited because it had “serious
concerns over the safety of its female athletes” and because it believed
that “forcing our young ladies to compete against biological males”
would make the school “affirm something that violates our religious
beliefs—i.e., that the males who play in the girls’ league are females.”
App’x at 238.
On April 3, 2023, the Committee notified Nichols and Mid
Vermont that it “cannot address the substantive arguments in the
Appeal until and unless the proper procedures are followed under
VPA Policies.” App’x at 484. These included the requirement that
Nichols or a designee “issue a notice of probable violation describing
the charges, the recommended penalty, and advise the alleged
violator of the right to be heard” by the Committee. Id. Indeed, the
Committee warned that “[i]f the VPA wishes to proceed with
discipline in this case, [its] Executive Director or designee must first
issue [such] notice.” Id.
The next day, Nichols provided Mid Vermont with an after-the-
fact Notice of Violation. Mid Vermont in turn submitted a second
written notice of appeal, repeating the points made in its previous
challenge.

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On May 8, the Committee upheld the expulsion. Its ruling
stated that “[i]t is a myth that transgender students endanger others
when they participate in high school sports or create unfair
competition.” App’x at 247. It further explained that “[h]ad the
School made a sincere commitment to abide by VPA Policies and
Vermont law, and that its teams would compete with other schools
who include transgender athletes, we would be open to penalties
short of expulsion.” Id. at 248. It then rejected Mid Vermont’s
religious objection to playing Long Trail:
The School’s claim is wrong. Participating in an athletic
contest does not signify a common belief with the
opponent. Brigham Young University athletes do not
compromise their Mormon faith—or endorse
Catholicism—when they play Notre Dame. The act of
playing together on a basketball court does not imply
any approval of the values or beliefs of the opponent.
This case has nothing to do with beliefs. It has
everything to do with actions and their impact on
transgender students.
Id.
That fall, Mid Vermont contacted the VPA about reapplying for
membership. Nichols responded that the Committee’s decision is
“binding” and “cannot now be challenged.” App’x at 253. Still, he
asked Mid Vermont to “address in writing how the School intends to
assure that it will meet [its] obligations if the School again becomes a
member of the VPA.” Id. Quoting the Committee’s decision on
appeal, Nichols further specified that Mid Vermont would be
required to make “a sincere commitment to abide by VPA Policies

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and Vermont law” and to “compete with other schools who include
transgender athletes.” Id.
It is undisputed that due to its religious beliefs, Mid Vermont
could not make that commitment. It instead joined the New England
Association of Christian Schools (“NEACS”). But the closest NEACS
school is in Concord, New Hampshire, so Mid Vermont has incurred
“significant time and expense in traveling f[a]rther away to play
schools.” App’x at 343.
B. Procedural History
In November 2023, Mid Vermont, along with four students and
their parents (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), sued for declaratory and
injunctive relief and compensatory damages. Plaintiffs brought
claims against Nichols (as the VPA executive director), two school
boards, and various state education officials, including the interim
Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Education, the Chair of the
Vermont State Board of Education, and the superintendents of two
unions (collectively, “Defendants”). Mid Vermont also moved for a
preliminary injunction, seeking readmission to the VPA “as a full-
status member eligible to participate in all VPA events and activities”
and several assurances, including that the VPA would not “force the
School to . . . rewrite its own policies to conform with the VPA’s
gender identity policy.” App’x at 187. Defendants opposed that
motion and moved to dismiss the complaint.1
1 Plaintiffs also requested relief in connection with their claims for
tuition payments under the “Town Tuitioning Program.” Those claims—
and all aspects of the motion related to those claims—are not before us on
appeal.

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In June 2024, the district court denied the request for a
preliminary injunction. The district court found that the VPA’s
“directives concerning transgender athletes are rules of general
application and neutral as to religion.” App’x at 874. It noted that
“this case is one of neutral application of educational policies that
apply to all Vermont schools.” Id. at 876. Therefore, applying
rational-basis review, the court concluded that “Vermont’s policy of
recognizing the gender choice of high school athletes is not likely to
result in a ruling favorable to Mid Vermont.” Id.
Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal and moved for an
injunction pending appeal. The district court denied that motion,
reaffirming that it found Mid Vermont unlikely to prevail on its claim.
But it noted that “[i]t seems likely . . . that the exclusion of Mid
Vermont from activities such as debate tournaments and science fairs
in which boys and girls compete on the same team is unnecessary and
excessive.” App’x at 958. In July 2024, Defendants agreed to allow
Mid Vermont to participate in co-educational, non-athletic activities.
And that same month, the district court stated that “[s]ince the issue
of injunctive relief is going up on appeal, the court will defer any
ruling on [the motions to dismiss] until the appeal is resolved and the
case is returned to this court.” Id. at 959.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement of their expulsion from
the VPA. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. It found
that the VPA’s policies are generally applicable and neutral, and thus
subject only to rational-basis review. We do not reach that question
here. Instead, we conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in
showing that the VPA did not consider Mid Vermont’s case with the

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neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires because it was hostile
to Mid Vermont’s religious views. We also conclude that Plaintiffs
have demonstrated that they will suffer irreparable harm absent an
injunction, and that the public interest favors injunctive relief.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order and grant Plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction insofar as it seeks Mid Vermont’s
reinstatement to full membership in the VPA pending the resolution
of this case.
A. Legal Standard
When “a preliminary injunction will affect government action
taken in the public interest pursuant to a statute or regulatory scheme,
the moving party must demonstrate (1) irreparable harm absent
injunctive relief, (2) a likelihood of success on the merits, and
(3) public interest weighing in favor of granting the injunction.”
Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 631 (2d Cir. 2020)
(quotation marks omitted). “We review a district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, but must assess de novo
whether the court proceeded on the basis of an erroneous view of the
applicable law.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The VPA likely violated Mid Vermont’s First Amendment right
to free exercise of religion because its consideration of Mid Vermont’s
case was not neutral.
1. Legal Framework
The First Amendment provides that the government “shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting

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the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I; see Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise
Clause against the states). “At its heart, the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment protects the ability of those who hold religious
beliefs of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through the
performance of religious acts.” Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332,
2351 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). It “guarantees to all
Americans the right to believe and profess whatever religious
doctrine they desire, even doctrines out of favor with a majority of
fellow citizens.” New Hope Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Poole, 966 F.3d 145, 161
(2d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
Of course, the protections afforded under the First Amendment
are not limitless. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Free
Exercise Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability.”
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 630-31 (2018)
(quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, even under a neutral law of
general applicability, the government still “fails to act neutrally when
it proceeds in a manner intolerant of religious beliefs.” Fulton v. City
of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 533 (2021). The First Amendment, in other
words, guarantees not only that our laws be neutrally drafted, but
that they subsequently “be applied in a manner that is neutral toward
religion.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added). The
government is thus “obliged under the Free Exercise Clause to
proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of . . . religious
beliefs” when taking action to enforce its laws—even laws that may
be neutral and generally applicable on their face. Id. at 638. A plaintiff
may therefore “prove a free exercise violation by showing that

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‘official expressions of hostility’ to religion accompany” actions taken
by the government to enforce its laws, and in such cases courts may
set aside the adverse results of tainted enforcement proceedings
“without further inquiry.” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S.
507, 525 n.1 (2022) (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. at 639).
2. Application
Plaintiffs argue that the VPA’s expulsion decision was non-
neutral and hostile toward Mid Vermont’s religious beliefs. Based on
the undisputed record, we conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to
succeed in establishing that the VPA’s decision was indeed
accompanied by official expressions of hostility to religion.
“The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to
religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for
state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its
practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to
the Constitution and to the rights it secures.” Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993). “Factors relevant
to the assessment of governmental neutrality include the historical
background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of
events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the
legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous
statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.”
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. at 639 (quotation marks omitted). From
the record developed below, we conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to
show that the VPA did not act neutrally toward Mid Vermont’s
religious beliefs when it rendered its disciplinary decision.

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First, Nichols’s public statements evinced hostility toward Mid
Vermont’s religious beliefs. As described above, Nichols testified
before Vermont’s House Education Committee just two days after
Mid Vermont’s forfeit—but three weeks before the VPA announced
the expulsion. Advocating for a bill that would block private,
religious schools from receiving public funding, Nichols urged the
House Education Committee to “do the right thing” and pass
“legislation that doesn’t continue to allow misuses of taxpayer dollars
to effectively discriminate against many of our children.” App’x at
183. In so doing, Nichols offered “official expressions of hostility to
religion” that were “inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause
requires.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. at 639.
In his testimony, Nichols listed examples of how religious
schools “don’t follow the same rules as public schools, at least on the
most important issues.” App’x at 181. He mentioned that “[t]wo
religious schools have refused . . . to sign an assurance that they
would follow State Board rules regarding non-discrimination,”
noting that “[i]t doesn’t take a rocket scientist to see that these schools
and their far right supporters are gearing up for another lawsuit.” Id.
at 182. He highlighted that “one religious high school that we are now
sending public tax dollars to[]” requires “four credits of religion and
theology” and “witness[ing] Christian values.” Id. And he criticized
Mid Vermont’s forfeit against Long Trail:
[A] Christian school forfeits so they won’t have to play
against this team that has a transgender
student . . . . Thank goodness the student in question
didn’t attend that religious school . . . but what if they

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did? Would we be okay with that blatant discrimination
under the guise of religious freedom?
Id.
Such testimony supports the inference that the VPA’s
punishment was “informed by hostility toward certain religious
beliefs.” New Hope, 966 F.3d at 160. As Executive Director, Nichols
wielded the power to “enforc[e] VPA policies.” App’x at 28. On this
record, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing that he failed to
serve as a “neutral decisionmaker who [gave] full and fair
consideration to [Mid Vermont’s] religious objection.” Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 584 U.S. at 640.
Second, the record reflects that the VPA itself challenged the
school’s religious beliefs. Rejecting Mid Vermont’s appeal, the
Committee explained that the substance of the religious claim was
“wrong”:
Participating in an athletic contest does not signify a
common belief with the opponent. Brigham Young
University athletes do not compromise their Mormon
faith—or endorse Catholicism—when they play Notre
Dame. The act of playing together on a basketball court
does not imply any approval of the values or beliefs of
the opponent.
This case has nothing to do with beliefs. It has
everything to do with actions and their impact on
transgender students.
App’x at 248.

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That statement did not just question Mid Vermont’s religious
sincerity. It also attacked the validity of Mid Vermont’s objection. See
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). But “[a]n individual
claiming violation of free exercise rights need only demonstrate that
the beliefs professed are sincerely held and in the individual’s own
scheme of things, religious.” Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of
New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
That is because “courts should not inquire into the centrality of a
litigant’s religious beliefs.” Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 123 (2d Cir.
2023).
What is binding on courts is equally binding on the VPA. “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in . . . religion.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943); see also Yeshiva Univ. v. Yu Pride All., 143 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2022) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment guarantees the right to the free
exercise of religion, and if that provision means anything, it prohibits
a State from enforcing its own preferred interpretation of Holy
Scripture.”). Put simply, the VPA may not impose discipline based
on its view that Mid Vermont’s religious objection was “wrong.” On
this record, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that the VPA
did exactly that.
Third, the expulsion violated the VPA’s own norms. Nichols
conceded that, to his recollection, the VPA had never before banned
a school from all sporting events. Appellants’ Br. at 16. That
concession actually understated the severity of the decision, which
extended to any interschool activity, from spelling bees to math

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competitions. See New Hope, 966 F.3d at 168 (“[A]nother matter
bearing on religious hostility . . . is the severity of [disciplinary]
actions.”). To be sure, the VPA has since allowed Mid Vermont to
participate in co-educational, non-athletic competitions. But that is
only because the district court explained that the VPA’s expulsion
was overbroad. See App’x at 958 (“It seems likely to the court that the
exclusion of Mid Vermont from activities such as debate tournaments
and science fairs in which boys and girls compete on the same team
is unnecessary and excessive.”).
Making matters worse, the VPA ignored the detailed
procedural requirements governing its disciplinary process. Those
procedures called for a formal investigation, a preliminary report,
written notice of a probable violation, a recommended penalty, and
an opportunity to be heard at a hearing involving counsel and
evidence. But in its rush to impose an “immediate” expulsion, the
VPA flouted its own rules.
In sum, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that
Defendants acted with hostility toward Mid Vermont’s religious
beliefs. The VPA’s Executive Director publicly castigated Mid
Vermont—and religious schools generally—while the VPA rushed to
judgment on whether and how to discipline the school. In upholding
the expulsion, the VPA doubled down on that hostility by challenging
the legitimacy of the school’s religious beliefs. And as noted above,
the punishment imposed was unprecedented, overbroad, and
procedurally irregular. Those facts strongly support the inference
that Mid Vermont’s religious objection “was not considered with the

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neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires.” Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 584 U.S. at 639.
Where a state actor’s “hostility was inconsistent with the First
Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is
neutral toward religion,” id. at 640, our job is clear. We thus conclude,
without engaging in strict scrutiny, that Plaintiffs have made a strong
showing that the VPA violated “the minimum requirement of
neutrality” to religion. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533; see Stephanie H.
Barclay, Replacing Smith, 133 Y ALE L.J. F. 436, 442 (2023) (“When the
government is hostile, it does not get an opportunity to present a
justification for its exercise-burdening action. Instead, the action is
per se invalid.”). 2
C. Irreparable Harm and Public Interest
We next consider whether Plaintiffs are likely to suffer
irreparable harm and whether the public interest favors granting the
preliminary injunction. We conclude that Plaintiffs satisfy both
inquiries.
First, “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable
injury.” Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 19
(2020) (quotation marks omitted); see Agudath Israel, 983 F.3d at 636
(“Religious adherents are not required to establish irreparable harm
2 Because the hostility toward Mid Vermont’s religious beliefs
suffices to show a likely constitutional violation, we do not reach Plaintiffs’
arguments concerning general applicability, individualized exemptions,
and public benefits.

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independent of showing a Free Exercise Clause violation.”). In any
event, the expulsion subjects Mid Vermont to irreparable practical
harm, preventing the school from using VPA competition as a
recruiting tool and causing dozens of students to lose opportunities
to participate in VPA sports and to pursue athletic scholarships. See
McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275,
302 n.25 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that “the inability to play in the fall
season, which deprives [plaintiffs] the chance for Regional and State
Championship competition, constitutes irreparable harm”). Those
lost opportunities constitute irreparable harm.
Second, “the public interest is well served by the correction of
this constitutional harm.” A.H. ex rel. Hester v. French, 985 F.3d 165,
184 (2d Cir. 2021). As noted, enjoining the VPA’s expulsion of Mid
Vermont will allow the school’s students to compete in VPA sports
and pursue athletic scholarships. There is a strong public interest in
ensuring that students and schools do not lose out on valuable athletic
opportunities by virtue of the government’s hostility to religion. The
public interest thus favors reinstating Mid Vermont’s VPA
membership.
III. CONCLUSION
The order of the district court is reversed and the case is
remanded for further proceedings and with instructions to grant
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction insofar as it seeks Mid
Vermont’s reinstatement to full membership in the VPA pending the
resolution of this case.

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