United States v. Dralle

24-2424
United States v. Dralle
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
_____________________________________
August Term 2025
Argued: March 18, 2026 Decided: May 12, 2026
No. 24-2424
_____________________________________
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Appellee,
— v. —
C HASE D RALLE, AKA C HEVY,
Defendant-Appellant,
S TEFAN B AGLEY, J R., T REMAYNE F ERGUSON, AKA T RE, J EFFREY
C HARLESTON, AKA J D OT, J AMAINE A DKINS, J R., AKA G B ANGER,
J R., E SKAVAIL G ORDON, AKA V AIL,
Defendants.*
_____________________________________
Before: S ULLIVAN, B IANCO, and R OBINSON, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Chase Dralle appeals from the judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Omar A. Williams, Judge),
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as reflected above.

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following his guilty plea to one count of illegal receipt of a trafficked firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 933(a)(2) and 933(b). The district court sentenced Dralle
principally to 30 months’ imprisonment, which was above the advisory range of
12 to 18 months’ imprisonment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the
“Guidelines”), followed by three years of supervised release.
On appeal, Dralle argues that, in imposing an above-Guidelines sentence,
the district court procedurally erred by considering: (1) uncharged conduct by
Dralle while on bail that was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence; and
(2) a co-defendant’s participation in two shootings that did not arise from any joint
criminal undertaking or conspiracy between him and Dralle. Dralle further
contends that the district court’s sentence was procedurally and substantively
unreasonable because the reasons articulated by the district court did not justify
the extent of the upward variance from the advisory Guidelines range and resulted
in a shockingly high sentence.
We conclude that the district court plainly erred in considering the co-
defendant’s criminal activity in arriving at Dralle’s sentence, as there was no
allegation that they participated in any joint criminal undertaking or conspiracy
or that Dralle was even aware of that prior activity by the co-defendant. Although
the district court stated that the co-defendant’s participation in two shootings
provided context to the nature and circumstances of Dralle’s offense, we are
unable to discern how the co-defendant’s prior violent activities had relevance to
Dralle’s receipt of a firearm from the co-defendant, and the district court failed to
articulate a proper basis for consideration of the co-defendant’s violent conduct in
Dralle’s sentence under any of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because
we conclude that this plain error warrants remand and resentencing, we need not
determine whether any other of the alleged procedural errors amounted to plain
error, or whether the 30-month sentence was substantively unreasonable. In
particular, with respect to his separate challenge to the district court’s
consideration of his alleged uncharged conduct while on bail, Dralle will have the
opportunity at the resentencing to raise any objections to the district court’s
consideration of that alleged conduct and, if he does so, the district court will be
required to make a determination of whether the government has proven that
conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.
Accordingly, we VACATE the sentence imposed and REMAND the case
with instructions that the district court conduct a full resentencing consistent with

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this opinion.
Judge Sullivan dissents in a separate opinion.
F OR A PPELLEE : K ENNETH L. G RESHAM, (Nathan
J. Guevremont and Conor M. Reardon, on the
brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for David
X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District
of Connecticut, New Haven, Connecticut.
F OR D EFENDANT -A PPELLANT : K ATHLEEN E. D ION,
(Scott T. Garosshen, on the brief), Robinson & Cole
LLP, Hartford, Connecticut.
J OSEPH F. B IANCO, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Chase Dralle appeals from the judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Omar A. Williams, Judge),
following his guilty plea to one count of illegal receipt of a trafficked firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 933(a)(2) and 933(b). The district court sentenced Dralle
principally to 30 months’ imprisonment, which was above the advisory range of
12 to 18 months’ imprisonment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the
“Guidelines”), followed by three years of supervised release.
On appeal, Dralle argues that, in imposing an above-Guidelines sentence,
the district court procedurally erred by considering: (1) uncharged conduct by
Dralle while on bail that was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence; and

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(2) a co-defendant’s participation in two shootings that did not arise from any joint
criminal undertaking or conspiracy between him and Dralle. Dralle further
contends that the district court’s sentence was procedurally and substantively
unreasonable because the reasons articulated by the district court did not justify
the extent of the upward variance from the advisory Guidelines range and resulted
in a shockingly high sentence.
We conclude that the district court plainly erred in considering the co-
defendant’s criminal activity in arriving at Dralle’s sentence, as there was no
allegation that they participated in any joint criminal undertaking or conspiracy
or that Dralle was even aware of that prior activity by the co-defendant. Although
the district court stated that the co-defendant’s participation in two shootings
provided context to the nature and circumstances of Dralle’s offense, we are
unable to discern how the co-defendant’s prior violent activities had relevance to
Dralle’s receipt of a firearm from the co-defendant, and the district court failed to
articulate a proper basis for consideration of the co-defendant’s violent conduct in
Dralle’s sentence under any of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because
we conclude that this plain error warrants remand and resentencing, we need not
determine whether any other of the alleged procedural errors amounted to plain

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error, or whether the 30-month sentence was substantively unreasonable. In
particular, with respect to his separate challenge to the district court’s
consideration of his alleged uncharged conduct while on bail, Dralle will have the
opportunity at the resentencing to raise any objections to the district court’s
consideration of that alleged conduct and, if he does so, the district court will be
required to make a determination of whether the government has proven that
conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.
Accordingly, we VACATE the sentence imposed and REMAND the case
with instructions that the district court conduct a full resentencing consistent with
this opinion.
BACKGROUND
I. The Investigation
The investigation into Dralle arose from an investigation by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives into his co-defendant, Stefan Bagley.
On July 26, 2023, Bagley and one other individual were separately dropped off at
a hospital in Bridgeport, Connecticut—each with a gunshot wound. Bagley
declined to provide investigators with any information about how he was injured.
Upon review of surveillance footage from the area of one of the shootings,

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investigators concluded that a passenger of a vehicle registered to Bagley had shot
the other individual. Investigators then obtained a warrant to search Bagley’s
vehicle, where they discovered eleven empty firearm cases and several receipts for
firearm purchases. Further investigation revealed that Bagley had purchased
approximately twenty firearms in the previous ten months. After observing him
on surveillance video stealing ammunition when purchasing a firearm,
investigators obtained a warrant for Bagley’s arrest.
On October 27, 2023, Bagley was arrested while attempting to purchase
another firearm. At the time of Bagley’s arrest, investigators also seized his
cellphone. Messages retrieved from Bagley’s cellphone revealed that
approximately two months before Bagley’s arrest, he had purchased a pistol for
Dralle for $760.
II. Dralle’s Arrest and Guilty Plea
On December 12, 2023, a grand jury returned a twelve-count superseding
indictment charging Dralle and five co-defendants, including Bagley, with various
firearms offenses. Dralle was charged in only one of those counts—Count Ten—
which charged him with receipt of a trafficked firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 933(a)(2) and 933(b), arising from his August 2023 purchase of a pistol from

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Bagley. Dralle was arrested six days later and was released pending trial. The
order setting the conditions of his release required, inter alia, that Dralle not violate
any federal, state, or local law while on release.
On May 2, 2024, Dralle pled guilty to Count Ten pursuant to a plea
agreement. The parties stipulated that Dralle’s advisory Guidelines range was 12
to 18 months’ imprisonment. Dralle remained on release pending sentencing,
which was scheduled for August 26, 2024.
III. The August 5, 2024 Incident and Bail Revocation Hearing
On August 14, 2024, the United States Probation Office submitted a petition
to the district court seeking an arrest warrant for Dralle for violating the conditions
of his pretrial release in Trumbull, Connecticut. The petition was based on a police
report from the Trumbull Police Department, which was summarized by the
Probation Office in the petition. The petition noted that the “Trumbull Police
Department advised that the matter was under investigation and that they would
provide more information once obtained.” Gov’t App’x at 27.
According to the petition’s summary of the relevant police report, on the
evening of August 5, 2024, officers responded to a report of an assault at a gas
station in Trumbull, Connecticut. Upon arrival, officers encountered the

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complainant, “whose face showed significant bruising and lacerations around
both eyes and surrounding areas of his face.” Id. The officers also observed that
one of the complainant’s earrings appeared to have been torn from his ear.
The petition then summarized the complainant’s statements to the police
about the incident, as reflected in the police report. In particular, he was parked
at the gas station speaking on his cellphone when a blue SUV pulled into an
adjacent space and multiple people exited the vehicle. One of those people—later
identified as Dralle—began shouting at the complainant. A verbal altercation
ensued and Dralle then spit in the complainant’s face and punched him. After
Dralle and the complainant exchanged further punches, Dralle returned to his
vehicle, but the verbal dispute continued. Several minutes later, as the
complainant attempted to enter the gas station and waited to be admitted, the SUV
pulled up alongside him and Dralle again spat in his direction. The complainant
then approached Dralle and punched him, at which point all three occupants of
the vehicle exited and began assaulting the complainant—punching and kicking
him. One person ripped the complainant’s necklace off, and another tried to
remove his wallet from his pocket. Dralle and the other two individuals then
retreated to the SUV and drove away. According to the petition submitted by the

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Probation Officer, Trumbull Police Officers “reviewed CCTV footage” of the
incident and concluded that “the complainant’s account appeared to be accurate.”
Id. The petition also noted that the Trumbull Police Department intended to seek
an arrest warrant for Dralle, charging him with Assault in the Second Degree,
Criminal Attempt to Commit Robbery in the Third Degree, and Breach of Peace in
the Second Degree.
On August 15, 2024, the district court reviewed and signed the petition,
ordering that a warrant be issued to compel Dralle to show cause why his bond
should not be modified or revoked. On August 21, 2024, Dralle was arrested on
the federal warrant and brought before the assigned magistrate judge for a bond
revocation hearing. At that hearing, the government conceded that state
authorities had not yet sought an arrest warrant for Dralle but argued that there
was sufficient probable cause to believe that Dralle committed state crimes and
thus his pretrial release should be revoked. In response, defense counsel
emphasized that Dralle was presumed innocent, had not even been charged in
connection with the alleged incident at the gas station, and was otherwise fully
compliant with the conditions of his pretrial release.
The magistrate judge concluded that there was probable cause to believe

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that Dralle committed state crimes in connection with the altercation at the gas
station. The magistrate judge also noted his “concern[s]” about the truthfulness
of Dralle’s statements contained in documents submitted in connection with the
original bail determination about (1) whether he was actually employed at his
father’s business, (2) whether his father had past felony convictions, and
(3) whether Dralle had any financial assets. Joint App’x at 37–39. Given this
probable cause finding and the concerns about Dralle’s truthfulness, the
magistrate judge determined that there were no bail conditions that would assure
the safety of the community and revoked Dralle’s bail, remanding him into
custody pending sentencing.
IV. Dralle’s Sentencing
Just five days later, Dralle appeared before the district court for sentencing.
After briefly reciting the applicable maximum penalties for the offense that Dralle
admitted, the district court immediately pivoted to discuss Dralle’s history on
pretrial release. It stated:
When someone is not in custody, when they appear before me when
entering a criminal guilty plea, I usually remind them that they have
the rare opportunity to prove to the Court what sentence they
deserve. Here, Mr. Dralle was remanded to custody because of an
August 5 incident being investigated by the Trumbull Police

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Department. It was reported that Mr. Dralle was at a gas station
standing outside a vehicle with two other people at least, when he
allegedly told someone who had been talking on his cellphone while
parked in his own vehicle, that Mr. Dralle didn’t like the way the
person was looking at them and accused him of being cowardly, but
in more colorful language. And then, ironically, outnumbering that
individual, Mr. Dralle is alleged to have assaulted that individual
along with the two other people that were with him; a three-on-one
fight in which Mr. Dralle is accused of spitting in the person’s face,
and the people who were there with him are accused of trying to steal
the victim’s wallet and necklace, all while captured on video.
Joint App’x at 79–80. Defense counsel did not specifically object to this recitation
of the August 5th incident.
Although the district court correctly noted that Dralle was “not being
sentenced for that additional alleged criminal conduct,” it specifically noted that
it “shapes what the Court should do [at sentencing]” and “tells [the district court]
what sentence [Dralle] deserve[s].” Joint App’x at 80.
The district court then heard argument from the parties. The government
sought a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, and defense counsel sought a
sentence of supervised release. Defense counsel began her argument recognizing
that “there have been substantial charges since this defendant last appeared”
before the district court and noted that “his family . . . as well as [defense counsel
were] angry and disappointed in him.” Joint App’x at 88. The district court

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interjected and asked why letters submitted by family members between the bail
revocation hearing and the sentencing hearing did not address the incident at the
gas station. Defense counsel explained that she advised both Dralle and his family
to remain silent on the issue of “what may or may not have happened in Trumbull”
because any statement could “be used against [Dralle] in [a potential] State Court
proceeding[].” Joint App’x at 89.
The district court also then posed a series of rhetorical “what if” questions:
I’m not going to ask Mr. Dralle these questions, but reading through
those allegations, I’m sure the question that comes to anyone’s mind;
what if his guy had a gun? What if he pulled that firearm? [. . .]
What if he shot one of the people with Mr. Dralle and shot some little
kid who is in the car with their parent? What if someone in the vehicle
had a firearm and maybe that’s why he was acting so tough, three to
one, right? Especially in light of these allegations for which he’s
pleaded guilty. What if somebody in that vehicle had a firearm? And
we will not know because there was not an arrest on-site. So maybe
that is why they feel so tough. What if one of them pulled a gun
during this altercation and shot and killed that victim after he was spit
in the face by Mr. Dralle, right? What if one of those other people shot
and killed this guy? Does Mr. Dralle understand whether he could
have been exposed to being prosecuted for felony murder, a 25-year
minimum in prison because he’s engaged in a felony in a three-to-one
physical altercation because the people he is with who are trying to
rob this guy?
So I’m not going to ask those questions. I don’t have to ask those
questions. I hope he’s considered those questions. Frankly, whether
he speaks to it or not, it’s his conduct that decides what sentence he

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deserves. And so I can hear about remorse and the, you know, how
he’s learned from this experience or learned from the couple of weeks
he sat in jail, but frankly, it’s his conduct that is going to drive the
sentence he receives.
Joint App’x at 90–91.
In response, defense counsel volunteered that when she met with Dralle in
custody between the bail revocation hearing and the sentencing hearing that she
“read the riot act to him,” “went through . . . that his behavior . . . was wrong” and
that she thought “he took [it] to heart.” Joint App’x at 92.
Later in the sentencing hearing, after defense counsel argued that Dralle was
immature when he committed the offense he pled guilty to, and that spending time
in prison would not help his maturation, the district court interjected: “Well,
apparently neither did being out of prison. . . . And so at least when he’s in prison
we won’t have somebody sitting at a gas station at 11:30 at night getting jumped by
three people, getting his earring ripped out or whatever else that happened.” Joint
App’x at 96.
After hearing from Dralle and Dralle’s mother, the district court then
articulated the reasoning for its sentence. The district court’s reasoning began as
follows:
Mr. Dralle, you talk about anxiety that you have experienced during

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your incarceration. But I know your lawyer has advised you not to
talk about August 5th, but imagine the anxiety of the person being
outnumbered three to one at 11:00 at night at a gas station. Imag[ine]
that anxiety. And in prison, presumably you have correctional
officials to ensure your safety. This person didn’t. And yet you
mention doing everything that you can since December, the date that
you were arrested and released. But is that really what your actions
have shown, that you have been doing everything in your power to
avoid incarceration? There’s no way.
You talk about needing to schedule your GED test. You have been out
since December. You have been out since December. It doesn’t sound
like at 11:30 at night on August 5th that you were out trying to
schedule your GED test. You know better; if your mother was in law
enforcement, specifically involved in pistol permitting, you definitely
knew better. On August 5th, you knew better and, you know, that if
you don’t do better this is where you wind up.
Joint App’x at 112–13.
The district court also explicitly mentioned that in connection with “the
nature and circumstances” of Dralle’s offense, it “has to consider” the “greater
context of Mr. Bagley’s activities,” including that his vehicle was involved “in two
separate shooting incidents,” as well as Dralle’s own “activities on August 5 as
alleged by the government.” Joint App’x at 113–14. The district court nonetheless
acknowledged that Dralle was “not being sentenced here for those things” but
stated that it “can’t ignore that context in assessing what it is you are accused of
doing.” Id. at 114.

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Ultimately, the district court sentenced Dralle principally to 30 months’
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. This appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Dralle argues, inter alia, that the district court committed
procedural error by considering: (1) the uncharged conduct at the Trumbull gas
station without the requisite finding that the allegations regarding his conduct had
been proven by the government by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) the
violent activities of co-defendant Bagley, especially given the absence of any
allegation that such conduct was jointly undertaken or part of a conspiracy
between them.
Although the procedural reasonableness of a sentence is typically reviewed
for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008)
(en banc), we apply the more deferential plain error standard to Dralle’s
procedural claims because he did not raise them before the district court, see United
States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 538, 540 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Under the plain
error standard, the defendant must demonstrate “(1) there is an error; (2) the error
is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected

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[the defendant’s] substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected
the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affect[s]
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States
v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
I. Consideration of Dralle’s Uncharged Conduct
Dralle contends that the district court erred in considering “conduct [at the
Trumbull gas station] that had not been charged, admitted to by [him], or proven
by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing hearing.” Appellant’s Br. at
15.
“In deciding upon a sentence, a district court has the discretion to rely on
the wide array of facts before it, including information set forth in the pre-sentence
report, as well as evidence that would not be admissible at trial, so long as the
defendant is given an opportunity to contest the accuracy of that information.”
United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011). As part of that broad
discretion, “[a] sentencing court is not limited to considering only evidence of the
convicted offense; it may take into account other relevant conduct.” United States
v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 2007); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. (“Conduct

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that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may
enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range.”).
However, we have emphasized that “there are distinct limits to this
discretion, and they include a defendant’s due process right to be sentenced based
on accurate information” and “factual matters considered as a basis for [a]
sentence must have some minimal indicum of reliability beyond a mere
allegation.” Juwa, 508 F.3d at 700–01 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “[w]e have held that facts relevant to
sentencing must be found by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 701; see also
Cossey, 632 F.3d at 88 (“It is uncontroversial to conclude that a sentencing decision
that relies on factual findings that were unsupported in the record, and thus could
not possibly have been established by a preponderance of the evidence, seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.”). In
resolving factual disputes under that standard, the district court is afforded broad
discretion as to what types of procedure are needed, including whether a full
evidentiary hearing is required. See United States v. Guldi, 141 F. 4th 435, 450 (2d
Cir. 2025).
Here, the district court never made a finding that the uncharged alleged

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conduct at the gas station was proven by the government by a preponderance of
the evidence. Indeed, it is not entirely clear what information the district court
considered before it decided to increase Dralle’s sentence because of the
uncharged alleged conduct. The uncharged alleged conduct was not described in
the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), and the government did not offer any evidence
at the sentencing related to that conduct. Instead, it appears that the district court’s
knowledge of these allegations was based upon the petition from the Probation
Office to the district court seeking a warrant for Dralle’s re-arrest for violation of
bail in light of those allegations. That warrant application summarized a police
report containing statements by the complainant from the gas station incident
about Dralle’s conduct.1 To be sure, during the sentencing, the district court also
made several references to a video of the incident. However, the district court did
not indicate that it had received the video or reviewed it; rather, it indicated that
“it was reported that it’s on video.” Joint App’x at 104. The only information
regarding the video was contained in the petition which, in the course of
1 Although the district court did not provide Dralle’s counsel with a copy of the petition
for the arrest warrant or the police report at the sentencing (if the district court had that
report), defense counsel had obtained a copy of those documents in connection with the
bail revocation proceeding.

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summarizing the police report, noted the report’s statement that “[o]fficers
reviewed CCTV footage and the complainant’s account appeared to be accurate.”
Gov’t App’x at 27.
The government argues that the district court could rely upon the petition
to find that Dralle engaged in the alleged conduct at the gas station because the
petition was summarizing the police report. However, “[p]olice reports are not
presumed to be categorically reliable.” United States v. Jordan, 742 F.3d 276, 280
(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Harrison, 809 F.3d 420, 424 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Whether
a police report is sufficiently reliable is a question we examine on a case-by-case
basis, considering all the relevant circumstances . . . .”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); United States v. Padilla, 793 F. App’x 749, 756 (10th Cir. 2019)
(“Not every police report satisfies the reliability floor.”).
With respect to this requirement, the government suggests that the police
report in this case contained sufficient indicia of reliability—namely, the
“complainant’s recollection and the information obtained by officers after
reviewing security footage.” Appellee’s Br. at 29. In doing so, the government
overlooks the fact that the district court (1) never identified the information upon
which it was relying (including whether it had reviewed the police report or the

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video or only the Probation Office’s summary of the report); (2) never made any
determination regarding the reliability of any information it was considering
regarding the alleged incident; and (3) never made a finding that the information
satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard. See United States v. Cordoba-
Murgas, 233 F.3d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court has observed that
the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ is the generally applicable standard for a
sentencing judge to employ when deciding the weight and effect to accord
relevant, uncharged conduct at sentencing.”) (citing United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.
148, 156–57 (1997) (per curiam) and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91
(1986)); see also United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1992) (vacating the
defendant’s sentence and remanding for resentencing where district court did not
make “explicit affirmative findings of fact” regarding the amount of narcotics
involved in the offense, but rather implicitly accepted the factual findings in the
PSR).
As the Tenth Circuit aptly explained,
[I]f a class of documents—such as police complaints or police
reports—is not inherently reliable, then it makes sense that any
individual document within that class cannot be assumed to be
sufficiently reliable to establish a sentencing fact. Rather, there must
be a finding that the specific document at issue contains sufficient

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indicia of reliability to support the probable accuracy of the
information it is being offered to establish. And such a finding is
logically appropriate only where the document has been entered into
evidence so that the district court may, on the record, assess factors
bearing on the document’s veracity such as the level of detail, internal
consistency, and overall quality of that document.
Padilla, 793 F. App’x at 759; see also id. (holding that “the district court clearly erred
in finding that [the defendant committed uncharged conduct] by merely relying
on the contents of a police report that had not been entered into evidence”); see also
Jordan, 742 F.3d at 281 (“Where the district court did not determine the [police]
report was reliable, its detail alone does not allow us to hold independently that it
was.”). In short, to the extent the district court relied upon information in the
police report (or the petition summarizing the police report) to establish that the
uncharged conduct occurred, it erred by failing to make a determination as to the
reliability of the information contained in the police report, as well as whether such
evidence met the preponderance of the evidence standard.
The government suggests no such findings were necessary because of
Dralle’s “apparent embrace of the petition[’s] facts” surrounding his alleged
conduct during the Trumbull incident. Appellee’s Br. at 32. As an initial matter,
we note that the district court did not ask Dralle or his counsel whether they had

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any factual objections to the allegations asserted by the government in connection
with the Trumbull incident. Moreover, notwithstanding the absence of a specific
objection to the district court’s consideration of the uncharged conduct, there is an
insufficient basis in the record for us to conclude that Dralle agreed with the details
of his alleged involvement in the Trumbull incident. Instead, defense counsel
explained to the district court why Dralle would not be addressing the Trumbull
incident during the sentencing—namely, given the possibility of new state charges
being brought in connection with that incident, she had advised Dralle and his
family not to make any comments about it. In particular, defense counsel told the
district court:
So, Your Honor, I met with the defendant over the weekend. I also
spoke with his mother. I advised the defendant very strongly, and I
hope that he sticks with this, that the Trumbull incident is, there’s a
possibility of an arrest. Anything he says, any comments that he
makes with regard to that incident whatsoever, can be used against
him, and I advised him not to address that issue. And if the Court
questions him about it, I’ll advise him that he has the right to remain
silent and that anything he says in this courtroom with regard to what
may or may not have happened in Trumbull can be used against him in
State Court proceedings.
Joint App’x at 89 (emphasis added). That statement was hardly an indication that
Dralle was stipulating or agreeing to the allegations made by the government in

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connection with his conduct during the incident.2
The government also points to the fact that defense counsel indicated to the
district court that she “read the riot act to [Dralle]” during their discussion about
the Trumbull incident, including “[going] through [with Dralle] everything that
his behavior, how it was wrong, the steps that were wrong, from beginning to
end.” Id. at 92. The government contends that “defense counsel’s remarks at
sentencing reflected evident agreement that Dralle had been involved in the violent
altercation as described.” Appellee’s Br. at 31 (emphasis in original).
We are unpersuaded. Defense counsel’s remarks could have been
reasonably construed to reflect disappointment in the fact that Dralle had shown
poor judgment in associating with certain individuals and/or placing himself in a
position where he could be accused of participating in an altercation and assault,
as well as failing to extricate himself from that situation once it developed, rather
than being construed as agreement that he was the aggressor in that incident.
2 Interestingly, when Dralle’s mother spoke on his behalf at sentencing and was
questioned by the district court about the Trumbull incident, she highlighted the fact that
that she was “not sure” what happened at the gas station in Trumbull on August 5th, and
noted that it “ha[dn’t] gone to court,” Dralle “ha[dn’t] been arrested for it and [she didn’t]
know what proof there is,” and “he ha[d] not been found guilty or anything like that.”
Joint App’x at 100. Immediately after this statement, the district court noted that “[t]here’s
video evidence [of the incident] according to the parties.” Id.

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Thus, even if her statement indicated agreement that Dralle was involved with his
friends in an altercation or dispute during the Trumbull incident, it could hardly
be construed as a concession that all of the allegations as described by the district
court, including Dralle’s personal involvement in an unprovoked assault and
attempted robbery, were undisputed. See, e.g., Joint App’x at 104 (the district
court, in summarizing the allegations, stating that “Mr. Dralle, unprovoked, had a
dispute with somebody else, spat in their face, assaulted them, and he and two
other people he was with assaulted this person, three on one; that the two people
he was with tried to steal the person’s necklace and wallet, and it was caught on
video.”); id. at 91 (“What if one of those other people shot and killed this guy?
Does Mr. Dralle understand whether he could have been exposed to being
prosecuted for felony murder, a 25-year minimum in prison because he’s engaged
in a felony in a three-to-one physical altercation because the people he is with who are
trying to rob this guy?”) (emphasis added); id. at 96 (“And so at least when he’s in
prison we won’t have somebody sitting at a gas station at 11:30 at night getting
jumped by three people, getting his earring ripped out or whatever else happened.”)
(emphasis added); id. at 102 (referring to the August 5th incident as “beating up
an innocent person”).

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Indeed, there is no indication that the district court interpreted Dralle’s
silence or defense counsel’s remarks as a concession regarding those alleged
details of the incident. To the contrary, when the district court explained its
consideration of the Trumbull incident in arriving at its sentence, it referred to,
inter alia, “[Dralle’s] activities on August 5 as alleged by the government” and further
emphasized that it “[couldn’t] ignore that context in assessing what it is [Dralle
was] accused of doing.” Joint App’x at 114 (emphasis added); see also id. at 90 (the
district court’s reference to “reading through those allegations” regarding the
Trumbull incident) (emphasis added). Thus, even though Dralle never stipulated
or agreed to the details of his alleged conduct during the Trumbull incident and
the district court appeared to view them as allegations, it nevertheless never made
any determination as to the reliability of those allegations of uncharged conduct
under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard before considering those
allegations in arriving at its sentence.3
3 We note that the government cannot meet this evidentiary standard by merely relying
upon the magistrate judge’s determination, in the context of the bail revocation hearing,
that “[t]here [was] ample probable cause to believe that on August 5, 2024, defendant and
other associates committed a violent assault of a third party, that the victim suffered
injuries and that the confrontation that ultimately led to the assault was instigated by the

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To be sure, we recognize that, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(i)(3)(B), the district court’s fact-finding obligation is only triggered “for any
disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter.” See
United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 456 (2d Cir. 1996) (“As to facts disputed in
connection with sentencing, the court is required to make findings sufficient to
permit appellate review. It is sufficient for these purposes if the court indicates,
either at the sentencing hearing or in the written judgment, that it is adopting the
recommendations in the PSR.”) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v.
Rodriguez-Delma, 456 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that “because [the
defendant] failed to make any allegations of factual inaccuracy [to the PSR], the
district court’s fact-finding obligation under Rule 32(i)(3)(B) was never
triggered”).
However, here, none of the procedural safeguards that exist in Rule 32, with
respect to objections to a PSR, were utilized in connection with the district court’s
defendant.” Gov’t App’x at 8. As we have explained, “[w]hile the evidentiary standard
at sentencing is more relaxed than at trial, and the burden of proof on the government is
a preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt, probable cause is a
lower standard than preponderance of the evidence; it requires only a probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Juwa, 508
F.3d at 701 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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consideration of Dralle’s uncharged conduct to ensure it was uncontroverted. In
other words, the alleged uncharged conduct was not put in an addendum to the
PSR, nor did the district court even identify to Dralle what document it was
considering in connection with the allegations. In the absence of any such
addendum or document, as noted supra, the district court never asked Dralle
whether he had reviewed the allegations of uncharged conduct with his attorney
or whether there were any factual objections to that alleged conduct, as would
occur with respect to an addendum to a PSR. See generally Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(1)(A) (explaining that, at sentencing, the district court “must verify that the
defendant and the defendant’s attorney have read and discussed the presentence
report and any addendum to the report”); cf. Rodriguez-Delma, 456 F.3d at 1253–54
(emphasizing, in finding that the district court’s fact-finding obligation was not
triggered, that defense counsel was questioned in detail regarding the
“undisputed facts” in the PSR and, after the court described those facts, counsel
stated that the court had “summarized everything quite well”). In short, because
of the manner in which the district court’s consideration of the uncharged conduct
unfolded at the sentencing, we are hesitant to conclude that all of the detailed
allegations regarding the uncharged conduct were undisputed, such that the

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district court was relieved of its obligation to assess the reliability of the evidence
upon which it relied and its obligation to determine whether the evidence was
sufficient to satisfy the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
However, we need not resolve whether the district court’s consideration of
the uncharged conduct under these circumstances amounted to a clear or obvious
error, or whether any such error affected Dralle’s substantial rights and the
fairness of his sentencing, because, as discussed infra, we conclude that a full
resentencing is separately required because of the district court’s plain error with
respect to its consideration of the co-defendant’s shootings in connection with
Dralle’s sentence. Thus, before the resentencing, Dralle will have the opportunity
to obtain any relevant additional information regarding the Trumbull incident,
including seeking to obtain any video of the incident. Moreover, the district court
should identify any documents or evidence upon which it intends to rely (whether
submitted by the Probation Office or the government) with respect to its
consideration of the uncharged conduct and ensure that any such documents or
evidence have been provided to the defendant. Finally, at the resentencing, Dralle
will have an opportunity to object to the factual accuracy of those allegations upon
which the district court intends to rely and challenge the evidence upon which

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they are based and, if he does so, the district court will need to determine, after
giving Dralle an opportunity to be heard, whether the evidence offered by the
government is sufficiently reliable to prove those allegations under the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
II. Consideration of Co-Defendant Bagley’s Violent Activities
Dralle asserts that “[t]he district court erred by weighing the shootings Mr.
Bagley was involved in during its consideration of the nature and circumstances
of Mr. Dralle’s offense, despite there being no allegation that the referenced
conduct resulted from jointly undertaken criminal activity or any allegation that
Mr. Dralle and Mr. Bagley were co-conspirators.” Appellant’s Br. at 26.
At sentencing, the district court noted that “about three months before
[Dralle] decided to purchase a firearm illegally from Mr. Bagley, [Bagley’s] vehicle
was involved in two separate shooting incidents.” Joint App’x at 113. The district
court further explained that “Mr. Bagley . . . was shot in one of those incidents . . .
[a]nd in another one, there’s someone who is alleged to have reached out of his
vehicle and shot up another vehicle multiple times striking somebody.” Id. at 114.
After recounting the shootings, the district court stated:
So, yes, you are being convicted of a nonviolent offense, but the Court

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has to consider the nature and circumstances of your offense and does
so with the greater context of Mr. Bagley’s activities, the activities of
your codefendant, your activities on August 5 as alleged by the
government, and I’ve got to decide what an appropriate sentence is
here. You are not being sentenced here for those things, but I can’t
ignore that context in assessing what it is you are accused of doing.
Thankfully, we are not in that type of situation here; you are not being
accused of being involved in any shootings. You are not shot yourself.
But it doesn’t take a whole lot to go from what it is you are accused of
doing and wind up in one of those much worse situations.
Id.
“It is well established that a district court may consider the relevant conduct
of co-conspirators when sentencing a defendant.” United States v. Johnson, 378 F.3d
230, 238 (2d Cir. 2004). In particular, when calculating a defendant’s Guidelines
range, a district court may consider “jointly undertaken criminal activity,”
whether or not that activity is charged as a conspiracy, when the acts or omissions
of others were: “(i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,
(ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and (iii) reasonably foreseeable [to the
defendant] in connection with that criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
Thus, we have made clear that “[in] order to hold a defendant accountable for the
acts of others, a district court must make two findings: 1) that the acts were within
the scope of the defendant’s agreement and 2) that they were foreseeable to the

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defendant.” Johnson, 378 F.3d at 238 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Here, as the government conceded at oral argument, the district court would
have committed plain error if it had increased Dralle’s sentence based on Bagley’s
shootings because there is no evidence, nor even an allegation, that Dralle and
Bagley were co-conspirators or that the shootings occurred within the scope of
jointly undertaken criminal activity. Indeed, Dralle purchased the firearm from
Bagley after those shootings, and there was no evidence that Dralle even had any
knowledge of those prior shootings. See, e.g., United States v. Burnett, 827 F.3d 1108,
1121 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding plain error where the district court “based [the
defendant’s] sentence in part on conduct that occurred before he joined the
conspiracy”); see also United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1246 (11th Cir. 2018)
(holding that the district court erred in considering conduct by co-conspirator that
was not within the scope of any jointly undertaken criminal activity when
calculating the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range).
Instead, the government argues that the district court properly considered
Bagley’s shootings for a different and permissible purpose, namely, as “important
context in understanding the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of Dralle’s

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offense.” Appellee’s Br. at 22; see also id. at 44 (explaining that “looking to the
conduct of others (including criminal associates) to place a defendant’s crime in
context is different from attributing that conduct to the defendant under the
Guidelines”). Accordingly, the government argues that “[t]he incidents involving
Bagley helped illustrate why it was so dangerous for someone like Dralle to
illegally purchase a gun.” Appellee’s Br. at 43.
To be sure, though a district court may not hold a defendant accountable for
a third party’s conduct by increasing the defendant’s sentence without finding that
the third party’s acts were within the scope of the defendant’s agreement and were
foreseeable to the defendant, a court may consider such conduct to the extent that
it is relevant to the Section 3553(a) analysis as it relates to the defendant.
However, the mere use of the word “context” by a sentencing judge does
not insulate a district court’s consideration of a co-defendant’s violent conduct
from review where the district court does not connect its consideration of such
conduct to one or more Section 3553(a) factor. In other words, the district court
must articulate how, even though it would be improper to hold the defendant
accountable for the co-defendant’s conduct by increasing the defendant’s sentence
without making the findings required under Johnson, the co-defendant’s activities

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still could be properly considered for some other reason under the Section 3553(a)
factors.
Here, to the extent that the district court imposed the above-Guidelines
sentence in part because Bagley’s shootings demonstrated the nature and
circumstances and/or seriousness of Dralle’s offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(A), there was an insufficient evidentiary basis to do so given the lack of any
reasonable foreseeability that Dralle was about to “wind up,” as the district court
described it, see Joint App’x at 114, participating in the same type of violent
conduct as Bagley. Indeed, at one point during the sentencing, the district court
did suggest that “trafficking of firearms can be related to . . . gang or drug activity
in a lot of cases,” and further noted that “some might argue that unprovoked
violence as is alleged in the Trumbull incident against Mr. Dralle, some might
argue that type of unprovoked violence is also suggestive of that type of gang and
drug activity without other explanation.” Joint App’x at 87. But the government
then confirmed to the district court that it was not making any allegation that
Dralle was involved in any drug or gang activity. Nor was there any evidence at
sentencing advanced by the government that Dralle, who had no criminal record,
was purchasing the firearm to further any other type of criminal activity, or that

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Dralle was knowingly associating with violent individuals.4
Moreover, the district court did not point to any other consideration that
would permit the district court to consider Bagley’s prior shootings as “context”
under one of the Section 3553(a) factors. In sum, the district court plainly erred in
drawing any inference as to Dralle’s potential dangerousness, or the seriousness
of his offense, based upon Bagley’s participation in two shootings.5
4 In response to defense counsel noting that, if Dralle had simply waited a few months
for his 21st birthday, he could have applied for a permit and purchased the gun for
himself (rather than through Bagley), the district court asked why Dralle needed the gun
so quickly, and defense counsel responded: “Because he’s young and stupid. I don’t
have another answer for that. He was driving back and forth from Trumbull to Stamford
to work at his father’s business. I know there’s a lot of gang violence in the Bridgeport
area. I don’t know how close he is on the Trumbull border to Bridgeport and all the issues
that go on in Bridgeport, but he wanted a gun. And his stepfather’s nephew, who is Mr.
Bagley, I believe, had a permit and was able to purchase guns” legally. Joint App’x at 94.
5 Although the dissent correctly notes that our precedent does not require a sentencing
judge “to engage in the utterance of robotic incantations when imposing sentences in
order to assure us that they have weighed in an appropriate manner the various [S]ection
3553(a) factors,” post at 6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), reliance on that
precedent is misplaced because we are not remanding for resentencing because the
district court failed to recite and address each of the Section 3553(a) factors in arriving at
its sentence; rather, the plain error here arises from the district court’s failure to explain
the basis for its reliance on a co-defendant’s violent conduct even though there is no
allegation that Dralle was involved in, or even aware of, that conduct. As discussed supra,
in order to comply with our precedent, the district court needed to do more than vaguely
reference its consideration of the co-defendant’s violence as “context” for the nature and
circumstances of the Dralle’s offense under Section 3553(a)(1). Thus, we respectfully

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In concluding there was plain error, we find inapposite the cases cited by
the government to support its position. For example, in a nonprecedential
summary order, United States v. Small, No. 22-1622, 2024 WL 1173046 (2d Cir. Mar.
19, 2024) (summary order), we concluded that the district court could properly
consider specific harms caused by the co-conspirators of the drug business that the
defendant operated. In particular, it could consider that one of the defendant’s
associates who manned the defendant’s drug phone and serviced his customers,
“led police on a high-speed chase, which resulted in the killing of a bystander and
serious injury to two others” and that one of the defendant’s associates was killed
in “a double homicide that occurred down the street from the house that hosted
[the defendant’s] drug operation.” Id. at *1–2. We explained that those incidents
“illustrated the dangers associated with the kind of drug trafficking with which
[the defendant] was involved.” Id. at *2. Thus, there was a potential causal link
between the defendant’s conduct and the clear harm to third parties caused by his
disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that our holding mandates some type of robotic
incantation of each of the sentencing factors by the district court. Instead, our holding
requires a district court to sufficiently explain how it properly considered a co-
defendant’s violence under one or more of the Section 3553(a) factors, which thereby
allows us to meaningfully review the district court’s exercise of its discretion and ensures
that the defendant being sentenced receives the requisite procedural fairness that is a
cornerstone of our sentencing jurisprudence.

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36
co-conspirators, thereby bearing on the seriousness of the defendant’s offense.
Here, in contrast, there is no allegation that Dralle and Bagley were co-conspirators
and no possibility that Dralle’s receipt of the gun from Bagley could have
somehow caused two prior shootings by Bagley.
The government’s reliance on our decision in United States v. Davis, 82 F.4th
190 (2d Cir. 2023), is likewise misplaced. In Davis, in affirming an above-
Guidelines sentence for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a
felony, we found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s reference to, inter
alia, “the need to deter a recent rise in local gun violence,” where the defendant
“agreed [at sentencing] that the court needed to take the rise into consideration”
and merely argued on appeal that it gave “the local crime spike too much weight.”
Id. at 200–01 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Unlike in Davis, there
was no reference by the district court, in considering Bagley’s shootings, to local
crime rates or some need for general deterrence due to Dralle’s conduct.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hatch, 909 F.3d 872 (7th Cir.
2018) (per curiam), is distinguishable for similar reasons. In Hatch, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed an above-Guidelines sentence involving the defendant bringing a
total of 17 handguns from Indiana to Chicago and “[o]ver the next year, Chicago

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police recovered five of [those] guns—some from felons and one even from a
minor.” Id. at 874. During the sentencing, the judge gave statistics that attributed
the spike in Chicago’s homicides to guns from Indiana, noting that 21% of illegal
guns recovered in Chicago are traceable to Indiana, where guns laws are less
restrictive than in Illinois. Id. Given those circumstances, the Seventh Circuit held
that the district court acted in its discretion in “conclud[ing] that a rise in local
crime made the offense more serious than what the Guidelines contemplated . . .
[a]nd in describing Chicago as ‘vulnerable’ to the flow of guns from Indiana, the
judge also appropriately considered the need to deter the illegal transport of guns
from a state to another with a gun violence problem.” Id. at 875. Thus, the
circumstances in Hatch are far afield from the instant sentencing, where there was
no possibility that Bagley’s shootings were somehow a by-product of Dralle’s later
purchase of a pistol from him, or any reference by the district court that such a
purchase was facilitating a crime problem that required general deterrence.
In short, because we cannot discern from the record any proper basis for the
district court’s consideration of Bagley’s shootings in sentencing Dralle under the
Section 3553(a) factors, the district court plainly erred in doing so. Moreover, there
is, at least, a “reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the

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38
[sentencing] would have been different.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S.
129, 134–35 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). More
specifically, in imposing the above-Guidelines sentence, the district court
explicitly noted that “it was consider[ing] the nature and circumstances of
[Dralle’s] offense” and was “do[ing] so with the greater context of Mr. Bagley’s
activities,” as well as Dralle’s activities during the Trumbull incident. Joint App’x
at 114. Although it is clear that the district court relied more heavily on the
Trumbull incident in arriving at the above-Guidelines sentence, there is a
reasonable probability, based on the district court’s reasoning, that its improper
consideration of Bagley’s shootings contributed to the upward variance.
Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s plain error with respect to
consideration of those shootings affected the defendant’s substantial rights and
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. See Rosales-Mireles, 585 U.S. at 141 (emphasizing that the “public
legitimacy of our justice system relies on procedures that are neutral, accurate,
consistent, trustworthy, and fair, and that provide opportunities for error
correction”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we VACATE the sentence imposed and REMAND the case
with instructions that the district court conduct a full resentencing consistent with
this opinion.

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1
R ICHARD J. S ULLIVAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority vacates Chase Dralle’s thirty-month prison sentence for
procedural unreasonableness. Concluding that the district court abused its
discretion by improperly sentencing Dralle based on his co-defendant’s conduct,
the majority flyspecks the sentencing proceeding and draws inferences against the
district court notwithstanding the fact that neither Dralle nor his counsel ever
objected to the district court’s remarks at any point during the proceedings.
Because the district court’s sentence is entitled to deference on plain-error review,
I would affirm.
We review a district court’s sentencing decisions under “a deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard.” United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted). As relevant here, “[a] district court errs
procedurally when it fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing
Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider
the [section] 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Alvarado, 720 F.3d
153, 157 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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2
Furthermore, because Dralle concedes that he did not raise a procedural
objection to his sentence in the district court, we review only for plain error. See
United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 538, 540 (2d Cir. 2021). “To establish plain error,
a defendant must demonstrate: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects
substantial rights.” United States v. Bleau, 930 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “If all three conditions are met, we will then exercise
our discretion to rectify this forfeited error only if (4) the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
Meeting this standard is no easy task. To be plain, an error must be “clear”
under “binding precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court,” or “so
egregious and obvious as to make the trial judge and prosecutor derelict in
permitting it, despite the defendant’s failure to object.” United States v. Esteras, 102
F.4th 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have described
plain-error review as “very stringent,” United States v. Ramirez, 973 F.2d 102, 105
(2d Cir. 1992), “not easily met,” United States v. Johnson, 529 F.3d 493, 501 (2d Cir.
2008), and “exacting,” United States v. Mendonca, 88 F.4th 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2023),
necessitating a “clear and obvious” error by the district court, United States v.

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3
Haverkamp, 958 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2020). That means “reversal for plain error
should be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of
justice would otherwise result.” United States v. Fletcher, 134 F.4th 708, 712 (2d Cir.
2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[m]eeting all four prongs is
difficult, as it should be.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
I. Dralle’s Sentence Was Procedurally Reasonable.
The majority concludes that the district court plainly erred because it cannot
“discern from the record any proper basis for the district court’s consideration of
[Bagley’s] shootings in sentencing Dralle under the [s]ection 3553(a) factors.” Maj.
Op. at 37. In particular, both the majority opinion and Dralle belittle the district
court’s statement that it “ha[d] to consider the nature and circumstances of
[Dralle’s] offense . . . with[in] the greater context of [Bagley’s] activities,” which
included two recent shootings that occurred shortly before Dralle illegally
purchased a firearm from Bagley. J. App’x at 114. In their view, this amounted to
plain error because it is “undisputed” that Dralle and Bagley were “not co-
conspirators” and that the shootings were “not even alleged to have occurred

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4
within the scope of jointly undertaken criminal activity.” Dralle Br. at 27; see also
Maj. Op. at 31.
But the district court expressly told Dralle that he was “not being sentenced”
for Bagley’s conduct and explained that Dralle was not “accused of being involved
in any shootings.” J. App’x at 114. Instead, the court merely thought it relevant
that Dralle had purchased a firearm from a violent, unlicensed seller who himself
had been involved in two separate shootings just weeks earlier – and who
expressly told Dralle that it would be illegal for him to purchase the firearm at
issue. Id.; see also id. at 95 (defense counsel agreeing with district court that “it’s
clear” Dralle understood “the illegality” of his firearm purchase “from the
communications that were attributed to him”); PSR ¶¶ 25–26 (text message
exchange between Dralle and Bagley in which the two discussed firearm and
ammunition transactions).
Although the majority asserts that it is “unable to discern how [Bagley’s]
prior violent activities had relevance to Dralle’s receipt of a firearm from [Bagley],”
Maj. Op. at 4, the sentencing transcript makes clear that the district court used
Bagley’s troubling criminal activity and the circumstances of his sale to Dralle to
aid in its evaluation of the section 3553(a) factors, particularly the “nature and

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5
circumstances of [Dralle’s] offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); see J. App’x at 95, 114
(district court highlighting that Dralle had “actively, knowingly violat[ed] the
law[] [by] going outside [its] bounds . . . to participate in [the] purchase of a
straw[-]purchased firearm”). Not every unlicensed firearms transaction is the
same, and the district court was justified in drilling down to the details of the
transaction here, including the particulars of the seller. I see no error – much less
plain error – in the district court’s consideration of the fact that Dralle purchased
a firearm (and discussed purchasing more) from an individual who had procured
twenty 9mm semi-automatic pistols in the span of a year and who was himself
involved in two recent shootings. Haverkamp, 958 F.3d at 150. Such facts clearly
distinguished Dralle from others convicted of the same crime who purchased
firearms from collectors, sportsmen, or relatives in illegal, but far less troubling,
off-the-books transactions. See United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 464 (2d Cir.
2004) (“When making sentencing determinations, a district court may rely on any
facts available to it.”).
While acknowledging that a court “may consider [a co-defendant’s] conduct
to the extent that it is relevant to the [s]ection 3553(a) analysis as it relates to the
defendant,” Maj. Op. at 32 (emphasis deleted), the majority nonetheless chastises

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the district court for (i) “not connect[ing] its consideration of such conduct to one
or more [s]ection 3553(a) factor[s]” and (ii) failing to “articulate how” Bagley’s
criminal “activities still could be properly considered for some other reason under
the [s]ection 3553(a) factors,” id. at 32–33. But we have never “articulate[d] precise
standards for assessing whether a district court’s explanation of its reason for
imposing a non-Guidelines sentence is sufficient.” United States v. Pereira, 465 F.3d
515, 524 (2d Cir. 2006). And we have repeatedly held that district courts are not
required “to engage in the utterance of robotic incantations when imposing
sentences in order to assure us that they have weighed in an appropriate manner
the various section 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir.
2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[s]entencing is a responsibility
heavy enough without our adding formulaic or ritualized burdens.” United States
v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). Unfortunately, the majority
imposes precisely such a burden here, even though Dralle made no objection or
request for clarification during the course of the sentencing proceedings. On this
record, I am not prepared to conclude that the district court committed an error
“so egregious and obvious” as to warrant vacatur of Dralle’s sentence. Esteras, 102
F.4th at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Nor has Dralle established a “reasonable probability that, but for the error,
the outcome of the [sentencing] would have been different.” Maj. Op. at 37–38
(quoting Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2018)). Even the
majority concedes that the district court’s decision to impose an above-Guidelines
sentence was driven “more heavily” by “the Trumbull incident,” id. at 38, which
occurred just weeks before sentencing, when Dralle instigated a “verbal
altercation” with a stranger at a gas station because he “didn’t like the way he was
looking at him,” “sp[a]t in [the stranger’s] face[,] and punched him,” leaving the
individual with “significant bruising and lacerations” on his face, Gov’t App’x at
27. Since the upward variance was tethered to that gratuitous act of violence, the
district court’s statements about Bagley can hardly be said to have affected Dralle’s
substantial rights or “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
That of course brings us to the bulk of the majority opinion, which opines
broadly on the propriety of the district court’s reliance on the Trumbull incident
as the basis for an upward variance – only to then disclaim resolving that issue.
See Maj. Op. at 16–29. Since this portion of the opinion is clearly dicta, it is
probably not necessary to respond. See Barclays Cap. Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com,

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Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 899 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[S]ubsequent appellate panels are required
to follow only . . . previous appellate legal holdings.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). But given the record below, and in light of the fact that Dralle made no
objection to either the district court’s reliance on that incident or its
characterization of the underlying facts, I feel compelled to push back on the
majority’s advisory opinion.
For starters, in relying on the Trumbull incident, the district court did not
base its sentence “on clearly erroneous factual findings.” United States v. Singh,
877 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir. 2017). It is well-settled that a district court may consider
a defendant’s post-conviction, pre-sentencing conduct at sentencing. See United
States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742, 747–48 (2d Cir. 2013). District judges possess broad
“discretion to rely on the wide array of facts before” them at sentencing, including
evidence that “would not be admissible at trial, so long as the defendant is given
an opportunity to contest the accuracy of that information.” United States v. Cossey,
632 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Finkelstein, 229 F.3d 90, 96 (2d
Cir. 2000) (underscoring that a “district court is entitled to take into account any
relevant information to which it has access” at sentencing).

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The district court acted within its discretion in relying on the facts contained
in the Probation Office’s petition here because they met the “minimal indicium of
reliability beyond mere allegation,” United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 701 (2d Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), as required to satisfy due process. A
Probation Officer signed the petition under penalty of perjury, and while the
officer did not personally observe the Trumbull incident, district courts may rely
on hearsay at sentencing. See United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir.
2005) (Sotomayor, J.). Furthermore, the Probation Officer drew from a detailed
police report, and the complainant’s account of the incident was also verified by
video-surveillance footage.
That makes this case far different from United States v. Juwa, where we
vacated a defendant’s sentence because the district court relied on a “bare-bones
indictment” that merely asserted charges – with “no evidence,” underlying facts,
or identification of sources to support the district court’s finding. 508 F.3d at 701.
Here, by contrast, there were ample “indici[a] of reliability,” id., supporting the
district court’s reliance on the petition. See, e.g., Gov’t App’x at 27 (noting that
“[o]fficers reviewed CCTV footage and the complainant’s account appeared to be
accurate”).

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While the majority spills much ink pointing out that “the district court did
not ask Dralle or his counsel whether they had any factual objections to the
allegations asserted by the government in connection with the Trumbull incident,
the fact remains that Dralle did not object to the facts contained in the petition or
to the district court’s consideration of them. Maj. Op. at 21–22, 26–27; see Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) (explaining that a district court’s fact-finding obligation is only
triggered “for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other
controverted matter”). And neither Dralle nor the majority points to anything in
the record to suggest that the information relied on by the district court was in any
way untrustworthy. See Singh, 877 F.3d at 118.
Nor can it be said that Dralle lacked “an opportunity to contest the accuracy
of th[e] information” regarding the Trumbull incident. Cossey, 632 F.3d at 86. Five
days before his federal sentencing, Dralle was arrested and brought before a
magistrate judge for a bond-revocation hearing based on the allegations in the
petition. And at the outset of the sentencing hearing, Dralle’s counsel
acknowledged that Dralle was “in custody” following the Trumbull altercation,
which was “something [the parties] will be addressing [at sentencing], I’m sure.”
J. App’x at 33. The government also incorporated the allegations surrounding the

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11
incident into its argument at sentencing, asking the district court to impose a hefty
sentence “[b]ased on the information of what happened in Trumbull earlier this
month.” Id. at 84. At no time did Dralle or his lawyer object to the accuracy of the
petition or the government’s description of the facts underlying the Trumbull
arrest. And at no time did Dralle or his lawyer request a hearing to resolve
disputed facts. To the contrary, Dralle’s counsel seemingly agreed with the
government’s account of what had transpired, telling the district court that she
“read the riot act to [Dralle]” after “meet[ing] with him” following the incident,
and communicated to Dralle “that his behavior . . . was wrong . . . from beginning
to end.” Id. at 92. The majority’s alternative explanation – that these remarks could
be “reasonably construed to reflect disappointment in the fact that Dralle had
shown poor judgment in associating with certain individuals” or to express
frustration that he “plac[ed] himself in” that position – strains credulity and
ignores the thrust of the sentencing proceedings. Maj. Op. at 23. To my mind, the
district court acted well within its discretion in relying on the Trumbull incident
to sentence Dralle.

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II. Dralle’s Sentence Was Substantively Reasonable.
The majority vacates Dralle’s sentence on procedural-reasonableness
grounds, so it does not address his remaining arguments – that his sentence was
substantively unreasonable because it was “three times longer than the average for
similar defendants,” Reply Br. at 2, and because the district court placed
“extraordinary weight” on “a single [section] 3553(a) sentencing factor,” Dralle Br.
at 30. By any measure, however, Dralle’s sentence was substantively reasonable.1
A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it is “shockingly high,
shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v.
Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). To establish that a sentence is substantively
unreasonable, defendants “bear[] a heavy burden because our review of a sentence
for substantive reasonableness is particularly deferential.” United States v.
Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012). We do not review a sentence’s
substantive reasonableness to “substitute our own judgment for the district court’s
on the question of what is sufficient to meet the [section] 3553(a) considerations in
any particular case.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189. To the contrary, we will set aside a
1 As discussed above, Dralle did not raise his substantive-reasonableness challenge below. But
because “[w]e have not decided whether plain[-]error review applies to an unpreserved challenge
to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence,” our review is for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 258 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014).

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district court’s substantive-reasonableness determination “only in exceptional
cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of
permissible decisions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court placed great emphasis on the fact that Dralle “committed
a violent assault of a third party,” Gov’t App’x at 8, mere weeks before his federal
sentencing, underscoring the difficulty of deterring his criminal behavior. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). This followed Dralle’s “active[]” and “knowing[]” straw
purchase of a firearm from a street dealer, J. App’x at 114, as well as Dralle’s blatant
desire to purchase more weapons, as reflected in the text messages sent to Bagley
shortly before his arrest, see PSR ¶¶ 24–25. Even though the Trumbull incident
drove the district court’s sentencing decision, these aggravating facts lend
additional support for an upward variance from Dralle’s Guidelines range. See
Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (“It is now, however, emphatically clear that the Guidelines
are guidelines – that is, they are truly advisory.”); cf. United States v. Davis, 82 F.4th
190, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2023) (affirming forty-eight-month sentence in felon-in-
possession case where Guidelines provided for range of fifteen to twenty-one
months).

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Dralle insists that the district court “assigned controlling weight” to a
“single [section] 3553(a) sentencing factor” – namely, “deterring [him] from future
criminal conduct.” Dralle Br. at 30. But the record belies that contention and
instead shows that the district court considered the full range of statutory
sentencing factors, including various mitigating factors described in the letters of
family members. See J. App’x at 89 (“acknowledg[ing that the district court] read
through all the letters”). Nevertheless, after considering the totality of the
circumstances, the court concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed any
mitigating factors and justified an above-Guidelines sentence. The district court
unquestionably placed great weight on the need to deter Dralle, who had
demonstrated a remarkable lack of self-control and immaturity. But district courts
are free to make such assessments, and “the weight given to any single [section
3553(a)] factor . . . is beyond our review.” United States v. Capanelli, 479 F.3d 163,
165 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). That appellate judges might
have reached a different conclusion does not make for an abuse of discretion,
particularly in an area “firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing
judge.” Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Finally, we have long noted that “a sentence outside the Guidelines”
“carries no presumption of unreasonableness.” Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.
708, 714 (2008). Here, the district court a confronted a defendant so reckless that
he committed a violent assault weeks before his federal sentencing. That fact –
coupled with his purchase of a firearm from a street-level gun dealer and his
obvious intent to purchase more firearms in the days before his arrest – supported
the district court’s conclusion that Dralle would be harder to deter than a typical
defendant. Because district courts possess “broad latitude to impose either a
Guidelines sentence or a non-Guidelines sentence,” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 114 (internal
quotation marks omitted), I cannot say that Dralle’s thirty-month sentence was
either “shockingly high,” id. at 123, or outside “the range of permissible decisions,”
United States v. Darrah, 132 F.4th 643, 652 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks
omitted).2
2 If the majority opinion is a harbinger of heightened scrutiny for above-Guidelines sentences, we
might expect the same scrutiny to be applied to below-Guidelines sentences, which accounted for
more than three quarters of the sentences imposed in the District of Connecticut in 2025. See
U.S.S.C. Interactive Data Analyzer (reflecting that 21.2 percent of all Connecticut sentences fell
within the applicable Guidelines range, with 2.7 percent above the range and 76.1 percent below
the range).

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* * *
Chase Dralle straw-purchased a firearm and got into a violent altercation
mere weeks before his federal sentencing. In vacating his sentence as procedurally
unreasonable, the majority shows little to no regard for the district court’s
judgment, despite our review for plain procedural error. Because I would afford
the district judge more deference in making sentencing decisions – and because
Dralle’s sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable – I
respectfully dissent.

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