Passang Tenzin v. Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-3580
PASSANG TENZIN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A98-648-356)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Frederic G. Leeds
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 9, 2009
Before: AMBRO, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 15, 2009)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Passang Tenzin seeks review of a final decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued on August 1, 2008. For the reasons that follow, we

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will deny the petition for review.
I. Background
Tenzin is a native of Tibet and a citizen of China. He claims that, in 1994, he
became a Buddhist monk and began living in a monastery. In 2002, upon discovering a
Dalai Lama prayer book in his room, Chinese authorities allegedly arrested him, assaulted
him, and imprisoned him for three months. After his release, Tenzin fled Tibet. During a
stay with an uncle in India, Tenzin stopped being a monk and got married. Tenzin
eventually entered the United States on a fraudulent Nepalese passport. He applied for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), claiming past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution and
torture based upon his religion.
After a hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) rendered an oral decision on January
24, 2007. The IJ recognized that Tibetan monks face serious persecution at the hands of
the Chinese government and expressed great sympathy for those who face such a plight.
However, the IJ found a serious conflict between Tenzin’s testimony and his proffered
documentary evidence. Specifically, Tenzin submitted a household registry document
issued in the year 2000, during the time that Tenzin claimed he had been living full-time
at the monastery. According to the IJ, the document showed that Tenzin lived and
worked at home with his family, not in a monastery. This “complete contradiction with
[his] testimony” called into question the fundamental issue of Tenzin’s identity as a

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monk. Coupled with a lack of corroborating evidence, this credibility issue led the IJ,
“with heavy heart,” to deny Tenzin’s application.
On August 1, 2008, the BIA issued a decision agreeing with the IJ’s conclusion
that Tenzin did not meet his burden of proof due to a lack of credibility and of
corroborating evidence. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Tenzin’s
appeal. This petition for review followed.
II. Analysis
We generally review only final orders of the BIA. See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d
157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548-49 (3d Cir. 2001).
However, where the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning and discusses some of the bases of the
IJ’s decision, we also review the IJ’s order. Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir.
2004). We review legal conclusions de novo, see Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396,
405 (3d Cir. 2003), and uphold factual determinations if they are supported “by
reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Guo
v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004). Ultimately, for Tenzin to succeed on his
petition for review, this Court “must find that the evidence not only supports that
conclusion [, that the application should have been granted], but compels it.” INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
A.
The BIA upheld the IJ’s finding that Tenzin was not credible because of

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Because Tenzin filed his asylum application in 2004, the REAL ID Act, effective1
May 11, 2005, does not apply to his claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B).
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inconsistencies concerning his identity as a Buddhist monk. We review adverse
credibility determinations for substantial evidence. Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215,
221-22 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we will affirm the adverse credibility finding if it is
supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as
a whole.” Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). To reverse, the evidence
of Tenzin’s credibility must be so strong “that in a civil trial he would be entitled to
judgment on the credibility issue as a matter of law.” Chen, 376 F.3d at 222.
We conclude that the adverse credibility determination rests upon substantial
evidence. The IJ provided specific, cogent reasons for concluding that Tenzin’s
testimony lacked credibility. As the BIA summarized: although Tenzin “testified that he
lived in the monastery from 1994 until 2002, a household registry . . . indicates that he
was living at his parents’ house in June 2000” and “lists his place of employment as
‘Second Village, Gyama Town, Medo Gungkar County, Tibet,’” Because Tenzin’s
identity as a monk is critical to his application, these apparent conflicts go to the “heart”
of Tenzin’s claims. See Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir. 2004).1
In response, Tenzin argues that the IJ’s determination improperly rested upon
unsupported speculation. Specifically, Tenzin claims that the IJ should have accepted his
testimony explaining that: (1) the household registry document indicates his status as a

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To prevail on his asylum claim, Tenzin bore the burden to establish that he suffered2
past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution in China. See Gao v.
Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). To meet the more stringent standard for
withholding of removal, Tenzin had to demonstrate a “clear probability” of future
persecution – that he would “more likely than not” be persecuted in China. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449-50 (1987). Finally, for relief under the CAT, Tenzin
bore the burden of proving through objective evidence that he would “more likely than
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member of his family, but does not address whether he lived with his family or in a
monastery; and (2) being a monk is not considered employment in China, so the
household registry document does not describe him as a monk. Tenzin contends that
when the IJ declined to accept these explanations, the IJ was improperly speculating as to
the meaning of the household registry document.
We disagree. Tenzin’s testimony may offer one plausible interpretation of the
document. However, the IJ need not have accepted Tenzin’s unsupported interpretation
because it is not consistent with the face of the document itself. The registry document
refers repeatedly to “residency registration” and indicates that it is “used . . . to investigate
and check the residency of the relevant residents.” A.R. 195. Given the plain meaning of
the word “residency,” the IJ logically concluded that the registry document indicates that
Tenzin resided with his family during the very time that he testified to residing full-time
in a Tibetan monastery. See A.R. 201. The IJ’s interpretation of the document is
reasonably grounded in the document’s plain language and does not rest upon mere
speculation.
Tenzin bore the burden to establish the elements of his claims. Tenzin failed to2

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not” face torture in China. See Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004).
Indeed, at the hearing before the IJ, Tenzin’s counsel conceded that he failed to3
provide any evidence supporting Tenzin’s proffered interpretation of the meaning of the
household registry document. See A.R. 187-88.
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meet that burden. He offered only his own testimony to contradict the plain language of
the household registry document. Without evidence substantiating his interpretation, and3
given the absence of any additional evidence in the record corroborating Tenzin’s alleged
status as a monk, there is substantial support in the record for the IJ’s conclusion that the
household registry document undermined Tenzin’s credibility.
B.
Tenzin also argues that the IJ erred by concluding that Tenzin should have
produced evidence to corroborate his identity as a monk. A failure to provide
corroborating evidence may undermine an applicant’s case where: (1) the IJ identifies
facts for which it is reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) the applicant fails to
corroborate; and (3) the applicant fails to adequately explain the failure to corroborate.
Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2007). Even a credible applicant
may be asked to provide evidence corroborating his testimony if it is reasonable to expect
the applicant to do so. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001).
We conclude that the IJ’s request for corroboration in this case was reasonable in
light of the conflicting evidence concerning Tenzin’s identity as a monk. The IJ
suggested that Tenzin reasonably should have provided evidence from either the

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Tenzin stated only that it would have been too dangerous for his family in Tibet to4
provide a statement on his behalf. However, neither the BIA nor the IJ accepted this as
an adequate response because Tenzin’s family members were able to forward the
household registry document to him.
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monastery or from his family members concerning his monkhood. When questioned
about the lack of corroborating evidence, Tenzin did not provide a convincing
explanation for its absence. See Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 191-92.4
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

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