Shih-Liang Chen v. Township of Fairfield

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-3635
SHIH-LIANG CHEN,
Appellant
v.
TOWNSHIP OF FAIRFIELD; MAYOR AND TOWN COUNCIL;
TOWNSHIP PLANNING BOARD AND ENGINEER; JOHN DOE 1-25;
JANE DOE 1-25; BENNET STERN, ESQ.; LAVINTHAL STERN
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-07-cv-02955)
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 9, 2009
Before: AMBRO, GARTH, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 2, 2009)
OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
In March 1988, Shih-Liang Chen purchased property to build a Super 8 Motel.
Events related to this purchase led to several lawsuits over the last two decades, including

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In his amended complaint, Chen raises three new state law claims: 1) a fraud claim1
against all of the defendants; 2) a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Stern and Stern’s
law firm; and, 3) a legal malpractice claim against Stern and Stern’s law firm. The
District Court properly exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) in declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims after dismissing Chen’s
federal claims.
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the current suit. In particular, Chen has consistently alleged violations of his civil rights
(including his equal protection rights). In this case, Chen brought related claims by
means of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the Township of Fairfield, as well as its mayor,
town council, planning board, and engineer. Chen has also sued his former attorney,
Bennett Stern, and Stern’s law firm, Stern, Lavinthal, Frankenberg & Norgaard, LLC.1
The District Court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. We deny Chen’s motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix
and affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
Over two decades ago, Chen purchased property in the Township of Fairfield to
construct a Super 8 Motel. While Chen was working to gain the town’s approval of the
motel, the town council amended its zoning ordinance to prohibit the construction of
hotels and motels in Fairfield. Under the amended zoning ordinance, Chen was denied a
permit to construct his motel. In response, he sued in state court, alleging that the
amendment to the zoning ordinance was passed specifically to prevent him from building
the motel. As evidence, Chen noted that, after denying his permit, the planning board

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approved a different hotel’s expansion. The state court invalidated Fairfield’s amended
zoning ordinance, but provided the township with an opportunity to revise it.
In response to the state court’s ruling, Fairfield amended its zoning ordinance in
February 1989. Chen again filed suit, this time alleging civil rights violations in
connection with the denial of his permit. He settled his underlying claims with the
township and its officials in 1990, when Fairfield agreed to allow him to build his motel.
Following this settlement, Chen alleges that the township and various officials continued
to impede his efforts to construct the motel. As a result, Chen moved to enforce the
settlement. Once again, the township agreed to settle the dispute.
In May 1991, Chen was given final approval for his motel. In spite of this
approval, he alleges that the township continued to place unnecessary obstacles in his
path. For instance, the township did not issue a construction permit until April 1992 —
only to revoke it a week later. As a result of these delays and acts, Chen alleges that he
lost the property for his motel through foreclosure.
Since 1993, Chen has brought three related lawsuits — one in state court and two
(including this case) in federal court. In his state court action, Chen filed a motion to
vacate the initial stipulation of settlement. The trial court denied Chen’s motion, and the
appellate division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied his petition for
certification. In his 1998 federal action, Chen sued the township, as well as its mayor,
council, planning board, and two town council members, alleging violations of his civil

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rights and a breach of the initial settlement agreement. The District Court dismissed
Chen’s suit as both untimely and barred by claim preclusion and laches. His appeal was
dismissed by this Court for failure to prosecute.
In the current case, Chen again alleges violations of his civil rights by the same
parties. Chen has also brought civil rights claims against his former attorney, Bennett
Stern, as well as Stern’s law firm and the town engineer.
On July 31, 2008, in the current action, the District Court granted the defendants’
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court held that the claims
against the township, as well as its mayor, council, and planning board, were barred by
claim preclusion. It further concluded that the claims against Stern, Stern’s law firm, and
the town engineer were barred by the statue of limitations. Chen filed a timely notice of
appeal. We disagree with Chen, and thus affirm.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We
have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The standard of review on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is plenary. See
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). A motion to dismiss
should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

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Just prior to the disposition date of this matter, Chen submitted a collection of2
additional supporting documents. He did not have authorization to do so. Chen then filed
a motion for leave to file these documents as a supplemental appendix. We deny that
motion.
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unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
III.
The Township of Fairfield, as well as its mayor, council, and planning board,
argue that Chen’s causes of action against them in this case are barred by the doctrine of
claim preclusion. We agree.2
“Claim preclusion bars a party from litigating a claim that it could have raised or
did raise in a prior proceeding in which it raised another claim based on the same cause of
action.” CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls America, Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 1999).
“Claim preclusion requires: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving . . .
(2) the same parties or their privities[,] and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause
of action.” Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Centra,
983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992). “If these three factors are present, a claim that was or
could have been raised previously must be dismissed as precluded.” CoreStates Bank,
N.A., 176 F.3d at 194. With these requirements in mind, “[a] cause of action is defined by
its factual contours.” Id. at 200. “In deciding whether two suits are based on the same

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‘cause of action,’ we take a broad view, looking to whether there is an ‘essential
similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.’” Id. at 194
(quoting United States v. Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)).
We turn first to the “final judgment” requirement of claim preclusion. In 1998, the
District Court ruled on the merits of Chen’s civil rights claims against the township, as
well as its mayor, council, and planning board. In its 1998 opinion, the Court granted the
defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) provides that, “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal
under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule — except one for lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19 — operates as an
adjudication on the merits.” Therefore, under Rule 41(b), the District Court’s 1998
decision to dismiss Chen’s complaint (which was based on untimeliness, claim
preclusion, and laches) “operates as an adjudication on the merits.”
The final two requirements of claim preclusion are also satisfied in this case. Chen
brought both his 1998 action and the current case against the same parties. Furthermore,
Chen’s allegations in this case arise out the “same cause of action” — in other words, the
same series of events related to his attempt to construct a motel in Fairfield. As all three
requirements for claim preclusion are satisfied, we hold that the District Court’s 1998
decision precludes Chen’s current suit against the township, and its mayor, council, and
planning board.

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IV.
Since Stern, Stern’s law firm, and the town engineer were not parties to the 1998
federal action, Chen’s claims against them are not barred by claim preclusion. Even so,
his claims against these parties are over a decade old. Therefore, the District Court
concluded that these claims were prohibited by the statute of limitations. Again we agree.
The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions “is that which the State provides for
personal-injury torts.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Under New Jersey
law, the relevant statute of limitations is two years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. At the
same time, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is
not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in original).
“[Accrual occurs] when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action’” – in
other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Bay Area Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)
(quoting Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941)). Under this rule, “‘[t]he cause of
action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.’”
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391 (quoting 1 C. Corman, Limitations of Actions § 7.4.1, at 526-27
(1991)). On a related note, “[t]he discovery rule dictates that a cause of action accrues
when a potential claimant discovers, or should have discovered, the injury that forms the
basis of his claim.” Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 216
(3d Cir. 2008).

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The underlying events that gave rise to Chen’s civil rights allegations ended in
1993, with the final denial of Chen’s construction permit by the Construction Board of
Appeals. Chen alleged similar civil rights violations in his 1998 federal action — thereby
demonstrating his knowledge over a decade ago of the injuries that are the basis of his
causes of action in this case. Whether his causes of action accrued in 1993 or 1998,
Chen’s claims against Stern, Stern’s law firm, and the town engineer are barred by the
two-year statute of limitations.
Finally, Chen’s claims are not saved by the discovery rule, for he fails to establish
in his complaint that the allegations against Stern et al. were based on information that
was not available to him (or should not have been discovered by him) until now. Indeed,
there appear to have been no obstacles to Chen discovering these injuries in time to bring
them in his 1998 federal action. We thus hold that Chen’s claims against Stern, his law
firm, and the town engineer are time-barred.
* * * * *
We deny Chen’s motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix and affirm the
judgment of the District Court.

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