Keynen Guider v. Department of Corrections

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DLD-229 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1072
___________
KEYNEN GUIDER,
Appellant
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; GEORGE PATRICK, Superintendent;
MS. E. GAINES, D.O.C. Kitchen Worker; MR. MAUER, D.O.C. Kitchen Supervisor;
MR. JOE KOWNOSKI, D.O.C. Medical Staff, Nurse; MR. J. ROMEO, D.O.C. Doctor;
D. AMOS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-00103)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 25, 2009
Before: Barry, Ambro and Smith, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 22, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Keynen Guider appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the

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Middle District of Pennsylvania denying him leave to amend his complaint after his initial
complaint was dismissed. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
Guider filed his civil rights complaint in January 2007 while an inmate of the
Quehanna Boot Camp (“Quehanna”) operated by the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (“DOC”). He alleged that he slipped and fell on a slippery floor while
working in the facility’s kitchen, causing a back injury. He sought $200,000.00 for pain
and suffering and medical treatment. Guider named as defendants the DOC,
DOC/Quehanna employees, and the doctor working at Quehanna but employed by an
outside medical service. In April 2007, upon Guider’s motion, the District Court
dismissed the individually-named DOC employees because Guider indicated his intent to
sue only the DOC. Guider then filed a motion to amend the complaint to reinstate the
individually-named defendants into the complaint. On July 5, 2007, the District Court
granted the DOC’s motion to dismiss and denied Guider’s motion to amend the
complaint. In its memorandum, the District Court agreed with the DOC’s arguments,
inter alia, that the DOC cannot be sued as a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the
complaint’s allegations of negligence by the kitchen staff were insufficient for a section
1983 action, and that the allegations against the Quehanna nurse were insufficient to state
a claim of inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Further, the
District Court determined that amendment of the complaint to add the DOC/Quehanna

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employees as defendants would be futile, because the theory of respondeat superior does
not apply in section 1983 actions, and because the allegations did not state an Eighth
Amendment medical claim. The proceedings continued against the doctor who worked at
Quehanna, the lone remaining defendant. On August 21, 2007, the District Court granted
the doctor’s motion to dismiss, noting in its memorandum that Guider’s allegations
against the doctor failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
Guider did not appeal. Instead, more than one year later, in November 2008, he
filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint to add additional defendants. On
December 4, 2008, the District Court denied Guider’s motion for leave to amend, noting
that the complaint had been dismissed on August 21, 2007. Guider appeals. He has filed
a motion for appointment of counsel and has filed written argument in support of his
appeal.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. At the outset,
we note that Guider’s November 2008 motion for leave to amend under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a) and 15(c), filed long after entry of final judgment in his case, would
more appropriately be characterized as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) for relief from judgment. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir.
2002) (citing 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur A. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
Practice & Procedure, § 1489 (a Rule 15 amendment cannot be allowed after entry of
final judgment until the judgment is set aside or vacated under Rule 59 or 60)). It is

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Defendants Patrick and Gaines were named in the original complaint; defendants1
Patrick and Amos were identified in the prior motion to amend.
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evident from the record that Guider’s motion for leave to amend was filed too late to be
considered under Rule 59 (see Rule 59(e), filing within ten days after entry of judgment)
or Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) (see Rule 60(c), filing no later than one year after entry of
judgment). It is also evident that neither Rule 60(b)(4) (for a void judgment) nor Rule
60(b)(5) (judgment that is satisfied, released, or discharged, or based on a vacated or
reversed judgment, or inequity in the prospective application of the judgment) apply here,
Guider does not make any arguments to suggest otherwise. As for Rule 60(b)(6) (any
other reason justifying relief), we conclude that Guider’s motion to amend does not
warrant reopening under this rule.
The motion to amend sought to add defendants George Patrick, D. Amos, and
E. Gaines. Guider asserted that he was unaware of the proposed defendants’ legal
responsibilities connected with their DOC/Quehanna employment until after he
completed the ninety-day program at Quehanna, and that he was hindered by the lack of a
law library at Quehanna. However, Guider did previously identify these same proposed
defendants in his initial complaint and his previous motion to amend the complaint. The1
proposed amended complaint is based on the same incident of his slip and fall while
working in the Quehanna kitchen and the alleged failure of the proposed defendants to
provide a safe work environment for inmates. Although Guider now argues that his

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Rule 15(b) permits post-judgment amendment of a complaint in limited2
circumstances not present here, and Guider does not argue that Rule 15(b) applies.
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previous motion to amend was never entertained, he is mistaken. The District Court
discussed and denied the previous motion in its July 5, 2007 memorandum and order and
explained why amending the complaint to add defendants–including defendants Patrick,
Amos, and Gaines–on the basis of Guider’s theories of liability was futile. (See District
Court July 5, 2007 Memorandum at 4-5 and n.3, 6-7.) We note that Guider argues the
merits of his motion to amend under Rule 15(a) and Rule 15(c). However, we do not2
reach the application of Rule 15 in light of our conclusion that Guider cannot satisfy the
requirements for reopening the judgment under Rule 60(b). Given that reopening was not
warranted, we discern no error in the District Court’s denial of Guider’s motion to amend.
Because this appeal presents no “substantial question,” we will summarily affirm
the District Court’s decision. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Guider’s
motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

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