Emmanuel N. Lazaridis, individually v. Lavina Tina Wehmer

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 09-1342
EMMANUEL N. LAZARIDIS,
individually and in his capacity as
legal custodian of V.L., a minor,
v.
LAVINA TINA WEHMER; MATTHEW NEIDERMAN;
CATHERINE SUTER; AFRODITI MINA MAUROEIDI;
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE;
ATTORNEY GENERAL JOSEPH BIDEN, III
Emmanuel N. Lazaridis, Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 1-06-cv-00793)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1 on
December 3, 2009

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2
Before: RENDELL HARDIMAN and ALDISERT,
Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 7, 2010)
Emmanuel N. Lazaridis (pro se)
Lazaridis-Kortsidakis, Smyrnis 14
71201 Heraklion
Crete, Greece
Pro Se Appellant
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Emmanuel Lazaridis filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
raising various constitutional and statutory claims relating to
child custody proceedings and the registration of foreign
custody orders in the state of Delaware against his ex-wife, her
attorneys, and the Delaware Attorney General. Lazaridis now
appeals from the District Court’s October 30, 2008 and January
14, 2009 orders dismissing his complaint and denying his
motion for reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the District Court’s orders.

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1Lazaridis and V.L. currently reside in Greece.
2The Delaware courts treat foreign custody orders the
same as custody orders from other states, and “a child custody
determination made in a foreign country under factual
circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional
standards of this chapter must be recognized and enforced . . . .”
13 Del C. Ann. § 1905(a), (b).
3
I. Background
At issue in this appeal is the custody of V.L., Lazaridis’s
and defendant Wehmer’s daughter.1 In June 2004, a French
court granted Wehmer and Lazaridis joint custody of V.L. but
ordered that the child’s primary residence be with Wehmer.
Wehmer thereafter sought to register the French custody order
in Delaware Family Court pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), as
adopted by the State of Delaware.2 See 13 Del. C. Ann. §
1934(a). As permitted by Delaware law, Lazaridis challenged
the registration of the order. See 13 Del. C. Ann. § 1934(d). In
March 2005, the Family Court held a hearing at which
Lazaridis’s attorney argued that Delaware lacked jurisdiction to
enforce or to register the French order. Although the Family
Court ordered briefing on “whether there were any valid
grounds for challenging the registration,” it ultimately denied
Lazaridis’s motion.
Lazaridis appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court,
claiming, among other things, that: (1) the UCCJEA violates
the Delaware Constitution; (2) the UCCJEA, as applied, violated

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4
his right to due process; and (3) the Family Court abused its
discretion by ordering the registration of the French order. In
June 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Family
Court’s order and declined to consider Lazaridis’s constitutional
claims because he had not raised them before the Family Court.
See Letsos v. Warren, 901 A.2d 120 (Del. 2006).
In August 2006, Lazaridis filed a motion in Family
Court seeking relief from the registration and enforcement of the
2004 French custody order on the basis that Greece was
exercising jurisdiction over V.L. He claims that the Family
Court never ruled on this motion.
Meanwhile, in August 2005, a French court issued
another custody order giving Wehmer the right to “exclusively
exercise parental authority” over V.L. In October 2006,
Wehmer requested that the Family Court register the order, and
on December 6, 2006, Lazaridis filed a motion challenging the
registration of that order.
On December 27, 2006, Lazaridis filed the instant
complaint against Wehmer, her attorneys, and the Delaware
Attorney General. Lazaridis set forth the following three
claims: (1) the UCCJEA and Uniform Interstate Family and
Support Act (“UIFSA”) violated the due process rights
guaranteed by the Delaware Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, both generally
and as applied to him; (2) V.L.’s “fundamental rights” were
violated because the Delaware courts applied the UIFSA and
UCCJEA rather than Greek law, which includes the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; and (3) Wehmer

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5
and her attorneys conspired to violate Lazaridis’s and V.L.’s
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lazaridis asked the District
Court to enjoin the Delaware courts from enforcing current or
future foreign orders registered in Delaware Family Court under
the UCCJEA or UIFSA. He also sought to enjoin the
defendants from registering or enforcing French orders in
Delaware courts. Finally, Lazaridis requested monetary
damages pursuant to the § 1983 claim.
On January 31, 2007, a Greek court issued a custody
order granting temporary custody of V.L. to Lazaridis. That
order was continued on April 27, 2007. And on July 30, 2007
the Delaware Family Court vacated the registration of the 2005
French order, citing the January 2007 Greek order.
In August 2007, Lazaridis filed a motion to reopen in
Family Court seeking to vacate the registration of the 2004
French order. The Family Court, on November 29, 2007, issued
a decision denying his request based on the doctrine of res
judicata. T.W. v. E.L., No. CN04-08707, 2007 WL 4793123
(Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 29, 2007).
Before the Family Court issued its November 2007
decision, the District Court sua sponte dismissed Lazaridis’s
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) based on its
determination that Lazaridis was barred from filing suit under
the so-called fugitive disentitlement doctrine. See Ortega-
Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234 (1993); Degen v.
United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996). On appeal, we vacated the
District Court’s order after finding that the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine did not apply to Lazaridis.

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On remand, the District Court sua sponte dismissed
Lazaridis’s complaint under the following rationales: (1) the
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, or alternatively by reason of res judicata and collateral
estoppel (claim no. 1—2004 French order); (2) the Younger
abstention doctrine (claim no. 1—2005 French order); (3) as
frivolous (claim nos. 2 and 3); and (4) for failure to state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (claim nos. 2 and 3). The
District Court denied Lazaridis’s outstanding motions for
service and for “renewed consideration of prior motions” as
moot. Lazaridis subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the District Court denied on January 14, 2009.
Lazaridis timely appealed. Our jurisdiction rests on 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
II. Analysis
A. Denial of the Motion to Reconsider
Lazaridis first appeals from the District Court’s denial of
his Rule 59 motion. In this case, the appropriate standard of
review is for an abuse of discretion. See Federal Kemper Ins.
Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986) .
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is “to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677
(3d Cir. 1998). A proper Rule 59(e) motion therefore must rely
on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the

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need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.
N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194,
1218 (3d Cir. 1995). Lazaridis’s motion advanced the same
arguments that were in his complaint and motions. Because this
is not a proper basis for reconsideration, the District Court
appropriately denied the motion.
B. Dismissal of the Complaint
We also have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s
October 30, 2008 order dismissing Lazaridis’s complaint
because his timely Rule 59(e) motion tolled the time to file a
notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv); Rauscher,
807 F.2d at 348 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Our
standard of review is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating standard of review for dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v.
Lower Gwynedd, 970 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating standard
of review over legal determination as to whether Younger
abstention requirements are met); Turner v. Crawford Square
Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating
standard of review for dismissal under Rooker-Feldman
doctrine). We may, however, affirm the District Court’s
judgment on any basis found in the record. See Erie
Telecomms. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir.
1988).
(1)

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3While the District Court dismissed part of this claim
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Younger
abstention “represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ [that] may
be resolved before addressing jurisdiction.” Tenet v. Doe, 544
U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005). Because we hold that Younger abstention
is appropriate, we need not consider whether the District Court
had subject matter jurisdiction over this claim.
4Even when the three-prong test is met, Younger
abstention is not appropriate when “(1) the state proceedings are
8
Lazaridis first sets forth constitutional challenges to the
registration and enforcement of the 2004 and 2005 French
custody orders. The District Court applied the Younger
abstention doctrine to Lazaridis’s challenges to the registration
and enforcement of the 2005 French order only. We conclude,
however, that Younger requires the dismissal of Lazaridis’s first
claim in its entirety. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971). 3
In certain circumstances, district courts must abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution
of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity
by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding. See Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,
437 (1982). However, such abstention is appropriate only when
the following three requirements are satisfied: (1) there are
ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state
proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal
claims.”4 Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411

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being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or
(2) some other extraordinary circumstances exist. . . .” Schall v.
Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989). Neither of these
exceptions applies here.
9
F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005). Lazaridis’s first claim satisfies
each of these requirements.
The state court actions regarding the registration of the
French orders were pending when Lazaridis filed his federal
court complaint on December 27, 2006, satisfying the test’s first
prong. In August 2006, Lazaridis filed a motion with the
Delaware Family Court seeking relief from the registration of
the 2004 order, and on December 8, 2006, he filed a motion
challenging the registration of the 2005 order.
It is also clear that the Delaware state courts presented an
adequate forum in which Lazaridis could pursue his claims
regarding the constitutionality of Delaware statutes. See Juidice
v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (stating that Younger requires
only “an opportunity to present federal claims in a state
proceeding”). The “burden on this point rests on the federal
plaintiff to show that state procedural law barred presentation of
its claims.” See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1987) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Lazaridis has
failed to carry this burden. Further, although he did not raise his
federal constitutional claims in state court and would likely be
precluded from doing so now, this does not save his claim, as
the Supreme Court held in Pennzoil that one “cannot escape
Younger abstention by failing to assert . . . remedies in a timely
manner [in state court].” Id. at 16 n.16.

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5Because the state court rulings dealt with state custody
law issues, other important state interests are implicated as well.
See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations
are a traditional area of state concern.”).
10
The second prong of the test asks whether the state
proceedings implicate important state interests. We have held
that when the other elements of the Younger test are met, neither
injunctive nor declaratory relief will be available “in cases in
which the federal relief would render the state court’s orders or
judgments nugatory.” Schall, 885 F.2d at 108; Juidice, 430 U.S.
at 336 n.12. “This is a particularly appropriate admonition in
the field of domestic relations, over which federal courts have
no general jurisdiction . . . and in which the state courts have a
special expertise and experience.” Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d
610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000). Lazaridis requests a declaration that
the UCCJEA and the UIFSA are unconstitutional, an injunction
preventing Delaware from registering or enforcing current or
future custody orders registered pursuant to Delaware law, and
an injunction precluding private parties from registering or
enforcing the French custody orders. Such relief would nullify
the Delaware court’s judgments regarding the appropriateness
of registering the French custody orders.5
Lazaridis essentially wants wholesale federal intervention
into a state dispute. He seeks the vacation of existing orders and
a federal injunction directing future litigation. Were the District
Court to grant this relief, it could “readily be interpreted as
reflecting negatively upon the state court’s ability to enforce
constitutional principles.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592, 604 (1975). This is precisely the type of case suited to

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6To the extent that Lazaridis seeks a declaration that the
Delaware courts violated the UCCJEA and the UIFSA, as
adopted by Delaware, this alleged violation is one of state law.
Although Lazaridis asserts due process violations, we do not
construe the alleged misapplication of state law as violative of
substantive federal due process. The constitution does not
guarantee that the decision of state courts shall be free from
error. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299
(1937). As explained by the Supreme Court, “[w]e have long
recognized that a ‘mere error of state law’ is not a denial of due
process.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21 (1982).
11
Younger abstention, as the state proceeding implicates the
important state interest of preserving the state’s judicial system.6
Because all elements of the three-prong test for Younger
abstention are met, we hold that the District Court properly
dismissed Lazaridis’s first claim, albeit on different grounds..
(2)
Lazaridis’s second claim, which he seeks to reopen in the
name of his daughter, asserts that the registration of the French
orders violated his daughter’s rights because the Delaware
courts did not apply Greek law, the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child (which the United States has not
ratified), or appropriately apply the “best interest of the child”
standard under Delaware law. Because Lazaridis may not
represent his child in federal court as a non-lawyer parent, Osei-
Afriye v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 877
(3d Cir. 1991), we will dismiss the appeal as to this claim.

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(3)
Lazaridis’s third claim asserts that his former wife and
her attorneys conspired to violate his civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. A claim brought under § 1983 can only be
sustained if the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of a federal
constitutional or statutory right while acting under color of state
law. Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir.
2006). Lazaridis has failed to set forth facts suggesting that the
defendants are state actors or acted under color of state law. See
Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F3d. 789, 806 (3d Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, this claim has no legal merit and the District Court
appropriately dismissed it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
III.
Given our preceding discussion, we agree with the
District Court that it was unnecessary to provide Lazaridis with
an opportunity to amend his complaint because any amendment
would have been futile. Cf. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). Further, we
conclude that the District Court appropriately denied Lazaridis’s
outstanding motions as moot.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s October 30, 2008 and January 14, 2009 orders.

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