United States of America v. Latacha Renee Thompson

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-1609
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LATACHA RENEE THOMPSON,
Appellant.
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00251-2)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 24, 2009
Before: BARRY, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges,
(Filed: September 29, 2009)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Latacha Renee Thompson appeals the judgment of conviction, entered against her
by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, for interstate
transportation in aid of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).

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Thompson alleges that police violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping and searching
her car without reasonable suspicion. Because the police did have reasonable suspicion,
we will affirm.
I. Background
On May 14, 2007, Keith Kierzkowski, a special agent in the Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania office of the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), received a call
from a confidential informant. The informant, who had provided Kierzkowski with
reliable information in the past, told him that Thompson and Duwanna Robinson planned
to drive to Georgia in a rental car to purchase cocaine. The informant also told
Kierzkowski when and where Thompson planned to pick up Robinson.
Kierzkowski and two other DEA agents went to the location specified by the
informant and observed Thompson pick up Robinson in a rental car. They followed the
car as it made various stops but, eventually, Thompson sped up and Kierzkowski and his
fellow agents lost sight of her vehicle. Knowing the road Thompson had turned onto,
Kierzkowski radioed ahead to Pennsylvania State Trooper Tony Todaro, explained the
situation, and asked him to pull the vehicle over.
Todaro stopped Thompson’s vehicle for speeding and issued her a warning.
During the course of the stop, Todaro received Thompson’s permission to search the
rental car. He found $25,000 in currency packaged in 25 individual bundles. The
currency was seized, and Thompson was permitted to leave.

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On June 13, 2007, the informant called Kierzkowski and told him that Thompson
and a man named Clifford Bradley had rented a car at the Harrisburg Airport and driven it
to Philadelphia, where they had boarded a flight to Georgia. The informant also said that
Thompson and Bradley would be returning to either Philadelphia or Harrisburg by train
with a large quantity of cocaine. After speaking with the informant, Kierzkowski
contacted rental car companies in Harrisburg and confirmed that Thompson and Bradley
had rented a car. He also verified that they had taken a flight from Philadelphia to
Atlanta, Georgia, and he located the rental car they had parked at the Philadelphia airport.
Kierzkowski coordinated surveillance of the vehicle, and, on June 15, he observed
Thompson and Bradley return to it, place luggage in the trunk, and leave the airport. He
then followed the vehicle from the airport and eventually radioed Todaro and another
state trooper, Brian Overcash, with the information he had about Thompson and Bradley.
The troopers waited for the car on the Pennsylvania Turnpike and pulled it over after
determining that it was going 75 miles an hour in a 65 mile an hour zone. Overcash
approached the vehicle, which was being driven by Thompson, and informed the
occupants that they had been stopped for speeding.
After issuing Thompson a warning for speeding, Overcash asked if Thompson and
Bradley would answer a few questions. At that point, Todaro approached and Thompson,
who recognized Todaro from their previous encounter, became agitated. The troopers
asked for permission to search the car. Thompson and Bradley denied their request. The

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troopers then called a detective with a drug dog to do an exterior scan of the vehicle.
The detective arrived within minutes, and, during the exterior scan of the vehicle, the dog
alerted to the scent of drugs. The troopers handcuffed Thompson and Bradley, placed
them in the back of the police vehicle, and applied for a warrant to search the rental car.
The warrant issued and police found eight ounces of cocaine in the car.
On June 20, 2007, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Thompson and
two co-defendants with conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or
more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Thompson brought a
motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of the rental car on June 15,
2007, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle and perform
an exterior scan with a drug dog. After a hearing, the District Court denied Thompson’s
motion to suppress, and she agreed to plead guilty to two counts of interstate travel in aid
of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). In her plea agreement,
Thompson preserved the right to appeal the District Court’s denial of her motion to
suppress.
Thompson was sentenced to 51 months in prison, 26 months for Count 1 and 25
months for Count 2, with the terms to run consecutively. She filed a timely appeal of her
conviction, and, on appeal, renews her argument that the troopers lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop her car and conduct an exterior scan with a drug dog.

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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have1
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In considering the District Court’s denial
of Thompson’s motion to suppress, we review the District Court’s factual findings for
clear error and exercise plenary review over its application of the law to the facts. United
States v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2009).
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II. Discussion 1
The Fourth Amendment permits police officers to stop vehicles briefly for further
investigation when they have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.
United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 999 (3d Cir. 2008). During these brief
investigatory stops, officers may use dogs trained to detect narcotics. See Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (“A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful
traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no
individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
In determining whether officers had reasonable suspicion, we look at the totality of
the circumstances from the officers’ viewpoint and ask whether they had a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting that the individuals they stopped were engaged in
criminal activity. Mathurin, 561 F.3d at 174. When officers conduct an investigatory
stop based on information provided by another officer, our inquiry focuses on whether the
officer who provided the information had reasonable suspicion. United States v. Brown,
448 F.3d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 2006). When an investigative stop is made primarily on the
basis of a tip from an informant, we consider both the reliability of the informant and the

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content of the tip in determining whether the tip was sufficiently reliable to create
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, 560 (3d Cir. 2006).
In this case, a confidential informant told Kierzkowski that Thompson and Bradley
had rented a car in Harrisburg, driven it to Philadelphia, flown to Atlanta to purchase
cocaine, and would be returning to Philadelphia or Harrisburg by train. The informant
had provided Kierzkowski with reliable tips in the past, including information about
Thompson that had only a month earlier led to the seizure of $25,000. In addition,
Kierzkowski was able to verify several details from the most recent tip, including that
Thompson and Bradley had rented a car in Harrisburg, had driven it to Philadelphia, had
taken a flight to Atlanta, and were returning to Philadelphia by Amtrak train. Given
Kierzkowski’s previous dealings with the informant and his corroboration of details from
the tip, we conclude that Kierzkowski clearly had reasonable suspicion that Thompson
was involved in criminal activity. Accordingly, the brief investigatory stop that Overcash
and Todaro conducted based on information they received from Kierzkowski did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
III. Conclusion
Because the officers had reasonable suspicion, we will affirm the District Court’s
decision to deny Thompson’s motion to suppress.

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