Catherine Walsh v. John M. Quinn

ALD-074 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3411
___________
CATHERINE WALSH,
Appellant
v.
JOHN M. QUINN; FRANCIS J. KLEMENSIC; DENNIS P. BORCZON; MARTIN
ACRI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00167)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and IOP. 10.6
December 17, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 29, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Catherine Walsh appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of her civil
suit. For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm.

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The opinion affirmed based on the District Court’s second finding and not on its1
Rooker-Feldman holding.
2
In 2000, Walsh filed a medical malpractice suit in Pennsylvania state court. Judge
John A. Bozza presided over the case, and John Quinn and Francis Klemensic represented
defendants Dennis Borczon, M.D., and St. Vincent Health Center. The suit ended when
the court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In November 2007, Walsh
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, alleging that Quinn and Klemensic conspired with Bozza to interfere with
her due process rights. Acting on Quinn and Klemensic’s motion, the District Court
dismissed the case, first determining that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, and second finding that Walsh’s conspiracy claims failed inasmuch as she did
not plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that Quinn and Klemensic could be treated as
having acted “under color of state law.” Walsh appealed, and we affirmed. Walsh v.
Quinn, 327 F. App’x. 353 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished).1
Walsh filed the current action in July 2009, alleging that defendants violated her
procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)(3), and 42
U.S.C. § 1986. Specifically, Walsh alleged that Appellees conspired with Judge Bozza to
dismiss her 2000 medical malpractice suit in order to benefit Judge Bozza’s daughter.
According to Walsh, Judge Bozza’s daughter worked for a medical clinic which provided

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her with prenatal care from 1998 to 2006. The District Court sua sponte dismissed her
lawsuit with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
Walsh filed a timely motion for reconsideration but the District Court denied it. Walsh
then filed a timely notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction over final orders of the District Court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. Our standard of review of the District Court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
plenary. Atkinson v. LaFayette College, 460 F.3d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 2006). In reviewing
the District Court’s judgment we “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). We
summarily affirm an order of the District Court “when ‘no substantial question’ is
presented by the appeal.” United States v. Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 190 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000)
(per curiam) (citation omitted).
We agree with the District Court that the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion bar Walsh’s claims against Appellees. The principle of claim preclusion bars
claims that were brought, or could have been brought, in a previous action. In re
Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). The doctrine bars a suit where three
circumstances are present: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2)
the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of

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action.” Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991). “The
prerequisites for the application of issue preclusion are satisfied when: 1) the issue sought
to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; 2) that issue [was]
actually litigated; 3) it [was] determined by a final and valid judgment; and 4) the
determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.” Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d
163, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2007). Moreover, under the modern doctrine of non-mutual issue
preclusion, a litigant may be prevented “from advancing a position that he or she has
presented and lost in a prior proceeding against a different adversary.” Id. at 175.
Here, for purposes of both claim and issue preclusion, there was a final judgment
on the merits in a prior suit. The District Court dismissed the 2007 action for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394, 399 n.3 (1981) (dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is
a judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes). The second element is satisfied
because the previous suit involved claims against Quinn and Klemensic. Third, the 2007
suit involved the same cause of action: a conspiracy to deprive Walsh of her procedural
due process rights during the earlier state-court litigation. Thus Walsh’s new suit against
Quinn and Klemensic was barred.
The result of the 2007 suit also satisfies the prerequisites for application of issue
preclusion to the conspiracy claims against Appellees Borczon and Acri. Namely, Walsh
is attempting to re-litigate the issue of whether her due process rights were violated

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during the 2000 medical malpractice suit. Under non-mutual issue preclusion, inasmuch
as Walsh had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the conspiracy issue and received a
judgment on the merits, that claim is now also barred against Appellees Borczon and Acri
as well. In any event, even if these claims were not barred by issue preclusion, we would
still affirm as Walsh failed to plead facts which would allow the District Court “to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citation omitted).
Walsh has filed a motion to disqualify all Pennsylvania judges and all judges on
this Court “due to bias and conflict of interest.” (Appellant’s Motion to Recuse at 1.) As
evidence of bias, she points to an opinion this Court issued in 2007 which cites her state
court case. There is absolutely no merit to Walsh’s argument that a citation in an
unrelated case requires recusal of any judge, let alone the judges of this panel, or the
entire Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Walsh’s motion is denied.
Accordingly, because this appeal presents us with no substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3rd Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.

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