Glenford Ragguette v. Premier Wines

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-2449
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GLENFORD RAGGUETTE,
Appellant
v.
PREMIER WINES AND SPIRITS, LTD
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Appeal from the District Court
of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. Civil No. 1-06-cv-00173)
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 14, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: April 19, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Glenford Ragguette, brought an action against Appellee, Premier Wine
& Spirits, Ltd., in the District Court of the Virgin Islands alleging, among other things,
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. On January 5, 2010 the District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Premier. Ragguette failed to file a notice of

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appeal of the summary judgment within thirty days of the judgment, as prescribed by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a). On March 2, 2010, fifty-nine days after summary judgment had
been granted, Ragguette filed a timely motion for an order granting an extension of time
to file a notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5).1 The District Court denied
Ragguette’s motion in an order issued on May 14, 2010. Ragguette filed a timely notice
of appeal of the May 14, 2010 order. We consider this appeal below. We will vacate the
District Court’s denial and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
As a threshold matter, we discuss the disputed issue of whether this Court has
jurisdiction over Ragguette’s appeal. We find that we do. The denial of a Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(a)(5) motion for extension of time to appeal is a final order for purposes of appeal. See
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 153 (3d Cir. 2005). Ragguette filed a
timely notice of appeal of the May 14, 2010 order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(5)
motion. Ragguette’s failure to file a notice of appeal of the underlying January 5, 2010
order entering summary judgment is inconsequential for purposes of determining our
jurisdiction over the Rule (4)(a)(5) motion. Nor has Ragguette’s ability to take advantage
of a reversal here been affected by his failure to file a notice of appeal of the underlying
judgment because, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(5)(C), if his motion for extension of time is
1 Within the same motion, Ragguette also requested an Issuance of Order Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e). He appeals the denial of that portion of the motion as well. The
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e) portion of the motion, however, is irrelevant as there was no basis
for the District Court to make Rule 58(e) order because Premier never filed the
appropriate motion for fees and costs pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), as required by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e) to extend the time for appeal.

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granted on remand he will have up to fourteen days after the date of the order granting
the motion to file a notice of appeal of the underlying judgment.2
As jurisdiction is not an issue, our focus shifts to the substance of the matter. We
review a trial court’s denial of a motion for extension of time under Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(5) for abuse of discretion measured against the analysis that is required by virtue of
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship,
507 U.S. 380 (1993). Cf. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Larson, 827 F.2d
916, 918 (3d Cir. 1987). In Pioneer, the Supreme Court articulated the standard for
finding excusable neglect in the context of the bankruptcy rules. This Court has applied
the Pioneer standard for finding excusable neglect outside of the bankruptcy context,
including our specific application of the Pioneer standard when making an excusable
neglect determination in the context of a Rule 4(a)(5) motion for extension of time. See
In re Diet Drugs, 401 F.3d at 153-54. The determination of whether neglect is excusable
“is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding
the party's omission.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. Pioneer provides four factors to
consider when making this equitable determination: (1) the danger of prejudice to the
2 Prior to 1979, extensions of time under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(C) were limited to the
thirty days after the expiration of the original appeal time. As a result, some courts found
that in order to appeal the denial of a Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) motion for extension of time,
the appellant must have also filed a notice of appeal of the underlying judgment within
the sixty-day window prescribed for extensions. See In re Orbitec, 520 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.
1975). In 1979, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(C) was amended to allow for extensions of time
up to ten (now fourteen) days after a Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) motion is granted. In pointing
to In re Orbitec as a source of confusion, the Advisory Committee Notes indicate that this
expansion was meant to expel the requirement of filing a notice of appeal of the
underlying judgment prior to challenging the denial of a Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) motion. See
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) advisory committee’s note (1979).

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non-movant; (2) the length of the delay and the impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the
reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the
movant; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. Id.
Here, the District Court disposed of Ragguette’s motion “without an opinion,
without a reason, and more importantly, without reference to the Pioneer four-factor
balancing standard.” In re Diet Drugs, 401 F.3d at 154. In doing so, the District Court
abused its discretion. Id. We therefore vacate the District Court’s denial of Ragguette’s
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Notice of Appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5),
and remand the case to the District Court to analyze whether the neglect at issue in this
case was excusable under the Pioneer standard.3
3 Ragguette urges us to re-assign this matter to a different judge, but we have confidence
that the District Court will engage in an appropriate analysis of the Pioneer factors on
remand.

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